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Latin America’s Left Turn: El Factor Indígena 
The Role of Indigenous Social Movements in Latin America’s Left Turn  
Abstract 
This thesis examines the emergence of the left in Latin America at the turn of the 
century. In particular, it examines Latin America’s ‘left turn’ in light of the 
mobilisation of indigenous social movements in the region during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. It is argued that indigenous movements entered into a political alliance 
with leftist parties in the lead up to the left turn in their respective countries. This 
alliance was predicated on the agreement that indigenous movements would mobilise 
support for the left within their social bases in return for prospective compensation 
from the left. This compensation came in the form of a promise by the parties to 
implement policies addressing indigenous demands if elected. It is argued that 
indigenous movements were ideologically compatible with the left based on other 
policies too, such as the redistribution of wealth and alleviation of inequality.  
Ultimately, the thesis finds that indigenous movements provided a valuable base of 
support for the left in Bolivia and Peru in particular. This can help to explain the 
electoral success of the left in some cases, thereby contributing to the scholarship on 
Latin America’ Left Turn. It is also suggested indigenous movements are more likely 
to support the extreme or ‘contestatory’ variants of the left rather than moderate forms 
which are less likely to implement radical redistributive policies and constitutional 
reform. In this way, the research contributes to the secondary puzzle that has emerged 
within the literature on Latin America’s left turn concerning the variation in the types 
of left which have emerged.  
Although the support by movements does not exclusively explain the emergence of 
the parties studied here, it was nonetheless an important contribution to their success. 
It is in this way that the thesis provides a missing piece of the puzzle of Latin 
America’s left turn. I term this missing piece ‘el factor indígena’, or the indigenous 
factor.  
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Introduction 
Latin America’s Left Turn: El Factor Indígena 
The emergence of new political and alternative movements despite their scant 
participation in [traditional] political life marks the start of a new way of conducting 
politics which responds to the legitimate demands of the marginalized majorities. 
— Juan del Granado, Mayor of La Paz, 
Bolivia1 
Introduction  
At the turn of the century Latin America underwent an electoral shift to the left. In 
1997, James Petras wrote that the left in Latin America was “staging a major 
comeback” (Petras, 1997: 1). By 2009 almost two-thirds of the region was under 
some form of left-leaning government (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). The ‘left turn’ 
was “unprecedented” and “striking” in terms of its breadth and depth across the 
region (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011: 1; Weyland et al., 2010: 1). The electoral success 
of the left has stimulated much interest in the region, resulting in a significant body of 
work exploring its emergence and performance (see Blanco and Grier, 2013; Flores-
Macías, 2012; Levitsky and Roberts, 2011; Cameron and Hershberg, 2010; Weyland 
et al., 2010; Lievesley and Ludlam, 2009; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2009; Barrett et al., 
2008; Seligson, 2007; Roberts, 2007; Cleary, 2006; Castañeda, 2006; Schamis, 2006; 
Panizza, 2005). Although diverse in their analysis, these scholars agree that the rise of 
the left in Latin America since the turn of the century is “incontrovertible” (Beasley-
Murray et al., 2010: 2).  
The left turn is important because it signalled not only a change in government in the 
region, but also a change in how the region would be governed (Levitsky and Roberts, 
2011). While neoliberal reforms implemented by conservative regimes dominated the 
region during the 1980s and 1990s, the left  turn “ushered in a new era of policy 
experimentation in which governments expanded their developmental, redistributive, 
and social welfare roles” (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011: 2). The extent to which leftist 
governments pursue these policies depends on ‘how left’ the respective government 
is. Indeed, much of the more recent debate on the left is centred on understanding the 
                                                          
1
Vanden (2007: 17).  Juan del Granado was Mayor of Bolivia from 2001 to 2010. 
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variation in the types of left which have emerged there (see Wiesehomeier, 2010; 
Weyland et al., 2010; Cameron, 2009; Weyland, 2009; Vargas-Llosa, 2007; Lynch, 
2007; Leiras, 2007; Castañeda 2006). This discussion was sparked by Castañeda’s 
(2006) seminal piece ‘Latin Americas Left Turn: The Tale of Two Lefts’ in which he 
distinguishes between a radical left, henceforth termed the contestatory left, and a 
moderate left. Consequently, explaining the variation in the types of left which have 
emerged during this time has become somewhat of a secondary puzzle within the 
literature on the left turn. Accordingly, my central research question is; what explains 
the emergence of the left in Latin America at the turn of the Century? In addition, a 
secondary research question is; what explains the variation in the types of left which 
have emerged during the left turn?  
This study hypothesises that the mobilisation of indigenous social movements during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s may explain support for the left at the turn of the 
century.
2
 Specifically, it is argued that these movements acted as a central base of 
support for the left in the region, and that the variation in the level of their 
mobilisation may, in turn, explain the variation in electoral support for the left. The 
reasoning here is that the more mobilised a movement the more effective it is at 
mobilising its social base in support of a party. Therefore, we expect to see that the 
higher the level of mobilisation, the more electoral support for the left. This is 
especially the case where indigenous populations represent a substantial proportion of 
the population, and thereby providing a considerable base of support for the left. 
Therefore, while the principal independent variable is indigenous movement 
mobilisation, it is interacted with levels of indigenous population. It is anticipated that 
support for the left is highest where indigenous movement mobilisation and 
population are also high. It should be noted however that a key component of the 
argument is that high population alone does not guarantee support for the left; rather it 
is the mobilisation of the movements which is central.  
The thesis investigates the central research question by exploring the role of 
indigenous movements in the left turn, termed here as ‘el factor indígena’ (the 
indigenous factor). Moreover, it is argued that if given the choice between the 
moderate and contestatory left, indigenous movements are more likely to support the 
                                                          
2
 As will be addressed in Chapter 1, the left turn is considered to have begun with the election of 
President Hugo Chávez in 1998.  
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latter with which they have a strong ideological congruence. It is suggested then, that 
variation in indigenous movement mobilisation may also help to explain the variation 
in the types of left which have emerged during the left turn. 
The argument is tested using a mixed-method approach in which both quantitative 
and qualitative methods are employed. Firstly, a quantitative study is used to explore 
the general relationship between the variation in indigenous movement mobilisation 
and variation in electoral success of the left across the region. This is supplemented 
by in-depth comparative case studies which focus on the Andean region of Latin 
America and the countries of Bolivia and Peru in particular. The case studies 
investigate the relationship between indigenous social movements and leftist parties 
through original field interviews with movement and party members. The goal of this 
dissertation is to address the central research question, and indeed the secondary 
question regarding the type of lefts which have emerged in a way that provides an 
original contribution to the literature on the left in Latin America. More generally 
however, the research seeks to provide a more comprehensive understanding of 
movement-party relations which although explored in a Latin American context here, 
can be applied more generally in other regions.  
The puzzle: ‘The Left Turn’ 
The left turn began with the election of former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in 
1998 (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). During the 2000s there was a surge of leftist 
presidents elected across the region from Ricardo Lagos in Chile, elected in 2000, to 
Mauricio Funes in El Salvador, elected in 2009 (see Table 1 below for full list of 
elected leftist leaders since 1998). Indeed, the percentage of right-wing Latin 
American presidents dropped from 64 per cent during the 1990s to 33 per cent from 
2005 to 2008 (Blanco and Grier, 2013). While leftist governments certainly existed 
prior to this ‘turn’, for example the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) 
in Nicaragua held power from 1979-1990, “never before in Latin America have so 
many countries been governed by the presidents of the left” (Seligson, 2007: 81). The 
re-election of leftist presidents such as Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva  in Brazil (2006), 
Evo Morales in Bolivia (2009) and more recently Rafael Correa in Ecuador (2013) 
and Michelle Bachelet demonstrates the continued support for the left in some cases.  
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Table 1: Leftist Presidents of Latin America (1998-2013) 
 
Country 
 
Party President Year Elected (re-elected) 
 
Venezuela  
 
Fifth Republic 
Movement/United 
Socialist Party of 
Venezuela  
 
Gran Polo Patriótico (GPP) 
 
Hugo Chávez 
 
 
 
 
Nicolás Maduro 
 
1998; re-elected in 2000, 
2006, 2012 
 
 
 
2013 
 
Chile 
 
Chilean Socialist Party 
(PSCh) 
 
Ricardo Lagos 
 
Michelle Bachelet 
 
2000 
 
2006 
 
Brazil 
 
Workers party (PT) 
 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 
 
Dilma Rousseff 
 
2002; re-elected in     2006 
 
2010 
 
Argentina 
 
Justicialista Party (PJ) 
 
Néstor Kirchner 
 
Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner 
 
2003 
 
2007; re-elected in 2011 
 
Uruguay  
 
Broad Front (FA) 
 
Tabaré Vázquez 
 
José Mujica 
 
2004 
 
2009 
 
Bolivia 
 
Movement toward 
Socialism (MAS) 
 
Evo Morales 
 
2005; re-elected in 2009 
 
Nicaragua 
 
Sandinista National 
Liberal Front (FSLN) 
 
Daniel Ortega 
 
2006; re-elected in 2012 
 
Ecuador 
 
Country Alliance  
 
Rafael Correa 
 
2006; re-elected in 2009 
and 2013 
 
Paraguay 
 
Patriotic Alliance for 
Change  
 
Fernando Lugo 
 
2008 
 
El Salvador 
            
 
Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front (FMLN) 
 
Mauricio Funes 
 
2009 
 
 
Peru  
 
Gana Perú 
 
Ollanta Humala Tasso 
 
 
2011 
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The left has also gained substantial political ground in unlikely places such as the 
archetypally conservative Mexico and Colombia where continued conflicts with leftist 
insurgencies act as a deterrent to leftist politics.
3
 The 2006 presidential elections in 
Mexico are considered among the “most contested” in the country’s history and 
resulted in the defeat of the leftist candidate López Obrador of Partido de la 
Revolución Democrática (PRD) to the right-wing candidate Felipe Calderón of 
Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) by less than one per cent (IDEA, September 2006). 
Obrador’s defeat occurred amid allegations of electoral fraud which sparked a mass 
demonstration organised by Obrador and his supporting social movements to demand 
a recount (BBC, 2006). This illustrated the willingness of movements to mobilise in 
support of their chosen candidate even post-election. In Colombia, the left made 
significant progress by forming viable leftist opposition parties such as Polo 
Democrático Alternativo (PDA). In 2006, PDA candidate Carlos Gaviria Díaz came 
second in the presidential elections with 22 per cent of the vote (Pachón and Hoskin, 
2011). Ultimately, increased support for the left across Latin America in both 
presidential and congressional elections spurred a wide body of literature aimed at 
explaining the left turn. As previously mentioned, a subsequent body of literature has 
also emerged with the purpose of explaining the variation in the types of left which 
have emerged ranging from extreme to moderate left. 
In his seminal piece on the ‘Two Lefts’ Castañeda (2006) labelled the contestatory 
left as the ‘wrong left’ and the moderate left as the ‘right left’. The ‘right left’ is a 
reconstructed version of the socialist or “Castroist” left of the 1960s and 1970s which 
reinvented itself as a moderate left with “sincere” respect for and commitment to, 
democratic rules and institutions (Castañeda, 2006: 35). Leaders such as former 
president Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva (known henceforth as ‘Lula’) of Brazil typically 
represent this social democratic left. The “wrong” left on the other hand, is based on 
“good old-fashioned populism” (Castañeda, 2006: 31). Like its predecessors, such as 
Juan Perón in 1950s Argentina, leaders of the ‘wrong left’ use nationalistic rhetoric to 
mobilise the masses, appealing especially to the poor and marginalised (Castañeda, 
                                                          
3
Conflicts with Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo) or ‘FARC’ continue in Colombia. In Peru a 
conflict is considered as on-going with Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) despite the capture of the 
guerrilla movements’ leader Abimael Guzmán in 1992 which de-capacitated the organisation.  
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2006). Former Venezuelan President, Hugo Chávez and Ollanta Humala of Peru
4
 
embody this ‘wrong left’ (according to Castañeda, 2006: 31). Since Castañeda’s 
(2006) article more authors have adopted labels to distinguish between the ‘two lefts’. 
These range from; the ‘vegetarian’ versus ‘carnivorous’ left, ‘moderate’ versus 
‘radical’, ‘social democratic’ versus ‘populist’ and ‘moderate’ versus ‘contestatory’ 
(Vargas Llosa, 2007; Weyland, 2009;Panizza, 2005, Weyland et al.,2010).  
This study adopts the labels ‘moderate’ and ‘contestatory’ whilst recognising that 
variation exists between and within these groupings. The binary categorisation of the 
left however is the subject of much debate within the literature. For many, such strict 
dichotomies imply that there are “good” and “bad” countries which can potentially 
discolour analyses of the performance of these governments (Cameron, 2009:23). 
Understanding the left in stringent dichotomies can “make blunt instruments for 
analysis” and it is therefore more accurate to understand the left in the region along a 
broad ideological scale ranging from extreme left to centre left such as that devised by 
Wiesehomeier (2010) (Cameron 2009: 5). The author uses expert surveys to indicate 
the policy positions of Latin American presidents demonstrating their ideological 
variation from extreme left (1), to extreme right (20), as displayed on Figure 1 below. 
She illustrates how, when examined more closely, that those typically “lumped 
together” as either radicals or as moderates actually vary greatly within their 
categories of contestatory or moderate groups (Wiesehomeier, 2010: 6). For example, 
the governments of Evo Morales, Néstor Kirchner and Hugo Chávez are typically 
classified as the ‘wrong’ or ‘radical’ left yet Wiesehomeier’s results indicate that 
there is variation between the ideological positioning of these leaders. Understanding 
the variation within the left in the region is important for any study interested in 
examining the left turn. It is particularly important for this research because it directly 
relates to the secondary question as to whether indigenous movement mobilisation 
can also help to explain the variation in kind of left which emerged during the left 
turn. In this research I adopt the terms ‘contestatory’ and ‘moderate left’ but 
acknowledge the variation which exists across and within these types of left in the 
region.  
                                                          
4
 Ollanta Humala was considered part of the contestatory left during his 2006 campaign. By his 2011 
campaign however, he positioned himself as a center-left candidate and since his election is considered 
to have moved even closer to the center.  
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Figure 3: Latin American Presidents on a scale of Left-Right 
 
Source: Wiesehomeier (2010) 
The argument  
I argue that the mobilisation of these movements in the late 1980s and early 1990s is 
“intimately related” to the emergence of the left because they were a central political 
ally for the left at the turn of the century (Van Cott, 2007: 2). As a political ally, 
indigenous movements mobilised their social bases in support of the left in return for 
the implementation of policies addressing indigenous demands if elected. The 
movements are vital for the party because distrust towards institutionalised politics 
and parties within indigenous communities means that the party could not mobilise 
this base themselves. Rather, they rely on the movements and their leaders, who are 
trusted, to legitimise support for the party and mobilise their bases. In this way the 
movement acts as a necessary intermediary between indigenous constituencies and 
the leftist party which can generate support by legitimising the party within the 
community. Variation in levels of motivation matter because the more mobilised the 
movement the more effective it is in generating support within its base. Therefore, 
where movements are highly mobilised they have a greater capacity to mobilise their 
bases in support of a party and so we should expect to see higher support for the left 
in these cases. Conversely, where mobilisation of indigenous movements is low, they 
do not have the same capacity to mobilise their bases. In such cases we should see 
less support for the left.  
In conjunction with levels of mobilisation the size of indigenous population of the 
country also matters. There must be a substantial population so that, if mobilised it 
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can provide significant support for the party. Importantly, even where populations are 
low indigenous movements may still provide a base of support for the left, but 
primarily in local level elections. Ultimately, if we are to explain the variation in the 
emergence of the left at a national level we should fix the analysis on cases in which 
indigenous populations are substantial
5
, therefore holding this variable constant. This 
allows us to assess the impact of variation in indigenous movement mobilisation on 
the emergence of the leftist governments in the region. This argument is demonstrated 
on Figure 2 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Substantial population is considered in this study as those exceeding ten per cent of the total 
population. 
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Figure 4: The argument 
 
 
 
 
 
Highest support for the left.  
High levels of movement 
mobilisation in conjunction with a 
high population means movements 
have the capacity to mobilise a 
substantial base of support for the 
left. Where the party fulfils its 
promises to the movement once in 
power, we might even expect the re-
election of these candidates through 
continued support from the 
movements.  E.G. Bolivia and 
Ecuador. (Re-election Bolivia and 
Ecuador) 
Potentially high support for the 
left. 
If movements mobilise they could 
potentially provide a substantial 
base of support for the left because 
there is a substantial indigenous 
population. However, without the 
mobilisation of the movements it 
is likely that the indigenous base 
will remain demobilised.  
E.g. Peru  
  
Low Support for the left.  
Despite high levels of mobilisation, 
a low population means that the 
movements cannot generate a 
substantial base of support for the 
left. In such cases it is unlikely the 
left will enter into an alliance with 
the movements for national 
elections. However, we may see 
some relationship during local or 
municipal elections particularly in 
constituencies where indigenous 
populations are higher.  E.g. Chile 
Lowest support for the left.  
With a low indigenous population 
and low mobilisation, indigenous 
movements are not likely to 
explain support for the left should 
it emerge in these cases.  
E.g. Colombia 
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The first quadrant represents the first qualitative case study included in this research, 
Bolivia. In such cases, highly mobilised movements can generate substantial support 
for a party. Therefore we are likely to see movement-party alliances emerge here, in 
which a movement mobilises support in return for the implementation of policies 
relating to indigenous issues once in power. Moreover, where the party fulfils the 
promise of these policies we are likely to see continued support but where they do not 
we are likely to see the withdrawal of support for the party in future elections.  
The second quadrant represents the second case study explored in this research, Peru. 
In cases where indigenous population is high but mobilisation is low it is likely that 
the indigenous social base, without an intermediary between them and the party, will 
not mobilise in favour of a party. In such cases we are more likely to see clientelistic 
linkages between traditional parties, with more resources, and indigenous 
communities. However, given that the level of movement mobilisation can increase 
over time, and even between successive elections, support for the left is potentially 
high in these cases if mobilisation increases.  
The third quadrant represents a case in which the population is low yet movements 
mobilised to represent this base. For example, just 4.6 per cent of the Chilean 
population self-identified as indigenous in 2002, yet indigenous communities such as 
the Mapuche
6
 have formed movements and mobilised to resist neoliberalism and 
tourism polices which affect their territories (Funk, 2013). Despite high levels of 
mobilisation by the Mapuche the small size of their social base means they are 
unlikely to gain attention from parties looking for electoral support, particularly at a 
national level. However, relationships may emerge at the local level between party 
and the movement especially in constituencies where indigenous populations are 
higher. Alliances in these cases are more likely to be with contestatory leftist or 
indigenous candidates who are more ideologically congruent with the movement. 
Contestatory left parties are also more likely to support the indigenous cause than 
moderate candidates who may be concerned about isolating non-indigenous voters 
who represent a larger base of support. 
7
 
                                                          
6
 The Mapuche people represent over 90 per cent of the total indigenous people in Chile (Funk, 2013). 
7
 For example, the Mapuche movement in Chile has been in conflict with former President of the 
moderate left, Michelle Bachelet, and current conservative president Sebastián Piñera (Dudenhoefer, 
2010).   
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Finally, the fourth quadrant represents cases in which indigenous population and 
movement mobilisation are both low. Unlike the case of the Mapuche in Chile who 
are highly mobilised, this quadrant represents cases where populations are low and no 
movements have emerged. Therefore, it is unlikely that a movement-party alliance 
would emerge here because the indigenous social base does not represent a potential 
source of party support in terms of population size. Moreover, without a movement 
pushing indigenous issues, we are unlikely to see even local level support because 
indigenous issues are not politicised. For instance, in Colombia the indigenous 
population represents just two per cent of the total population, movement mobilisation 
is low and there is little support for the left (Inter-American Development Bank, 
2006).  
The case of Venezuela presents an outlier. The indigenous population is low in 
Venezuela (less than two per cent of the total population) and indigenous movement 
mobilisation is also low, therefore it should sit in the fourth quadrant with Colombia 
(Inter-American Development Bank, 2006). Venezuela however was ruled for over 
fifteen years
8
 by former President Hugo Chávez who embodied the contestatory left 
in the region. As stated in the fourth quadrant of Figure 2, indigenous movement 
mobilisation cannot explain support for the left in these cases because the population 
is too small and movements are not mobilised enough to politicise indigenous issues, 
even at the local level. Rather, the small indigenous movements and communities 
which do exist in Venezuela assimilate into the category of the poor, who were an 
integral base of support for Chávez. In this way indigenous movements in Venezuela 
mobilise along class rather ethnic lines and are a component of support for the left in 
Venezuela. Ciccariello-Maher (2013: 139) explains that peasant self-defence 
movements and indigenous people are among those who “have thrown themselves 
into the struggle not against Chávez but against the state he inherited”.  
Interestingly, this support is not predicated on a charismatic linkage centred upon a 
dedication to Chávez ‘the leader’. Rather it is based upon the ideals of his Bolivarian 
Revolution which is very much a class-based revolution.
 
Part of the Revolution is the 
condemnation of the right, and neoliberalism in particular, as well as a focus on the 
reintegration of the poorer classes into politics and society. Given that indigenous 
                                                          
8
 President Hugo Chávez ruled Venezuela successively from 1998 until his death in 2013.  
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people are among the “revolutionaries”9 rather than the “Chávistas” of Venezuela we 
can say that their support is also based upon an ideological congruence rather than 
simply the leadership of Chávez (Ciccariello-Maher, 2013: 139).
 
Therefore, 
indigenous communities in Venezuela are supporters of the left but they assimilate 
into the broader category of the poor and are less mobilised along ethnic lines than 
movements found in the cases of Bolivia, Peru or Chile discussed above.  
 
The relevancy of the study 
There are varying explanations for the left turn in Latin America. The one most 
relevant to this research is the suggestion that the mobilisation of social movements 
more generally provided a base of support for the left which contributed to their 
success. In Bolivia, Argentina and Ecuador, social movements “brought down 
unpopular governments” through mass protest which in turn created a political 
opportunity for the left (Boron, 2008: 234). The left “came to power on the back of 
these protests” and made electoral promises to address the core grievances of the 
movements, such as tackling the crisis of legitimacy, to implement bureaucratic 
reforms, to generate revenue and to increase transparency and accountability (Boron, 
2008: 234, Beasley-Murray et al., 2010).  
Indigenous social movements, while considered part of this broader category of 
movements, represent a particularly interesting stratum of support. In some cases, 
indigenous movements and their bases are considered as “the lifeline of the Latin 
American Left” and one of the strongest supporters of these parties (Vergara-Camus, 
2013: 1; see also Madrid, 2011; Lupu, 2009; Van Cott, 2007). However, there 
remains relatively little known about the nature of the relationship between the left 
and indigenous movements. With little empirical investigation into the relationship 
between indigenous movements and the left there remains a gap within the literature 
that is worthy of exploration. This research seeks to fill this gap by empirically 
investigating the role of indigenous movements in the left turn therefore contributing 
to the literature on the left. In addition, because I argue that indigenous movements 
are more likely to support the contestatory left I hope to contribute to the discussion 
on the variation within the types of left in the region, which acts as a secondary puzzle 
within the literature on the left turn.  
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 The “revolutionaries” are those who believe in the Bolivarian revolution rather than the “Chávistas” 
who are dedicated followers of Chávez ‘the leader’ specifically (Ciccariello-Maher, 2013).  
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Studies which contribute to our understanding of the left in Latin America hold some 
‘real-world’ importance in terms of the alleviation of inequality and democratic 
consolidation in Latin America. The focus of the left in the region is centred on the 
redistribution of wealth, alleviation of poverty and inequality and in some cases 
experimentation with more direct forms of democracy. The policies adopted by the 
contestatory left in particular have been the subject of much criticism yet their ‘radical 
experiments in social democracy’ also present an alternative route to tackling 
inequality and development (Lievesley and Ludlam, 2009). For instance, upon his 
death the United Nations commended Hugo Chávez, the embodiment of the 
contestatory left, for his “progressive policies” and “commitment to social justice” 
throughout his political career (United Nations News Centre 2013). By the same 
token, the persistent referenda held by these leaders to increase their powers 
jeopardises the already weak institutional foundations of many of these countries 
(Ellner 2012; Madrid et al., 2010). Interestingly, Luna (2010: 23), referring to the 
contestatory left in particular, claims that; 
“there is a lack of fieldwork on how these [leftist] parties and leaders built 
their electoral coalitions over time, how these coalitions are structured today, 
and what means were employed and challenges faced”.  
This study helps to fill the gap highlighted above by providing empirical evidence 
through field interviews that indigenous social movements were central political allies 
for the left in Bolivia and Peru. Furthermore, the research finds that in both cases 
these movements supported the contestatory left in particular, thereby offering insight 
into this puzzle. In doing so it provides an empirical contribution into the building of 
electoral coalitions by the left. The case studies also reveal the nature of these 
alliances today, thus highlighting the challenges facing the left in upcoming 
elections.
10
 The results indicate that where the left has failed to fulfil its promises to 
indigenous movements, their support is withdrawn and the party loses a central base 
of support for subsequent elections. This, in turn, presents an opportunity for 
                                                          
10
 Leftist Presidents face (re)elections in the following countries; Bolivia (2014), Brazil (2014), 
Uruguay (2014), Argentina (2015) and Peru (2016). Some leftist leaders have already been 
successfully  reelected for a third term such as President Rafael Correa in Ecuador 2013 while others 
are in the process of (or have successfully) made constitutional amendments to allow for their 
reelection for a third term such as Evo Morales in Bolivia and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in 
Argentina. 
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opposition parties of the right who since the mid-2000s have recognised the 
advantages of movement-party alliances. The right has intentionally harnessed the 
mobilisation capacity of other social movements. Since the late 2000s some of the 
“most powerful and organised civil society movements are organised by right-wing 
urban big business, agribusiness elites backed by substantial numbers in the private 
sector middle class farmers, retailers, civic associations, transport owners and 
professional organisations” (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2009: 22).  
Indeed, the election of President Sebastián Piñera of Chile in the 2009 highlighted 
that the “right has by no means disappeared” in the region (Beasley-Murray et al., 
2010: 3). Since then, some argue that a ‘new right’11 is (re)emerging in the region, 
which threatens the longevity of the left (see Bowen, 2011: Petras and Veltmeyer, 
2009). The increase in support for the right demonstrates the fragility of the left in the 
region, particularly as many leftist leaders approach the end of their terms in office. 
This study argues that the survival of the left depends on their ability to fulfil their 
electoral promises to the various social movements that helped bring them to power.  
Beyond the scope of the Latin American left, the study also seeks to contribute to the 
field of electoral politics more generally by investigating the role that movements can 
play in generating support for parties. Highlighting the mass mobilising capacity of 
movements for political parties offers an alternative electoral strategy for parties who 
might consider a movement-party alliance as a way to increase their vote share in 
elections. Indeed, providing evidence that social movements can be useful political 
allies may have some policy implications for parties wishing to ally with them. For 
instance, parties would need to incorporate the demands of these movements into their 
policy agenda in order to solidify the alliance. While some authors have explored the 
relationship between parties and ‘extra-parliamentary’ organisations such as social 
movements or trade unions, this remains a relatively understudied subject (please see 
Strøm, 1990; Rucht, 2004, Koelble, 1987 discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis). This 
research contributes to the literature on movement-party relations by providing insight 
into the nature of the relationship between indigenous movements and the left in Latin 
America in a way that is applicable to other cases with similar contexts.  
                                                          
11
 Bowen (2011: 106) loosely classifies the new right as those who associate with the “upper social and 
economic strata of society” and who pursue “pro-business” or “pro-market” political agendas.  
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Freidenberg and Levitsky (2006:178) note that the “contemporary literature on 
political parties pays insufficient attention to informal organisations” and the role it 
can play in politics more generally. The authors claim that in non-western party 
systems such as those found in Latin America for example, informal organisations 
such as movements can constitute the “meat” of party organisations by mobilising 
bases and delivering votes (Freidenberg and Levitsky, 2006:178). Party literature 
however tends to focus more on highly formalised party organisation in the West and 
consequently the role of movements as ‘extra-parliamentary’ organisers goes 
understudied. By providing an empirical investigation into informal organisations and 
political parties in a non-western context this research, may in turn be relevant for 
other cases within developing regions.  
Finally, an examination of movement-party relations also contributes to our 
understanding of party-society linkages. This is particularly pertinent for the case of 
Latin America where high levels of inequality and poverty have facilitated the 
dominance of clientelistic relations which greatly impact the quality of democracy in 
the region (Hilgers, 2012). I argue that the political alliance between the left and 
indigenous movements is based upon a strong ideological congruence on policy 
issues, and therefore has the potential to break down clientelistic relationships 
between party and society. This may have implications for other cases where the 
poorest sectors of society are traditionally engaged in clientelistic relationships with 
parties by providing a way to develop more programmatic relations which may in turn 
help to enhance the quality of democracy in such cases.  
The structure of the thesis   
Chapter 1 outlines prevailing explanations for the left and places my argument within 
this body of work. This chapter also outlines the theoretical framework upon which 
the argument that indigenous social movements can provide a base of support for the 
left is grounded. The chapter concludes with a summary of where my argument is 
situated within the literature and the way my research contributes to this body of 
work.  
Chapter 2 presents the causal mechanism and the research design employed in order 
to test the argument. The chapter firstly outlines the causal mechanism and the 
conceptualisation and operationalisation of the central variables. The mixed-method 
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approach used in this research is then discussed with particular attention given to case 
selection for the qualitative case studies. Finally, a brief discussion on the suitability 
of fieldwork for the study is addressed before offering expected outcomes.   
Chapter 3 presents the quantitative study in which the relationship between the 
support for the left and variation in movement mobilisation over the period 1990-
2011 is tested. Descriptive statistics on the central variables are also presented here. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the general relationship 
between these two variables before focusing on the qualitative comparative case study 
of Bolivia and Peru in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively.  
The case study chapters examine the relationship between indigenous social 
movements and the contestatory left in more detail and in the context of each country. 
In each case, a background to the country and the elections selected for study is 
outlined. Indigenous movements specific to each country are then discussed in terms 
of mobilisation levels and respective social bases. Finally, original field interviews 
conducted with both the movements and the left in each country provide the empirical 
evidence that the movements supported these parties in the respective elections. The 
results detail the ways in which the movements mobilised their bases in support of the 
party and the impact of this support. Each chapter concludes by outlining relations 
between the movements and parties discussed as they stand today.  
In the conclusion the results are discussed in light of the research question. The 
findings offer an original insight into the support of leftist leaders in Latin America 
whilst also highlighting the role social movements can play in electoral politics more 
generally. These implications will hopefully contribute to the field by challenging 
some of the traditional assumptions present in political party literature and social 
movement theory. The implications of the research reach beyond the literature 
however and the democratising role of movements is also revealed. Finally, the 
concluding chapter presents areas for further research in light of the findings. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review & Theoretical Framework 
 
Introduction  
This chapter outlines the literature in relation to the left turn in Latin America. The 
prevailing explanations for the left turn are addressed and I situate my argument 
within it this body of literature. I argue that indigenous movement mobilisation can 
help to explain the left turn because the movements provided a central base of support 
for the left. Accordingly, the second section of the chapter outlines the key literature 
used as a theoretical framework for this argument. The chapter concludes by situating 
this study within the body of literature addressed.  
1.1 Literature review  
Prevailing explanations for the left  
While there is no “single cause” for the left turn, many explanations are rooted in the 
economic, social and political failings of predominantly neoliberal incumbents, which 
became apparent in the early 1990s (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011: 7). These failings 
generated a discontent with the right, which the left used to their electoral advantage 
at the turn of the century. The discontent with incumbent regimes is considered the 
“lowest common denominator” in explaining the rise of the left in the region as it led 
to a backlash against the right in the late 1990s and a trend of retrospective voting 
emerged (Luna, 2010: 24: see Murillo et al., 2008; Panizza, 2005; Castañeda, 2006; 
Boron, 2008; Arditi, 2008). Disillusionment coincided with democratic consolidation 
and the institutionalisation of electoral competition in the region, which allowed the 
left to legally organise and compete elections for the first time since its repression by 
right-wing dictatorships beginning in the late 1970s
12
 (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011: 8). 
It is argued then that “the surge of left-wing electoral success, have their roots in 
earlier failures of right-wing politics and in the violent repression of the left in mid-
twentieth century Latin America” (Lievesley and Ludlam, 2009: 10). Ultimately, the 
combination of democratisation and the failure of the right in the late 1980s and early 
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The case of Chile in 1973 offers such an example. General Pinochet ousted leftist President Salvador 
Allende in a bloody military coup. Pinochet implemented a series of neoliberal reforms and the country 
became synonymous with the ‘Chicago Boys’ and the Washington Consensus.  
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1990s, created a political opportunity for the left at the turn of the century which 
explains the timing of the left turn.  
By the late 1990s the left in Latin America had reinvented itself as a ‘new’ left which 
distinguished itself from the old revolutionary left associated with Fidel Castro’s 
armed revolution in Cuba (1959), or Maoist insurgent movements like the Sendero 
Luminoso in Peru (Rodríguez-Garavito et al., 2008). This ‘new left’ was more 
concerned with the “ballot box” than with armed revolution and could therefore assert 
itself as a viable electoral alternative to the right (Petras, 1997: 22). Furthermore, the 
fall of the Soviet Union removed the geopolitical stigma of the left allowing the new 
left to emerge independently and without being labelled as another “Soviet 
beachhead” (Castañeda, 2006: 29). By the late 1990s, the left prepared to take 
electoral advantage of their newfound creditability and tapped into the prevailing 
dissatisfaction of the electorate by developing a “persuasive critique of the failures of 
democracy and neoliberalism in Latin America” (Luna, 2010; Panizza, 2005: 729). In 
this section of the chapter I outline three aspects of the ‘discontent’ explanation. The 
literature highlights that people were driven left by economic, social and political 
discontent with neoliberal incumbents. Importantly, these factors are not mutually 
exclusive but rather overlap and intertwine depending on the context of each country. 
More generally, they are the three key components of this central explanation for the 
left turn.  
Before outlining the roots of discontent it is important to clarify where I situate my 
argument within this explanation. The goal is to add to this explanation by providing 
insight into the indigenous perspective on discontent in particular. More specifically, I 
argue that indigenous people were among the most dissatisfied with neoliberal 
incumbents which drove them to support the left.  For example, during the neoliberal 
era indigenous rights were often unrealised and their access to health, education and 
social assistance was limited (Hall et al., 2006). Moreover, indigenous people 
remained the subject of labour market discrimination and unequal earnings with non-
indigenous people (Hall et al., 2006). The privatisation of land resulted in a 
significant loss of traditional indigenous territories due to the lack of constitutional 
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protection (Yashar, 2005).
13
 However, I also argue that the distrust felt by indigenous 
communities towards institutionalised politics meant that the parties relied on the 
movements to mobilise the indigenous bases in support of the left. Therefore, the 
movements were central in translating this discontent to electoral support. We now 
turn to the basis for economic, social and political discontent more generally and how 
it explains support for the left at the turn of the century.  
Economic discontent  
Neoliberal reforms were implemented throughout the region during the 1980s in 
response to the debt crisis when governments were forced to turn to international 
institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 
relief (Vanden and Prevost, 2009). This placed “unprecedented power in the Fund’s 
hand which it used to implement a rapid neoliberal market reform programme across 
the region” during the 1980s and early 1990s (Green, 1996: 109). Latin American 
governments began to implement structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) as a 
condition of their loans in the hope that it would control government costs and 
inflation (Vanden and Prevost, 2009). In some cases the pressure to control inflation 
caused countries such as Argentina and Mexico to overvalue their currencies (Kirby, 
2003). By the late 1990s another economic crisis hit the region and countries found it 
increasingly difficult to repay their external debt, forcing them to once again negotiate 
with economic institutions. The Mexican Peso Crisis
14
 in 1994 provided the first 
indication of the regions instability. During the early 1990s, Mexico was viewed as a 
“model reformer” in the region by the international market (Kirby, 2003: 62). It was 
the main recipient of foreign direct investment in Latin America at this time, and the 
economy was growing at an annual rate of 3.6 per cent (Griffith Jones, 2000; Martin, 
2000). In December 1994 however, the overvaluation of the peso by the conservative 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari government
15
 (1988-1994) resulted in an economic crisis in 
Mexico that forced the government to devalue the peso (Green, 1996). Within a year, 
GDP fell by seven per cent, foreign direct investment also “fell dramatically”, and the 
“banking system was severely weakened” (Griffith Jones, 2002). Similar crises 
ensued in other countries across the region in the late 1990s as a result of the failure 
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Indigenous land was sold to those within the logging industry, cattle ranchers and those exploring 
natural resources in the region.  
14
The peso crisis is also known as the ‘Tequila Crisis’ 
15
 President Carlos Salinas de Gortari was from the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI ) 
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of SAPS and the impact of the Asian crisis in 1997 on the region (Levitsky and 
Roberts, 2011).  
 
Neoliberal governments also failed to deliver on promises of increased growth, 
investment and employment. Growth rates remained unpredictable throughout the era 
of neoliberal consensus in Latin America. In most countries, economic growth 
remained below the six per cent level deemed necessary to tackle stark poverty and 
unemployment (which was rapidly increasing during this time) (O’Toole, 2011). 
Trade liberalisation led to a flood of imports into the region, which greatly affected 
local producers who could not compete in this market (O’Toole, 2011). This had a 
direct effect on indigenous people and campesinos
16
 that predominantly worked 
within the agricultural sector (O’Toole, 2011). Ultimately, where neoliberalism failed, 
support for the free-market model and those who implemented it dissolved (Levitsky 
and Roberts, 2011). In some cases however, such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and 
Peru, neoliberal policies increased growth and stabilised hyperinflationary economies 
and neoliberal governments were re-elected during the 1990s (Levitsky and Roberts, 
2011). This was more the exception than the rule and by the close of the century it 
had become abundantly clear that neoliberalism had failed in many countries across 
the region.  
 
The Argentine economic crisis of 2001 provides an example how the failure of 
neoliberalism, and ensuing discontent, contributed to the electoral success of the left 
there. President Fernando de la Rúa came to power in 1999 on a platform of change 
after the ten-year rule of Carlos Menem. Menem had borrowed extensively during his 
successive terms acquiring over $90billion in foreign debt alone (Katel, 2001, Kirby, 
2003). In addition Menem’s neoliberal policies such as the privatisation of public 
utilities, including electricity and telecommunications, had increased unemployment 
within these sectors (Katel, 2001). The economy began to stagnate within the first 
year of the de la Rúa presidency and revenues began to fall dramatically (Powell, 
2002). In 2000, the government was forced to negotiate a $40 billion lending package 
                                                          
16
 Campesino means ‘farm-worker’ or in some cases it is translated to ‘peasant’. However, the 
campesino identity is often intertwined with indigenous identity because the majority of farm workers 
in the highlands are indigenous. These highland workers will often identify as campesino in which an 
ethnic component is implied. Campesino is a term widely used within the literature (see Van Cott, 
2002; Yashar, 2005).  
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with the IMF (Powell, 2002). The government introduced a series of austerity 
measures including significant tax increases and £649million in spending cuts 
(Powell, 2002; Katel, 2001). In 2001, Argentina negotiated a further $30 billion debt 
exchange with the IMF and introduced a ‘zero deficit’ austerity bill which would 
drastically cut pensions and salaries (Powell, 2002). In April that year a political crisis 
led to the breakdown of the ruling UCR-FREPASO coalition, further jeopardising 
political stability (Dinerstein, 2003).
17
 Finally, in November 2001, $1.3 billion “fled 
the banks” and the central bank was left with a net reserve of just $1.7billion 
(Dinerstein, 2003: 191). The government restricted cash withdrawals to no more than 
$250 dollars per week and limited the transfers of funds abroad to $1,000 per month 
(Dinerstein, 2003). 
 
Under increased hardship, tens of thousands of people took to the streets of Buenos 
Aires in December 2001, proclaiming that they had “Enough!” of these reforms and 
called for the resignation of the President and dissolution of government (Dinerstein, 
2003). The feeling of discontent is best expressed through the demonstrators slogan 
“Que se vayan todos, que no quede ni uno solo” (“all of them [politicians] must go, 
not a single one can stay”) which they chanted outside the Presidential Palace in 
December 2001. President de la Rúa reacted to the protests by declaring a state of 
siege, which only encouraged more people to take to the streets and demand his 
resignation (Dinerstein, 2003). On December 21
st
 2001, state forces and 
demonstrators clashed in what is known as the “Battle of Buenos Aires” and President 
de la Rúa fled Argentina by helicopter (Dinerstein, 2003). The “spectacular collapse 
of the neoliberal experiment” in Argentina in 2001 led to the mass protests which are 
considered as “the iconic moment of this backlash against politics and politicians 
associated with the failures of neoliberal adjustment policies” (Boron, 2008: 234; 
Arditi, 2008: 65). The case of Argentina demonstrates how discontent with neoliberal 
incumbents resulted in a desire by the electorate to throw the ‘rascals’ out of 
government (Murillo et al., 2008).  
 
By the turn of the century then, Latin America was “swerving left” due to a series of 
“distinct backlashes” against dominant trends such as free-market reforms and the 
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 President De la Rúa came to power in 1999 under a collation made up of his political party Unión 
Cívica Radical (UCR) and Frente por un País Solidario (FREPASO).  
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failure of the incumbents to deliver on their promises (Castañeda, 2006: 8; 30). In this 
way discontent with free-market policies “paved the way for leftist leaders’ electoral 
victories” (Luna and Filgueira, 2009: 377). Accordingly, electoral volatility in the 
region is “driven by retrospective economic voting” (Panizza, 2005: 725; Arnold and 
Samuels, 2011). For example, Wiesehomeier and Doyle (2010: 15) use public opinion 
surveys from Latinobarómetro to measure the dissatisfaction of Latin American 
voters from 1997 to 2008 and find that there is “strong temporal coincidence” 
between the steady increase in unsatisfied voters and support for left-leaning 
candidates. The election of Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva in Brazil in 2002 provides an 
example of how neoliberal reforms under incumbents drove support for the left. For 
example, the privatisation of public services and state-owned enterprises by President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso resulted in high unemployment and in turn, “swelling of 
support” for Lula’s Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) (Rodríguez-Garavito et al., 2008: 
10). 
 
This argument of retrospective voting builds on the work of Panizza (2005: 725) who 
believes that support for the left can be best understood in terms of “loser alliances”. 
These alliances are comprised of a heterogeneous electoral base made up of 
traditional support along with some newer elements like the impoverished, the self-
employed and informal or unemployed workers (Panizza, 2005). It is the opposition 
to neoliberal incumbents which unites this heterogeneous base of support for the left. 
I argue that indigenous people and their movements are part of this base of support 
who feel aggrieved by the economic failings of neoliberalism. In particular, the 
neoliberal reforms failed to address issues of poverty and inequality which directly 
impacted indigenous communities already among the most marginalised in society. 
This is best understood by the societal discontent generated under neoliberal 
incumbents.  
 
Social discontent 
Neoliberal economic policies severely impacted poverty and inequality levels in the 
region. Huber and Solt (2004) find that countries which radically liberalised during 
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neoliberalism are associated with higher levels of poverty and inequality.
18
 
Specifically, more liberalised countries such as Argentina, Chile, Guatemala and Peru 
had higher levels of inequality by 1995 than the less liberalised economies (Huber and 
Solt, 2004). Countries that underwent episodes of drastic reform
19
 increased their Gini 
index nine times more than those who did not
20
 (Huber and Solt, 2004). Additionally, 
countries that underwent radical reforms are also associated with higher levels of 
poverty (Huber and Solt, 2004). 
Stokes (2009) argues that it is not simply neoliberal incumbents and the free-market 
model which motivated support for the left but the failure of these governments to 
appropriately ‘compensate’ the losers of this model which led to their downfall. That 
is, neoliberal incumbents failed to match the increase in trade liberalisation with an 
increase in public spending in areas such as social welfare and redistribution of 
wealth. Her argument is based on the assumption that globalisation creates losers and 
winners and that the State must keep the losers happy by redistributing benefits from 
the winners (Stokes, 2009). When neoliberal incumbents failed to redistribute the 
wealth to the ‘losers’ they reinforced inequality and generated a discontent with social 
policies. Interestingly, Stokes (2009) explains that while many moderate leftist 
governments continue to pursue some elements of the free-market model, most 
notably trade liberalisation, they do not suffer the same backlash because they 
compensate the losers through social policies. It was the proposal to implement such 
policies that “helped bring the left to power” (Stokes, 2009: 29). The new left took 
electoral advantage of the failure of the right to compensate the losers by re-
politicising inequality and poverty, using this as a central issue in their platform for 
change (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011).  
Castañeda (2006) also argues that inequality was a driver of support for the left who 
campaigned on this issue. However, he argues that inequality is an inherent 
characteristic of the region since colonisation and therefore we cannot say it alone 
explains the left turn. Rather the combination of continued inequality and 
democratisation through which the new left emerged as a viable political alternative 
                                                          
18
The authors use the General Reform Index (GRI) compiled by Morley et al. (1999) to measure the 
level of neoliberal reform in each country across the region from 1982-1995. 
19
These countries include; Peru, Bolivia Ecuador Guatemala and Brazil, Costa Rica, Paraguay, 
Dominican Republic and El Salvador 
20
 Uruguay, Chile, Venezuela, Argentina, Honduras, Colombia, Mexico and Jamaica 
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explains the left turn. He argues that “impoverished masses” will inevitably vote for 
policies that will make them less poor when given the opportunity (Castañeda, 2006: 
30). In Latin America, this opportunity arose when the left emerged as a viable 
opposition following democratic consolidation. Therefore, the left turn was an 
inevitable consequence of democratic consolidation because the “social, 
demographic, and ethnic configuration” of the region increases the likelihood of high 
levels of poverty and inequality and these issues are naturally congruent with left-
wing politics (Castañeda, 2006: 30). This is a somewhat tautological argument for it 
implies that once voting for a viable left alternative emerged (under democratic 
consolidation) the region was always going to swing left. While the author highlights 
the ideological congruence between the poor (such as indigenous people) and leftist 
politics, Castañeda fails to capture the casual complexities involved in the left turn. 
That is, if we assume that democratisation was the sole catalyst for the left turn then 
how can we explain the variation in support for the left, and indeed they types of left 
across a region? In this research I propose that the mobilisation of indigenous 
movements can explain this variation.  
For example, Debs and Helmke (2010: 232) find that while “inequality under 
democracy shapes the electoral fortunes of the Left”, mass mobilisation also has a 
positive effect on the left’s vote share. Furthermore, Levitsky and Roberts (2011: 8) 
explain that poverty and inequality created a new “potential constituency for the Left” 
which was made up of “a large pool of voters who are likely to be receptive to 
redistributive appeals” (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011: 8). I contribute to this 
explanation by proposing that indigenous people were among this new constituency 
motivated by the lefts policies to alleviate inequality and poverty. However, I also 
argue that this constituency was mobilised in favour of the left by indigenous 
movements rather than party members and for this reason mobilisation of movements 
also matters for explaining the left turn. 
While Latin America continues to have the highest level of inequality in the world 
Lustig (2009) finds that inequality is declining. Since 2002 inequality has decreased 
in twelve out of seventeen countries and extreme poverty has also fallen faster than in 
the past. The author claims that the declination of poverty and inequality has 
“coincided with the rise of leftist regimes in a growing number of countries (Lustig, 
2009: 1). Interestingly however, Arnold and Samuels (2011) find that at the micro 
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level, the number of Latin Americans who believe the distribution of wealth to be 
unfair or very unfair decreased by just three per cent between 1997 and 2007. The 
implication then, according to these authors is that, “leftist leader’s redistributive 
rhetoric has failed to resonate with citizens” (Arnold and Samuels, 2011: 32). The 
work of these authors provides an interesting insight into the potential endurance of 
the left as discussed in the introduction because it begs the question; if the perception 
among Latin Americans is that inequality remains high, will the electorate punish the 
left as they did the right in subsequent elections? I argue that, as indigenous people 
are among the most impoverished stratum of society, improved levels of equality 
matter to them and therefore to the movements which represent them. If we find that 
these movements are dissatisfied with equality levels they might withdraw their 
support for the left. Such questions will be addressed in the qualitative case study 
chapters.  
Political discontent  
Political discontent is rooted in weak democratic institutions and the failure of 
incumbent parties to provide representative democracy (Luna, 2010).  High levels of 
political corruption during this time compounded political discontent. For instance, in 
2000 the head of Peru’s central intelligence service, Vladimiro Montesinos was 
filmed bribing an elected congressman from the opposition party to join the right-
wing governing party of President Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000). The ensuing 
scandal further revealed the level of corruption within President Fujimori’s 
administration, who was forced to resign over the incident. Such levels of corruption 
were not limited to Peru. Findings from a Latinobarómetro survey in 2002 revealed 
that 31.4 per cent of respondents were aware of one or more cases of patronage
21
 
(UNDP, 2004). The poor performance of political parties is even recognised by 
political leaders themselves. For instance, in an elite survey with over 231 current and 
former leaders in Latin America conducted by the UNDP (2004) respondents did not 
feel that political parties fulfilled their roles in the region
22
. Not surprisingly, political 
                                                          
21
 Countries with a low level of awareness include Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and El Salvador. 
Countries with moderate levels include of awareness of examples of cronyism; Argentina, Costa Rica, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela and the two qualitative cases of this 
dissertation, Bolivia and Peru. Finally, cases where there is a high level of awareness of examples of 
cronyism include Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Mexico.  
22
 The survey included 41 presidents and vice-presidents across the region and was conducted between 
2002 and 2003. There were two exceptions Uruguay and Honduras. 
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discontent and the failure of incumbent parties to convert popular will into policies 
paved the way for “new leaders” who promised political renewal (Luna and Filgueira, 
2009:  377; Rodríguez-Garavito et al. 2008).  
Weak institutions contributed to the decline and in some cases the collapse of 
incumbents who in most cases represented the traditional parties in their respective 
countries. This created a power vacuum and political space for the left to emerge 
(Rodríguez-Garavito et al., 2008). A general phenomenon of voter detachment from 
traditional parties in the late 1990s “reflected a deep-seated crisis of political 
representation” in the region (Roberts, 2007: 11). As mentioned in the introduction of 
this chapter, economic, social and political discontent comprise the lowest common 
denominator in explaining the left turn and therefore these factors are often 
intertwined. This is true for the political crisis because it was intimately related to the 
“political fallout from the economic crisis which produced widespread anti-incumbent 
vote swings” and in turn “vacated” space for other political leaders such as populists 
and outsiders (Roberts, 2007: 11- 12). In Bolivia for example “the virtual collapse of 
the country’s traditional political parties created an institutional vacuum” that was 
“largely filled” by the left at the turn of the century (Bowen, 2011: 110). The attitude 
of external actors such as the US also contributed to the emergence of the left. For 
instance the “aloofness” of the US in the region post 9/11 created a power vacuum 
that provided a favourable setting for the left turn (Arditi, 2008: 67).  
Regardless of how this political space was created, the left occupied it by channelling 
economic, social and political discontent into their policies and translating it to 
electoral success. The politicisation of inequality, poverty and marginalisation were 
particularly effective weapons in the policy repertoire of the left. For instance, Blanco 
and Grier (2013: 78) explain that the left were able to “tap into widespread and deep 
discontent over voters’ feelings of political marginalisation” (Blanco and Grier, 2013: 
78). I contribute to this literature by arguing that indigenous people were among those 
most discontented with politics and therefore provided a base of support for the left. 
For instance, representation of indigenous people in parliament remains generally 
limited
23
 and according to indigenous activist and former Minister for Culture in 
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 The number of indigenous people in the lower or single chamber of the legislature in 2001–2002 
stood at: around 0.8 percent in Peru (one out of 120); 3.3 percent (four out of 121) in Ecuador; 12.4 
percent (14 out of 113) in Guatemala; and 26.2 percent (34 out of 130) in Bolivia (UNDP,  2004). 
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Guatemala, Otilia Lux de Cojti, democracy in Latin America is incomplete because it 
is mono-cultural in that indigenous people are not recognised by the state (UNDP, 
2004). Furthermore, political discontent is central to my argument because I contend 
that indigenous communities were so disillusioned with and marginalised by 
traditional politics that it took the work of indigenous movements to legitimise 
support for leftist parties and in turn provide a base of support for the left.   
In relation to the polices proposed by the left some authors are keen to highlight that 
the left turn is not only a backlash against neoliberal incumbents but is based upon the 
appeal of the policies of the new left beyond the marginalised. That is, the left, and 
the moderate left in particular offer appealing policies to the more general moderate 
voters in the region. Baker and Greene (2011) argue that Latin Americans are 
themselves becoming more moderate and the policies offered by the moderate left 
directly appeal to this section of the electorate (Baker and Greene, 2011). Such 
policies offer voters a chance to reject some neo-liberal reforms while maintaining 
others such as free trade agreements and therefore it only “partially” reverses market 
reforms rather than eliminate them which is unappealing to the moderates (Baker and 
Greene, 2011: 73). The implication of this argument is that support for the left in the 
region reflects a mass ideological shift to the left. Such a shift would mean that the 
left could maintain a core of group of voters “anchored on the left” upon which they 
could rely for future elections (Arnold and Samuels, 2011: 31).  
Seligson (2007: 87) finds however, that while there was a mass ideological shift to the 
left in the region between from 1996 to 2006 the “magnitude of the shift is small”. 
Other authors find that there was a substantial ideological swing to the left at the mass 
level in some countries
24
 between 1996 and 2008, but there was a decrease in 
identification with the left in others
25
, thus highlighting the variation in support for the 
left across the region (Arnold and Samuels, 2011). Indeed, Arnold and Samuels 
(2011) claim that because there is no evidence of a “dramatic ideological 
realignment” to the left at the mass level, the electoral swing to the left may be more 
“hype than substance” (Arnold and Samuels, 2011: 37-49). Rather, because the 
authors find that few Latin Americans identify as leftists, they claim that the left turn 
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Countries, which experienced an ideological swing to the left at the mass level, include Chile, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
25
 Countries, which experienced a decrease, include Brazil and Mexico. 
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simply signals the maturation of democracy in the region in which the electoral 
rotation of parties reflects the “normal workings of representative democracy” 
(Arnold and Samuels, 2011: 49). Discontent towards incumbents was the driver of 
this electoral rotation and indeed this has more to do with the failure of incumbents 
generally that would occur regardless of ideology.  
I argue that the simple rotation of parties and maturation of democracy does not 
sufficiently capture the complexities and variation involved with Latin America’s left 
turn and that the electoral shift to the left deserves further exploration in order to 
uncover these nuances. Moreover, the argument by Baker and Greene (2011) that 
Latin Americans are for the most part moderate and the success of the moderate left is 
rooted in their ability to appeal to them is based on general trends across the region, 
which fails to capture important distinctions across countries. More explicitly it fails 
to explain variation in support for the left (if most Latin Americans are moderate then 
why do we see variation within support for the moderate left?) and more pertinently 
the variation in the type of left which has emerged in different cases (from moderate 
to contestatory).  Accordingly, the chapter will now turn to literature relating to the 
secondary puzzle, namely, what explains the variation in the types of left which have 
emerged during the left turn? 
 
Prevailing explanations for the ‘Two Lefts’  
The current literature addressing the variation in the type of left which emerged is not 
very diverse but rather centres on the work of one author in particular. Weyland 
(2009; 2010) proposes two, non-mutually exclusive, explanations for the variation in 
the left. The first explanation is based on commodity booms which Weyland (2009: 
146) claims is a “crucial factor” in explaining the emergence of the contestatory left 
in some cases and not in others. This argument is based on rentier state theory in 
which the “bust-boom cycle of rentier states, especially in natural resource bonanza” 
such as oil or gas can help to explain the emergence of the contestatory left.  
Specifically, the sudden boost in revenue generated by the bonanza allows 
contestatory left governments to increase public spending and win mass support. 
Contestatory and populist leaders are more likely to incur bust-boom cycles than 
moderate leaders because they are greater ‘risk takers’ (Weyland, 2009). Where 
strong institutions do not control these leaders, they increase public spending thus 
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satisfying the electorate who will re-elect them (Weyland, 2009). The author 
explicitly states that “[i]t is not a coincidence that the contestatory left emerged in 
countries and time periods when there happened to be a greater economic latitude for 
pursuing ambitious goals” (Weyland, 2010: 21). He refers to the oil industry in 
Venezuela and the gas deposits discovered in Bolivia, which increased revenue in 
both countries
26
 (Weyland, 2010). Conversely, in cases of the moderate left, such as 
Chile and Brazil, there was no resource bonanza and these governments faced more 
economic constraints, which limited their capacity to make radical transformations 
(Weyland, 2010).  
Indeed, high growth rates in the mid-2000s allowed leftist presidents to redistribute 
wealth and increase public spending on new social programs allowing them to 
“govern” by delivering on their promises for increased spending in these areas 
Levitsky and Roberts (2011: 11). Those however, who have not experienced 
commodity booms must be more careful with their expenditure, thus restricting their 
ability to govern in the same way as those with natural resources (Levitsky and 
Roberts, 2011). Blanco and Grier (2011) find some support for this argument in their 
quantitative study where commodity booms in areas such as agriculture, mining and 
oil positively correlate with the probability of a leftist candidate winning the 
presidential elections.  
I argue however that commodity booms do more to explain the endurance of the 
contestatory left once in power, than how this left come to power in the first instance. 
Commodity booms generate enough revenue for the extreme left to implement their 
radical policies, often including redistribution of wealth, which appeases voters who 
re-elect them. This argument however only applies to those who are in power in the 
first place and have the power to implement redistributive policies using this extra 
revenue. Moreover, the commodity boom is not exclusive to ideological divides and 
we can assume that the right would take equal advantage of this revenue when in 
power. That is, while the contestatory left are more likely to rely on these commodity 
booms to implement their ambitious redistributive plans, there is no evidence to 
suggest that the right would not also use this surplus revenue to further their own 
policy agenda, and consolidate support among their own social bases. Furthermore, 
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the case of Brazil offers an example in which a state with large oil reserves has been 
governed by a moderate left since the left turn there in 2002 (The Economist, 2011). 
Perhaps the existence of these resources poses an opportunity for the contestatory left 
in Brazil if it were to emerge and gain power, though current Brazilian politics 
remains dominated by the moderate left and the centre. Ultimately, what the left 
might do if in power and indeed how electoral support may be increased or sustained 
is not the central concern of this research. Rather, the primary focus of this research is 
to provide an explanation for the variation in the type of left when it first emerged.  
The second explanation posited by Weyland (2010) is related to the previous 
discussion regarding discontent. The author argues that in cases of higher market 
reform failure, a stronger sense of discontent emerged that fostered an environment 
for extreme policies proposed by the contestatory left (Weyland, 2010). In Bolivia for 
instance, the continuing failure of market reforms by the late 1990s resulted in 
mounting criticism of neoliberalism and made way for contestatory leftist President 
Evo Morales in 2006 (Weyland, 2010). The contestatory left, which arose in both 
Bolivia and Venezuela “was born out of discontent with market economics” 
(Weyland, 2010: 20). Conversely, the moderate left emerged in Brazil and Chile 
because market reforms experienced some initial success which had a “de-radicalising 
effect” on the electorate (Weyland, 2010: 20). 
The level of discount however should be understood in conjunction with the level of 
party system institutionalisation (Weyland, 2010). For instance, discontent with 
economic reforms in the cases of Bolivia and Venezuela was compounded by poor 
governance, weak state functioning and growing corruption. In both cases, poor 
institutional structure and weak party systems disintegrated in the late 1990s resulting 
in the deterioration of the party system (Weyland, 2010). The combination of 
discontent with weak party systems provided the opportunity for new leaders and 
movements to emerge and use “fiery rhetoric and ambitious promises” to garner 
support (Weyland, 2010: 20). The emergence of the contestatory left was made more 
difficult in cases where strong and well-institutionalised party systems because such 
systems make it more difficult for new parties to emerge. The party system in Brazil 
for example, had stabilised by the early 1990s and existing parties such as the Partido 
dos Trabalhadores (PT) have established close ties with labour unions and civil 
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society organisations since their inception, making it difficult for a new contestatory 
left party to capture that support base (Weyland, 2010).  
Flores-Macías (2012) also highlights the importance of party system 
institutionalisation for controlling contestatory leftist candidates. He argues that the 
“type of economic policy conducted by leftist governments in the region is best 
explained by the degree to which the party system is institutionalised” (Flores-
Macías, 2012: 60). Where weakly institutionalised party systems are in “disarray”, 
anti-system candidates who espouse contentious politics, such as contestatory leftist 
leaders, are able to undertake more “drastic transformations” in economic policies 
(Flores-Macías, 2012: 63). Where systems are more strongly institutionalised insider 
candidates are more concerned with consensus-building politics and therefore do not 
adopt radical economic reforms but rather stick with the “status quo” (Flores-Macías, 
2012: 63). As with Weyland’s (2009) commodity boom argument however, Flores-
Macías (2012) explains more about the variation in the leftist leaders once in power 
than describing how they came to power in the first instance. 
The cases of Bolivia and Brazil used by Weyland (2010) above are illustrative of the 
argument that the weaker the party system the more likely the contestatory left will 
take power. However, if party system institutionalisation is what matters, the 
comparative case study used in this research poses an interesting question. For 
instance, when we measure the strength of the respective party systems using the 
Pederson Index of electoral volatility, we find that between 1980-1997 Peru was 
substantially more volatile than Bolivia yet the contestatory left emerged there later 
(2011) than in Bolivia (2006).
27
Moreover, since coming to power the contestatory 
leftist President of Peru, Ollanta Humala, has moderated considerably and rather than 
implementing radical leftist economic reforms as Flores-Macías’ argument suggests 
he might, Humala has been criticised for following a policy of neoliberalism. 
Therefore, Peru represents a case in which despite a weak, and highly volatile party 
system the contestatory left did not emerge until much later than other cases and once 
in power this left moderated substantially and was more concerned with keeping the 
status quo. Admittedly, Humala who had campaigned as a contestatory leftist 
candidate in 2006 and lost had shifted to the moderate left by 2011 when he was 
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elected. This explains why Humala has not pursued radical reforms since taking 
office. Nevertheless, the argument remains that Peru is a case in which the party 
system is highly volatile yet the contestatory left has not been successful.  
Party system institutionalisation alone cannot explain the variation in the type of lefts 
that emerged at the beginning of the left turn. Rather it should only be considered in 
conjunction with other factors such as levels of discontent as posited by Weyland 
(2010). Even within this argument however there is a failure to recognise that where 
there are high levels of discontent the masses are likely to be disillusioned with 
political parties and so rely on non-institutionalised actors to mobilise their bases in 
support of the party such as social movements. Therefore this study seeks to 
contribute to the secondary puzzle regarding the types of left which emerged in the 
region by highlighting the role played by movements, and indigenous movements in 
particular. The chapter will now turn to the theoretical framework through which the 
variation in the mobilisation of indigenous social movements can be argued to firstly 
help explain support for the left in the region, and secondly the variation in the types 
of left which emerged.  
1.2 Theoretical framework  
Blanco and Grier (2011: 8) note that “leftist political movements may have been 
sparked by increased mobilisation of indigenous populations”. I empirically 
investigate this claim by analysing the role of indigenous movements in particular. In 
order to justify how such an assertion can be made, we must consider the role social 
movements can play in providing a base of support for a party. The literature 
discussed here provides the theoretical foundation for the argument. In the second part 
of the theoretical framework I provide an overview of the literature which provides a 
basis for the argument that indigenous movements in particular provided a base of 
support for the left in Latin America.  
Social movements provide a base of support for a party 
The fundamental starting point for the theoretical framework is a discussion of social 
cleavage structure in Latin America. All societies divide or “cleave’ the electorate by 
gathering individuals into groups according to their different preferences (Roberts, 
2002: 9). Such preferences are informed by sociological factors, such as class, or in 
other cases, they are “constructed within the political arena through the competitive 
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interaction of alternative party organizations, programs, or leaderships without 
reference to pre-existing social divisions” (Roberts, 2002: 9). Social cleavages can 
provide a stable social base of support that parties depend upon for election (Dalton, 
1996). Dalton (1996: 321) explains how “[S]urvey research found that social 
cleavages exerted a potent effect on voting, especially class and religious 
differences”. In their work Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 320) explain that; “Differences 
between competing social groups provided the potential basis for political conflict, 
furnishing both a possible base of voter support and a set of political interests that 
parties vied to represent”.  The class cleavage in particular is “one of the most 
pervasive bases of party support” (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 32). This cleavage 
represents the losers and winners of society and is reinforced by issues such as 
un/employment, “inflation, social services, tax policies and government management 
of the economy” (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 32).   
 
This research argues that indigenous people form a base of voter support for the left 
by ‘cleaving’ along both ethnic (indigenous) and class (poor) lines. Indigenous social 
movements are important because they mobilise this base of support for the left. 
Dalton (1996) argues that ethnic cleavages are less prevalent in Latin America. That 
is, while ethnicity has “the potential to be a highly polarised cleavage”, because many 
Latin American societies are ethnically homogenous “the effect of ethnicity as overall 
predictor of vote choice is limited” (Dalton, 1996: 329). It can be argued however in 
cases where ethnicity is more heterogeneous and indigenous population high that 
ethnic cleavages can become prevalent. That is, the higher the indigenous population 
the more likely ethnic cleavages will matter. Lupu (2009) provides evidence that 
ethnicity is a “significant political cleavage” in the more ethnically heterogeneous 
countries in the region and Madrid (2004) claims that this cleavage can be a valuable 
source of support for the left in particular.   
 
Moreover, this research argues that there is often an overlap between class and ethnic 
identities among indigenous people in Latin America and consequently they can 
cleave along both lines, sometimes simultaneously. It is important to situate this 
assertion within the literature on social cleavage and party systems in Latin America, 
which is distinct from European systems, discussed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) in 
their seminal article ‘Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments’. Dix 
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(1989: 25) for example, outlines the contrast between party system emergence in the 
West and Latin America. In the West party systems evolved more or less 
incrementally: 
“with parties based on newly salient cleavages being added to the existing 
system, in time shunting aside parties founded on previously prominent 
cleavages, reducing them to minor party status, or interacting with them in 
complex ways, this has been the case only exceptionally in Latin America.” 
 
In Latin America, emergence of the party system can be described as “discontinuous”. 
It emerged more or less “de novo, usually after a revolution or long period of 
dictatorial rule, with few perceptible links to the pre-revolutionary or pre-dictatorial 
past” (Dix, 1989: 25). In this post-revolutionary era, most traditional conservative or 
liberal parties ceased to exist, “leaving no visible progeny” (Dix, 1989: 25).  
Ultimately, Dix (1989: 25) claims that: 
 
“rather than the European model of party development suggested by Lipset 
and Rokkan, whereby the principal differences among contemporary party 
systems can be traced to distinctive configurations of early cleavages (centre-
periphery, church–state, and landowners-commercial/industrial interests), 
variations among many of Latin Americas party system reflect divergent 
responses to the expanded political mobilisation of the last several decades.” 
 
Roberts (2002) also highlights the need to address the difference in cleavage 
formation between the West and Latin America. The author explains that while the 
foundation for cleavages existed, particularly in the sense of class cleavages, they did 
not consolidate the way they did in Europe. For this reason, we must understand 
cleavages in Latin America distinctively from other cases. The history of Latin 
America, such as the impact of neo-liberalism on the party system organisation for 
example should be considered when discussing cleavages in the region (Roberts, 
2002). The difference in cleavage structure in the region has, in turn, moulded party-
society linkages there. A discussion of party-society linkages is useful here because 
through them it is “possible to identify the different ways in which parties mobilise 
support and how these evolve in response to societal change” (Roberts, 2002: 15). I 
posit that because of distrust towards parties they could not mobilise support without 
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the movements, who acted as intermediaries between society and the party. Therefore 
it is important to understand party-society linkages in the region in order to observe 
how they changed over time and, in turn, how movements mobilised support in place 
of parties.  
There are a number of party-society linkages worth discussing here. The first is 
programmatic linkages which are historically weaker in Latin America than in Europe 
precisely because of the frailty of social cleavages structures (Roberts, 2002). For 
instance, socialist parties in Europe were able to articulate the interests of their base, 
the working class, in order to “build mass organisations to encapsulate their 
supporters” however without the same cleavage structures, Latin American parties did 
not emerge along programmatic lines, thus weakening this linkage. Patron-clientelism 
linkages are also important for this study, particularly given the persistence of 
clientelism in the region, especially within poor communities such as indigenous 
people.
28
 Such linkages are most likely to occur where there are “machine politics or 
parties” whereby a party has the resources to exchange material benefits for political 
support (Roberts, 2002: 15). In the case of Latin America, and Bolivia in particular, 
the “machine” was traditionally right-wing parties which had more resources to 
distribute gifts (Roberts, 2002). Linkages can also be personalistic or charismatic in 
nature which occur when leaders demonstrate a “special gift” inspiring the popular 
masses to place their confidence in this “messiah figure to direct a process of radical 
change or resolve a national crisis” (Roberts, 2002:19). 
Collective-based linkages are also important for this study because they occur when 
citizens become associated with a party through “membership in a party-affiliated 
social group or organisations, such as a labour union, peasant federation, or ethnic 
group” (Roberts, 2002: 15). In this way those affiliated with indigenous social 
movements establish a linkage with the party through the movement, which is useful 
for understanding the nature of party-society linkages in this study. Encapsulating, or 
participatory linkages are closely related to this because they “incorporate the masses 
directly into the political process beyond the act of voting” which “entails the 
construction of a party organisation with local branches or grassroots units that 
                                                          
28
 For a more comprehensive understanding of clientelism in Latin America and in poorer communities 
please see the work Hilgers, T. (Ed.). (2012). Clientelism in Everyday Latin American Politics. 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
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provide activism” (Roberts, 2002:16). These “party organs” are supplemented by 
“close bonds to mass secondary associations of workers or peasants, creating 
collective modes of association among groups defined by pertinent social cleavages or 
identities” (Roberts, 2002:16). Importantly, these linkages are more horizontal in 
structure with the parties relying greatly on the political labour of committed 
members (Roberts, 2002). This research demonstrates that some indigenous 
movements in Bolivia have established this kind of linkage with the left. Moreover, 
just as Roberts (2002:17) claims that in this linkage “parties thus help integrate 
society and socialise citizens to political life”, this research postulates that indigenous 
social movements fulfilled this role where the parties could not.  
The mobilisation of citizens by movements leads to a key component of this research, 
the role of social cleavages in the formation of social bases of support for a party 
(Roberts, 2002). These bases form social groups that enable parties “to formalise a 
basis of support” (Dalton, 1996:321). It is argued in this study that indigenous people, 
represented by indigenous social movements form a basis of support for the 
contestatory left. Explicitly, “[S]ocial groups could provide a political and an 
organisational basis for a party, furnishing members, funds, and the necessary votes at 
election times.”(Dalton, 1996: 321). For example, Christian democrats recruit 
supporters at Sunday Mass and social democrats use labour unions to muster up 
workers and support for the party (Dalton, 1996:321). This study adopts the literature 
on social cleavages and social groups as a basis for party support to argue that 
indigenous social movements represent a base of support for the left, thereby 
justifying an empirical investigation into whether the emergence of the left in the 
region was indeed “sparked” by the increased mobilisation of indigenous people 
(Blanco and Grier, 2011: 8).  
Cleary (2006: 39) argues that social movements in general can indeed provide a 
“structural base of support” for the left in Latin America. Furthermore he argues that 
such a base is crucial to the success of the left because “the left needs a mass-
mobilising capacity to translate latent and diffuse support into electoral success” 
(Cleary, 2006: 39). While this mass mobilising capacity was historically provided 
from within the labour sector, “in a few cases leftist parties have also relied on social 
movements, indigenous organisations, and other popular groups for mass support” 
“[emphasis added]”. I argue that in some cases leftist parties have relied on 
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indigenous social movements to provide this mass mobilising capacity and translate 
latent support into electoral success for the left. The case of Ecuador illustrates the 
role of indigenous organisations in providing this mass mobilising capacity where the 
“rapid growth of indigenous movements and their incorporation into the party 
system” has given Ecuador the “type of mass-mobilising capacity that is necessary for 
leftist victories” (Cleary, 2006: 39). The importance of these structural bases of 
support is exemplified by Cleary’s (2006: 39) assertion that while the exact form of 
mobilisation is different in each country, “the common theme is that leftist victories in 
the current wave have been built on pre-existing organisational structures that 
facilitate class-based mobilisation”. The term, ‘pre-existing’ is important to note here 
because it implies that the left’s success depends on whether organisational structures 
existed in the country before the left turn. That is, in cases where these organisational 
structures pre-existed the left is more likely to be successful because they have better 
access to a mass mobilising capacity. 
 
This assertion is based on the work of Roberts (2002) who distinguishes between 
labour mobilising and elitist party systems in Latin America. Roberts (2002) argues 
that two different types of party systems emerged in Latin America which drove the 
emergence of two different types of cleavage structure. The first is an elite party 
system, which led to a segmented cleavage structure in which the electorate divided 
across lines such as religion (Roberts, 2002).  In this system parties do not mobilise 
voters based on social distinctions but rather they “structure electoral competition by 
generating organisational identities, articulating alternative policy agendas, and/or 
constructing rival patronage networks” (Roberts, 2002: 9).  The second party system 
is labour-mobilising in which the electorate was divided along class lines resulting in 
a ‘stratified cleavage’ structure. Until the 20th century, Latin American party systems 
were elite and driven by the oligarchy. For this reason segmented cleavage structures 
dominated the region and reflected “intra-élite divisions” centred on church-state 
relations (Roberts, 2002: 10). At the turn of the 19
th
 century however, new parties 
emerged in the southern cone and began to demand more political inclusion for the 
middle class such as the Partido Liberal, established in Chile in 1849. At the same 
time blue-collar workers organised into labour unions and became “significant 
political actors” (Roberts, 2002: 10). “The rise of the proletariat signalled the dawning 
of a new era of mass politics” (Roberts, 2002: 10). As a result, stratified, or class 
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cleavage, structures emerged in some Latin American countries which Roberts 
categorises as labour mobilising. Others remained dominated by the oligarchy and 
elite driven as class cleavages remained too weak, and therefore segmented cleavage 
structures remained. Table 1.1 below lists each country according to Roberts (2002) 
classification.  
 
Table 1.1: Roberts’ (2002) party system classification by country 
Elite Party System  Labour Mobilising 
Party System 
Colombia Argentina 
Costa Rica Bolivia 
Dominican Republic Brazil 
Ecuador  Chile 
Honduras  Mexico 
Panama Nicaragua 
Paraguay  Peru 
Uruguay  Venezuela 
Source: Roberts (2002) 
 
These stratified or class-based cleavages, first emerged during the 19
th
 century, but 
became particularly pronounced during the 20
th
 Century when the manufacturing 
sector grew rapidly in the Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) era of the 1930s-
1980s. The growth in the sector resulted in higher levels of unionisation. The 
emergence of a mobilised labour movement was met with the formation of mass-
based labour mobilising political parties. These parties usually left or populist in 
nature, developed stronger organisational structures within this union sector and 
encouraged mobilisation. Aware that a mobilised labour movement could be an 
effective base of support for the party, it began to encourage further mobilisation by 
placing “party cadres” into labour unions and civic associations in order to “activate 
and organise civil society” (Roberts 2002: 12). Labour mobilising parties “developed 
stronger base level organisational structures than traditional parties” (Roberts, 2002: 
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12). As a result, these parties encapsulated voters within labour and peasant
29
 
organisations and so in countries that were ‘labour –mobilising’ there was a rise in 
mass politics which “spawned the emergence of new collective actors, ideologies and 
mobilising strategies” (Roberts, 2002: 12). Ultimately, in labour-mobilising party 
systems such as those listed in Table 1.1 above, leftist and populist parties emerged 
which sought to tap into the organisational structures of labour unions and peasant 
organisations for support.   
 
While Roberts (2002) argues that these cleavages were greatly weakened during the 
neoliberal era, it can be contended that by re-politicising inequality at the turn of the 
century, the new left revived these cleavages. For example, Handlin (2012: 3) 
explains that contestatory leftist leaders in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia “actively 
shape and institutionalise a new organisational foundation for class cleavages” which 
is centred on “community-based organisations created through social policy rather 
than formal sector labour unions” (Handlin, 2012: 3). Therefore, just as the 
unionisation of the labour presented an opportunity for the left during the ISI era, the 
mobilisation of anti-neoliberal social movements during the 1990s
30
 presented a novel 
potential social base of support for the new left. As noted earlier, continued inequality 
and poverty created a “potential constituency for the Left” at the turn of the century, 
therefore the movements which emerged to tackle these issues represented a new 
organisational base of support for the left (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011:8). Cleary 
(2006: 37) argues that continuing inequality acted as the catalyst for remobilising 
social bases and states that “the electoral dominance of the left has an obvious 
explanation: The left succeeds because most Latin Americans are poor and a small 
minority is quite wealthy”. Crucially however, while inequality may have acted as 
catalyst for mobilisation, the variation in support for the left is explained by variation 
in structural bases of support which exists in each case (Cleary, 2006). This is 
fundamental to my argument that inequality and discontent with incumbents provided 
the motivation for mobilisation of indigenous movements but it is the variation in 
indigenous movement mobilisation which can explain the variation in support for the 
type of left in the region.  
                                                          
29
 Indigenous people are among the group considered as peasants at this time but they organised along 
class rather than ethnic lines. 
30
 Anti-neoliberal movements include, among others, the mobilisation of indigenous social movements, 
or the 1994 Zapatista Uprising in Mexico.  
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Ultimately, labour mobilising party systems are more likely to facilitate mobilisation 
than elitist party systems because pre-existing organisational structures exist in these 
cases. For example, in the 2002 Brazilian Presidential election Lula benefitted from 
the pre-existing structural base through the support of the labour and social 
movements. Conversely, in Bolivia and Ecuador, the structural base of support came 
in the form of indigenous organisations. In these cases, Cleary (2006: 38) explains 
that the left “draws support from indigenous political parties that grew out of 
unusually strong social movements in the 1990s”.The work of these authors provides 
a basis for the argument that indigenous social movements, where they exist and are 
mobilised, can provide a structural base of support for the left by acting as the ‘mass-
mobiliser’ of their base. 
 
In his earlier work, Roberts (1998) refers to the role of social movements in providing 
a structural base of support to the new left. He explains that the left in the late 1990s 
built on “the creative political energy of grassroots social organisations” (Roberts, 
1998: 23). These organisations which include peasant organisations, acted as “organs 
of political power” for the creation of a new cultural and political hegemony 
envisioned by the left (Roberts, 1998; 25). For instance, by the late 1990s the left had 
“reconceptualised” itself and was building on the “creative political energy of grass-
roots social organisations such as neighbourhood associations, Christian base 
communities, and women’s groups” (Roberts, 1998; 23). Such organisations were 
viewed by the left as a “breeding ground for a new cultural and political hegemony 
with a more radically democratic ethos based on equality, direct participation and 
community solidarity” (Roberts, 1998; 23). Ultimately, these organisations helped to 
revive a leftist ideology whilst providing a structural base of support for the new left. 
This relationship was possible because of an ideological congruence between these 
groups and the left in which socialism became more of national rather than a class 
project. A “vision of a deeper, more profound process of democratisation became the 
rallying cry for leftist groups” (Roberts, 1998; 23). The foundation of this ideology 
rested on a “diverse and pluralistic social bloc” of groups (Roberts, 1998; 23). I argue 
that indigenous social movements were an integral part of this new social bloc which 
provided support for the left.  
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Rodríguez-Garavito et al. (2008) also highlight the role of social movements in 
providing support for the new left. The authors explain that “the emergence of new 
political actors that have served to compensate for the decline of trade unions” was 
central to the success of the left at the turn of the century (Rodríguez-Garavito et al., 
2008: 10). They specifically include indigenous movements as part of this base of 
support, claiming that: 
“a large part of the left’s organisational and ideological novelty comes from 
recent indigenous movements, campesino organisations, movements of the 
underemployed, mobilisations of landless rural workers ...and other forms of 
social mobilisation” (Rodríguez-Garavito et al., 2008: 11). 
 
Rodríguez-Garavito et al. (2008) are the first to provide insight into the ways in which 
these organisations provided support for the left. They explain that these organisations 
form “coalitions” or “networks” with each other and “contribute to common political 
purposes” (Rodríguez-Garavito et al., 2008: 12). Such ‘common political purposes’ 
can include a cycle of protest or electoral campaigns. The authors include indigenous 
social movements as part of the “new social base” which works in coalition with the 
left “without losing their organisational autonomy” (Rodríguez-Garavito et al., 2008: 
14). This is especially important for indigenous social movements who are reluctant 
to lose their autonomy and merge with political parties. These movements form the 
main social base for political parties in the region such as Movimiento al Socialismo 
(MAS) in Bolivia and President Rafael Correa’s political party Alianza PAIS (AP) in 
Ecuador (Rodríguez-Garavito et al., 2008). Interestingly, both these parties are 
considered part of the contestatory left in the region, thus justifying the argument that 
the mobilisation of movements may explain the variation in support for the types of 
left that emerged during the left turn.  
 
Indigenous movements provide a base of support for the left 
Luna and Filgueira (2009: 376) state that the ability of the left to “bring together a 
broad socially heterogeneous electoral constituency in the context of fragmented civil 
societies” was a key component in the success of the left at the turn of the century. 
The role of the indigenous constituency is of special concern to this study and has 
been the subject of some empirical research. Lupu (2009) for instance, finds that 
ethnic minorities, particularly indigenous people, are most likely to vote for the left. 
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The author uses cross-national surveys to investigate individual voting behaviour to 
ascertain ‘who’ is voting left. He finds that class voting does occur in labour-based 
party systems which imply that socioeconomic cleavages are important in these 
systems, thereby supporting the argument that class cleavages re-emerged after the 
neoliberal era. This is important because indigenous people divide along both ethnic 
and socioeconomic lines, sometimes simultaneously. Specifically because indigenous 
people are “overwhelmingly” poor, “leftist parties, which appeal to lower-class 
voters, should attract indigenous votes” (Van Cott, 2005: 35). Crucially, Lupu (2009) 
finds that of all the ethnic groups in his study
31
indigenous people are most likely to 
vote for the left.  
 
This finding is further substantiated by Madrid (2005) who found that the failure of 
the traditional parties to represent indigenous people caused indigenous voters to 
support left or populist parties. In this way, Madrid (2005) supports the earlier 
discussion that the failure of traditional parties to represent indigenous people 
generated a discontent with politics within this sector of society. Indeed, Madrid 
(2007) argues that indigenous voters have provided much support for minor parties 
such as the left, particularly in states where indigenous people are highly politically 
mobilised. The author uses the case of Bolivia to illustrate how a substantial 
indigenous population, once mobilised, can provide an important vote share for the 
left (Madrid, 2012). Specifically, he provides an overview of the ethnic composition 
of the vote share of Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in 2005 according to Latin 
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) in 2006. Respondents, who self-identified 
as indigenous, comprised 28 per cent of the MAS vote in the Presidential elections 
(Madrid, 2012: 62). Those who identified as Mestizos who spoke an indigenous 
language
32
  comprised over 43 per cent of the total MAS vote in the 2005 presidential 
elections (Madrid, 2012). Together these identities make up the indigenous base. 
Therefore, according to survey data, indigenous people composed over 70 per cent of 
the vote for MAS in 2005 (Madrid, 2012). The remaining 29 per cent of the vote was 
divided between Mestizo who spoke Spanish only (19 per cent), white people (7 per 
cent) and ‘other’ (3 per cent) (Madrid, 2012 b).  
                                                          
31
 Lupu (2009) also includes Black, mixed and ‘other ethnicity’ groups in his study. 
32
Mestizo is the term commonly used to describe the ethnic group made up of both indigenous and 
Spanish descendants, or mixed ethnicity. Mestizos who speak an indigenous language are considered 
part of the indigenous base.  
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The work of Madrid (2012) illustrates how a mobilised indigenous constituency can 
provide a valuable vote share for a party in cases where the population is substantial 
and mobilised. In addition, Korovkin (2006) explains that divisions within indigenous 
movements in Ecuador led many indigenous voters to support left, rather than 
indigenous parties, further illustrating the compatibility between indigenous people 
and the left. Ultimately, if the work of Cleary (2006) and Roberts (1998; 2002) 
explicates that the left depend on a social base of support for electoral success, then 
the work of Madrid (2012) and Lupu (2009) implies that indigenous voters are acting 
as this base. However, neither Madrid (2012) nor Lupu (2009) explicitly investigate 
the relationship between indigenous social movements and leftist parties. This 
research provides such an investigation, thereby filling the empirical gap.  
 
The work of Van Cott (2005; 2007) is useful for understanding this relationship. Van 
Cott (2007: 2) claims that “the electoral resurgence of the leftist political parties is 
intimately related to the rise of indigenous movements in the 1980s”. Specifically she 
argues that the “political resurgence of leftist parties after 1998 follows the partially 
successful efforts of indigenous movements to articulate opposition to neoliberalism 
in the public sphere and to gain a foothold in formal politics” "[emphasis in the 
original]" (Van Cott, 2007: 2). This provides a firm basis for my argument that 
support for the left can be explained by the mobilisation of indigenous social 
movements who shared a common enemy in neoliberal incumbents. Importantly, 
indigenous movements were the first to articulate opposition to neoliberalism in the 
public sphere and the left were able to build upon the strength of this opposition (Van 
Cott, 2007). The left were, therefore, able to tap into this discontent and build upon 
the organisational strength of these anti-neoliberal movements.  
 
The relationship between indigenous movements and the left however, predates the 
left turn. It dates back to peasant revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s when leftist 
parties incorporated indigenous communities into their own organisations and fought 
alongside them for agrarian reform (Van Cott, 2005: 35). Later, and preceding the 
political mobilisation of independent indigenous movements in the 1990s, indigenous 
organisations relied on the left to express many of their socioeconomic demands and 
consequently, “indigenous peoples first gained access to the political arena through 
relations with the left” (albeit as subordinate partners under the leftist umbrella) (Van 
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Cott, 2007:1). Peeler (2003) notes that the left supported indigenous and peasantry 
mobilisation at this time because they viewed them as a potential political ally. This 
implies that the left recognised the potential of indigenous communities and 
movements to provide a structural base of support from early in their relationship. 
Arguably, only with the combination of democratisation, and the growing discontent 
with failed reforms in the 1990s, did the left have the opportunity to use the 
mobilisation capacity of these movements. For example, by the beginning of the 
1990s, indigenous people mobilised and formed movements which rejected 
“dependent alliances with the left”, choosing instead to become independent 
organisations (Van Cott, 2007: 2). This changed the dynamic of the relationship as the 
left began to rely on indigenous movements for political legitimacy. Van Cott (2007: 
40) explains that indigenous social movements “revitalised a moribund left by 
injecting more content and legitimacy into a sterile socialist discourse”.  
 
Ultimately however, Van Cott does not investigate the relationship between the left 
and indigenous movements in terms of the role of the movements in the left turn at 
the turn of the century. Rather her work is more concerned with the role played by the 
left in helping indigenous movements mobilise before and during the 1990s. I 
recognise the mutually beneficial relationship between the left and movements over 
time, but I am centrally concerned with the role played by the movements in 
generating support for the left at the turn of the century. In other words, I am 
exclusively interested in how this relationship benefits the left.  
 
Van Cott (2007) does however, provide a typology of indigenous organisation-leftist 
party ‘linkages’ which can be used as a framework for analysing indigenous 
movement-left relations at the turn of the century. As displayed in Table 1.2 below, 
Van Cott (2007) organises these linkages into three categories based on who is the 
dominant player in each linkage, the left or the indigenous organisation. These 
categories include; indigenous dominant, balance of power between indigenous and 
leftist movements, and finally left dominant. In her work, Van Cott (2007) not only 
provides a list of possible interactions as displayed in the Table 1.2 below, but she 
also provides the context in which each linkage is likely to take place. I will now 
briefly outline each of these linkages before discussing the relevance of this typology 
to the research.  
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The first linkage listed above is likely to occur when the left remains weak on its own 
or where indigenous militants need experienced political advice or financial 
resources. The second linkage occurs where indigenous movements or parties are 
sought-after electoral partners for the left who lack organisational resources in rural 
areas. The third occurs where there is a need to block neoliberal polices or to secure 
rights and so indigenous parties form “conjunctural alliances” with ideologically 
compatible left parties (Van Cott, 2007: 4). The fourth occurred mostly in the 1990s 
when indigenous movements participated in anti-neoliberal protests sponsored by 
diverse popular movements in Mexico, Chile and Ecuador. The fifth occurs when 
indigenous and leftist movements are weak and so form joint electoral vehicles. The 
sixth is likely to occur where indigenous parties are unable to win alone or indigenous 
movements want to maintain their social movement status and avoid the taint of 
formal electoral competition. The seventh linkage occurs when a candidate or 
electoral vehicle, and so an indigenous movement, may endorse a leftist candidate 
who promises to represent their interest. The eighth linkage occurred when the 
popularity of indigenous movements increased and leftist parties recruit indigenous 
leaders. Finally, the ninth linkage is likely to occur when elitist parties form 
dependent indigenous parties such as the Peronist party in Argentina formed a 
dependent sub-unit called agrupaciones.  
 
As stated, this typology can act as a guide for investigating indigenous-left relations at 
the turn of the century. The linkages are useful because they are “sensitive to change” 
and are only intended for the short-term such as an electoral campaign or a term in 
office, which is particularly relevant to this study (Van Cott, 2007: 5). The typology 
encompasses a variety of possible relations between indigenous organisations and 
leftist parties ranging from electoral alliances to joint protest activities and the 
dynamic of each linkage also varies. For instance, in some cases the leftist party will 
incorporate an indigenous movement within its candidate list while in other cases the 
indigenous organisation may form a party and incorporate leftist leaders. In other 
cases still, an indigenous party is the senior partner in an electoral alliance with the 
leftist party. This variation reflects a wider variation in left-indigenous relations more 
generally. The typology also provides a guide for observing how the left and 
indigenous organisations work together and, in turn, provides a framework for 
investigating the ways in which movements might mobilise support among their bases 
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(for instance, protest activities or candidate endorsements). The work of Van Cott 
(2005; 2007) therefore provides a foundation for investigating indigenous 
movements. Moreover, Van Cott (2007: 2) postulates that of the ‘two lefts’, 
indigenous movements are more likely to ally with extreme variants of the left “which 
shares indigenous peoples commitment to rolling back neoliberalism”. Indigenous 
movements are more likely to support the “stridently populist” over the more 
“modern and market-friendly” left (Van Cott, 2007: 2). This provides a basis for my 
argument that indigenous social movement mobilisation can explain the emergence of 
the contestatory left in particular because of their common enemy in neoliberal 
incumbents.  
 
Ultimately, however, Van Cott explores the variation in indigenous movement 
mobilisation in light of support provided by leftist parties. I however, explore 
variation in support for the left, in light of variation in indigenous movement 
mobilisation. Given the often symbiotic nature of movement-party relations discussed 
early in this chapter, these two subjects of research are complimentary rather than in 
conflict with one another. Indeed, taken together the work of Van Cott and others, my 
research can provide a more comprehensive understanding of indigenous-left relations 
in the region by providing an in-depth empirical investigation into the relationship 
between indigenous movements and leftist parties in the region. 
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Source: Adapted from Van Cott (2007) 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2 : Categories of indigenous-left relations 
 
Category Original linkage(s) which form 
this category 
Example from Van Cott 
(2007) 
 
Party 
composition 
1. Indigenous social movement 
organisation forms a party that 
incorporates leftist leaders and 
popular organisations 
 
5. Indigenous organisations and 
leftist intellectuals/popular 
movement leaders form a joint 
political party 
 
8. Leftist party incorporates 
indigenous movement within 
candidate list  
 
9. Leftist party forms a dependent 
indigenous subunit or allied party 
 
 
 El Movimiento de Unidad   
Plurinacional Pachakutik, 
Ecuador (1996) 
 
 
Frente Democrático Nueva 
Guatemala (late 1990s) 
 
 
Movimiento Bolivia Libre 
incorporates numerous 
organisations (1990s) 
Indigenous agrupaciones 
within the Peronist party, 
Argentina  
Candidate 
endorsement 
7.Indigenous movement/parties 
endorse a leftist candidate 
 
Pachakutik endorse Rafael 
Correa, Ecuador (2006) 
Electoral 
alliance 
2. Indigenous party is senior 
partner in electoral alliance with 
leftist parties or popular 
movements 
 
6. Indigenous movement/party and 
leftist party compete in electoral 
alliance. 
 
 
Pueblos Unidos 
Multiétnicos del Amazonas 
(PUAMA) and Patria Para 
Todos, Venezuela (2000)  
Movimiento Bolivia Libre 
and 
Confederación de Pueblos 
Indígenas de Bolivia, 
Bolivia (1997) 
Representative 
alliance 
3. Indigenous party representatives 
work with leftist party 
representatives in legislatures, 
constituent assemblies, municipal 
councils 
 
Pueblos Unidos 
Multiétnicos del Amazonas 
(PUAMA) and Hugo 
Chavez-MVR in Constituent 
Assembly of Venezuela 
(1999)  
Protest 
alliance 
4.Indigenous social movement 
organisations join with popular 
organisations in protest activity  
 
Cochabamba Water War, 
Bolivia (2000) 
  Literature Review & Theoretical Framework   
48 
 
1.3 Summary 
There are essentially three bodies of literature outlined in this chapter. The first deals 
with the prevailing explanations for the left turn which are centred on the issue of 
discontent with neoliberal incumbents. This research is situated within this literature 
by arguing that indigenous people were among some of the most discontented with 
these incumbents and the failure of their policies to alleviate inequality, poverty and 
political marginalisation in particular. The contribution of this research however is to 
illustrate that due to political disillusionment and distrust, the indigenous constituency 
could not be mobilised by leftist parties and instead these parties relied on the 
movements to generate support on their behalf. In doing so, I highlight the role that 
the indigenous movements played in the emergence of the left, which, in turn, 
illustrates that social movements can play a role in electoral politics. Moreover, 
through the cases studies in particular, the research uncovers the ways in which the 
movements mobilised their bases for the left, thus providing insight into how social 
movements can play a role in electoral politics. Indeed, revealing the strategies used 
and the nature of the movements’ relationship with the left, the research reveals more 
about how the left came to power. This is a relevant contribution because much of the 
discussion on the left focuses on why the left came to power (such as economic, 
social and political discontent). Additionally, I contribute to the literature on the ‘Two 
Lefts’ by arguing that indigenous movements are more likely to support the 
contestatory than moderate left if given that option. Therefore, where they are 
mobilised they may help to explain the emergence of different types of left in the 
region. Given that this body of literature is to date, quite narrow, this research can 
provide a valuable contribution.   
 
The second body of literature addressed in this chapter relates to social cleavage 
structure, social bases and the potential mass-mobilising capacity of social 
movements. This body of work provides a foundation for the argument that social 
movements have a mass-mobilising capacity, which they can use to generate support 
for parties.  I seek to contribute to this literature by providing a detailed study which 
specifically explores the mass-mobilising capacity of movements. In addition, 
because the research is focused on indigenous movements and the left in particular, I 
further the work of Roberts (2002) and Cleary (2006) who postulate this mass-
mobilising thesis in the context of the left turn. With little empirical investigation into 
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the relationship between movements and parties more generally, I hope to contribute 
to prevailing literature on social cleavages, social bases and the potential mass-
mobilising capacity of movements by demonstrating movement-party alliances are an 
important aspect of this literature. Indeed, a central argument of this research is that 
movements, through alliances with political parties, can play a role in the outcome of 
elections. By providing evidence that movements can play such a role I also seek to 
contribute to social movement theory.  
Firstly, social movement theory is focused primarily on explaining variation in levels 
of mobilisation. Olsen (1965) first challenged the assumption that collective action 
was based on irrationality, and instead demonstrated that the participation of 
individuals in such behaviour was a rational and deliberate choice made by 
individuals. Since then, social movement theorists have sought to explain variation in 
levels of collective action, and more specifically social movement mobilisation. 
McCarthy and Zald (1977) argued that the availability of resources to a movement 
greatly influenced their ability to mobilise, resulting in the emergence of resource 
mobilisation theory. Soon after, Tilly (1978) argued for a more interactive approach 
by emphasising the impact of interests, opportunity and organisation in explaining 
variation in mobilisation levels. Tilly’s work acted as the genesis of political process 
theory (PPT), further developed by McAdam (1982), which stressed the importance 
of mobilising structures, political opportunity structure and cultural framing for 
movement mobilisation. PPT was advanced further by McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow 
(2001) and despite challenges from Goodwin and Jasper (1999) for an overemphasis 
on structure
33
, political process theory remains the dominant paradigm of social 
movement theory. As will be discussed in the next chapter, this research adopts a 
more pluralist approach in understanding variation in mobilisation as influenced by 
the works of Vermeersch (2006; 2012) and Barany (2001). Importantly however, this 
research does not seek to explain variation in mobilisation. Indeed, the work of 
Yashar (2005) also discussed in more detail in the next chapter adequately addresses 
this issue for the countries studied in this dissertation. Fundamentally, the goal of the 
research is not to explain variation in mobilisation, but rather the impact of this 
                                                          
33
More specifically the authors argue that there is not enough consideration for the role of 
morals, principles and emotions in mobilisation.  
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variation on politics more generally, and electoral politics more specifically. In this 
way the research attempts to move the discussion beyond why some movements 
mobilise and other do not to instead ask, what impact does this variation have on 
other facets of politics?  
Secondly, because I argue that this variation can impact electoral politics, and the fate 
of political parties in some cases, I challenge the assumption that new social 
movements operate within an “essentially non-party space” (Kaldor, 2003: 85). By 
arguing that movements form alliances with political parties, particular around 
election time, I directly challenge the assumption that movements operate in a non-
institutionalised and non-party space. This has an implication for our typical 
understanding of a social movement as an informal political actor participating in 
non-institutionalised and contentious forms of political participation (such as protests) 
to one which can also enter the formal realm by working to garner support for a 
political party in one of the most institutionalised form of political action, namely 
elections. Ultimately, I hope to contribute to social movement theory firstly by 
shifting the debate towards the implications of the variation in mobilisation on 
politics. Secondly, I hope to contribute to the literature by challenging the assumption 
that movements are informal actors primarily concerned with non-institutionalised 
politics, which in turn may develop our understanding of social movement behaviour 
in contemporary politics.   
 The third body of literature outlined above, deals with general indigenous-left 
relations in the region. Current research on the relationship between indigenous 
people, their movements and leftist parties remains somewhat understudied and 
fragmented. For instance, Madrid (2005; 2011) and Lupu (2009) focus on the micro 
level relationship between indigenous people and their propensity to vote left while 
Van Cott (2007) exclusively explores relations between indigenous movements and 
parties. I provide a theoretical contribution to this body of work by suggesting that the 
relationship between the indigenous voters and the left is actually facilitated by 
indigenous movements. I also provide an empirical contribution by demonstrating that 
movements do indeed generate support among their bases for the left and illustrating 
the ways in which they do so.  
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Chapter 2: Research Design 
Introduction 
The central research question of this study is; what explains the emergence of the left 
in Latin America at the turn of the Century? As discussed in the introduction the 
variation in the type of left which has emerged in the region is a secondary puzzle 
within the left turn. Accordingly, the secondary research question in this study is; 
what explains the variation in the types of left which have emerged during the left 
turn? The hypothesis is that the variation in levels of indigenous movement 
mobilisation can help to explain variation in support for the left across the region 
because they acted as a central political ally for the left. In addition, it is hypothesised 
that levels of mobilisation may also help to explain the variation in the types of left 
which emerged because these movements are more likely to support the contestatory 
left rather than the moderate left. The principal dependent variable therefore is 
variation in support for the left in Latin America at the beginning of the left turn. The 
central independent variable is variation in levels of indigenous movement 
mobilisation. As demonstrated on Figure 2 in the introduction the independent 
variable is interactive and considered in conjunction with population size. The 
purpose of this chapter is to further clarify the argument by outlining the causal 
mechanism. The conceptualisation and operationalisation of the central variables will 
then be discussed. This chapter will also outline the mixed-method approach adopted 
to answer the research question. Finally, the justification of case selection and 
suitability of field interviews will be addressed before providing some expected 
outcomes of the study.  
 
2.1 The causal mechanism  
A good causal mechanism should provide “proper explanations” that “detail the cogs 
and wheels of the casual process through which the outcome to be explained was 
brought about” (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010: 50). Specifically, a causal mechanism 
identifies how “x and y inter-relate” in a manner which “builds support for a theory” 
(Gerring, 2004: 348; King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 86). The casual mechanism in 
this research is centred upon a political alliance between indigenous movements and 
the left in Latin America at the beginning of the left turn there. The alliance is based 
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on a mutual agreement in which movements mobilise their bases in support of the 
party in return for the implementation of policies addressing indigenous demands by 
the left once elected. While this is a mutually beneficial agreement, this research is 
principally concerned with the impact of the alliance on the outcome; electoral 
support for the left at the beginning of the left turn. It is worth noting however, that 
while this relationship is beneficial for the movements in theory, it is not always the 
case in practice because the parties may not fulfil their promise once in power, 
making the movements the real risk-takers in this alliance. The chapter will now 
discuss the nature of movement-party relationships in more detail.  
 
A movement-party alliance 
Movements act as “extra-parliamentary party organisations” in movement-party 
alliances which entrepreneurial politicians and their parties “need in order to win the 
prize of government” (Strøm, 1990: 575). Extra-parliamentary organisations such as 
movements can satisfy party needs by supplying information about the preferences of 
the electorate and by mobilising supporters (Strøm, 1990). Therefore, the movements 
can act as the “political mobiliser” in this context by encouraging their social base to 
take part in political action including protesting, voting or indeed simply joining a 
party, movement or active civic organisation (Vermeersch, 2012: 224). In this way, 
extra-parliamentary organisations are a source of “cheap labour” for the party because 
they can be “satisfied by nonmonetary compensation such as public policy and spoils” 
(Rucht, 2004: 207). Indeed, for the party, “the ideal activist is highly policy motivated 
and is similar to the typical voter in that support can be exchanged for promises of 
future public policy” (Rucht, 2004: 207). As a result, party leaders ally with 
organisations that can help them win elections by providing them with mobilised 
voters and in return they can promise implementation of particular polices once in 
power (Strøm, 1990: 575).  
 
In the case of Latin America, Freidenberg and Levitsky, (2006:178) note that informal 
organisations such as social movements constitute the “meat” for many parties 
because they “recruit activists, select candidates, raise money, maintain societal 
linkages, and most importantly deliver votes”. At the same time, movements hope that 
“close ties with a party” guarantees representation within the legislative process and 
the government should that party succeed in presidential elections in particular 
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(Dalton, 1996: 321). I argue that indigenous movements can act as political mobilisers 
for the left and provide cheap labour in return for nonmonetary or “prospective” 
compensation such as constitutional amendments that recognise indigenous rights or 
other policies related to indigenous demands (Strøm, 1990: 575). Furthermore, the 
more highly mobilised a movement the more effective it is at mobilising its bases for 
the party, therefore levels of mobilisation matter. This is a particularly effective 
strategy for parties where indigenous voters represent a substantial percentage of the 
population, providing an electorally advantageous base of support. For this reason, the 
research considers the size of indigenous population (as proportion of total 
population) in conjunction with mobilisation levels in explaining the variation in 
support for the left.  
 
Movement-party alliances also allow each actor to participate in a mutually beneficial 
agreement without jeopardising their respective reputations amongst their base of 
support.  Alliances are formed by actors who want to “keep some of their autonomy 
and distinctiveness, and therefore refrain from merging into a single entity whose 
prior constituent elements become more or less invisible, or completely dissolve as 
distinguishable units” (Rucht, 2004: 203). This is pertinent for indigenous social 
movements because, to them, merging with a party could taint their reputation as an 
informal, non-institutionalised political actor among their social base. This is also 
relevant for political parties on the left who may wish to align with movements 
because they “provide ideas, a mass base and/or radical mood”, yet maintain 
autonomy so they do not exclude or isolate non-indigenous or moderate voters 
(Rucht, 2004: 207).  
 
Movements and parties are part of “two different systems of action” and each “will 
play different roles” in politics which allows us to distinguish between the party and 
the movement (Diani, 1992: 15).  Roberts (1998: 74) argues that given these different 
roles, there is no reason why “parties and movements cannot complement each other”. 
The problem is that because there is no “consensual formula on how to do this” we 
find that “parties have entered into a variety of relationships with social movements” 
which in turn can blur the lines between parties and movements. This is particularly 
the case when movements and parties become “overlapping, mutually dependent 
actors in shaping politics” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 213). For instance, in some 
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cases the alliance can be based on an “organic model” in which parties are the 
“political expression of organisation groups in civil society” (Roberts, 1998: 75). 
Distinctions between the party and the movement are “deliberately blurred” in the 
organic model as the party often engages in social struggle outside the sphere of 
institutional politics and the party members and leader are “drawn directly from social 
movements rather than from the ranks of a separate, professional political caste” 
(Roberts, 1998: 75). This will become more relevant when we discuss the case of 
Bolivia in this study where evidence of such ‘blurred lines’ are evident between 
indigenous movements and Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). As will be argued, the 
blurring of these lines proved advantageous for the movements because it enabled 
them to mobilise support for their ally without losing their legitimacy among their 
bases. It was also beneficial for the party because the movements acted as a reliable 
source of cheap labour and source of support for the party.   
 
The indigenous base of support  
Indigenous voters in Latin America in the lead up to the left turn were especially 
valuable because they had no party affiliation, yet in some cases, they represented a 
substantial proportion of the vote share (Madrid, 2005). The lack of party affiliation 
meant that in the early 2000s, no political party could “count on the automatic 
contribution of an indigenous electoral bloc” (Stavenhagen, 2002: 34). The 
indigenous electoral base was not affiliated with any party because it was detached 
from institutionalised politics. Distrust towards the state and institutionalised politics, 
as discussed in Chapter 1, can help to explain this detachment. The root of this 
distrust however, is in the historical ill treatment and marginalisation of indigenous 
people by the state. In terms of power structure in Latin America, indigenous 
peoples
34
 have always been seen as “subalterns” (Becker, 2008: 9). This is best 
illustrated by Marcela Cornejo of Centro de Documentación Sobre la Mujer 
(CENDOC) and Centro de Culturos Indígenas del Perú (Chirapaq) who explains that: 
 “the ideas of democracy, citizen participation and vigilance are little 
understood or accepted in a population whose majority has never been 
                                                          
34
 Here the author is referring to highland indigenous peasants specifically. It is worth noting that 
Amazonian groups were also marginalised by the state in the sense that they were simply ignored.   
  Research Design    
55 
 
sovereign or represented in its legitimate interests and that has always been 
manipulated and ignored.”35 (Cornejo, 2006).  
 
Stavenhagen (2002: 34) explains that instead “indigenous demands are channelled in 
other ways than through traditional party policies”. I argue that indigenous 
movements provide the principal channel for indigenous demands. If a political party 
wishes to capture the support of an indigenous electoral bloc, it must first ally with 
the movement, which can then act as an intermediary between indigenous voters and 
the party. Because indigenous voters are detached from institutionalised politics, 
parties cannot mobilise this base without first obtaining the support of the movement 
that represents indigenous people. For this reason movements are crucial extra 
parliamentary organisations. Figure 2.1 below illustrates that indigenous people are 
more trusting towards indigenous movements than political parties. This figure is 
based on public opinion survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP) for all of Latin America in 2006.
36
 Respondents were asked to score their 
confidence in political parties and indigenous movements from 1 (no trust) to 7 (much 
trust).The results indicate that indigenous people are more trusting towards 
indigenous movements than political parties. Specifically, over 20 per cent of 
respondents claim to have much trust in indigenous movements while only six per 
cent claim to have much trust in political parties.
37
 The implication of higher trust in 
movements than in parties is that indigenous people are more likely to perceive the 
movement as their representative than a party. They are therefore more likely to 
follow the guidance and decision-making policies of indigenous movements than of 
political parties. If the party establishes a relationship with the movement, they can 
garner access to this bloc of voters because the movement acts as the voice and 
principal decision-maker for the wider community.  
 
                                                          
35
 My own translation 
36
 2006 is the first year in which surveys asked respondents to self-report their ethnicity, and so it is the 
earliest data available to investigate indigenous peoples trust in parties and movements. Self-reporting 
is used rather than mother tongue here because there are too many variables when all mother tongues in 
the region are considered.  
37
 The Chi2 for the tabulation between political parties trust and self-reported ethnicity was (539.9) and 
Cramérs V was (0.06). For the cross-tabulation between indigenous movement trust and self-reported 
ethnicity the Chi2 was (279.4) and Cramérs V was (0.08). 
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Figure 2.1: Indigenous peoples’ trust in political parties versus indigenous 
movements, 2006.  
 
Source: Barómetro de las Americas 2006, Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 
 
 
By the early 2000s indigenous activists became increasingly aware that “they can 
only get so far if they go it alone” (Stavenhagen, 2002: 41). It was at this point that 
indigenous movements opted to ally with political parties. Indigenous movements 
allied with political parties rather than other movements first and foremost because a 
party can be elected to government and directly implement change. Additionally, 
competition between movements for social bases and/or financial resources often 
results in conflicts, which can make movement alliances more problematic (Della 
Porta and Diani, 2006). Furthermore, indigenous movements ally with the left rather 
than indigenous parties because indigenous parties are unlikely to win a majority and 
gain the power necessary to implement change. Typically, indigenous parties are 
weak or fragmented, which can be off-putting for indigenous voters. Tanya Korovkin 
(2006) explains how divisions within indigenous movements in Ecuador for example, 
led many indigenous voters to support the left rather than indigenous parties. These 
parties can also be exclusionary, they can choose to represent one particular ethnicity 
and isolate others. For example, in Bolivia the political party Movimiento Indígena 
Pachakuti (MIP) predominately represented Aymara identities in 2002. Indeed, MIP 
adhered to a radically indigenous ideology called ‘Indianismo’38 and represented the 
Aymara people in particular. In 2002 however, MIP won just over 19 per cent of the 
                                                          
38
 Indianismo is a radical indigenous ideology that focuses on the subordination of indigenous people 
and can manifest an anti-western or “anti-white” sentiment (Van Cott, 2009:53). 
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vote in municipalities where the majority of the population spoke Aymara as their 
mother tongue while Movimiento al Socialismo won 29 per cent indicating that even 
for Aymara speakers, MIP were too radical (Madrid, 2012). This research argues that 
leftist parties are more compatible allies for indigenous movements because they do 
not divide ethnicities and because they are more likely to win elections, making them 
a better strategic choice for movements.  
 
The compatibility of indigenous movements and the left  
As discussed in Chapter 1, before the mobilisation of indigenous movements in the 
1980s and 1990s there was a “long history of leftist parties incorporating indigenous 
communities and fighting alongside them for agrarian reform” (Van Cott, 2005: 35). 
During this time indigenous people relied on the left to express many of their 
socioeconomic demands (Van Cott, 2007:36). Peeler (2003) notes that the left 
actively supported indigenous and peasantry mobilisation at this time because they 
saw it as a potential political ally. After the mobilisation of indigenous movements the 
balance of power switched and the defunct ‘old’ left of the 1970s relied on indigenous 
movements to revitalise a “moribund left by injecting more content and legitimacy 
into a sterile socialist discourse” (Van Cott, 2007: 40). It is important to note here that 
while I recognise the symbiotic relationship between indigenous movements and the 
left throughout history, this study is principally concerned with the nature of this 
relationship during the left turn specifically. Therefore, while the left played a role in 
the initial mobilisation and politicisation of indigenous people and their movements, 
this research is principally concerned with how these movements mobilised support 
for the left in later years, during the left turn. That is, I am more concerned with how 
this relationship benefited the left than how the left helped mobilise the movements in 
previous decades. For now however, it is worth simply noting that the history of 
relations between the left and indigenous movements in the region provided the 
foundation for their political alliance during the left turn.  
 
The alliance between indigenous movements and the left during the left turn was 
centred on a policy congruence and solidarity against the ‘right’. As discussed in the 
previous chapter discontent with neoliberalism is a central explanation for the left 
turn. I argue that because indigenous people and the left were among those most 
discontented with neoliberalism they shared a common enemy in the right-winged 
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governments which had implemented these policies. As the central opposition party to 
the right, indigenous movements shared the common goal of subverting right-wing 
incumbents from power.  This relates to the work of Rucht (2004) who explains that 
movement-party alliances are particularly common among oppositional parties who 
“tend to seek linkages with like-minded extra-parliamentary groups to strengthen their 
position vis-à-vis the government” (Rucht, 2004: 207). In the case of Labour parties 
in Germany and Britain during the 1970s for example, trade unions were “important 
allies since they have a great number of members, hence conference votes” (Koelble, 
1987: 257). The British Labour Party actively sought out an alliance with trade unions 
not only to acquire member votes but to also pursue a strategy of “no enemies on the 
left” (Koelble, 1987: 256). In this way Labour and trade unions became “allies in the 
struggle against the party right” (Koelble, 1987: 256). This project proposes a similar 
relationship between leftist parties and indigenous movements in Latin America.  
 
This alliance was not only based on a goal of ousting the right. Rather, the ‘new left’ 
which emerged at the turn of the century in the region offered policies which directly 
appealed to indigenous peoples and their movements. Although the specific policies 
of the new left will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter, the left more 
generally proposed policies such as land reform and redistribution of wealth which 
were largely congruent with indigenous demands. Indeed, because the contestatory 
variants of the left propose the more radical redistribution of wealth and land reform, 
it is likely that indigenous movements would support this left if given the choice 
between these parties and the moderate left who are less radical in their approach and 
policies. Nonetheless, indigenous movements and the left are compatible allies 
because they have a historical relationship with one another and because, at the turn 
of the century the new left offered policies which were compatible with indigenous 
demands. Lastly, both actors shared a common enemy in the traditional right.  
 
There are however exceptions to indigenous-left relations which should be addressed 
here. Specifically, Guatemala is an outlier in the study of indigenous movements and 
the left because the behaviour of the movements is often dictated by clientelistic 
linkages rather than ideologically congruence. First and foremost, Guatemala 
underwent a brutal civil war between the years 1960 and 1996 in which indigenous 
Mayan people and their communities were systematically targeted by a series of 
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military regimes over the 36 year period. It is estimated that 200,000 people died or 
were ‘disappeared’ during the war, most of whom were indigenous (Chamarbagwala 
and Morán, 2011). This inevitability impacted indigenous movement mobilisation, 
particularly as movements which did emerge during the war to address the systematic 
targeting of indigenous people were only met with further violence (Chamarbagwala 
and Morán, 2011). 
 
In the post-war era however indigenous movements emerged with the goal of 
rearticulating indigenous demands in light of the Peace Accords (1996). Indeed, the 
movements merged to create a consultative body called “Asamblea de la Sociedad 
Civil” (Civil Society Assembly - ASC) which played an integral role in the peace 
agreement. By the early 2000s however the role of movements’ vis-à-vis the state 
changed and government was more interested in pleasing political and economic 
elites than indigenous movements. Movements had to change their strategies and they 
did so by deciding to ally with political parties. True to the fragmented nature of the 
movements there was no consolidated effort to align with one party and instead 
different movements allied with different parties, often those which provided the best 
career opportunities for the indigenous leaders (Yagenova & Castañeda, 2008).  
 
In most cases however, the movements sought to ally with the left or centre-left. For 
example, National Coordination of Indigenous Peoples and Campesinos (CONIC) 
allied with the ‘social-democratic’ Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE). The 
UNE however receives much support from new business elites and is more a centre-
left party than it is left (Yagenova and Véliz, 2009). This fragmentation of indigenous 
movements in Guatemala means that there is very little relationship between the 
movements and the people they claim to represent. Therefore it is not surprising that 
we see the movements ally with parties such as UNE but this does not necessarily 
translate to support for that party among indigenous people in Guatemala. 
Furthermore, because clientelism is rife in Guatemala we might not expect indigenous 
communities to support parties such as the UNE even when movements encourage 
support. For example, in 2012 a report by the National Democratic Institute
39
 (NDI) 
found that 37 per cent of respondents were aware of vote-buying in their community 
                                                          
39
 In conjunction with the University of Notre Dame and Acción Ciudadana 
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and the report estimated that 17 per cent of respondents indeed practice in vote 
buying. It is not surprising therefore that we do not see a reflection of the movements 
aspirations to support the left at the micro level in Guatemala, especially given that 
right-wing parties are traditionally more likely to have more material resources at 
their disposal than the left. Indeed in a country where 50.9 per cent of the population 
lives in poverty and 15.2 per cent live in extreme poverty it is not surprising that 
clientelism is rife at the micro level (NDI, 2012). Given that indigenous and 
campesino communities are among the most impoverished it should not be 
unexpected that they are most likely to practice vote-buying. Consequently, the 
relationship between indigenous people and leftist parties is different in the context of 
Guatemala.  
 
The nature of political alliances  
It is important to note the fragile and temporal nature of these alliances. Just as a 
movement can provide a party with the support necessary to come to power, it can 
also retract that support should the party not fulfil its obligations once in power. The 
relationship between the British Labour party and trade unions from 1974-1979 offers 
an illustrative example of the temporal nature of alliances between parties and ‘extra-
parliamentary party organisations’. These actors made an alliance in 1973 in which 
the unions supported the “governments attempt to fight inflation by curbing their 
wage demands” in return for “favourable industrial policy, unemployment relief and 
structural modernisation” (Koelble, 1987: 257). When Labour failed to fulfil their part 
of the deal due to the economic pressure of a financial crisis, the unions mobilised 
against their former ally by instigating “a great number of wildcat strikes” (Koelble, 
1987: 257). Union members realised that they could also demonstrate their 
dissatisfaction by voting against their union leaders (Koelble, 1987). Consequently, 
“union leaders found themselves under pressure to punish the parliamentary party for 
its ineffective policies”, which detrimentally impacted the support for the party within 
its social base (Koelble, 1987: 261). Koelble (1987:  261) claims that the pressure put 
on leaders to punish Labour had a “more important effect” on the party than the 
failure of its economic programme. It could be argued therefore that Labour’s defeat 
in the 1979 elections was partly a result of the breakdown in their alliance with the 
trade unions.  
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This research argues that a similar fate may lie ahead for leftist parties who do not 
fulfil the promises made to the movements that helped elect them. Beasley-Murray et 
al. (2010: 3) explain that for the left to retain power in the region it must “maintain 
and deepen” close ties with the social movements that helped bring them to power. If 
the left do not deliver on the promises made to movements before their election, the 
movements will withdraw their support for subsequent elections. Without this base of 
support the party could lose subsequent elections. For this reason, the electoral base 
provided by social forces such as indigenous movements represent a valuable source 
of electoral support, that if withdrawn, could be detrimental to the party. It could be 
argued that this is a particular danger for the contestatory left who are more likely to 
rely on the support base of movements than on a moderate or middle-class electoral 
base of support which the moderate left may have built up during its time in office. 
The fragile nature of movement-party alliances may provide a temporal explanation 
for the rise and decline of the ‘new left’ in some cases in the region.  
 
2.2 The conceptualisation and operationalisation of the central variables  
 
The dependent variable: variation in support for the left  
The election of former Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez in 1998 marks the 
beginning of the ‘new left’ in Latin America (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). Figure 2.2 
below demonstrates the steady rise of the left in presidential and legislative elections 
from 1990-2010. The left vote share is measured here by calculating the proportion of 
the total vote won by the left in each presidential and legislative election from 1990-
2010. This is my own measurement adopted from the electoral data from Latin 
America provided by Baker and Greene (2011).
40
As the figure demonstrates, there 
was a steady increase in the vote share of the left during this time, and we can see that 
this became more pronounced from the late 1990s. More recently this left turn has 
shown signs of abating, as demonstrated by the 2009 election of right-wing President 
                                                          
40
 As will be discussed in the next Chapter this is calculated by summing the vote share of all leftist 
candidates and parties to get the combined vote share of left in each election. I used the ideological 
score provided by Baker and Greene to establish which parties and candidates were left (all those with 
a score between 0 and 10.5) 
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Sebastián Piñera in Chile. The ‘left turn’ is considered by this research to encompass 
the time frame of 1998-2009.   
The political left which emerged at the turn of the century was labelled the ‘new left’ 
in order to distinguish it from the ‘old’ revolutionary left of the 1960s and 1970s. The 
old left is epitomised by Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution (1959) and was 
centred on Stalinist, Maoist or indeed ‘Fidelista’41 ideologies of armed leftist 
revolution (Petras, 1997). The new left is more socially democratic in nature and more 
concerned with electoral democracy than armed radicalism (Petras, 1997).  This new 
left can be understood as political parties and leaders principally concerned with 
social equity, justice, solidarity, redistribution of wealth and greater control over their 
economies (Panizza, 2005; Lupu, 2005; Cleary, 2006; Lievesley & Ludlam, 2009; 
Weyland, 2010; Doyle, 2011). Also common to the new left is the commitment to 
popular participation and the desire to deepen ties with social bases, a characteristic 
particularly pertinent to this research (Cameron, 2009; Petras, 1997). Within this 
broad left, the extent to which leaders pursue these policies, and the strategies used to 
achieve these goals, varies. Wiesehomeier’s (2010) ideological scale of Latin 
American presidents from left to right outlined in the introduction highlights the 
variation in policy positions adopted by presidents in the region.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41
 Fidelista is a reference to Fidel Castro’s ideology during the Cuban Revolution.  
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Figure 2.2:  The ‘Left Turn’ from 1990-2010 
 
Source: Adapted from Baker and Greene (2011). 
 
As previously mentioned, a secondary puzzle addressed in this research is the 
variation in the types of left which have emerged during this time. This research 
incorporates this puzzle by postulating that the variation in the type of left which 
emerged may be explained by the variation in indigenous movement mobilisation 
because the movements are likely to support the more radical policies of the 
contestatory left. It is therefore important to explain the central differences between 
the types of left in the region.  
 
Firstly, the term ‘contestatory’ left is adopted from the work of Weyland (2010: 3) 
who explains that it originates from the “urge to contest with enemies”, including 
political adversaries, business sectors and the US government. This is a key difference 
between the contestatory and the moderate left. That is, while the moderate left pursue 
their goals more prudently and with respect for economic constraints and political 
opposition, the more extreme left pursue these goals by aggressively challenging 
neoliberalism, attacking political opposition and contesting globalisation and US 
hegemony (Weyland, 2010). I adopt Weyland’s label of the contestatory left because I 
feel it best embodies this left and avoids more problematic labels such as a ‘good’ or a 
‘bad’ left.  
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The contestatory left is also different in terms of its policies and how it pursues them. 
That is, while all governments of the new left “broke with neoliberalism and 
embraced redistributive social policies” others took “bolder measures” in their 
economic reform (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011: 23). The moderate left typically 
embraces the market, remains open to free trade and investment pacts (including trade 
agreements with the US) and adheres to conservative fiscal policies (Madrid, 2010). 
In terms of privatisation moderate variants have neither privatised much of state-
owned assets nor nationalised private firms (Madrid, 2010). In contrast, contestatory 
leftist governments have taken a more statist approach by expanding state intervention 
in their economies (Madrid, 2010). This entails more state control over economic 
activity, an increase in public spending and easing in fiscal policy, sometimes “at the 
expense of central bank independence” (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011: 21). State 
controls on trade, foreign investment and capital flows have also been tightened under 
the contestatory left (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011: 22). Therefore these governments 
differ in terms of economic policy goals. The variation is best explained by Mazzuca 
(2013: 108-109) as the  “wholesale reversal of trade liberalisation and privatisation” 
by the contestatory left on the one hand, and the “more restrained moderate-left 
reforms within free-market parameters” of the moderate left on the other.  
 
The statist agendas of the contestatory left has been “facilitated by buoyant revenues 
from natural resources” and is particularly evident in the area of control over natural 
resources (Eaton, 2013: 7). Nationalisation of natural resources, such as oil in 
Venezuela and Ecuador
42
 and gas in Bolivia are key characteristics of this left. 
Revenue generated from these resources is redistributed to fund ambitious social 
programmes designed to help the disadvantaged (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). These 
programmes focus on areas such as providing housing, building schools and health 
clinics, as well as subsidised food markets in low-income communities (Levitsky and 
Roberts, 2011). Furthermore, this left has also been more likely to implement policies 
of land reform, which is a central concern for indigenous movements (Levitsky and 
Roberts, 2011; Madrid, 2010). 
 
                                                          
42
 While oil is not yet fully nationalised in Ecuador, President Rafael Correa increased the state’s share 
of oil profits from 50 to 99 per cent since coming to power in 2006 (Madrid, 2010). 
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Recentralisation of state authority is also an innate characteristic of the contestatory 
left. Since coming to power the contestatory left has sought to reverse many 
decentralisation reforms implemented by incumbents. For example, Bolivian 
President Evo Morales implemented deep cuts in revenue to departmental 
governments (Eaton, 2013). This policy triggered protests and increased polarisation 
between the gas rich department of Santa Cruz de la Sierra and the rest of the country 
(Eaton, 2013). Interestingly, many contestatory leftist leaders justify the 
recentralisation of the state and ensuing conflicts with mayors and governors by 
classifying it as a class-struggle against the “presumably privileged class positions of 
the right-of-centre subnational elected officials” (Eaton, 2013: 3). This highlights the 
propensity of the contestatory left to espouse class-based rhetoric that is critical of the 
right, which is in turn likely to appeal to indigenous movements.  These leaders also 
follow a “strongly plebiscitarian style of rule” in which referenda are commonly used 
to implement change and “demonstrate majority support” (Eaton, 2013: 6). The 
contestatory and moderate left also differ in foreign policy. Given the statist and anti-
neoliberal nature of the contestatory left, it is not surprising that it rejects agreements 
with the US while its moderate counterpart are open to such agreements. Rather than 
forming relations with the US the contestatory left pursues agreements with “a variety 
of traditional rivals with the US” such as Iran, Russia and the People’s Republic of 
China (Madrid, 2010: 590).  
 
Variation in support for the left is measured by vote share in presidential elections, 
which are first order elections in the region. Given that the executive branch heavily 
shapes policy, presidential elections represent a change in power in a way that 
legislative elections do not (Stokes, 2009). Consequently, movements seeking change 
are more likely to focus on electing parties to the executive branch where the party 
will have sufficient power to implement change. Since the distribution of votes in 
legislative and presidential elections is often quite similar, focusing on the 
presidential race in the qualitative cases does not impede the research. The central 
goal of the study is to assist in explaining support for the left in presidential elections.  
Support for the left is operationalised using the four central measures listed on Table 
2.1 below. Each variable is drawn from existing data on electoral results and 
ideological positioning of parties and presidents across the region sourced by 
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prominent scholars in the field and is discussed in more detail in the following 
quantitative chapter.  
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Table 2.1: Operationalisation of the dependent variable for the quantitative 
analysis  
Variable  Measurement  Source  
Presidential 
VRL 
(presvrl) 
The degree of support for leftist 
candidates relative to all other 
candidate in any given presidential 
election. The degree of support is 
indicated by a scale of support for 
the right (1) to support for the left 
(20). The authors provided data for 
the period 1990 to 2009.  
Baker and 
Greene (2011) 
   
 
VRL Doyle  
(presvrl2) 
 
The degree of support for the left in 
any given presidential election 
relative to support for all other 
candidates. The degree of support is 
also indicated by a scale that runs 
from support for the right (0) to 
support for the left (4). The authors 
provided data for the period 1978 to 
2009, although only data from the 
period from 1990 to 2009 is used in 
this analysis. 
 
 
Wiesehomeier & 
Doyle (2012) 
 
Lower house 
VRL  
(lhvrl) 
 
The degree of support for leftist 
parties relative to all other parties in 
any given legislative election. The 
degree of support is indicated by a 
scale of support for the right (1) to 
support for the left (20). The 
authors provided data for the period 
1990 to 2009. 
 
 
Baker and 
Greene (2011) 
Left Vote Share  
(leftvoteshare) 
The proportion of the total vote 
won by the left in each presidential 
and legislative election. It can be 
used to reveal vote share of the left 
by type of election (presidential or 
legislative) or cumulatively over 
time (for example by year as shown 
on Figure 2.2 at the beginning of 
this chapter). Using updated data on 
the ideological scores of parties 
from Baker and Greene (2011), this 
variable provides data from 1990 to 
2011.  
Adapted from 
Baker and 
Greene (2011) 
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The principal independent variable: variation in indigenous movement mobilisation 
Social movements can be understood as a mobilised group, which make demands that 
challenge existing policies and practices through non-institutionalised forms of action 
(Pickvance, 1999). Generally, social movements seek to; alter the social structure, 
redistribute wealth, organise previously unorganised groups against the institutional 
elites, and represent the interests of those who are excluded from the polity (Jenkins, 
1983). Indigenous movements are understood as “a tidy subset of the social 
movements in the region” (Houghton and Bell, 2004: 5).While most social 
movements in Latin America share the common goal of challenging neoliberalism 
there is a “strong distinction” between indigenous and non-indigenous movements in 
the region based on the ethnic demands incorporated by indigenous movements 
(Houghton and Bell, 2004: 5). These demands include indigenous political rights, 
access to bi-cultural education, wealth redistribution, land reform, territorial 
autonomy and respect for customary law (Van Cott, 2005; 2007, Yashar, 1998).  
 
Indigenous peoples represent approximately eleven per cent of the total population of 
Latin America, amounting to fifty million across the region (Van Cott, 2007:33). The 
cultural and linguistic diversities among indigenous people are immense with some 
estimating a total of 379 distinct ethnic groups across the region with further variation 
within each group (Tresierra, 1999). Given this heterogeneity it is not surprising that 
indigenous movements, often “defy political scientists’ attempts to categorise them in 
neat typologies” (Warren and Jackson, 2002: 12). This research divides the 
movements into two broad categories of highland and lowland groups in accordance 
with the work of Alison Brysk (2007) and Salvador Martí i Puig (2010). The lowland 
or ‘tribal’, movements are based in the Amazon and lowland Atlantic/Pacific regions 
of Latin America (Martí i Puig, 2010: 84). These movements represent a small 
proportion of the overall indigenous population (of eleven per cent), however because 
they are concentrated in specific areas they comprise an important social base (Martí i 
Puig, 2010). Lowland movements mobilised around specific ethnic demands such as 
recognition of indigenous rights and protection of territories, often with the help of 
international advocacy networks (Martí i Puig, 2010). The highland, or Indian, 
movements are concentrated in the Andean and Mesoamerica regions of Latin 
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America and are comprised of indigenous farm workers known as campesinos.
43
 
These groups tend to interchange between ethnic and class identities (Peeler, 2003: 
69; Van Cott, 2005: 35). It is important to note that this research focuses on highland 
and lowland groups exclusively and does not include Afro-indigenous peoples or their 
movements. The ethnic composition and collective identity of Afro-indigenous 
groups in the region is vastly different from that of highland and lowland groups. To 
include all of these groups would be erroneous given this diversity in identity and 
culture. For instance, the culturist argument for ethnic mobilisation implies that a 
common culture is the “essential basis of an ethnic community’s political continuity” 
(Vermeersch, 2006: 31). While shared culture alone does not explain mobilisation
44
 it 
does provide the foundation for a collective identity and given the diversity between 
Afro-indigenous groups and highland/lowland groups it would be erroneous to apply 
the same causal mechanism across all of these groups. Rather this study adheres to the 
work of prominent scholars in the field of indigenous social movements in Latin 
America who analyse Afro-indigenous groups separately from lowland and highland 
groups in the region. The variation in movement mobilisation is a central part of this 
study, therefore the following discussion conceptualises movement mobilisation 
generally and the mobilisation of indigenous movements studied in this research in 
particular.   
 
Conceptualisation of indigenous movement mobilisation  
Social movements are “moving targets” that “have a brief life upon the stage” 
(Tarrow, 1991: 17). This makes it difficult to capture a particular episode of 
mobilisation or indeed variation in levels of mobilisation over time. Nonetheless, the 
level of mobilisation of movements is a central part of this study and therefore we 
must look closely at what explains variation in the mobilisation of the groups studied 
here. To do this we must first address what ‘mobilisation’ means more generally. 
                                                          
43
 The Andean Region of Latin America consists of the following countries; Bolivia, Peru Ecuador, 
Venezuela and Colombia. The Mesoamerican region consists of the following countries; Belize, Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama and the nine federal states of the 
southeast region of Mexico: Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, 
Veracruz and Yucatan. Please find a map of each region in the appendix.  
44
 Ethnic mobilisation cannot be explained by a shared ethnic identity or culture alone. Vermeersch 
(2006) highlights that if this were the case then we would see little rather than stark variation in the 
mobilisation of Romani movements across Europe. Rather Vermeersch (2006) argues that variation in 
ethnic mobilization is dependent upon four central factors: political opportunity structure, framing, 
opportunities within the international environment and ethnic competition.  
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Political mobilisation “denotes the deliberate activity of a group of individuals for the 
realisation of political objectives” (Barany, 2001: 309). Mobilisation therefore 
represents the transition of a group from non-action to collective action. Collective 
action can be understood as “joint action in pursuit of common ends” and typically 
manifests in strikes, elections, petitions or marches and other activities common the 
realm of contentious politics, or “unconventional political action” (Tilly, 1978: 84; 
Barany, 2001;Vermeersch, 2012: 225).  
 
Simply put political mobilisation can be understood as “the process by which political 
actors organise collective efforts in order to attempt to bring about political change” 
(Vermeersch, 2006: 28-29). Collective efforts allow a movement to represent and 
formulate the demands of their social base in order to bring about change 
(Vermeersch, 2006). In the case of indigenous movements in Latin America this 
typically means addressing issues of land reform or bilingual education. Often, 
collective efforts are based upon a collective identity understood as a shared 
“cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, 
practice or institutions” (Polletta and Jasper, 2001: 285). For example, the 
mobilisation of an ethnic social movement occurs when a movement mobilises along 
ethnic lines (which acts as their collective identity) in order to achieve political ends 
(Nagel & Olzak, 1982). It is important to note however that collective identities are 
not always pre-existing or ethnically based and in the case of indigenous movements 
in Latin America identities of class and ethnicity often overlap (Polletta and Jasper, 
2001). Specifically, ethnic lines can often overlap or intertwine with socioeconomic 
or class lines. Indeed, the mobilisation of indigenous movements against 
neoliberalism in the region mixed both cultural and class-based identities by 
incorporating economic and ethnic repression as grievances against the neoliberal 
model (Silva, 2009). The overlap between class and identity is not unusual for ethnic 
movements. Reactive theory suggests that ethnic mobilisation is “prompted by 
unequal division of resources along ethnic lines” and “dependent upon the economic 
competition between ethnically differentiated segments of the working class” 
(Vermeersch, 2006: 34). Reactive theory can be problematic for the understanding of 
ethnic movement mobilisation because it assumes that ethnic identities are 
predetermined and therefore mobilisation will automatically coincide with the 
unequal division of resources. The ethnic competition model posits that ethnic 
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mobilisation can be driven by inequality and deprivation but that ethnic identities are 
not a given and instead can be constructed by political leaders (Vermeersch, 2006). I 
argue that while economic disadvantage alone does not explain ethnic mobilisation, or 
indeed variation in ethnic mobilisation, it can explain the often intertwining of ethnic 
and socioeconomic demands, particularly as indigenous peoples are 
socioeconomically disadvantaged.  
 
Indigenous movements across the region began to mobilise in the late 1980s under 
demands of indigenous rights including the recognition of indigenous peoples and 
their territories (Sieder, 2002). During this time existing leftist parties supported 
indigenous movement mobilisation (Van Cott, 2007). By the early 1990s indigenous 
movements became more autonomous from the left and underwent an intense period 
of independent mobilisation. The quincentenary of the discovery of the Americas in 
1992 triggered an increase in mobilisation as movements across the region mobilised 
to “demand the basic human and civil rights that their peoples had been denied for 
centuries” (Rodríguez and Carruthers, 2008:3). Highland groups first mobilised 
around socioeconomic demands such as land and employment by the mid-1980s they 
began to incorporate ethnic demands, such as the recognition of indigenous rights 
(Martí i Puig, 2010). In many cases highland movements mobilised earlier than 
lowland movements. For example, the Katarista movement in Bolivia in 1979 is an 
example of early highland mobilisation. The lowland movements did not mobilise 
until the late 1980s and early 1990s. The late mobilisation of lowland movements can 
be explained by their geographic and administrative isolation. For instance, lowland 
regions were, for the most part, overlooked by the state until the neoliberal era when 
the privatisation of land led to an influx of resource exploration by the state and 
private companies. This jeopardised the territories of lowland communities, providing 
the motivation for the mobilisation of these movements.  
 
The variation in the level of mobilisation is central to this study. I argue that highly 
mobilised movements are more effective in generating support for the left. The 
strength of social ties between a movement and its base can help illustrate this. For 
instance, a highly mobilised movement is likely to have stronger ties and connections 
with their social bases than lowly mobilised movements that are weak and 
fragmented. The strength of social ties can act as a measure in the prediction of 
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individual participation. Therefore where social ties are strong, individuals within the 
social base are more likely to act in accordance with the movement (McAdam and 
Paulsen, 1993). The stronger the connection and social ties between a movement and 
its base, the more likely the movement can efficiently mobilise its base in support for 
a party. Conversely, where social ties are weak, the connection between the 
movement and the base will also be weak, and individuals are less likely to follow the 
instructions of the movement. For this reason, I expect to find stronger support for the 
left where movements are highly mobilised than where they are weakly mobilised. 
The work of Yashar (2005) provides an explicit framework for understanding 
variation in indigenous movement mobilisation in the context of Latin America and 
the movements studied here. She provides three variables essential for understanding 
the variation in indigenous movement mobilisation across the region. They are 
motivation, capacity and opportunity.  
 
Motivation relates to the incident, threat or critical juncture, which occurred to 
motivate individuals to become involved in mobilisation, and take political action. In 
many cases the motivation for indigenous movement mobilisation was the transition 
from corporatist citizenship regimes to neoliberal regimes from 1980s-1990s. 
Corporatist citizenship regimes can be understood as a type of citizen regime which 
“generally advanced the idea” that citizens have some civil rights, such as the right to 
organise, and some social rights, such as the right to a basic standard of living 
(Yashar, 1998: 81). Under corporatist citizen regimes, labour and peasant associations 
were promoted and received state subsidies. These regimes sought to reconstitute 
Indians as peasants by implementing land reforms which returned titles to highland 
Indians such as the Velasco regime in Peru (1965-1975), discussed in more detail 
later in this chapter. These regimes were replaced by neoliberal regimes from the 
1980s onwards, which had a different perception of citizenship based on individual 
autonomy and responsibility that was rooted in the promotion of free markets in land 
and labour (Yashar, 2005). This type of regime threatened the local autonomy and 
subsidies enjoyed by the movements under corporatist regimes thus sparking the 
mobilisation of movements against neoliberalism.
45
  
                                                          
45
 For a more detailed discussion on corporatist versus neoliberal citizenship regimes please see Yashar 
(2005) Contesting Citizenship in Latin America; The rise of Indigenous Movements and the Post 
liberal Challenge.  
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The second factor necessary for mobilisation is the type of political opportunity 
structure in place and whether movements have the freedom and space to mobilise. 
Yashar (2005) argues that in periods of political closure and militarisation, 
opportunities for legally organising in a group are closed and so mobilisation cannot 
take place.
46
 Political opportunity theorists postulate that “declining repression should 
promote movement mobilisation and success while increasing repression should deter 
mobilisation and inhibit success” (Schock, 1999:361). It is important to state however 
that this is not simply a case of whether the system is open or closed, but rather the 
degree to which each state is open or closed (Maiz, 2003). This is in congruence to 
the work of Yashar (2005) who equates openness with associational space but insists 
that associational space is not necessarily synonymous with democratisation. Rather 
associational space “exists to varying degrees in different political contexts” (Yashar, 
2005: 77).  
 
Ultimately for Yashar (2005: 77), the common denominator is that these contexts do 
not “trample the capacity to associate and speak out”. We can reconcile this with the 
work of Schock (1999) who examined the mobilisation of social movements in the 
Philippines. The author finds that “social movements do not mobilise in the same 
way; some are activated by an open POS whereas others are not because they react to 
threats” (Schock, 1999:3). This relates to the above discussion in which movements 
mobilised in reaction to the change from corporatist to neoliberal systems. The point 
here is that mobilisation cannot be explained simply by absolute freedom and 
associational space. Instead, the degree to which a state is open or closed can impact 
the levels of mobilisation we might expect. Moreover, opportunities are not given but 
rather they must be perceived as opportunities by the movement itself in order to be 
seized, thus highlighting the role of movements themselves in recognising opportunity 
(Barany, 2002). Ultimately, what this illustrates is that political opportunity structure 
helps to explain the variation in the mobilisation of indigenous movements in Latin 
America but only when understood in conjunction with other factors such as 
motivation and the organisational capacity of the movement discussed below. 
                                                          
46
 Therefore political opportunity structure can be understood as the space available for groups to 
organise. This is determined by how much associational space is available for groups under a given 
regime. The more open the space the easier it is for groups to form. This however must be taken in 
conjunction with the other two variables, motivation and organisational capacity, to explain levels of 
mobilisation.   
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Movements must strengthen their organisational capacity in order, “to initiate and 
sustain” the movement (Yashar, 2005: 71). While the organisational capacity of a 
movement can be determined by a variety of factors
47
, Yashar (2005) explains that the 
strength of pre-existing networks between movements is crucial for explaining 
variation in indigenous movements in Latin America. She argues that networks 
“provide a forum for future indigenous leaders to meet, share common experiences, 
develop a common language, identify common problems, and articulate common 
goals” (Yashar, 2005: 71). Networks are particularly important for indigenous 
communities separated by vast distances (Yashar, 2005). Networks increase the 
capacity of a movement to mobilise because they transform “a group of concerned 
individuals into a viable movement” (Yashar, 2005:74). In many cases, external state 
actors such as International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) helped 
communities establish these networks whilst in others, internal actors such as trade 
unions, churches, and in some cases the state, have helped establish these networks. 
(Yashar, 2005: 73). Where these networks existed prior to the motivation for 
mobilisation and political opportunities we see higher levels of movement 
mobilisation which helps to explain variation in mobilisation (Yashar, 2005).  
 
The mobilisation of the indigenous movement, Confederación de Nacionalidades 
Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) in 1985 is a case in which all three of Yashar’s 
(2005) components came together. In this case, neoliberalism provided the motivation 
for mobilisation while democratisation provided the opportunity structure necessary 
to mobilise and the pre-existing networks established by churches and peasant unions 
before the 1990s worked to enhance the level of mobilisation. This highlights the 
importance of understanding social movement mobilisation as an interactive process 
in which a variety of components come together and result in mobilisation. This is 
especially important for understanding ethnic mobilisation which for Barany (1998: 
548) “does not occur in a vacuum” but rather “needs a number of ingredients, or 
prerequisites, in order to succeed”. Finally, while the work of Yashar (1998; 2005) is 
concerned with explaining the variation in indigenous movement mobilisation, this 
study is primarily concerned with the impact of this variation on support for the left in 
                                                          
47
Such factors include the strength of collective identity (Vermeersch, 2006; Barany 2002), the framing 
of grievances and demands (Vermeersch, 2006; Fumagalli, 2007; Jenson, 1998) and the strength of 
movement leaders (Barany 2002; Vermeersch 2012; Polletta and Jasper 1998). 
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the region. Although these topics are inextricably linked, the research grounds itself in 
the work of Yashar (2005), which has sufficiently identified levels of mobilisation 
both across and within the five cases outlined on Table 2.2 below. By using the work 
of Yashar (2005) as a foundation to explain variation, the research can better direct its 
efforts into investigating whether this variation can explain variation in the support of 
the left.  
 
Table 2.2: Indigenous population and movement mobilisation by country.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Yashar (2005) and Inter-American Development Bank, 2006.   
 
Operationalisation of indigenous movement mobilisation  
The operationalisation of indigenous movement mobilisation is a complex task, not 
least because social movements are by nature “moving targets” making it difficult to 
measure their mobilisation levels at any one time (Tarrow, 1991: 17). This in turn 
makes it difficult to capture variation in mobilisation over time. For example, while 
Yashar (2005) provides a useful categorisation of mobilisation levels for the five 
countries (see Table above) this does not capture the variation in levels of 
mobilisation over time. To overcome this, I designed expert surveys to capture levels 
of indigenous movement mobilisation across time, providing original data for the 
study of indigenous movement mobilisation. Given that this is an original 
measurement it is important to specify its construction by providing a more detailed 
discussion on the expert surveys here.  
 
The surveys were limited to five cases in which indigenous peoples represent a 
substantial percentage of the total population. As discussed in the introduction of this 
thesis, indigenous population size is considered an important factor for the level of 
support for the left. The reasoning here is that although population is not a guarantee 
of mobilisation, there should be a large enough population so that if a social base 
were to mobilise it would have an impact on elections. In this way, the independent 
Country Indigenous 
Population  
% of total 
Regional or 
National   
Movements  
Level of  
Movement 
mobilisation  
Bolivia    71 Regional Strong 
Guatemala    66 National Significant 
Peru         47 Regional  Weak 
Ecuador    43 National Strong 
Mexico    14 Regional Significant 
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variable is interactive. The cases are Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Guatemala and Mexico. 
An indigenous population is considered as substantial by this research when it 
exceeds ten per cent of the total population. For example, as Table 2.3 below 
illustrates the indigenous population of Argentina is one per cent of total population. 
Even if every indigenous person in Argentina joined an indigenous movement and 
mobilised, it would still represent too small a social base for a party to consider it 
electorally advantageous.  
 
Table 2.3:  Estimated indigenous population across Latin America  
Country National 
Population 
Indigenous 
Population 
Indigenous 
Population 
(%) 
Bolivia  8,329,000 5,914,000 71 
Guatemala 12,640,000 8,342,000 66 
Peru 27,013,000 12,696,000 47 
Ecuador 12,920,000 5,556,000 43 
Belize 250,000 47,000 19 
Honduras 6,250,000 938,000 15 
Mexico 100,350,000 14,049,000 14 
Chile 15,211,000 1,217,000 8 
El Salvador 6,123,000 429,000 7 
Guyana 697,000 56,000 8 
Panama  2,808,000 168,000 6 
Suriname 431,000 26,000 6 
Nicaragua 4,813,000 241,000 5 
Paraguay  5,586,000 168,000 3 
Colombia 39,686,000 794,000 2 
Venezuela 23,543,000 471,000 2 
Costa Rica 3,644,000 36,000 1 
Argentina 36,955,000 370,000 1 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
1,075,000 12,000 1 
Brazil  166,113,000 332,000 0 
Uruguay  3,278,000 1,000 0 
 
Total  
 
477,715 
 
51,971 
 
11 
Source: Inter-American Development Bank, 2006.  
 
It is important to note that while Honduras also exceeds the threshold, it is not 
included in this study. Firstly, the ethnic composition of the indigenous population of 
Honduras is different than that of the other cases. For instance, one of the largest 
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indigenous groups in Honduras is the Garifuna people
48
 who are decedents of 
marooned African Slaves and the indigenous people of the Caribbean who were 
deported from the Island of St. Vincent in 1797 and who eventually settled in 
Honduras (Anderson, 2007). The Garifuna and other afro-hondureños groups 
dominate the ethnic makeup of Honduras. This is different from the indigenous 
population found in the other cases which is comprised of Mesoamerican or Indian 
(highland movements) and indigenous people from the amazon (lowland movements).  
This difference is important because the demands of these groups are distinct from the 
movements studied here. Consequently, the relationship and dynamics between ethnic 
movements in Honduras can be quite different from the movements in Bolivia or Peru 
for instance.
49
 As mentioned earlier the cultural difference between Afro-indigenous 
and lowland/highland groups is quite distinct and for these reason the two groups are 
not typically compared. 
 
This is not to say that smaller movements, more comparable movements did not 
emerge in Honduras. For example, Mesoamerican groups such as the Chortí
50
 
organised into smaller organisations. In the late 1980s these small movements allied 
with OFRANEH however and as a result the indigenous movement in Honduras is 
understood as one general autochthonous
51
 grouping of diverse ethnicities rather than 
the lowland-highland distinctions we get in the cases selected for study (Anderson, 
2007). This changes the dynamics of relations with the state and potential allies, such 
as parties, that operate within it. For instance, the Honduran state incorporates 
indigenous and black subjects within one single paradigm of collective rights and 
legislative framework (Anderson, 2007). The complexity of the ethnic composition of 
indigenous movement in Honduras, and indeed of other cases where Afro-indigenous 
communities are more dominant, means that it is somewhat of an apple among the 
                                                          
48
The population of Garifuna alone is 49,952 according to a 2001 government report (Anderson, 2007). 
49
For example, in the late 1970s the Garifuna group established an organisation called La Organización 
Fraternal Negra Hondureña (OFRANEH), which as the title suggests identified itself at first as an afro-
Honduran organisation. Where mobilisation occurred it was along afro-ethnic lines and mobilisation 
therefore is centred more on anti-racism and class divisions rather than demands for ethnic rights (such 
as bi-lingual education for instance) (Hooker, 2005). By the late 1980s the OFRANEH made diverse 
alliances ranging from timber merchants and military officers that were centred more along class than 
ethnic lines (Anderson, 2007).  
50
 Numbering 37,052 according to a 2001 government report (Anderson, 2007) 
51
The term autochthonous can be understood as pertaining to native, indigenous or aboriginal identities 
and is used by Anderson throughout his article. 
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oranges in terms of case selection and is therefore excluded.
52
 Finally, the selection of 
cases used in this study closely follows in the footsteps of prominent scholars on 
indigenous politics in Latin America such as Deborah Yashar (2005) and Donna Lee 
Van Cott (2005; 2007; 2008) who focus their studies on the cases of Bolivia, 
Guatemala, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru.  
 
The case of Romani movements and political parties in Eastern Europe illustrates the 
importance of considering population size in this study. Although some Romani 
movements sought alliances with political parties, the parties were not willing to ally 
with the movements because the Romani communities represent a low proportion of 
the population
53
 (Barany, 2002: 227). By representing a small proportion of the 
electorate there was little incentive for parties to pursue an alliance, illustrating that 
without an electorally advantageous social base movement-party alliances are 
unlikely to form (Barany, 2002: 301). Similar to indigenous people in Latin America, 
a social bias against the Romani ethnicity amongst the electorate meant that if a party 
was to include a gypsy name on their list they risk that “one Romani vote means the 
loss of two others” (Barany, 2002: 301). In other cases parties “court gypsy voters” by 
asking popular gypsy personalities to campaign for them in gypsy communities, or by 
buying the gypsy vote with cash, food supplies or festivals (Barany, 2002: 301).  
 
There is no guarantee however that the voters will adhere to their side of the 
agreement. For example during the 1998-1999 presidential and legislative elections in 
Macedonia two major parties distributed food in the Romani suburbs yet the 
community voted for a party that had no contact with the community during the 
campaign (Barany 2002: 302). For this reason, movement-party alliances are less 
likely to occur and even if they did, they would have minimal impact on the electoral 
success of a party. This study therefore focuses on cases in which a population is 
                                                          
52
 Honduras is also excluded because the indigenous population of Honduras is simply not consistently 
reported which could impede the research if incorrectly selected. For example, according to figures 
from a 2006 report by the Inter-American Development Bank listed on Figure 3.6 above, the 
indigenous population of Honduras represents 15 per cent of the total population. However, according 
to a report by the Honduran government in 2001, the total indigenous population is 7.2 per cent of the 
total population (Anderson, 2007). Given that population size is the qualifier for case selection we 
should exclude ambiguous cases such as Honduras.  
53
 Romani population Hungary and Bulgaria is less than ten per cent of the total population (Barany, 
2002).  
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large enough that if it were to mobilise if could have a considerable impact on the 
electoral success of a party. 
 
The experts were asked to score levels of indigenous movement mobilisation by 
country, based on a scale of mobilisation (see appendix A.1 for a copy of the survey). 
I developed this scale of mobilisation based on social movement theory as well as an 
understanding of Latin American indigenous movements as informed by scholars 
such as Yashar (2005) and Van Cott (2005; 2007; 2008). Vignettes were provided to 
experts in order to score mobilisation levels according to low, medium or high levels 
(see appendix A.1 for vignette). Experts were asked to score indigenous movement 
mobilisation in each case in the following time frames; 1990-1998, 1999-2006 and 
2007-2011. These time frames are consistent with the time frame selected for analysis 
of the dependent variable (1990-2011)
54
 and capture variation within both the central 
variables (before and after the left turn in 1998 and before and after intense 
indigenous movement mobilisation in the mid-late 1990s). The survey was originally 
compiled and sent to experts in 2011, therefore this year is included in the time frame. 
It is unlikely that mobilisation dramatically increased or decreased in 2011 alone 
however, and because experts were asked to give a score per time frame rather than 
by year, this does not compromise the analysis.  
 
While Chapter 3 will provide a more detailed discussion on the expert surveys, it is 
important to note here that they are the central measurement for indigenous 
movement mobilisation. They are a fundamental part of the research design because 
they provide a measurement for the key independent variable where it did not 
previously exist. In this way the survey data provides an original measure of 
indigenous movement mobilisation which can be used in the quantitative analysis to 
test the breadth of the relationship between indigenous movement mobilisation and 
the variation in support for the left. The survey data also provides original information 
about the behaviour of indigenous social movements more generally as questions 
were also included to observe what activities are typically undertaken (protests or 
community meetings for instance) and whether movements are mobilised in some 
regions more than others (highland versus lowland movements). The responses to 
                                                          
54
 As listed in Table 2.1 the dependent variable is measured in four ways, the first three measurements 
(presvrl, presvrl2 and lhvrl) provide data from 1990 to 2009 while the fourth measurement 
(leftvoteshare) includes data from 1990 to 2011.  
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these questions provided a comprehensive and practical understanding of indigenous 
movements in the region and the scores provide a measurement for mobilisation. 
Therefore, the survey data alone provides an empirical contribution to research in this 
area. 
 
Admittedly, a shortcoming of the movement mobilisation scores from the expert 
surveys is that they only provide data for five cases. Given that the goal of the 
quantitative study is to provide breadth to the study this presents an obstacle for the 
quantitative analysis. In order to overcome this I include some proxy measurements 
for indigenous movement mobilisation, which I use first in a quantitative study of all 
eighteen Latin American countries. These include indigenous population and a 
general mass mobilisation score provided by the work of Roberts (2002) outlined in 
Chapter 1. Roberts (2002) categorises each Latin American country as either having a 
labour mobilising or elite party system. His work suggests that labour mobilising 
countries are more susceptible to mass mobilisation, therefore I renamed his labour 
mobilising countries as mass mobilising. The logic here is to use indigenous 
population (which admittedly is not a guarantee of mobilisation) along with mass 
mobilisation to uncover whether variables have a positive effect on support for the left 
when interacted with the measurements of the main dependent variable. Once these 
tests are conducted, I use my indigenous mobilisation score to test the relationship 
between mobilisation and support for the left within the five countries across the same 
time frame. Table 2.4 below provides a full overview of the measurement of the 
independent variable for the quantitative analysis.  
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Table 2.4: Operationalisation of the independent variable for the quantitative 
analysis  
Variable  Measure Source  
Indigenous Movement 
Mobilisation 
(movemobscore) 
0-2. where o is low, 
1 is medium and 2 is 
high. 
My original 
expert survey  
 
Indigenous Population  
 
 
As percentage of 
total population 
 
The Inter-
American 
Development 
Bank (IADB) 
 
Mass Mobilising  
(massmob) 
 
Dummy variable 
where 0 is non-mass 
mobilising and 1 is 
mass mobilising  
 
Roberts (2002) 
 
2.3 The mixed method approach  
This research adopts a mixed-method approach, which is understood as a “synthesis” 
of ideas from qualitative and quantitative research (Johnson and Turner, 2007: 112). 
Both quantitative and qualitative methods are employed to investigate the relationship 
between indigenous movement mobilisation and the variation in support for the 
contestatory left. Specifically, a quantitative study is used to test the general 
relationship between indigenous movement mobilisation and support for the 
contestatory left. This is complemented by in-depth comparative case studies of 
Bolivia and Peru, which exposes the nuts and bolts of this relationship.  
 
The difference between qualitative and quantitative methods is a difference of 
‘breadth’ and ‘depth’ (Mabry, 2008: 216). For example, quantitative studies “sample 
from broad populations and produce grand generalisations” thus providing breadth. 
Conversely, qualitative methods such as comparative case studies “provide a deep 
understanding about specific instances” (Mabry, 2008: 216). This allows the 
researcher to “peer into the box of causality” and “see X and Y interact” (Gerring, 
2007: 45). Importantly, both breadth and depth are “needed for understanding social 
phenomena” (Mabry, 2008: 2016). Essentially, while “researchers invariably face a 
choice between knowing more about less, or less about more”, the mixed method 
approach enables one to overcome this challenge by providing an approach in which 
both breadth and depth are of equal importance (Gerring, 2007: 106).  
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Furthermore, if the ultimate goal of scientific research is inference, the mixed-method 
approach can provide the methodological triangulation necessary to increase 
“inferential leverage” (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 7, Tarrow, 2004: 174). 
Triangulation is understood as the combining of qualitative and quantitative methods 
and is useful because it “heightens qualitative methods to their deserved prominence 
and, at the same time, demonstrates that quantitative methods can and should be 
utilized in complementary fashion” (Jick, 1979: 610). The mixed method approach 
also enables more rigorous testing because “the bias inherent in any particular data 
sources, investigators and particularly methods will be cancelled out when used in 
conjunction with other data sources, investigators, and methods” (Johnson et al., 
2007: 115). Consequently, methodological triangulation achieved through a mixed-
method approach allows the researcher to be more confident of their results because 
the hypothesis undergoes two sets of testing (Johnson et al., 2007: 115). 
 
Finally it is worth noting that the philosophical underpinning of the mixed method 
approach is “pragmatism” (Denscombe, 2008: 270). Mixed methods are pragmatic 
because they offer the researcher a “common ground” between quantitative and 
qualitative research paradigms, which often participate in “sterile and unproductive 
dualisms” over positivism (or post-positivist) and constructivism (or interpretivism) 
(Denscombe, 2008: 270-273). Accordingly, the mixed-method approach represents a 
“third paradigm” for social research that “incorporates a distinct set off ideas and 
practices that separate the approach from other main research paradigms” 
(Denscombe, 2008: 270). In addition, the mixed method approach provides an 
alternative for those who feel that “neither quantitative nor qualitative research alone 
will provide adequate findings” (Denscombe, 2008: 274). For others the mixing of 
methods is necessary in order to “provide an adequate answer” to the research 
question (Denscombe, 2008: 274). Ultimately, this project adopts a mixed-method 
approach in order to sufficiently answer the research question, and in turn make 
appropriate causal inferences.  
 
The purpose of the quantitative analysis is to explore the relationship between the 
variation in indigenous movement mobilisation and variation in support for the left.  
Specifically, a time-series, cross-sectional analysis is used to assess the relationship of 
indigenous movement mobilisation and the percentage of the left’s vote share in 
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legislative and presidential elections across Latin America. The analysis was 
conducted for eighteen Latin American countries from 1990 to 2009
55
 using an 
original dataset. This time frame was selected in order to capture variation in the 
relationship over time. This allows us to observe the relationship both before the left 
turn in 1998 and after the left turn which can be considered to ebb from 2009. This 
time frame also encompasses a period of intense indigenous movement mobilisation 
during the 1990s and a period in which the left experienced sweeping success across 
the region from 2000-2006. Ultimately, the quantitative study provides an overview 
of the relationship between indigenous movement mobilisation and support for the 
left across a time frame that provides variation within both variables.  
 
The project conducts a qualitative analysis using the comparative case study method. 
The comparative method allows the researcher to study “wholes” rather than “parts” 
(De Vaus, 2008: 236). Case studies help “achieve explanations by building a full 
picture of the sequence of events, the context in which they occur, and the meaning of 
actions and events as interpreted by participants and their meaning as given by a 
context” (De Vaus, 2008: 236). Accordingly, and as previously stated “the primary 
virtue of the case study method is the depth of analysis that it offers” (Gerring, 2007: 
49). Depth is understood as “detail, richness, completeness, wholeness, or degree of 
variance in an outcome that is accounted for by the explanation” (Gerring, 2007: 49). 
Moreover, the comparative case-study method permits repeated experiments, or ‘the 
logic of replication’, which ensures that the case that matched the predicted theory did 
not occur by chance, thus strengthening the hypothesis (De Vaus, 2008: 237). The 
strength of this however, lies upon the ‘strategic selection’ of case studies (De Vaus, 
2008:  237).  
2.4 Case selection  
For King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 128) case selection is “crucial” for the degree to 
which the research can “provide determinate and reliable results”. Specifically, the 
researcher must avoid selection bias, considered by the authors as the “most egregious 
error” (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 142). Ordinarily, the panacea for selection 
                                                          
55
 Due to data limitations, discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, the analysis does not include elections 
after 2009. This however does not impede the research because it is concerned primarily with the left 
turn at the turn of the century and secondarily with the ebb of the left turn around 2009-2010, both of 
which are included in this dataset.  
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bias is random sample, in small-n research however this is not “appropriate” (King, 
Keohane and Verba, 1994: 142).  Przeworski & Teune (1970: 32) explain that “for 
practical reasons the selection of countries can rarely be random”. Instead, selection 
must be based on “tactical choices” that are “limited to the question of the ‘best’ 
combination of countries” (Przeworski & Teune, 1970: 32-33).   
 
In order to select the ‘best combination of countries’ and avoid selection bias the most 
similar system design (MSSD) is adopted in this research. MSSD requires selection of 
cases which are “similar on all the measured independent variables except the 
independent variable of interest”; in this case the variation in indigenous movement 
mobilisation. This allows the researcher to control for other explanations. This system 
is advocated by Lijphart (1971) who explains that cases should be selected 
systematically, include as much control as possible, be comparable and focus on the 
key variables. This technique ensures non-selection on the dependent variable and 
variation on the independent variable which are crucial for making causal inferences 
in scientific research (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994).  
 
The cases of Bolivia and Peru are carefully selected in order to optimise variation 
both across and within cases. Firstly, they vary on the independent variable of 
indigenous movement mobilisation at a country case level. In the case of Bolivia, 
indigenous movement mobilisation is high, while in Peru it is low. The cases also 
provide within-case variation because there is variation between lowland and 
highland mobilisation within each case.  Therefore, the research adheres to the advice 
of King, Keohane and Verba (1994:140) who state that the “best ‘intentional’ design 
selects observations to ensure variation in the explanatory variable (and any control 
variables) without regard to the values of the dependent variables”. The authors also 
acknowledge that selecting on the independent variable alone is “often unrealistic for 
qualitative research” (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 141). Rather, the authors 
explain that when we must take into account the values of the dependent variable we 
should select observations with particularly high and particularly low values (King, 
Keohane and Verba, 1994). The 2005 elections in Bolivia represent a case in which 
the contestatory left was successful, while the 2006 elections in Peru represent a case 
in which the moderate left was successful. Selecting cases in which the value of the 
dependent variable varies is useful because it can “help us to gain some valuable 
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information about the empirical plausibility of a casual inference” (King, Keohane 
and Verba, 1994: 141). 
 
The MSSD is made up of two countries in the Andean region of Latin America, 
Bolivia and Peru. According to Lijphart (1971:688) the “geographic proximity” of 
countries means they are “likely to be similar in many other respects”. This is true for 
the cases which are part of the great Andean Corridor, a region which is often 
overlooked despite historical crises of democratic representation and political distrust 
(Yashar, 2005: 226; Mainwaring et al, 2006: 17). Both cases experienced “parallel 
political trajectories” as a result of a shared colonial past (Yashar, 2005: 226). 
Accordingly, Bolivia and Peru underwent a “politico-institutional parallel” in which 
the treatment of indigenous people was the same under the colonial constitution 
(Yashar, 2005: 226). Bolivia and Peru also share “unitary political systems” that 
allows the researcher to hold institutional factors constant such as party systems 
which according to Yashar (2005: 19) are fragmented and volatile in each case.  
 
Crucially, Bolivia and Peru share the same demography. Firstly, they both have 
substantial indigenous populations. In Bolivia, the indigenous population represents 
71 per cent of the total population while for Peru it is estimated as 47 per cent. As 
previously explained, a substantial indigenous population is important because there 
should be population large enough so that if mobilisation were to occur it would 
considerably impact the success of the contestatory left. The composition of 
indigenous populations is also similar in each case because they are geographically 
dispersed and ethnically divided between the highland and lowland groups providing 
variation within the cases (Yashar, 2005: 227). Importantly, the highland Quechua 
and Aymara Indians make up the majority indigenous group while the indigenous 
people of the lowlands constitute a minority (Yashar, 2005). It is particularly 
important in a project about indigenous movements that we compare movements 
which are similar in their demographic composition. In this way the research heeds 
the warning by Gerring (2007: 50), that if one were to compare “apples and oranges” 
then “one cannot learn anything about underlying causal processes”. In order to 
understand the causal process, this research selects cases that are similar but that vary 
on the key dependent variable. The selection of these cases also helps control for 
alternative explanations.  
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Controlling for alternative explanations  
Discontent is considered as the ‘lowest common denominator’ for explaining the left 
turn because it includes a variety of issues that drove voters left. This argument is 
predicated on the assumption that there was a neoliberal incumbent. As illustrated on 
Table 2.8 below, both countries experienced neoliberal incumbents in the elections 
studied (2005 in Bolivia and 2006 in Peru). Peru was governed by right-winged 
President Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) and later by centre-right President Alejandro 
Toledo (2001-2006) (Schmidt, 2007:814). In Bolivia, the election of Evo Morales in 
2005 was preceded by a succession of right-wing neoliberal presidents including 
President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada known as ‘Goni’ (2002-2003) and Carlos Mesa 
(2003-2005). Furthermore, in each case the incumbent implemented failing neoliberal 
reforms which generated discontent. 
 
There are a number of indicators that can be used to assess discontent. The first is 
whether economic growth occurred during the neoliberal era. Table 2.5 provides an 
overview of GDP annual growth rates in each country between 1994 and 2004. In the 
case of Bolivia, GDP annual growth decreased in 2000 and by 2004 it had not 
recovered to the growth levels achieved in 1998 and the preceding years. In Peru, 
GDP fell dramatically between 1994 and 1998 and although it recovered somewhat in 
2002 it feel again in 2004. The fluctuation of growth rates provides a basis for 
measuring discontent with these regimes.  
 
Table 2.5: GDP annual growth (%) in Bolivia and Peru (1994-2004) 
 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
Bolivia 4.8 4.5 5.0 2.3 2.7 3.8 
Peru 12.7 2.5 -0.5 2.5 5.4 4.6 
Source: O’Toole (2011) 
 
Unemployment rates can also indicate the performance of neoliberal regimes in 
Bolivia and Peru. It can be argued that high rates of unemployment were a source of 
discontent because neoliberal incumbents failed to deliver employment. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, in some cases the privatisation of state companies increased 
unemployment in some sectors, such as the Carlos Menem (1989-1999) 
administration in Argentina. Table 2.6 below demonstrates that urban unemployment 
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increased dramatically in the lead up to the left turn in Bolivia (2005). In Peru, 
unemployment experienced a marginal decrease from 1985-2000 but unemployment 
increased again in 2002.  
 
Table 2.6: Urban unemployment in Bolivia and Peru (1985-2002) 
 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 
Bolivia 5.7 7.2 16.4 15.1 19.7 
Peru 10.1 8.3 7.9 7.0 9.4 
Source: UNDP (2004: 123) 
 
Continued inequality is also a source of discontent resulting from neoliberal reforms. 
Inequality levels can be measured using the Gini coefficient. The following graph 
indicates the available Gini coefficient scores for each country from the earliest 
available data for the 1990s to the incumbent score closest to the left turn in each 
case.  As Figure 2.3 below indicates, inequality remained high in Bolivia between 
1991 and 2001. While the lowest Gini coefficient was reported in 1991, between 1993 
and 1997 inequality increased substantially reaching its highest point in 2000 and 
only decreasing marginally in 2001. Interestingly, it was at this time that indigenous 
movement mobilisation against the neoliberal incumbent Sánchez de Lozada or 
‘Goni’ intensified, as evidenced by the Cochabamba Water War in 2000 and ensuing 
demonstrations discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. Ultimately, inequality remained 
high in Bolivia throughout the neoliberal period. In Peru, inequality was also high 
during the neoliberal era. As Figure 2.4 below indicates, despite a drop in 1997 
inequality increased dramatically between 1998 and 1999. We also see a decrease in 
2000 but inequality rose again in 2001. As with Bolivia, inequality was high under 
neoliberal incumbents despite some relief in 1997. Although it is difficult to assert the 
reason for the drop in inequality between 1994 and 1997, it is worth noting the re-
election of neoliberal President Alberto Fujimori in 1995 who by this time was 
becoming increasingly authoritarian and besieged by allegations of corruption. While 
this cannot explain the decrease in inequality levels entirely, it is worth noting the 
political upheaval during this era.  
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Figure 2.3: Inequality in Bolivia (1991-2001)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database. 
 
Figure 2.4: Inequality in Peru (1994-2001) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database. 
 
As stated in Chapter 1 this research agrees that levels of discontent are important for 
understanding the left turn because it provided a central motivation for the electorate 
to vote for the left. Rather than challenge discontent as an explanation, this research 
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seeks to build upon it by arguing that indigenous people were amongst the most 
discontented with neoliberal reforms and for this reason were ideologically congruent 
with the left. The specific contribution made by this research to the discontent 
argument however is to highlight the importance of indigenous movements in 
transforming this discontent to electoral success by mobilising their bases in support 
of the left.  
 
The chapter will now discuss the cases selected for the qualitative study in light of 
prevailing explanations for the emergence of two types of left in the region which is 
the secondary puzzle explored in this research. Explanations for this variation in 
centred on two factors; commodity booms and the level of party system 
institutionalisation. Weyland (2009: 146) states that commodity booms are a “crucial 
factor” in explaining the variation in the emergence of the contestatory and moderate 
left. The argument here is that the boost in revenue generated by commodity booms 
allows the contestatory left to pursue its ambitious social policies and garner support 
for future elections. This research argues however that the commodity boom 
explanation does more to explain the endurance of the contestatory left once in power 
than the emergence of the various lefts. Nonetheless both cases have access to natural 
resource rents. Figure 2.5 below displays the growth in the total resource rents for 
both cases from 1990-2006. Although Bolivia is rich in gas and Peru in oil, total 
resource rents is a suitable measurement for comparing the two countries because it is 
the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal and mineral rents, and forest rents (World 
Bank, 2013). The graph below indicates that resource rents greatly increased from the 
early 2000s. This highlights revenue from these commodities was also available for 
use by neoliberal incumbents and so an increase in resource rents cannot explain the 
emergence of the contestatory left.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Research Design    
90 
 
Figure 2.5: Increase in resource rents in Bolivia and Peru (1990-2006) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database. 
 
Firstly, resource rents as percentage of GDP increased before the election in each 
case
56
 and so leftist governments were not yet in a position to spend the revenue 
generated on redistributive policies. For instance, Weyland (2010) argues that the 
revenues generated from the boom allow the contestatory left to increase social 
spending and increase popularity. However, the left must be in power in the first place 
in order to implement these polices and reap the rewards. The central interest of this 
research is to explain the emergence of these governments in the first instance, rather 
than what contributes to their re-election later. Moreover, it is argued here that the 
commodity boom argument is somewhat endogenous. That is, when we do not control 
for endogeneity we might see “that the values of our explanatory variable take on are 
sometimes a consequence, rather than a cause, of our dependent variable” (King, 
Keohane and Verba, 1994: 185). Commodity booms can be said to be a consequence 
rather than the cause of the contestatory left because once in power these leaders 
typically implement policies such as the nationalisation of commodities, providing 
them with higher resource rents which they then use to finance ambitious 
redistributive polices. For these reasons, the commodity boom argument is an 
insufficient explanation for the variation in the emergence of variant types of the left. 
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 Resource rents increase dramatically in 2004 in Bolivia and in 2006 in Peru.  
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Party institutionalisation is also considered to explain variation in support for the left. 
Indeed, for Weyland (2010), discontent with neoliberalism should be considered in 
conjunction with levels of party system institutionalisation in order to explain 
variation in left support. The combination of discontent with weak party systems 
provides the opportunity for new leaders and movements to emerge whose “fiery 
rhetoric and ambitious promises” were favoured by the discontented electorate 
(Weyland, 2010:20). Conversely, well-institutionalised party systems make it more 
difficult for new, more extreme, parties or leaders to emerge. Mainwaring and Torcal 
(2006: 2) also argue that party institutionalisation matters for the emergence of more 
extreme or ‘anti-party politicians’ such as former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. 
While the authors do not distinguish between a left-right divide (they also include 
former right-wing President Alberto Fujimori of Peru), their argument is similar in 
that they state that weakly institutionalised party systems are more vulnerable to 
allowing anti-party politicians to emerge and the contestatory left can be considered 
as such. For this reason, we should expect that the contestatory left are less successful 
where party systems are highly institutionalised.  
 
When we consider the case of Bolivia and Peru however we find that both countries 
have weakly institutionalised systems, yet the contestatory leftist candidates emerged 
in Bolivia in 2005 and not in Peru in 2006. Jones (2005) provides a party 
institutionalisation index score which is an aggregated score of electoral volatility, 
party roots, party and election legitimacy, and party organisation. According to this 
index scores, both Bolivia and Peru are at the lower end of party institutionalisation. 
Bolivia scores 56 while Peru scores lower with 53 indicating “weak party systems that 
are constantly changing” (Jones, 2005; Arce, 2010). Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) 
also provide a measurement for party system institutionalisation by compiling a mean 
measurement of electoral volatility within legislative elections from 1980-2002
57
 in 
which Bolivia receives a score of 39.8 and Peru again scores lower with 51.9. Peru in 
particular is considered as “extremely volatile” by the authors (Mainwaring and 
Torcal, 2005: 9). Sánchez (2008: 321) explains that party system institutionalisation 
in Peru was greatly weakened under President Alberto Fujimori (1980-2000) who 
introduced a “number of executive-driven reforms designed to open up the political 
                                                          
57
 In the case of Peru the time frame is 1980-2001 
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system”. Sánchez (2008: 31) argues that Peru has “struggled to recreate a bona fide 
party system” since the Fujimori era and this is reflected by continued electoral 
volatility which is “among the very highest in Latin America”. Despite a weakly 
institutionalised party system however, the extreme left did not emerge in Peru during 
the 2006 elections studied in this research. 
 
Party system institutionalisation in Bolivia is described as inchoate by Mainwaring 
and Scully (1995). During the 1990s the weakly institutionalised traditional parties of 
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), Acción Democrática Nacionalista 
(ADN) and Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) dominated vote share 
(Sánchez, 2008). However the social unrest which occurred in the early 2000s in 
Bolivia, including the Cochabamba Water War (2001), changed the political system 
because the traditional parties “were unable to channel newly politicised social 
grievances” (Sánchez, 2008: 323). Consequently, various newly formed movements 
and parties emerged to contest the 2002 and 2005 elections signalling the 
disintegration of the old party system (Sánchez, 2008). Ultimately, party system 
institutionalisation is weak for both elections studied.  
 
Table 2.8 below provides an overview of the abovementioned explanations in relation 
to the two cases selected. Three additional indicators of discontent are included here. 
The first is percentage of change in GDP per capita between 1980 and 2002, which is 
negative seven per cent in each case indicating that contraction may be a source of 
discontent. Privatisation was also a distinct characteristic of the neoliberal era. The 
privatisation of land was an issue that affected indigenous people in particular 
(Yashar, 2005). For this reason I include an indicator for privatisation here in the form 
of privatisation of revenue (as percentage of GDP). The measurement captures the 
mean percentage of GDP generated from privatisation between 1990- 1995, which 
encompasses a period of neoliberalism in each case. Revenue generated from 
privatisation accounted for two per cent of GDP in Bolivia and 1.6 per cent in Peru. 
Compared with other Latin American countries, Bolivia and Peru have the highest 
percentage of GDP generated by privatisation in the region.  For example, Mexico is 
the only country to equal Bolivia’s two per cent while Argentina (1.2) and Nicaragua 
(1.5) fall just behind Peru (O’Toole, 2). Privatisation then was also very high in both 
cases, adding to the argument that discontent can help to explain the left turn.  
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Finally, I also include my explanation of indigenous movement mobilisation. As the 
table illustrates, this is the only variable which differs across the cases suggesting that 
the variation in indigenous movement mobilisation may help to explain the variation 
in support for the left, and for the contestatory left in particular. The table also 
illustrates the within case variation of indigenous movement mobilisation between 
highland and lowland groups. The chapter will now turn to a discussion of the 
variation on the central variables across, and within cases.  
 
Table 2.8: Controlling for alternative explanations in the qualitative analysis 
Variable Bolivia Peru 
Neoliberal/Right Incumbent Yes Yes 
Additional Indicators for discontent   
 GDP per Capita % change 1980-2002
58
 -7 -7 
 Privatisation Revenue % of GDP 1990-1995
59
 2.0 1.6 
Other Explanations   
Party System Institutionalisation
60
 Weak Weak 
Commodities  Gas Oil 
Indigenous Movement Mobilisation    
Movement Mobilisation (Country) High Low 
 Mobilisation Highland Movements  High Low 
 Mobilisation Lowland Movements Low High 
 
Variation on the independent variable  
As stated in the introduction of this chapter, variation on the independent variable is a 
crucial component of intentional case selection. For King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 
140), “the best ‘intentional’ design selects observations to ensure variation on the 
explanatory variable”. Accordingly, cases were selected in which the independent 
variable, indigenous movement mobilisation varies. Despite having substantial 
indigenous populations with a “remarkably similar pattern” of marginalisation and 
exploitation, indigenous political mobilisation has occurred on a much larger scale in 
Bolivia than in Peru (Van Cott, 2007:34; Peeler, 2003:74).  
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 World Bank, World Development Indicators Database 2002 
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60
 Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) 
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Specifically, indigenous movements in Bolivia have been amongst the most active in 
Latin America. The early 1990s represented a period of “multiple indigenous 
mobilisation” and “energetic effervescence among grassroots indigenous 
organisations” in Bolivia (Gustafson, 2003: 275). Indigenous political mobilisation in 
Peru has been markedly weaker, in particular it has been “less active, less 
institutionalized and less successful” (Van Cott, 2005: 143). The “profound failure” of 
indigenous movement mobilisation in Peru has been directly equated with the “largely 
non-existent” political mobilisation of indigenous people in Peru in general (Lucero 
and García, 2007: 234). Ultimately, despite fitting some conditions for mobilisation 
such as population and motive (marginalisation or discontent with neoliberalism) 
indigenous movement mobilisation in Peru “barely exists” (Yashar, 1998: 26). 
Furthermore, where movements do exist in Peru they are weak and fragmented 
regional movements (Yashar, 1998). 
 
Mobilisation also varies within cases. Specifically, variation exists within highland 
and lowland movement mobilisation. In Bolivia for instance, highland movements 
such as Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia 
(CSUTCB) “were among the most vocal opponents of the government” throughout 
the late 1970s and 1980s (Postero, 2006: 195). Their mobilisation is exemplified by 
their use of protests and road blocks that paralysed transportation in 1979 which is 
considered as the largest mobilisation since the 1952 revolution and signalled “the 
return of the peasantry as an independent national political actors” (Van Cott, 2005: 
55). CSUTCB itself drew much inspiration from the highland Indian Katarista 
movement in the 1960s, who incidentally, named their movement after the leader of 
the highland rebellion against colonial powers in 1781, Túpac Katarí (Van Cott, 
2005). Today, CSUTCB is Bolivia’s largest indigenous movement with affiliates in 
each department, as well as a major base of support in its home department of 
Cochabamba among the cocaleros (coca growers) from the Chapare region in 
particular (Van Cott, 2005). 
 
Mobilisation occurred more slowly in the Bolivian lowlands. Although movements 
such as Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (CIDOB) formed in the early 
1980s, it was not until the 1990s when lumber companies, cattle ranchers and 
highland migrants began to encroach on their territory that these movements took 
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their demands public (Postero, 2006: 195). In 1990, CIDOB along with its affiliate 
organisation, Central de los Pueblos Indígenas de Beni (CPIB), organised a thirty-five 
day March for Territory and Dignity from Trinidad to La Paz which “dramatically 
raised awareness” of the demands of the lowland movements and “changed the face 
of Bolivia forever” (Postero, 2006: 195, Van Cott, 2005: 61). The march marked the 
mass mobilisation of lowland movements which until this point remained relatively 
subdued when compared to their highland counterparts. 
 
Conversely in Peru, indigenous movement mobilisation is higher among the 
Amazonian movements than the highland or Sierra movements. The division between 
the highland and lowland groups is “particularly pronounced” in Peru, both in terms 
of their treatment by the state and in how they have organised (Van Cott, 2005: 143). 
Highland indigenous mobilisation in Peru followed a similar path to its Andean 
neighbours Bolivia and Ecuador until the 1970s. Similar to Bolivia, Peru also 
experienced an indigenous rebellion in the 1780s when Túpac Amaru II led an 
uprising against Spain. Later in the 1960s Túpac Amaru II was used as a symbol to 
mobilise indigenous rebellion during the land invasions of the 1960s organised by 
peasant unions such as the Campesino Confederation of Peru (CCP) set up in 1947. 
By the late 1960s and 1970s however, highland mobilisation subsided. There are a 
number of reasons for this. Firstly, the military government of Juan Velasco in 1968 
introduced policies which benefitted the highland communities such agrarian reforms 
that resulted in the repatriation of lands to campesinos and educational reforms which 
introduced bilingual education (Van Cott, 2005; Yashar, 2005). Such reforms reduced 
mobilisation because movements had less grievances.  
 
Secondly, the Velasco Regime (1965-1975) began a series of reforms which began 
the "de-indianisation" of Peru (García & Lucero, 2005: 160). Essentially, Velasco re-
organised the highland indigenous population along class rather than ethnic lines 
making ‘indigenous’ mobilisation unlikely. Indeed, while some indigenous 
movements emerged during the 1970s, they remained weak and fragmented with 
interethnic struggles between Quechan and Aymara further weakening movements 
(Van Cott, 2005). Finally, the emergence of the guerrilla movements Sendero 
Luminoso in 1980 dealt a deafening blow to indigenous movement mobilisation in the 
highlands. Sendero Luminoso terrorised communities and forced indigenous 
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organisation leaders to resign (Van Cott, 2005). Other campesinos joined the 
organisation making their communities targets for violence by the armed forces 
fighting Sendero. While indigenous movements were consolidating in Bolivia and 
Ecuador during the 1980s, highland Indians in Peru were being assassinated or 
recruited by Sendero, thus greatly impeding their opportunities for mobilisation (Van 
Cott, 2005).  
 
While mobilisation in Peru is weak compared to its Andean neighbours, the lowland 
movements offer an exception. For example, the emergence of movements such as 
Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana (AIDESEP) in 1976 have 
mobilised in the lowlands. Similar to the lowland movements in Bolivia, AIDESEP 
mobilised to fight “Andean colonisation” of Amazonian territories in which highland 
Indians migrated to the Amazon territories to cultivate land (Postero, 2006: 166). 
Unlike the lowland movements in Bolivia however, AIDESEP is the most active and 
internationally linked indigenous movement in Peru during the 1980s (Van Cott, 
2005: 158). Today it is mobilised at local, regional, national and even international 
levels as indicated by its on-going dialogue with the United Nations and World Bank 
regarding issues of indigenous rights and climate change (Postero, 2006: 167). By 
1998 AIDESEP represented forty-two of the fifty-nine federations within the 
Amazonas region of Peru (Yashar, 2005:251). Notwithstanding this success however, 
AIDESEP has remained internally divided since its formation. For example, in 1987, 
members of the Amuesha group, left AIDESEP and formed Confederation of 
Amazonia Nationalities of Peru or CONAP (Van Cott, 2005:158). 
 
Highland and lowland movements also vary in terms of the population of their social 
bases. Highland movements, for example, tend to represent a larger social base than 
lowland movements because highland ethnicities such as Aymara or Quechua 
represent a majority of the indigenous population, while lowland ethnicities represent 
a minority in each case. In Bolivia, highland ethnicities represent over 55 per cent of 
the total population (Gigler, 2009). Specifically, Quechan people represent 31 per 
cent of the total national population and Aymara represent 25 per cent (Gigler, 2009). 
In stark contrast, Bolivia’s lowland indigenous groups represent just six per cent of 
the total population (Gigler, 2009).  The pattern is similar in Peru whereby highland 
groups make up the majority. In Peru, over eight million people identify as Quechua 
  Research Design    
97 
 
while the Aymara population is estimated at between 500,000 and 600,000 (Minority 
Rights Group International). Combining these ethnicities alone brings the total 
highland population to close to 8.6 million, or twenty-nine per cent of the total 
population.
61
 The total lowland populations are estimated significantly lower at 
350,000, or just one per cent of the total population (Minority Rights Group 
International). Table 2.9 below displays these figures as percentages of total country 
populations.  
 
Table 2.9: Breakdown of indigenous population by case 
 Bolivia Peru  
Highland Population as % of 
total  
25 29 
Lowland Population as % of 
total 
6 1 
Total  31 30 
Source: Adopted from Gigler (2009) and Minority Rights Group International (2013). 
 
Ultimately, cases in which indigenous movement mobilisation varies were selected 
for this study. This section of the chapter demonstrates that levels of mobilisation and 
proportion of social bases vary greatly within the cases. Consequently, my research 
heeds the warnings stipulated by prominent scholars of political science by employing 
variation on my independent variable within the intentional case selection and MSSD 
research design.  
 
Variation within the dependent variable  
The election cycles selected for the qualitative analysis represent an electoral shift to 
the left which provides variation on the dependent variable. As discussed in the 
introduction of this chapter, it is often “unrealistic” within qualitative research to 
select on the independent variable alone. When we must consider the values of the 
dependent variable however, we should select cases in which the values vary (King, 
Keohane and Verba, 1994: 141). As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the elections 
selected for study in the qualitative analysis include the 2005 elections in Bolivia and 
in the 2006 elections in Peru. These elections are selected because they signify an 
electoral shift to the left in each country. In Bolivia, the election of Evo Morales in 
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 These are calculated using current population of Peru which is 29.4 million according to World 
Development Indicators from the World Bank. 
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2005 was preceded by a succession of right-wing neoliberal presidents including 
Sánchez de Lozada or ‘Goni’ and President Carlos Mesa (Singer, 2006:197). In Peru 
the right dominated politics in the form of right-winged President Alberto Fujimori 
(1990-2000) and later by centre-right President Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) 
(Schmidt, 2007). What does vary however, is the type of left elected in each of the 
case. In the case of Bolivia in 2005, Evo Morales was elected and is considered a 
contestatory leftist candidate. In Peru however, the moderate left won the elections 
with President Alan García in 2006. Indeed, in the case of Peru, Alan García defeated 
contestatory leftist candidate Ollanta Humala, who was later elected in 2011. This 
variation allows me to assess the potential impact of movement mobilisation on the 
electoral success of these parties, whilst holding other controls constant such as 
discontent and inequality discussed in the previous section of this chapter.  
 
2.5 Field interviews 
The data for the qualitative case studies was collected during fieldwork in Bolivia and 
Peru from April to July 2012. Specifically, in-depth semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with key members of indigenous movements, political parties, non-
governmental organisations, and indigenous activists (see appendix B.1 and B.2 for 
full list of interviewees). The purpose of interviews was to investigate the role of 
movements in support for the left through primary data obtained from first-hand 
accounts of movement-party alliances from the actors themselves. Through the 
interviews I wanted to establish whether movements entered into an alliance with the 
left, and if so what was their principal motivation for doing so. I also wanted to 
uncover the ways in which the movements mobilised their bases for the party where 
they did enter into an alliance.  
 
The interviews provide the central data for the qualitative analysis and are a key 
component of this research. Centrally, interviews can reveal information, insights and 
nuances that secondary data cannot. This is especially the case when it comes to the 
study of political alliances, which are enigmatic by nature. For example, newspaper 
data is not sufficient for analysing movement-party alliances because the researcher is 
over reliant on information that the media rather than the researcher considers 
important. By relying on this data alone the researcher runs the risk of omitting 
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valuable information. Importantly, interviews provide a more in-depth understanding 
of events and relationships, which is necessary for making appropriate inferences. For 
instance, Aberbach and Rockman (2002: 673) argue that, “interviewing is often 
important if one needs to know what a set of people think, or how they interpret an 
event or series of events, or what they have done or are planning to do”. This is 
especially useful for my research, which ‘needs to know’, what a set of people think 
in order to understand why they may, or may not, have formed a political alliance. 
The research also ‘needs to know’ the respective actors interpretation of the alliance 
or support, what form the alliance took (what have they done) and the current 
relationship between the actors (what they are planning to do). Ultimately, often seen 
as “a conversation with a purpose”, interviews can reveal more in-depth insights by 
directly engaging with those involved in the phenomenon under investigation (Webb 
and Webb, 1932: 130).  
 
In the case of this research, in-depth semi-structured interviews provided first-hand 
accounts of the relationship between indigenous movements and political parties in 
Bolivia and Peru (see appendix B.3 for full list of interview questions). Semi-
structured interviews were selected because “they allow for certain degree of 
flexibility” and “for the pursuit of unexpected lines of inquiry during the interview” 
(Grix, 2004: 127). Given that this research is the first to explicitly address the 
relationship between indigenous movements and parties in Latin America it was 
crucial that there was flexibility within interviews that allowed me to pursue 
unexpected lines of inquiry. Interviews were conducted across a variety of locations 
in each country in order to capture variation in movement mobilisation within each 
case. Locations were selected on the basis of indigenous movement mobilisation and 
variation in the type of indigenous movement, as informed by the expert surveys and 
the literature on indigenous movements. As discussed previously, while some 
movements are nationally organised, others are more regionally based requiring travel 
beyond a country’s capital city.  
 
The movements were initially selected for interview through a method of purposive 
sampling informed by the literature. Purposive sampling occurs when the researcher 
makes a strategic choice about where, how and with whom interviews are conducted 
(Palys, 2008) Purposive sampling of interviews allows the researcher to 
  Research Design    
100 
 
“purposefully” select interviewees which will help to “illuminate the questions under 
study” (Patton, 1990: 169).  Just as purposive sampling in case selection “offers a 
degree of control” over selection bias, purposive sampling of interviewees offers 
control over the quality of information obtained in interviews (Barbour, 2001: 115). 
By purposively selecting the movements, politicians and relevant organisations from 
the outset the most relevant information required to answer the research question was 
received. This is a particularly useful strategy when undertaking fieldwork in Latin 
America, where travelling vast geographic distances to meet different movements can 
restrict precious time in the field. Once initial interviews with key interviewees were 
conducted however, a snowball sampling method followed. NGOs and activists 
provided an impartial view of the relationship between the movements and parties. 
Table 2.10 below provides an overview of interviews conducted in each country. The 
point of saturation occurred early in both Bolivia and Peru. In particular, key points 
regarding movement-party relations were consistent across interviews thus providing 
reliability for the study, and interviewing a variety of sources allowed for 
triangulation, as information could be crossed-checked. 
 
Table 2.10: Overview of interviews conducted in the field  
 Bolivia Peru 
Movements  12 8 
NGO/Research Organisations 7 3 
Politicians 6 4 
Academics 2 4 
Activist/ Others 2 2 
Total 29 21 
 
The interviews spanned from twenty minutes to over one hour in many cases which 
provided rich data for analysis. At the beginning of each interview, interviewees were 
presented with a letter of authentication stipulating the impartiality of the research, 
signed by my dissertation supervisors. Interviews were digitally recorded and 
transcribed verbatim by native speakers in order to minimise risk of misunderstanding 
or loss of data. Finally, the interviews for each country were analysed using thematic 
analysis by organising the data into themes and sub-themes. Themes were identified 
through the repetition of topics that “occur and reoccur” (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975: 
83). Similar to the point of saturation, themes emerged quickly and consistently 
across the interviews in each case.  
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2.6 Expected outcomes 
Given the variation in indigenous movement mobilisation in Bolivia and Peru it is 
expected that where mobilisation is high indigenous movements provided a base of 
support for the left. In Bolivia, it is expected that this support contributed to the 
success of the party in the 2005 elections because it mobilised a large base of support 
with no previous party affiliation. In the case of Peru, where mobilisation is weak, it 
is expected that ties with social bases are not as strong which impacts the movements 
ability to mobilise substantial support for the left. In other words, although the 
movements may have supported the left in the 2006 elections, it is expected that this 
support did not translate into electoral success because the movements were too weak 
to have an impact.  
 
Table 2.11 below lists the expected outcomes for this research both across and within 
cases. In each case, the country level is firstly addressed and this is followed by 
expectations for highland and lowland movements within each case. In the case of 
Peru, highland, or Sierra, movements are considered to be quite weak and where they 
are mobilised it is often fragmented and along class rather than ethnic lines. While 
still generally weak, lowland movements are comparatively more mobilised than their 
highland counterparts. For this reason they are ranked ‘higher’ in the Table 2.11 
below in relation to highland movements in Peru alone. In the case of Bolivia, 
mobilisation of highland movements is considered higher than that of lowland 
movements and for this reason they are categorised as ‘higher’ in Table 2.11. In 
relation to the secondary puzzle on the ‘two-lefts’ it is expected that where given the 
opportunity to support either the contestatory or moderate left that the movements 
chose the former. Where the movements were highly mobilised this in turn 
contributed to the success of these parties. Finally, it is expected that the dissertation 
will reveal that under certain conditions, social movements can be important political 
allies for parties. As discussed in the introduction such a finding would have 
implications for the way we typically understand social movements as well as 
implications for the electoral strategies of parties.  
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Table 2.11: Expected outcomes across and within cases  
Case  Level of 
mobilisation 
Expected Outcome 
Peru  Low Despite a potentially high social base as indicated by 
population, movement-party alliances are expected to 
be less likely because movement mobilisation is 
weak. 
 
Peru 
Highland 
Movements  
Low Despite a potentially high social base as indicated by 
population size, movement-party alliances are 
expected to be less likely because highland 
movements are not highly mobilised.  
 
Peru 
Lowland 
Movements  
Higher Movement-party alliances are expected to be more 
likely than highland movements because they are 
more mobilised. However, any alliances are expected 
to be weak because of small potential social base. 
 
Bolivia  High Movement-party alliances are expected to be likely 
because movements are highly mobilised and the 
potential indigenous social base is large as indicated 
by population size. 
 
Bolivia 
Highland  
High Movement-party alliances are expected to be likely 
because highland movements are highly mobilised 
and their potential social base large. 
 
Bolivia 
Lowland  
Lower Movement-party alliances are expected to be less 
likely because these movements are less mobilised 
than highland movements. Small social base. 
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Chapter 3: Quantitative Analysis 
Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section descriptive statistics 
relating to the central variables are outlined with the purpose of enriching our 
understanding of the left turn in Latin America, and the variation in indigenous 
movement mobilisation. The second section presents the results of the macro level 
analysis which examines the nature of the relationship between indigenous movement 
mobilisation and support for the left across the region from 1990-2009. Finally, the 
third section of the chapter will outline the results of a micro level analysis in which 
the relationship between individual indigenous voters and support for the left is 
examined using survey data from Latinobarómetro 2006.  
The goal of the quantitative analysis is to provide an overview of the nature of the 
relationship between the two central variables. A quantitative analysis is useful 
because it can help to tease out causal relationships more generally. This is explored 
in the macro level analysis in particular where a number of variables are tested in 
relation to support for the left. I expect to find that support for the left is highest 
where indigenous movement mobilisation is high. The goal of the individual level 
analysis is to uncover whether indigenous people do indeed support the left in the 
region.
62
 The central argument of this thesis is that where indigenous people support 
the left they do so because they are mobilised by the movements that represent them, 
thus highlighting the importance of movements in generating support for the left. The 
chapter concludes by outlining the central findings of the quantitative analysis which 
can be used as a blueprint for the qualitative case studies that follow. 
3.1. Descriptive statistics  
This section of the chapter firstly provides some descriptive statistics on the central 
dependent variable, variation support for the left, before turning to the principal 
independent variable, variation in indigenous movement mobilisation. As previously 
mentioned, indigenous movement mobilisation is considered in conjunction with 
indigenous population. Therefore some descriptive statistics on the interaction 
between mobilisation and population are provided here.  
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 As discussed in Chapter 1, authors such as Madrid (2012) and Lupu (2009) provide evidence that 
indigenous people supported the left in the region during the left turn.  
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The dependent variable: variation in support for the left 
As displayed on Table 2.1 in Chapter 2, variation in support for the left is measured in 
four ways. The first is support for the left in presidential elections (presvrl). The 
second is support for the left in lower house elections (lhvrl). Both of these 
measurements are sourced from Baker and Greene (2011) and measure the degree of 
support for leftist candidates or parties in each election in relation to all other 
contenders in that election. The authors call this ‘Voter Revealed Leftism’ (VRL) and 
they construct it by firstly noting the ideological position of the candidate or party as 
measured by Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009). They multiply this score by the vote 
share of that candidate or party and sum the electoral results for all contenders in the 
election to obtain the VRL score of that candidate or party. They do this for each 
candidate/party in each election from 1990-2009. Each candidate/party is then placed 
on an ideological scale of support for the right (1) to support for the left (20) (Baker 
and Greene, 2011).
63
 
The VRL method of measurement is becoming an increasingly recognised measure of 
support for the left (see Shifter 2011, Doyle 2011 and Wiesehomeier and Doyle, 
2012). Indeed, the third variable used to measure support for the left is an adaptation 
of Baker and Greene’s VRL score generated by Wiesehomeier and Doyle (2012). The 
authors constructed their own version of the VRL score which ranges from support 
for the right (0) to support for the left (4) in all presidential elections from 1978-2009. 
The authors create this score by firstly considering all presidential candidates who 
won five per cent or more of the popular vote and assign an ideological score to each 
candidate.
64
 The authors then multiply this score by vote share of each candidate in 
that election. The products are then summed for every candidate in the election to 
provide a measurement for support for the left that is relative to all other candidates in 
the presidential election. The principal difference between this measurement and that 
of Baker and Greene is that this variable extends to presidential elections since 1978 
and considers only those who received more than five per cent of the popular vote. It 
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 Formally    

tVRL 
i1
n
 Ideo log y * itvoteshare  
64
 The ideological score was based on Coppedge (1997), updated scores of Pop-Eleches (2009) and 
expert survey data from Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009).  
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is used in this study as a supplementary measurement of support for the left in 
presidential elections and is labelled here as presvrl2.  
The VRL scores capture the degree of support for the left relative to all other 
contenders allowing us to observe variation in support for the left, relative to all other 
parties of the left. VRL scores therefore capture the “fine-grained distinctions” 
between the extreme and the moderate left by providing ideology scores along a 
continuum and this is useful for a study which is interested in variation in support for 
the types of left in the region (Baker and Greene, 2011: 47).  
Finally, I include a fourth measurement which simply reports the proportion of the 
total vote won by the left in each election from 1990-2011 and is not relative to other 
parties or candidates in the election (leftvoteshare). I calculated this by summing the 
vote share of all leftist candidates and parties in each election to get the combined 
vote share of the left.
65
 I summed the vote share of these candidates
66
 and multiplied 
this score by one hundred to get the percentage of the total left vote in each election. 
This provides a general measurement for support for the left across the region by 
merging results from both legislative and presidential elections to get the mean 
support for the left.
67
  
This variable (leftvoteshare) also provides us with an overview of the general increase 
in support for the left between 1990 and 2011. While this variable relies on data from 
Baker and Greene (2011) which only extends to 2009, the authors do provide updated 
ideological scores for elections as far as 2011.
68
 Using the updated ideological scores 
by the authors I was able to determine candidates and parties of the left and the vote 
share of these candidates in elections from 2009 to 2011. Therefore leftvoteshare 
captures support for the left between 1990 and 2011 which sufficiently captures the 
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 I used the ideological score provided by Baker and Greene to identify parties and candidates on the 
left (all those with a score between 0 and 10.5). 
66
 The proportion of vote shares was also provided by the Baker and Greene data 
67
 It is worth noting however that this variable is coded in such a way as to allow the researcher to 
divide it into presidential and legislative elections if necessary.  
68
 While the authors provide updated data on the proportion of the left vote, their data is not updated 
with new ideological scores in order to calculate VRL scores for these candidates and parties. It would 
be erroneous to estimate ideological scores for candidates in elections succeeding those listed in the 
Baker and Greene data because of the extent to which party ideologies can shift between elections in 
some cases. For example, in 2006 presidential candidate Ollanta Humala moved from the contestatory 
left to the centre by the 2011 elections. The emergence of new parties further complicates estimating 
ideological scores, which could also skew the results.  
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period of time before (1990-1997), during (1998-2008) and after (2009-2011) the left 
turn.  
The graphs below depict support for the left in accordance with each of the 
measurements discussed above. We begin with support for the left in presidential 
elections using the variables presvrl and presvrl2. Figure 3.1 below identifies a shift 
from the centre-right to the centre, which becomes more pronounced after the turn of 
the century. The shift to the centre reflects the argument made by Baker and Greene 
(2011) that Latin Americans are becoming more centrist and therefore vote for the 
moderate left. The authors find that the region-wide VRL score moved from the 
centre-right (7.95) in 1995 to close to the midpoint (9.82) in 2008 (Baker and Greene, 
2011). While Figure 3.1 below paints a very general picture of a shift to the centre it 
is important to note that within this time “the presidential vote choices of Latin 
Americans clearly moved to the left” because VRL in the region increased by two 
points (Baker and Greene, 2011: 48). Therefore there was a shift towards rather than 
to the left between 1990 and 2009 (Baker and Greene, 2011). This is similar to 
Seligson’s (2007: 87) claim that while there was a mass ideological shift to the left in 
the region at the turn of the century, the “magnitude of the shift is small”.  
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Figure 3.1: Support for the left in presidential elections (presvrl) 
 
Source: Adapted from Baker and Greene (2011). 
Figure 3.1 above illustrates the shift to the centre that Baker and Greene (2011) find 
in their study using the same data. In order to move beyond Baker and Greene’s 
findings, their VRL score is supplemented by Wiesehomeier and Doyle’s (2012) VRL 
score (presvrl2). As Figure 3.2 below indicates presvrl2 further substantiates the shift 
to the centre. Again Latin American voter preferences moved from the centre-right to 
the centre during the period 1990-2009, indicating a shift towards rather than to the 
left.   
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Figure 3.2: Support for the left in presidential elections (presvrl2) 
 
Source: Adapted from Wiesehomeier and Doyle’s (2012) 
Figure 3.3 below demonstrates support for the left in lower house elections using the 
measurement lhvrl and again indicates a shift from the centre-right to the centre. 
According to Baker and Greene (2011) the region-wide VRL score increases by just 
0.5 during this time. This is comparatively lower than the two-point increase in the 
presidential elections leading the authors to conclude that, “the left turn in Latin 
America has been a strictly presidential phenomenon” (Baker and Greene, 2011: 50).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Right 
Centre Left
Centre
Centre Right 
Id
e
o
lo
g
y
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Presidential elections (Doyle, 2013)
Fitted Values
Support for the left in presidential elections, 1990-2009
  Quantitative Analysis    
109 
 
Figure 3.3: Support for the left in legislative elections (lhvrl) 
 
Source: Adapted from Baker and Greene (2011). 
From the above graphs we can conclude that there was a shift from the centre-right to 
the centre across the region in both presidential and legislative elections between 
1990 and 2009. This shift towards, rather than to the left can be misleading however 
because it potentially devalues the central puzzle, ‘the left turn’. While the above 
graphs indicate a generalised move towards the left, Shifter (2011: 113) rightly notes 
that “there is little question that, at least in the first part of the twenty-first century, 
candidates who could be described as left-leaning gained growing support and 
allegiance in parts of Latin America”. The growing support for left-leaning candidates 
in the first part of the twenty-first century is precisely what this research is interested 
in and this puzzle is worthy of further investigation. 
Figure 3.4 below demonstrates the growing support for the left during this time using 
the variable leftvoteshare which provides the mean vote share of leftist candidates by 
year in presidential elections only. We can see that there is a substantial increase in 
the vote share of the left from the late 1990s to 2000. In 2000 alone the left won over 
50 per cent of the vote share in presidential elections across the region. This is 
Right 
Left
Centre
Id
e
o
lo
g
y
 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Lower House VRL
Fitted Values
Support for the left in lower house elections 1990-2010
  Quantitative Analysis    
110 
 
reflected in the election of presidents such as Ricardo Lagos in Chile and the re-
election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. The figure also demonstrates the steady 
increase in the vote share of the left from 2003-2007. This result represents a period 
of increased success for the left beginning with the election of Néstor Kirchner as 
president of Argentina in 2003, and culminating with the election of his wife Cristina 
Fernandez de Kirchner in 2007. A number of other countries also experienced a shift 
to the left at this time including Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador.
69
  
Figure 3.4: Left vote share in presidential elections by year (1990-2011) 
(leftvoteshare)  
 
Source: Adapted from Baker and Greene (2011). 
The figures above provide insight into the general shift to the left across the region. 
However, it is important to capture the variation across the region and within 
countries in order to appreciate the variation in support for the left. To capture this I 
used the ideology scores (sourced from Baker and Greene)
70
 of each winning party in 
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 Please see Table 1 in the Introduction of this thesis for a full overview of all presidents elected and 
re-elected in the region during this time.  
70
 I used the ideologically scores from Baker and Greene (2011) which allows me to include elections 
as far as 2011.  
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each presidential and legislative election in each country to measure the mean 
ideology of the government over time. The ideological scale runs from left (0) to right 
(20) and I isolate only the winning party in each election in order to capture the mean 
ideology of the ruling government in each case. To capture a shift in the ideology of 
ruling governments across time in each country I divided the scores into three time 
frames of 1990-1997, 1998-2008 and 2009-2011. Figure 3.5 below highlights a steady 
ideological shift to the left by ruling governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela. There is also a shift to the left 
in the Dominican Republic and Paraguay within the first two timeframes with data 
missing for the third timeframe. However, we can assume that in the case of the 
Dominican Republic, the left remained the dominant ruling ideology because the 
successful candidate in 2012 was Danilo Medina Sánchez from Partido de la 
Liberación Dominicana (PLD) who was the candidate from the incumbent party. In 
Paraguay however, leftist President Fernando Lugo was impeached in 2012 and 
replaced by the conservative candidate Horacio Cartes in 2013 signalling the end of 
the left turn in Paraguay. The figure also indicates a steady shift to the right in Chile
71
, 
Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama.  
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 Indeed, recent elections in Chile indicate that there is a ‘return’ of the left in the country as former 
leftist President Michelle Bachelet was re-elected with over 62 per cent of the total vote share 
in December 2013.   
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Figure 3.5: The ‘Left Turn’ by country (1990-2011) 
 
Source: Adapted from Baker and Greene (2011). 
Ultimately, the descriptive statistics above illustrate three things. First, the general 
electoral shift in the region between 1990 and 2009 was towards rather than to the 
right. Second, there was an intensive increase in leftist presidents from during the 
early to mid-2000s. Third, when we examine the left turn across time within each 
country we see important nuances which are lost when we examine the shift across 
the region more generally. For example, while the region wide shift was towards the 
left, country level shifts were sharper in Bolivia, Ecuador and Uruguay for example. 
This highlights the importance of observing the left turn in the context of the 
countries within the region rather than the region generally. This is in congruence 
with the work of Leiras (2007) who argues that there is no ‘one size fits all’ 
explanation for the left turn across Latin America precisely because of the economic, 
social and political variation which exists there. The author states that: 
“Given the varying discipline with which different Latin American countries 
implemented free-market reforms, the uneven success of those reforms across 
countries and over time, and the significantly different social and partisan 
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contexts in which electoral competition takes place, it is highly unlikely that 
one general explanation fits all Latin American cases. If such a general 
explanation exists, it would surely have to include other factors besides the 
failure of free-market strategies.” (Leiras, 2007: 401). 
The point is that this variation makes the analysis of the left turn in a strictly 
generalised context problematic because it can cause us to miss important nuances 
within the region, which can in some ways devalues the puzzle itself. The work of 
Leiras (2007) also highlights that it would be erroneous to focus on the failure of 
neoliberal reforms as the central explanation without considering other variables 
relevant to particular cases. Accordingly, I argue that the variation in support for the 
left can, in some cases be explained by the variation in indigenous movement 
mobilisation. To provide substantial context for this argument we can now turn to 
some descriptive statistics regarding indigenous movement mobilisation.  
 
The principal independent variable: variation in indigenous movement mobilisation 
Indigenous movement mobilisation is primarily measured using original expert 
surveys designed to capture variation in mobilisation levels across time. As outlined 
in Chapter 2, I created original expert surveys for five countries, namely Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru. These countries were selected based on the 
size of the indigenous population in each case; therefore the independent variable is 
an interactive one consisting of levels of mobilisation and population size. It is argued 
that a population of ten per cent or more ensures that the population was high enough 
to potentially impact elections if mobilised but low enough not to exclude too many 
cases. Figure 3.6 below provides an overview of the variation in indigenous 
population across Latin America, including the five cases selected for study here.  
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Figure 3.6: Variation in indigenous population across Latin America, 2006.  
 
Source: Inter-American Development Bank, 2006.  
The expert surveys were designed to capture variation in indigenous movement 
mobilisation both across and within cases. Specifically, experts were asked to assign a 
mobilisation score for each country across three time frames of 1990-1998, 1999-
2006 and 2007-2011 allowing me to observe mobilisation across time in each case. 
Experts were asked to score the mobilisation level of movements on a scale of low 
(1), medium (2) and high (3) in each of the three time frames in their country of 
expertise, thus providing variation within cases. Experts were provided with vignettes 
to describe each level of mobilisation (please see appendix A for a full copy of the 
survey including vignettes). The vignettes were based on five different aspects of 
mobilisation including; nature of mobilisation, duration and commitment, the 
estimated number of people involved, impact of mobilisation on social awareness and 
activities undertaken during the mobilisation. This information allowed me to score 
mobilisation in terms of high medium or low. For example, mobilisation that was 
deemed timid in nature, revolved around the mild activities such the distribution of 
leaflets and included less than fifty people was considered an incident of low 
mobilisation. Conversely mobilisation was considered high if it was disruptive in 
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nature, included more contentious activities such as roadblocks or rallies, and 
consisted of several hundred people. Using these vignettes as a guide experts were 
asked to score mobilisation levels of indigenous movements as high, medium or low 
in each timeframe. The final mobilisation score for each time frame in each country 
was coded in accordance with the highest response. For example, in the case of 
Bolivia the period 1990-1998 is considered one of high mobilisation because this was 
the score most assigned to this time frame by the experts.     
The survey was sent to 210 experts selected from the Latin American Studies 
Association (LASA) member’s database and chosen based on country expertise. 
Those who listed ‘ethnicity and indigenous people’ as an area of expertise were also 
selected. The surveys were distributed digitally using the online survey application 
Lime survey. Response rates are a concern for any researcher wishing to utilise 
surveys and this is especially the case when sending electronic surveys to five 
different countries and to experts across a number of disciplines
72
. The aim of the 
survey is to quantify indigenous movement mobilisation, which like all social 
mobilisation, is by its very nature, a fluid phenomenon and therefore something that is 
not typically quantified. In some ways this presented the challenge that experts in this 
area may not be susceptible to taking part in such a survey. Nonetheless, the survey 
was carefully informed by social movement literature and indigenous social 
movement literature in particular in order to accurately represent the nature of 
indigenous movement mobilisation. Surveys were available to experts in both English 
and Spanish in order to further facilitate participation.
73
 As Table 3.1 above indicates 
however, the response rate is particularly problematic in the case of Mexico where 
there is a response rate of just 3.4 per cent. Despite these limitations the survey 
provides original data on the mobilisation of indigenous social movements that can be 
used in the quantitative analysis.  
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 Disciplines included political science, sociology and experts in ethnicity and indigenous people  
73
 The Spanish version of the surveys was cross-checked by a native speaker to ensure they were 
correct.  
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Table 3.1: The response rate from the expert surveys 
Country  Number of 
Surveys 
Sent  
Full 
Response 
Partial 
Response 
Total 
Response 
Total 
Response 
Rate           
(%) 
Bolivia  52 9 3 12 17.3 
Ecuador  36 7 3 10 19.4 
Guatemala  29 4 1 5 13.8 
Mexico  58 2 3 5 3.4 
Peru  35 5 4 9 14.3 
Total  210 27 14 41 19.5 
 
Figure 3.7 below displays the mean mobilisation score of each country from 1990-
2011 based on the survey data. Bolivia has the highest level of indigenous movement 
mobilisation with a score of 1.6 and is closely followed by Ecuador with a mean of 
1.2 and Mexico (mean of 1.1). Indigenous movements in Peru are less mobilised with 
a mean of .9, and Guatemala has the lowest mobilisation score of all the cases (.6). 
The graph provides an interesting depiction of the variation in indigenous movement 
mobilisation between the qualitative case studies included in this study, Bolivia and 
Peru.  
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Figure 3.7: Indigenous movement mobilisation across the five cases (mean) 
 
Source: Author’s own data 
Through the survey data I was able to capture variation in mobilisation within 
countries across time.  Figure 3.8 below demonstrates the within-case variation by 
using the raw data from the expert survey scores, which ranges from low (1), medium 
(2) and high (3). 
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Figure 3.8: Indigenous movement mobilisation across time (1990-2011) 
 
Source: Author’s own data 
The figure offers some interesting results. There is an increase in mobilisation across 
time in Bolivia and Guatemala that stabilises during the last time frame of 2007-2011. 
Indigenous movement mobilisation decreases over time in both Mexico and Ecuador. 
In Mexico this may be explained by the waning of the central anti-globalisation, 
indigenous-based movement, Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), 
known as the Zapatistas. The Zapatistas emerged in 1994 and underwent a period of 
intense mobilisation at the turn of the century including a national march on Congress 
in Mexico City in 2001. The movement however was less mobilised by the late-
2000s, which may explain the low score in 2007-2011.  
In Ecuador, the national indigenous movement, La Confederación de Nacionalidades 
Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) first mobilized in 1986 and underwent a period of 
intense mobilisation during the 1990s. They were highly mobilised in the early 2000s 
when they were integral in the ousting of Ecuador’s President Mahuad in 2000 and 
subsequent election of President Lucio Gutiérrez in 2002. CONAIE also mobilised 
support for President Rafael Correa in the second round of the 2006 elections. Once 
elected Correa went about rewarding the movements for their support by 
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implementing a constituent assembly to address indigenous rights and issues as 
promised. CONAIE however were not fully satisfied with the new constitution nor 
their relationship with Correa and the relationship deteriorated quite rapidly. For 
example, some movement members such as Pepe Acacho from the Amazonian region 
claim that Correa used the movement as a “stepping stone” and that President Correa 
“has stolen our ideals. He has been the worst President of all for us” (Caselli, 2011). It 
can be argued then that Correa incapacitated CONAIE once elected which weakened 
them between 2007 and 2011. In 2012 however the movement mobilised against 
Correa by initiating national and regional protests, demonstrating renewed 
mobilisation of the movement (Wolff, 2007).  
In Guatemala and Peru the level of mobilisation across time is as one might expect for 
countries that underwent violent internal conflicts in which indigenous populations 
greatly suffered. For example, in Guatemala a brutal civil war (1960-1996) devastated 
indigenous communities who suffered severe human rights abuses as discussed earlier 
in this thesis. There was also an absence of political freedom during this time in 
Guatemala, which greatly impeded the ability to for indigenous communities to 
mobilise. For example, Yashar (2005) argues that political opportunity structure is a 
central component of mobilisation and Guatemala was a closed space until the late 
1990s. Similarly, the internal war in Peru (1980-1992) between the state and the 
Shining Path greatly affected indigenous communities and therefore their ability to 
mobilise.
74
 Highland indigenous communities were especially impacted by the war 
and caught between enemy lines (the state and Shining Path). Like Guatemala, there 
was little political opportunity structure in Peru at this time, which impeded 
mobilisation. Ultimately, while the mobilisation of indigenous movements was 
already underway in Bolivia, Ecuador and Mexico during the mid-late 1990s, the 
constraints of war took its hold in Peru and Guatemala causing a lag in mobilisation. 
As Figure 3.8 below demonstrates however, mobilisation levels in Peru caught up 
with Bolivia by 2007. 
The chapter will now provide some descriptive statistics which depict the relationship 
between levels of mobilisation and indigenous population. As Figure 3.9 below 
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 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru (Comisión dela Verdad y Reconciliación del 
Perú) or (CVR) of 2003 found that an estimated 69,280 died or were ‘disappeared’ during the conflict 
and that indigenous people were the main victims of the conflict (Peru Support Group, 2004). 
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illustrates, a large indigenous population does not necessarily guarantee high 
movement mobilisation. For example, while Mexico has the lowest indigenous 
population of those included in the survey, it has a higher mean mobilisation score 
than the country with one of the highest indigenous populations, Guatemala. 
Conversely, while Peru has a high indigenous population it is among the least 
mobilised. Moreover, Ecuador has an indigenous population that is just three per cent 
less than Peru but indigenous movement mobilisation is the second highest in the 
sample. The point here is that mobilisation is not determined by population size. The 
relevancy of population size for this research is that a high population can have a 
bigger impact on elections, but only when movement mobilisation is also high. I 
argue that in cases where population is high but mobilisation is low (Guatemala for 
instance) we should not expect to see high levels of support for the left because there 
are no movements to act as intermediaries between indigenous people and the party. 
In this way, mobilisation is central for explaining support for the left, and population 
is more important for measuring how much support the movements can provide. The 
interaction of these variables helps to determine variation in support for the left 
because I argue that we expect to see highest support where both mobilisation and 
populations are high and lowest where mobilisation and population are lowest. 
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Figure 3.9: Variation in indigenous movement mobilisation and population 
across the cases 
Source: Author’s own data 
Although the principal aim of the expert surveys was to develop a proxy measure for 
indigenous movement mobilisation, they were also used as an opportunity to learn 
more about indigenous social movement behaviour more generally. In a separate 
section of the survey, experts were asked to list in numerical order a list of political 
activities undertaken by indigenous social movements. Figure 3.10 below lists the 
activities undertaken by indigenous movements in order of rare to very common. This 
graph represents the mean of all countries in the survey.  
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Figure 3.10: Political activities commonly undertaken by indigenous social 
movements 
 
Source: Author’s own data 
As the Figure 3.10 indicates, community meetings are the most commonly pursued 
political activities undertaken by movements. This is not surprising given the strong 
sense and importance of community and community leaders to indigenous people. 
Protests are also among the most common activity undertaken by the movements, and 
more at a small than large scale. Again this is not surprising given the often, 
insufficient means, an indigenous movement would have to organise a large-scale 
protest. With little resources these movements cannot afford the transportation and 
organisational costs involved in large-scale protests. This is especially the case where 
mobilisation levels are medium or low and networks between movements are weak, 
further complicating the organisation of a large-scale national protest. In these cases, 
indigenous movements are much more likely to organise small-scale local or regional 
protests which are more manageable in terms of financial and organisational costs. 
Interestingly, more formal methods of political action are less commonly undertaken 
by the movements including, letter writing and distribution of materials such as 
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leaflets. These results are not surprising given the high illiteracy rates among 
indigenous people in the region and the costs involved in producing materials.
75
 
Finally, it is also unsurprising to find that fundraising is amongst the least likely 
activities undertaken by indigenous social movements. The high poverty levels among 
indigenous people, demonstrated on Table 3.2 below, mean that there is little 
fundraising to be done within indigenous communities. Rather, many movements rely 
on the state or NGOs for financial support. 
Table 3.2: Poverty and extreme poverty across the five cases  
 Indigenous people living in 
poverty (%) 
Indigenous People living in 
extreme poverty (%) 
Bolivia 71.4 52.4 
Ecuador 84.3 63.3 
Guatemala 73.7 24.3 
Mexico  95.3 85.4 
Peru  62.8 22.2 
Source: Adapted from Hall and Patrinos, 2006.  
Note: Figures are for 2000  
 
While Figure 3.10 outlines the activities undertaken by movements more generally, 
Table 3.3 below illustrates the variation across countries. Unusually, letter writing is 
very common in Peru. Given the high rates of poverty and illiteracy there we might 
not expect the movements to partake in this activity. Moreover, letter-writing is a 
more formal political action that we do not associate with movements more generally 
and indigenous movements especially and so this result is unexpected. Ecuador 
presents another interesting result as canvassing is listed as a common activity. This 
might be explained by the transition of CONAIE from a movement-party in 1996 
when it first ran in elections, so it was likely to be canvassing since then. Ultimately, 
the results provide a useful roadmap for understanding the behaviour of indigenous 
social movements in these countries. Results from Bolivia and Peru are particularly 
useful because they can act as a guide for the qualitative case studies used in this 
study.  
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According to Jiménez et al., (2006: 59) “illiteracy is widespread in the indigenous population” of 
Latin America.  
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Table 3.3: Political activities commonly undertaken by indigenous social 
movements, by case. 
 Bolivia Ecuador Guatemala Mexico Peru 
Community 
Meetings  
Very Common Very Common Common Common Very Common 
Protests (small) Very Common Common Common Rare Very Common 
Protests (large) Very Common Common Common Rare Common 
Petitions  Common Common Common Rare Common 
Canvassing Rare Very Common Rare Common Rare 
Letter Writing  Rare Rare Common Rare Very Common 
Distribution of 
Materials  
Rare Rare Common Common Common 
Fundraising  Common Rare Common Rare Rare 
Source: Author’s own data 
The statistics outlined here are purely descriptive. The goal is to provide us with a 
better understanding of the central dependent and independent variables for following 
quantitative analysis, as well as the qualitative case studies. The chapter will now 
provide the results of the macro-level analysis. 
3.2 Macro analysis  
In this section of the chapter I will present the results of a series of regression analysis 
employed to test the relationship between indigenous movement mobilisation and 
support for the left.  
The data  
The dependent variables are measured using the four measurements outlined at the 
beginning of the chapter, presvrl, presvrl2, lhvrl and leftvoteshare. The independent 
variable, indigenous movement mobilisation, is measured in two ways. The first 
measurement is adopted from the work of Roberts (2002) and categorises Latin 
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American countries into labour mobilising and elite party systems.
76
 Cleary (2006) 
directly links Roberts’ (2002) categorisation to the emergence of the left by claiming 
that the success of the left in the region is associated with countries with labour 
mobilising systems in particular. Therefore, it is expected that mobilisation is more 
likely to occur in labour mobilising party systems than in elite party systems. A 
dummy variable massmob was created to distinguish between these two party 
systems.
77
 Debs and Helmke (2010) also use Roberts’ categorisation of party systems 
as a means to capture mass mobilisation.  
It is important to note from the outset however that massmob in no way captures 
indigenous movement mobilisation. Rather, this variable acts as a proxy for 
mobilisation more generally and simply distinguishes countries where mobilisation is 
likely to occur (labour mobilising countries) from countries where mobilisation is not 
likely to occur (elite mobilising). Moreover, massmob does not vary over time and is 
primarily based on the classic populist era of Latin American politics in the period of 
the 1930 to 1980s. Finally, few of the countries categorised as labour mobilising by 
Roberts (2002) have substantial indigenous populations however three of the five 
countries selected for the surveys are considered labour mobilising, including Bolivia, 
Peru and Mexico (Guatemala and Ecuador have elite party systems).
78
 Despite these 
limitations massmob is useful because it allows us to test the argument that mass 
mobilisation can help explain support for the left (see Roberts 1998; Cleary 2006; 
Rodríguez-Garavito, 2008). Debs and Helmke (2010: 227) explain that “even in 
contexts where the left has been weakened…the new post-2000 left is able to draw on 
some latent capacity among the poorer sectors for organisation and mobilisation” and 
it is therefore important to consider mass mobilisation when exploring support for the 
left.  
The second measurement of the independent variable (movemobscore score) is based 
on the indigenous movement mobilisation scores obtained from the experts’ surveys. 
Unlike massmob, this measurement specifically captures indigenous movement 
mobilisation. Its limitation however is that it only does so for the five cases previously 
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 Where labour mobilising systems are 1 and elite party systems are 0. 
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 It is important to note that Roberts (2002) excludes El Salvador and Guatemala from his 
categorisation but Debs and Helmke (2010) have coded them both as elite mobilising. This research 
follows the work of Debs and Helmke (2010) and also codes these countries as elite mobilising.  
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outlined, which limits the study to 60 elections (presidential and legislative). So while 
massmob fails to capture indigenous movement mobilisation, movemobscore score 
does so but is limited by number of observations. Notwithstanding these limitations it 
is equally important to recognise that by using both measurements we can tentatively 
observe the nature of the relationship between indigenous movement mobilisation and 
support for the left in a quantitative manner.  
Three other explanatory variables are also included in the analysis. Each of the 
variables used are consistent with the prevailing explanation for the left discussed in 
Chapter 1. The first is incumbent ideology which accounts for the ‘backlash’ 
argument in which dissatisfaction with right-wing incumbents drove voters to the 
left.
79
 The second variable is incumbent inequality which measures the level of 
inequality in each country under incumbents.
80
 Inequality is measured using the Gini 
coefficient as provided by the World Bank. The Gini coefficient is a widely used 
measurement of inequality where 0 is perfect equality and 1 is maximum inequality. 
Finally, because dissatisfaction with economic progress is also part of the backlash 
argument GDP growth (annual %) is included in the analysis and is obtained from the 
World Bank.
81
 As stated in Chapter 1, this research is not concerned with the rejection 
of these explanations. Rather it seeks to contribute to them by analysing them in the 
context of indigenous peoples and their movements specifically. Therefore, these 
variables are included in the analysis in order to provide a more comprehensive 
overview of the relationship between indigenous movement mobilisation and support 
for the left whilst controlling for prevailing explanations. 
The relationship was first tested using multiple regression with robust standard errors. 
Multiple regression analysis was then conducted and interaction terms were 
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 This variable is coded as 0-1 where 0 is an incumbent from the right and 1 is an incumbent from the 
left.  
80
 Specifically, the last year of each presidential incumbent term was used to capture inequality levels 
under that incumbent government. In many cases, this was simply recorded for the year preceding 
elections. It was important not to record the year of the election because where elections are held in the 
middle of the year the Gini score for that year represents both incumbent and newly elected 
governments. For this reason the last full year of the incumbent’s term was used. The exception was in 
cases where data was missing for the last year of the incumbent’s term, in such instances, the Gini 
score for the second last year of the incumbent’s term was considered. In some cases this was also 
unavailable and so the year of election was used in these cases. The years selected are based on 
presidential incumbents only and therefore legislative elections are coded in accordance to the last year 
of the presidential incumbent. So, if legislative elections occur in the middle of a presidential term, the 
Gini score used is still that of the previous incumbent.  
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 GDP growth is measured for the year of the election. 
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introduced. Interaction terms are particularly useful when the analysis wishes to 
observe a relationship that has a conditional hypothesis (Brambor et al., 2006). A 
conditional hypothesis is one in which “a relationship between two or more variables 
depends on the value of one or more other variables” (Brambor et al., 2006: 64). In 
the case of this analysis, an increase in indigenous movement mobilisation is 
associated with an increase in support for the left when the condition ‘substantial 
indigenous population’ is met, but not when the condition ‘substantial indigenous 
population’ is absent. Thereby suggesting that support for the left is highest where 
indigenous movement mobilisation and population are high.   
Ultimately, interaction terms help to capture the interaction between levels of 
mobilisation and levels of indigenous population. Measures of indigenous population 
size however are “notoriously unreliable and tend to vary in methodology across 
countries” which can result in measurement error (Rice and Van Cott, 2006: 711). In 
order to mitigate measurement error the indigenous population size is measured using 
data from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), which is a reliable and 
widely used source among Latin American scholars.
82
 The chapter will now outline 
the results of the analysis in which the relationship was tested using multiple 
regression without interaction terms. Following this the results of the analysis in 
which interaction terms were introduced are discussed. The chapter will then turn to 
the individual level analysis.  
The results  
As Table 3.4 below indicates, mass mobilisation (massmob) is positively associated 
with support for the left and this is statistically significant across all four models. The 
relationship is especially substantive in the leftvoteshare model. The results suggest 
that support for the left is likely to increase in labour mobilising than elite party 
systems. It can be tentatively argued then that the labour unions and peasant 
organisations which Roberts (2002) discusses in his work provided a base of support 
for the new left at the turn of the century, in the same way as they did for the 
traditional leftist and populist parties during the era of ISI (1950s-1980s). Perhaps 
these results are not surprising because they indicate that the left performs best in 
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countries that Roberts (2002) categorises as labour mobilising. More generally, the 
result indicates that a mass mobilising base is important for the left.  
The results indicate that the second measurement of the dependent variable 
indigenous movement mobilisation (movemobscore) is negatively associated with 
support for the left in the leftvoteshare model. This result is not statistically 
significant however. Therefore we cannot draw any inferential conclusions from this 
result. The leftvoteshare model is the only measurement of the independent variable 
listed on Table 3.4 below because the number of observations in the remaining 
models was too low to include in the study.
83
 As Table 3.4 also demonstrates, there 
were no statistically significant results in the leftvoteshare model in relation to the 
remaining variables. Indigenous population is negatively associated with support for 
the left, with the exception of the final model.
84
 This proved interesting as the model 
is limited to the five cases of Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru and Mexico where 
indigenous population is over ten per cent. Nonetheless the result is not statistically 
significant and therefore there is little we can say about this relationship.    
Incumbent inequality and incumbent ideology present some interesting results. 
Inequality is negatively associated with support for the left in the lower house model 
(lhvrl), and because Gini coefficient is measured 0 (equal) to 1 (unequal) the result 
implies that the more equal a country the less support there is for the left. It could be 
argued however that the reverse is also true, that is; the less equal a country the higher 
support for the left. Although this is not directly observed through this analysis the 
implication remains. What is clear is that as the Gini coefficient decreases so too does 
support for the left. This relationship is only significant in the lower house however 
and is not highly substantive. Incumbent ideology is also significant in the lower 
house elections (lhvrl) and in the fourth model (leftvoteshare). However, because 
incumbent ideology is coded as 0 (right) and 1 (left) it means that as the incumbent 
goes from right to left, support for the left increases. So, support for the left increases 
when there is a left rather than a right incumbent as the backlash argument might 
suggest. This is highly statistically significant and substantive in the leftvoteshare 
model
85
 which indicates that support for the left is highest where the left is the 
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incumbent. High levels of support for the left once already in power may be explained 
by the redistributive policies implemented by leftist governments across the region 
earning them popularity, at least in their first terms. This result however does not help 
to explain how the left came to power in the first place.  
The analysis above demonstrates that mass mobilisation more generally helps to 
explain support for the left as evidenced by the significance of this relationship across 
all measurements of the independent variable. Additionally, GDP growth is 
negatively associated across all models implying that there is higher support for the 
left when there is less economic growth. This finding is consistent with the argument 
that the lack of economic growth under neoliberal incumbents drove voters left. The 
results are neither substantive nor significant however, consequently the lack of 
economic growth cannot be said to explain support for the left based on these results. 
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Table 3.4: Mobilisation and support for the left without interaction terms 
Variables  presvrl  presVRL2 lhvrl leftvoteshare leftvoteshare
86
 
Mass Mobilisation  1.245076** 
(.5450553) 
.2773108* 
(.1593694) 
.9604338*** 
(.3406424) 
10.48389*** 
(10.48389) 
 
Indigenous Movement 
Mobilisation 
    -.5403157 
(3.2007) 
 
Indigenous Population  -.0021283 
(-.0021283) 
-.0038901 
(.003837) 
.0060704 
(.009107) 
-.0076073 
(.062897) 
.0098762 
(.0862839) 
 
Incumbent Inequality  -.0678271 
(-.0678271) 
-0.0168218 
(.0135504) 
-.0588546* 
(.0342837) 
 -.1089093 
(2883671) 
1.297553 
(.4326308) 
 
Incumbent Ideology .691822 
(.691822) 
.0963936 
(.1735839) 
.9823759** 
(.409562) 
16.1018*** 
(3.204569) 
13.30122 
(6.728779) 
 
GDP Growth (%) -.0332603 
(-.0332603) 
-.0324062 
(.0245935) 
-.0229269 
(.0473126) 
-.0648559 
(.3426428) 
-.0317623 
(.5694543) 
 
Constant  11.76447 
(11.76447) 
2.534966 
(.6888838) 
10.78142 
(1.848107) 
30.1405 
(15.26847) 
-37.7332 
(23.38207) 
 
R-Squared  0.1436 0.1443 0.2070 0.2394 0.2129 
N 65 65 81 169 51 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Note: ***p>0.01, **p>0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
Table 3.5 below demonstrates the results of the analysis when we include interaction 
terms. It is worth noting that even with the introduction of interaction terms, mass 
mobilisation continues to be positively associated with support for the left across all 
four measurements of the independent variable. It is statistically significant across all 
models and highly substantive in the leftvoteshare model. 
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only five countries are included (Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru). All models 
preceding were run with the massmob variable as the central independent variable which includes all 
countries in the dataset.  
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Indigenous movement mobilisation (movemobscore) however, is negatively 
associated with support for the left and is highly substantive and statistically 
significant. As with the previous analysis, while all measurements of the independent 
variable were included in the analysis, there were too few observations in the presvrl, 
presvrl2 and lhvrl models to validate their inclusion in Table 3.5 below (please see 
appendix C for full results of all tests).
87
 Indigenous population is also negatively 
associated with support for the left in this model. Although not a highly substantive 
relationship, the implication is that support for the left is higher where indigenous 
populations are low, rather than where they are high as would be expected.  
The interaction term mass mobilisation*indigenous population was introduced as an 
exploratory proxy to capture indigenous mobilisation across all countries. The results 
indicate a negative relationship which is statistically significant in the leftvoteshare 
model. While this relationship is not very substantive, the implication is that support 
for the left is lower in labour mobilising countries with high indigenous populations. 
However, given that only three of the eight countries listed by Roberts as labour 
mobilising have substantial indigenous populations (Bolivia, Peru and Mexico) it is 
unlikely that this variable can tell us much about the relationship between indigenous 
movement mobilisation and support for the left. Instead we must turn to our principal 
measurement of the independent variable, the interaction term indigenous movement 
mobilisation*indigenous population. The result indicates a statistically significant 
positive relationship. This is the key finding from the analysis because it implies that 
support for the left is high where indigenous population and indigenous movement 
mobilisation is also high. 
As with the previous analysis outlined on Table 3.4 above, incumbent inequality is 
negatively associated with the left in the lower house model. Therefore as the Gini 
coefficient decreases so too does support for the left, thus implying that there is less 
support for the left where countries are more equal. Indeed, it can be argued that 
where inequality is low there is no mandate for leftist parties who centre their policies 
on alleviating inequality. In other words, if inequality is low so too is support for the 
left because addressing inequality is not an important issue. Incumbent ideology is 
once again positively associated with support for the left and this is highly substantive 
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and significant in the leftvoteshare model. Because incumbent ideology is coded as 0 
(right) and 1 (left) it implies that support for the left is high when the left is the 
incumbent rather than the right as the ‘backlash’ theory might suggest. This tells us 
more about continued support for the left than it does about the emergence of the left 
in the first place (which is the goal of this research).  
Finally, GDP growth is negatively associated with support for the left across the first 
three models implying that support for the left is high where economic growth is low, 
thereby supporting the argument that the failure of neoliberal incumbents to provide 
growth drove voters left. The direction of this relationship changes in the last two 
models however. The implication here is that an increase in economic growth is 
associated with an increase in support for the left, and this is more substantive in the 
fifth model which includes the five countries from the survey only. Ultimately, the 
results for GDP are not statistically significant therefore there is little to be observed 
on the relationship between GDP growth and support for the left in this case.  
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Table 3.5: Mobilisation and support for the left including interaction terms  
Variables  presvrl  presVRL2 lhvrl leftvoteshare leftvoteshare
88
 
Mass Mobilisation  1.751048** 
(.7123276) 
.4281977** 
(.1881823) 
1.17545*** 
(.4348726) 
14.23665*** 
(3.344204) 
 
 
Indigenous Movement 
Mobilisation  
    -20.07877** 
(8.195758) 
 
Indigenous Population  
 
 
 
.0119095 
(.0140704) 
 
 
.0004017 
(.0048353) 
 
.0133272* 
(.0075412) 
 
.117202 
(.0772089) 
 
-.5431189** 
(.253218) 
Mobilisation*  
Indigenous Population 
 
-.027697 
(.0249509) 
-.0082402 
(.0077549) 
-.0137135 
(.018045) 
-.226657* 
(.1192123) 
 
Indigenous Movement 
Mobilisation*  
Indigenous Population 
 
    .4280106** 
(.165444) 
Incumbent Inequality  -.0792202 
(.0525734) 
-.0202808 
(.0136862) 
-.0630704* 
(.03441) 
-.1815594 
(.2848851) 
 
1.126727 
(.3932475) 
 
Incumbent Ideology .5923487 
(.6213956) 
.0718225 
(.168812) 
.9961547** 
(.4095915) 
16.07414*** 
(3.274425) 
 
11.96429 
(6.02072) 
 
 
GDP Growth (%) 
-.0193024 
(.0867816) 
-.0293191 
(.0247151) 
-.0210886 
(.047901) 
.0023174 
(.3412128) 
 
.4769356 
(.7455919) 
 
Constant  12.11383 
(2.780596) 
2.642796 
(.6919339) 
10.87771 
(1.855281) 
31.85016 
(15.07906) 
 
-5.279453 
(25.33032) 
 
R-Squared  0.1644 0.1700 0.2155 0.2553 0.3086 
N 65 65 81 169 51 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Note: ***p>0.01, **p>0.05, *p<0.1 
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Based on both of the analyses above we can conclude that mass mobilisation helps to 
explain support for the left. This was statistically significant across all models and 
highly substantive in the leftvoteshare model both with and without interactions. 
Accordingly, it provides a strong foundation for the argument that the left depend on 
mass-mobilising bases for support in elections.  
 
It can also be said that incumbent inequality is negatively associated with support for 
the left in the lower house. The result implies that there is less support for the left 
where countries are more equal. As previously discussed this may simply reflect the 
lack of a mandate for parties to address inequality typically proposed by the left. 
Incumbent ideology was positively associated with support for the left in the lower 
house and again in the leftvoteshare model. However, because this variable is coded 
as 0 (right) and 1 (left) it implies that support for the left is high when the left is the 
incumbent therefore suggesting that the redistributive polices and the reforms carried 
out by the left once in power, is well among the electorate. Nevertheless, this result 
does not provide insight into how the left came to power in the first instance.  
The central finding of the analyses is related to the key independent variable, 
indigenous movement mobilisation. Indigenous movement mobilisation alone was 
negatively associated with support for the left in both cases but was statistically 
significant and highly substantive in the interaction model. However, when 
indigenous mobilisation was interacted with indigenous population it changed the 
direction of the relationship. Therefore indigenous movement 
mobilisation*indigenous population is positively associated with support for the left 
in the leftvoteshare model. This is the key finding of this analysis because it 
demonstrates that high levels of indigenous movement mobilisation and population 
are related to high levels of support for the left. Although it is not a highly substantive 
relationship it nonetheless provides a real indicator that indigenous movement 
mobilisation can help to explain support for the left, particularly where indigenous 
population provides a large base of support. This is particularly interesting given that 
indigenous population (although admittedly not statistically significant) was 
negatively associated with support for the left in the same model, implying that it is 
not just population size that matters. Rather it is whether that population is mobilised 
in support for the left, which I argue was facilitated through the movements. Figure 
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3.11 below demonstrates the nature of the relationship between the variables, support 
for the left, indigenous population and indigenous movement mobilisation in the five 
cases of Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru.  
 
Figure 3.11: Marginal effects for indigenous movement mobilisation and 
indigenous population (leftvoteshare) 
 
Source: Author’s own data 
Figure 3.11 above demonstrates that support for the left increases in line with 
indigenous movement mobilisation in cases of high indigenous populations. 
Furthermore, where population is high, support for the left is observed to ne highest 
when indigenous mobilisation is high indicating that a high population alone cannot 
explain support for the left. Rather it is the combination of a high population and high 
indigenous movement mobilisation that explains higher support for the left according 
to this graph.  
Interestingly, there is another relationship can be observed from Figure 3.11. As 
indicated by the blue line above, support for the left decreases in cases of low 
indigenous population despite high mobilisation. The case of the Mapuche 
movements in Chile mentioned in the introduction may offer some insight here. Chile 
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represents a case of a high mobilisation but low indigenous population and therefore 
the Mapuche do not constitute a large enough population to impact support for the 
left. Moreover, because they represent a low base of support they are not likely to be 
of any strategic advantage to political parties at the national level and therefore are 
unlikely to form of movement-party alliances. As long as the Mapuche movements 
represent such a minority and do not ally with larger, more general, social movements 
they will not be of strategic importance for parties and they are unlikely to achieve 
their political goals.
89
 Chile therefore represents a case in which mobilisation is high 
but indigenous population are low and so support for the left decreases. Even if such 
movements were to support a political party for instance this would have little 
consequence at the national level without the support of other social bases also.  
The goal of the quantitative analysis above was to explore the role of indigenous 
movement mobilisation in support for the left. More generally, the analyses provide 
us with further indication that mass mobilisation matters to support for the left. 
Despite the data limitations the results of the last model in each of the above tables 
can provide a blueprint for relationships between the movements and the left. Central 
to my argument is that the movements mobilised their bases in support for the left 
which contributed to the success of the left at the turn of the century. To explore 
whether indigenous people did indeed support the left we can now turn to the 
individual level analysis.  
3.3 Individual analysis  
This section of the chapter addresses the relationship between indigenous voters and 
the left in Latin America. The goal is to investigate whether indigenous people 
supported the left, thereby providing a base of support for these parties. This research 
suggests that where indigenous people vote left it is because indigenous movements 
mobilise them to do so. These movements mobilise support for the left because once 
in power they can help the movements achieve their goals, this is the basis of the 
political alliance. While Madrid (2012) and Lupu (2009) both provide empirical 
evidence that indigenous people are likely to support the left, this section of the 
chapter will use the survey data sourced from Latinobarómetro 2006 to further 
explore the relationship between indigenous people and the left in the region.  
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To investigate this we must first identify who is indigenous within the sample. To do 
so we can explore two questions from the survey. The first question is; ‘What is your 
Mother Tongue?’ Those who selected an indigenous language as their mother tongue 
can be considered as part of the indigenous base. This includes a sample of 657 
people, which amounts to just 6.25 per cent of the total sample for Latinobarómetro in 
2006. Secondly, we can isolate those within the sample who selected an indigenous 
language as their interview language. This constitutes just 134 people or 1.33 per cent 
of the total sample. Selecting either question can allow us to isolate indigenous voters. 
The mother tongue question however is a more suitable measurement of the 
independent variable in this analysis (the indigenous vote).Those who selected an 
indigenous language as their mother tongue is a more representative measurement for 
identifying the indigenous base because it encompasses both those who may select 
Spanish as the interview language, otherwise consider themselves indigenous. For 
instance, in some cases indigenous people may not want to identify as such in the 
survey by selecting an indigenous language as the interview language but we can 
assume that if they select an indigenous language as their mother tongue that they are 
indeed part of the indigenous base. On this matter we can follow in the footsteps of 
scholars such as Madrid (2012) who includes mestizos who speak Spanish as part of 
the indigenous base in his study. Furthermore, the mother tongue question also 
provides a larger sample than the interview language question which is important in 
any quantitative analysis. Consequently, mother tongue is the primary measurement 
of the indigenous base in this analysis. 
 
It is important to note that capturing indigenous identity through surveys is 
undeniably problematic. Responses given can vary depending on the propensity to 
identify as indigenous on any given day. While I recognise the limitations of 
capturing indigenous identity in this manner, I also argue that these limitations should 
not discourage us from exploring the relationship. The results may provide important 
indicators which can be used as a guide within the qualitative research, providing 
triangulation within the study.  
 
As with the previous analysis, the dependent variable remains support for the left. It is 
measured using the responses to the question in the survey, “For which party would 
you vote this Sunday?”. Survey responses were coded by Wiesehomeier and Doyle 
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(2012) in accordance to the ideology
90
 of the party selected by each respondent. The 
ideology of the party is based on a scale which runs from right (-10) to left (10) where 
0 is the centre. Parties which have an ideological score of less than 5, for instance, can 
be considered extreme left parties while those between 0 and 5 are considered left or 
centre left (where closer to 0). Wiesehomeier and Doyle (2012) provide this 
measurement for responses to Latinobarómetro in 2006 exclusively and therefore this 
is the year selected for study. The year 2006 is also significant because it represents a 
period of accelerated support for the left in the region. For example, in 2006 leftist 
leaders were elected in Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile and the re-elected in the case of Lula 
in Brazil. In order to analyse the relationship between indigenous voters and support 
for the left I ran a basic OLS regression. Table 3.6 below demonstrates the results of 
this test. The results indicate that those who selected an indigenous language as their 
mother tongue are more likely to vote for the left, however this relationship is not 
statistically significant.  
 
Table 3.6: The indigenous vote 
Variables Mother Tongue  
(indigenous2) 
Support for the  Left  .0970957     
(.202417) 
Constant 10.08802    
(.0516773) 
R2 0.0000 
N 10080 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.  
Note: ***p>0.01, **p>0.05, *p<0.1 
 
Figure 3.12 below depicts this relationship by country and provides some interesting 
results, particularly in terms of the qualitative case studies in this research. In both 
Bolivia and Peru, the indigenous vote is positioned towards the left suggesting that 
the indigenous people do provide support for the left in each case. It is clear from the 
graph that indigenous people support the left in these two cases more than any other 
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in the region and this is a statistically significant relationship. It is also interesting to 
note, that while not statistically significant, indigenous people in the remaining three 
cases of interest (Ecuador, Guatemala and Mexico) are also positioned to the left of 
the scale (albeit more to the centre in the case of Mexico).  
 
Figure 3.12: The Indigenous vote by country (mother tongue) 
  
Source: Author’s own data 
The case of Venezuela and Argentina also provide significant results, albeit in a 
direction we may not expect. That is, indigenous people are positioned to the right of 
centre in Argentina and further to the right again in Venezuela. As discussed in the 
introduction of this thesis, the case of Venezuela presents an outlier because there is a 
low indigenous population, low indigenous mobilisation yet the late President Hugo 
Chávez symbolises the left in the region (the contestatory left in particular). In the 
introduction I argued that indigenous movements and their communities in Venezuela 
assimilate into the movements of the poor who provided a base of support for Chávez. 
The results from Figure 3.12 above however imply that indigenous people are not 
supporters of the left in Venezuela, or in Argentina for that matter. One key 
explanation for this could be the persistence of clientelistic ties between the poor, 
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such as indigenous communities, and the right in the region. In such cases, indigenous 
people are likely to vote for the right based on clientelistic linkages rather than the 
programmatic linkages with the left proposed by this research. In relation to the 
overall argument however, because indigenous populations are small in each case, we 
do not expect these populations to have a substantial impact on support for the left at 
a national level.   
It is our cases of Bolivia and Peru in which we find the most interesting results. If the 
indigenous population in these cases are voting left as the graph suggests, then I argue 
it is because the social movements that represent them mobilise them to do so. If this 
is the case, then the movements are indeed important allies of the left in the region. 
While both the macro and micro level analyses discussed in this chapter provides 
some indicators that these movements matter, the qualitative case studies are used to 
further investigate the relationship.  
3.4 Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter is to provide a general overview of the relationship between 
indigenous movement mobilisation and support for the left in the region. The chapter 
began by providing some descriptive statistics on the key variables, support for the 
left and indigenous movement mobilisation. The descriptive statistics indicated that 
the left turn in the region is more a shift towards rather than to the left when examined 
region-wide, much as previous scholars suggested (see Baker and Greene, 2011). 
However, when we explore the left turn over time and across cases using the 
leftvoteshare variable we see that the left underwent a period of accelerated success in 
the early and mid-2000s. Furthermore when we analysed the vote share of the left 
over time and across all countries it became apparent that the left turn was sharper in 
some cases more than others, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and 
Uruguay. This highlights the importance of assessing the left turn in the context of 
cases and over time so that we do not devalue the puzzle by assessing it too generally. 
Importantly, we find that there was a shift to the left in the two cases selected for our 
qualitative case studies, Bolivia and Peru.  
The descriptive statistics also provided an overview of the distribution of indigenous 
population and mobilisation in the region. Specifically, results from the expert survey 
provided us with some key information on the mobilisation of movements in Bolivia, 
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Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru. While we find that both population and 
mobilisation is high in the two cases of majority indigenous populations, Bolivia and 
Ecuador, cases like Peru and Guatemala demonstrated that a high population does not 
guarantee mobilisation. Mexico meanwhile indicated that even countries with 
comparatively smaller populations can achieve medium-high levels of mobilisation. 
The information collected from the surveys also provided us with a better 
understanding of the behaviour of these movements. For example, we found that 
community meetings and protests are the most commonly undertaken by indigenous 
movements and that they are less likely to undertake more formal types of political 
participation such as letter-writing.  
With this in mind, the second part of the chapter examined the relationship between 
support for the left and indigenous movement mobilisation. The macro level analysis 
tested the relationship between these central variables using four measurements of the 
dependent variable (support for the left) and two measurements of indigenous 
movement mobilisation (massmob and movemobscore). The results indicate that mass 
mobilisation can help explain support for the left across the region. The implication of 
this result is that the left benefit from a mass-mobilising base. The central finding 
however was that the interaction term indigenous movement mobilisation*indigenous 
population was positively correlated with support for the left. In the final section of 
the chapter, the individual level study sought to uncover whether indigenous people 
support the left. Using data from Latinobarómetro in 2006 we found that indigenous 
people
91
 in Bolivia and Peru are positioned more to the left than other cases, again 
providing a basis for the argument that they represent an important base of support for 
the left if mobilised. 
The results of the quantitative analysis provides breadth to the study by looking at the 
general relationship between the central variables. So far, we can say that mass 
mobilisation and in some cases, indigenous movement mobilisation, is correlated with 
support for the left. Correlation however is not causation and to truly uncover the 
causal relationship we must now turn to the qualitative case studies of Bolivia and 
Peru.  
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Chapter 4: Bolivia 
“We [indigenous people] are the base, the majority….we have a name for it… 
Kollasuyo” 
- Froilán Puma Carmona, leader of CONAMAQ (Interview, May 
22
nd
, 2012). 
Introduction  
The first case study to be discussed is Bolivia where, in 2005, the election of Evo 
Morales and his party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) signalled the country’s left 
turn. Bolivia was selected because indigenous movement mobilisation is high and 
therefore it is anticipated that support for the left would also be high here. More 
specifically, it is expected that indigenous social movements are highly mobilised and 
have strong social ties with their bases. The indigenous population of Bolivia is 
highly substantial; culminating in 71 per cent of the country’s total population, 
therefore the mobilisation of these bases would generate considerable support for the 
party.  
In relation to the ‘backlash’ argument, Bolivian politics was dominated by a 
succession of neoliberal governments since 1985. The Víctor Paz Estenssoro 
administration (1985-1989) implemented a “radical” neoliberal economic policy 
known as the New Economic Policy (NEP) which continued under succeeding 
administrations until 2003 when social movements mobilised to reject the model 
under President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (known as Goni) (Conaghan, 1990: 17). 
Indeed, neoliberal restructuring in Bolivia “was the most radical in Latin America 
after Chile” (Kohl, 2006: 305). By the turn of the century however it became evident 
that this model was failing. On October 17
th
 2003, an estimated 500,000 protestors 
marched in La Paz calling for the resignation of Goni and “death to neoliberalism” 
(Kohl, 2006: 304). Goni resigned amid this social pressure and fled to Miami, leaving 
his vice-president Carlos Mesa in charge (Kohl, 2006). By June 2005, Mesa too 
resigned under continued protest and elections were called for December 2005 (Kohl, 
2006).  
The 2005 election signalled the left turn in Bolivia. The election was between the 
contestatory left represented by Evo Morales and his party MAS, and the right 
  Qualitative Analysis: Bolivia    
143 
 
represented by Jorge Quiroga and his party Poder Democrático y Social (Podemos). 
Morales won by a majority of 53 per cent and the election marked the highest voter 
turnout in 25 years (Ballivián, 2006). For many, Morales was the “anti-establishment” 
and “anti-elite” candidate whose presence in Bolivian politics was “long-awaited” 
(Madrid, 2012: 65; Ballivián, 2006: 38). In particular, Morales received much support 
from indigenous people who represented 71 per cent of the MAS vote (Madrid, 
2012).
92
 The 2005 elections not only marked the success of the contestatory left, but 
they also occurred at a time of high indigenous movement mobilisation. Many of the 
movements were involved in the protests which ousted Goni in 2003 and Mesa in 
2005.  
There are a number of indigenous movements identified within the literature as 
central actors in Bolivian politics. They include; Confederación Sindical Única de 
Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (or the Unified Syndical Confederation of Rural 
Workers of Bolivia) (CSUTCB), Proyecto Fortalecimiento Organizacional del 
Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (Project Organisational 
Strengthening of the national Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu) 
(CONAMAQ), Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (Confederation of 
Indigenous People of Bolivia) (CIDOB), Confederación Nacional de Mujeres 
Campesinas Indígenas Originarias de Bolivia “Bartolina Sisa” (the National 
Confederation of Campesino, Indigenous and Original Women of Bolivia) 
(CNMCIOB-BS) and Confederación Sindical de Comunidades Interculturales de 
Bolivia (Syndicalist Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia) 
(CSCIB)
93
 (Yashar, 2005: Van Cott, 2005; 2008: Postero and Zamosc, 2004). These 
movements are central to the analysis. 
Ultimately, the 2005 elections in Bolivia is a case in which the contestatory left won 
elections amid high levels of mobilisation and with much support from indigenous 
people. This chapter assesses the role of the indigenous movements in mobilising 
support for MAS. Firstly, the chapter will provide a brief but relevant historical 
background to Bolivian politics. The 2005 elections will then be outlined before 
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This figure is adopted from the work of Madrid (2012) who uses the LAPOP surveys to calculate the 
ethnic composition of the MAS vote share. Indigenous people are considered as those who self-identify 
as indigenous or selected an indigenous language as their first language.  
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Confederación Sindical de Comunidades Interculturales de Bolivia (CSCIB) is formally known as 
Confederación Sindical de Colonizadores de Bolivia (CSCB). 
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providing an overview of the movements and their respective social bases. Finally, 
the chapter will turn to the results of field interviews in which evidence of movement 
support for MAS in 2005 is outlined.  
4.1 Historical background 
Like many Latin America countries, Bolivian history is marked by military juntas, 
revolution, on-going economic crisis and persistent corruption and clientelism. 
Bolivia was once part of Peru and the great Inca Empire (1438-1532), until 
colonisation in the 16
th
 Century. During colonisation by the Spanish, Upper Peru 
(now Bolivia) was rich in silver deposits and therefore a major source of income for 
Spain (Skidmore and Smith, 2001). The spirit of mobilisation was evident in Bolivia 
from 1781 when indigenous leader Túpac Katarí led a rebellion against the Spanish in 
the city of La Paz (Meade, 2010). Despite his defeat, Túpac Katarí remains a symbol 
of indigenous rebellion in Bolivia. An independence movement emerged in 1809 
which included the geographically dispersed guerrilla independence movements 
known as republiquetas (1809-1825) which were led by local caudillos (or ‘strong 
men’ local leaders) and were comprised of rural campesinos and Indians, as well as 
independence leaders from Argentina (Meade, 2010; Unzueta, 2003). However it was 
the South American liberator José San Martín defeat of the Spanish in Peru in 1821 
that led to the liberation of Upper Peru in 1825, renamed initially as Bolívar (in 
honour of Símon Bolívar) and later as Bolivia.
94
  
 
The first constitution was enacted in 1826 and there have been 16 subsequent 
constitutions since then including the most recent in 2009 ratified by the government 
of Evo Morales. Constitutional amendments however were very much in the power of 
the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of the state until 2004 when the 
National Congress approved a constitutional reform package which contained a 
provision for national-level referendums (Breuer, 2008). The 1967 Constitution was 
the constitution in effect during the 2005 elections, although it had been amended on 
several occasions. Since 1997 the president was elected for a five year term without 
consecutive re-election, but the former presidents could run once one-term had passed 
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 More specifically, the Spanish monarchy refused to recognise the independence of Peru and a series 
of battles ensued between independence movements and supporters of the crown (royalists). It was the 
Battle of Ayacucho (1924) led by Antonio José de Sucre which ultimately resulted in the liberation of 
Upper Peru. 
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(Political Database of the Americas (PDBA)).Bolivia has a bicameral congress in 
which there are 27 seats in the Senate (upper house) and 130 seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies (lower house). The country is divided into nine departments with one 
governor (prefecto) per department
95
 (PDBA).  In 2005, there were 327 municipalities 
and municipal councils elect mayors for five year terms (PDBA). Since the new 
constitution in 2009, the number of municipalities increased to 337.  
 
Since their independence however, Bolivia has had “one of the least stable political 
histories in Latin America” (Van Cott, 2003: 755). From 1900 to 2009, Bolivia 
experienced a total of 29 attempted coups, 19 of which were successful (Lehoucq, 
2011). Not surprisingly then, Bolivia’s transition to democracy (1978-1982) is 
described as a “transition through rupture” and has earned a reputation as a country 
with “par excellence of political instability and military coups” (Mayorga, 2005: 152; 
Mayorga, 1997: 142). Before exploring more modern characteristics of Bolivian 
politics it is important to discuss the 1952 Revolution led by the leftist party 
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), which represents a critical juncture 
in indigenous-left relations in Bolivia. The 1952 revolution arose when incumbent 
President Mamerto Urriolagoitía Harriague (1949-1951) refused to transfer power to 
the democratically elected Víctor Paz Estenssoro of MNR. When Urriolagoitía 
installed the head of the Bolivian military Hugo Ballivián (1951-1952) as president, 
MNR seized power with a military coup. Of particular relevance to this study is the 
role played by highland indigenous communities, or campesinos, in supporting the 
MNR revolution. These communities “radically mobilised” in favour of MNR, who, 
in turn, “used the campesinos to win the revolution” (Yashar, 2005: 155; Van Cott, 
2005: 53). Many of these communities were politically mobilised by the Chaco War
96
 
(1932-1935) with Paraguay in which 200,000 highland Indians fought
97
 (Westin, 
1968). Bolivia’s defeat generated a mood of discontent and mobilised highland 
Indians who had acquired a “sense of political consciousness” whilst fighting in the 
war (Westin, 1968: 87). In this way, MNR tapped into the mobilisation of these 
communities, which supported their revolution based on an ideological congruence 
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 Governors or prefectos are also elected for five year terms. 
96
 The Chaco war was a conflict over territory along the border with Bolivia and Paraguay known as 
Chaco Boreal. The territory was considered to be rich in oil. Bolivia lost the war and lost over 50,000 
soldiers resulting in a “period of social and political disintegration” (Westin, 1968: 86).  
97
  Indeed, highland Indians were conscripted by the State to fight in the Chaco War.  
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and a common enemy in the incumbent government. For instance, the MNR appealed 
to highland campesinos in particular by denouncing the latifundia system of 
agriculture in Bolivia in which a small number of large landowners owned the 
majority of the land which was worked by campesinos (Westin, 1968).  
 
Undoubtedly, the relationship between MNR and highland communities at this time 
represents the first indigenous-left alliance in Bolivia. Interestingly, the nationalistic 
rhetoric of the contemporary contestatory left could be considered reminiscent of the 
MNR in the 1950s who denounced the large “tin barons” who spent “their fortunes 
abroad” and who were responsible for Bolivia’s woes (Westin, 1968: 96). Like the 
contestatory left, MNR in the 1950s also made populist and ethnic appeals by 
claiming that the highland Indian “by the very weight of his number is the number 
one factor in the economy”, and should therefore be central to the rebuilding of 
Bolivia after the Chaco War (Westin, 1968: 96).
98
 
Once in power, MNR sought to secure this “principal mass political base” by 
immediately implementing reforms that especially benefitted indigenous communities 
(Smith, 2005: 256). Chief among them was the 1953 Land Reform (Law Decree 
3464) which established the Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (INRA). The 
reform included the following objectives; the redistribution of land, abolition of 
unpaid labour, the promotion of Indian communities, stimulation of agriculture, 
preservation of national resources and promotion of migration to the less populated 
eastern lowlands to cultivate land (where Amazonian communities reside) (Malloy 
and Thorn, 1971: 162). The day the reform was announced was proclaimed the 
national “Day of the Indian” thus highlighting that the reform was specifically aimed 
at highland indigenous people (Malloy and Thorn, 1971: 162). President Víctor Paz 
Estenssoro also implemented a series of education reforms and social services in rural 
communities where highland indigenous people resided (Madrid, 2012). Crucially, 
MNR removed literacy restrictions on suffrage, allowing the largely illiterate 
indigenous campesino population to participate in elections for the first time (Madrid, 
2012).  
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 This claim was made in 1940 by Enrique Sánchez de Lozada, a central figure in MNR and father of 
President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (Goni). 
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In order to secure the indigenous base, MNR institutionalised party support by also 
reorganising local indigenous unions, or sindicatos, across Bolivia into national 
federations. The sindicatos were structured firstly by respective province
99
 and then 
by department.
100
 This fed into one national federation as illustrated in Figure 4.1 
below (Yashar, 2005). Importantly, indigenous movements in Bolivia remain 
organised in this way today. As this chapter will show, this structure has proven an 
effective way to communicate up and down the chain of command. Centrally, it is an 
efficient way to disseminate important information about protests, marches and even 
what candidate the movement will support in upcoming elections. Moreover, by 
organising highland communities in this way the federations became the “interlocutor 
between the peasants and the state” (Yashar, 2005: 159). I argue that movements 
remain the principal ‘interlocutor’ between indigenous people and the state today and 
for this reason they can play a central role in mobilising support for candidates.  
Figure 4.1: Federated structure of indigenous movements in Bolivia after the 
1952 Revolution. 
Source: Adapted from Yashar (2005) 
The reforms and institutionalisation of the indigenous base proved a successful 
strategy for MNR who in 1958 secured 95 per cent of their total vote from indigenous 
provinces (Madrid, 2012). Consequently, indigenous people were a key base of 
support for MNR until fellow party member René Barrientos overthrew the 
government in 1964 through a bloody coup. Barrientos initiated a campaign of 
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repression against indigenous organising during the 1970s which marked a dramatic 
change in MNR-indigenous relations (Smith, 2005). 
By the mid-1980s, Bolivia was in the depths of an economic crisis that “was 
unprecedented even by Latin American standards” (Conaghan et al. 1990: 17). The 
MNR government of Víctor Paz Estenssoro (1985-1989) took drastic neoliberal 
measures to tackle the on-going crisis in which hyperinflation reached 8,000 per cent 
in 1985 (Conaghan et al. 1990). In 1985, Paz Estenssoro and Goni (then Minister for 
Planning) implemented the neoliberal program entitled, the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) (Mayorga, 2005). Neoliberalism continued under the Jaime Paz Zamora 
government (1989-1993). His party Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria 
(MIR) pursued the same NEP style policy
101
 to tackle the crisis.
102
 Neoliberalism was 
accelerated once again under the first administration of Goni (1993-1997) who 
expanded privatisation to a point where 50 per cent of a number of strategic 
companies were given to investors free of charge (Mayorga, 1997). In 1997, former 
military dictator Hugo Banzer of the right-wing Acción Democrática Nacionalista 
(ADN) was elected and included a drastic policy to eradicate coca in conjunction with 
neoliberalism. The ‘eradication of coca’ policy destroyed over 80 per cent of the coca 
crop worsening the position of highland indigenous communities who exclusively 
cultivated coca and were already suffering from neoliberal policies (Van Cott, 2003). 
When Banzer was diagnosed with lung cancer in 2001, he transferred his power to his 
vice president Jorge Quiroga who continued this policy and would later face Morales 
in the 2005 elections whose presidency would finally break the reign of neoliberal 
governments since 1985.  
Another characteristic of Bolivian politics that is relevant to this study is the 
domination of politics by the traditional parties since the return of democracy in 1982. 
As Table 4.1 below demonstrates, MNR, ADN and MIR have dominated presidential 
elections from 1982 until the ousting of Goni in 2003. The ideological positioning of 
these parties has shifted over time. For instance, the MNR moved from a leftist 
revolutionary party in the 1950s concerned with the inclusion of indigenous people to 
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 However, Paz Zamora did not pursue neoliberalism to the same extent. For example, despite 
securing the passage of a privatisation  law  in Bolivia, the administration did not have the “political 
will” to  implement it (Mayorga, 1997: 146) 
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 Interestingly, Paz Zamora pursued neoliberal policies despite the social democratic roots of his 
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one that pursued radical neoliberal polices from the mid-1980s.  MIR can be 
described as a “somewhat less than social democratic” party yet in 1989 it entered an 
alliance with the unequivocally right-wing ADN (Domingo, 2005: 1731). Indeed 
coalition building among these three parties was another common pattern in Bolivian 
politics that was broken by the election of MAS in 2005. Coalitions are incentivised 
by the electoral system, which stipulates that should a party not win over 50 per cent 
of the vote, elections are decided by Congressional vote (Domingo, 2005).  
Table 4.1: Ruling parties in Bolivia since the return to democracy 1982 
 Years Party  President  
1982-1985 
1985-1989 
MNR 
MNR 
Hernán Siles Zuazo 
Víctor Paz Estenssoro 
1989-1993 MIR*  Jaime Paz Zamora 
1993-1997 MNR Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada 
1997-2001 ADN  Hugo Banzer Suárez 
2001-2002 ADN  Jorge Quiroga  
2002-2003 MNR Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada 
* Coalition with ADN 
By 2005, the political sentiment was of contempt for traditional politics. As María del 
Carmen (of the opposition party Plan Progreso para Bolivia- Convergencia Nacional 
(PPB-CN)) explains, “people were tired of these traditional parties, and so they put 
their hopes into Evo Morales” (Interview, May 7th, 2012). The Bolivian people had 
also grown tired of corruption associated with these parties. For example, a 2003 poll 
indicated that confidence in parties was just six per cent (Barr, 2005). Politics was 
also “stifled” by the clientelistic linkages between these traditional parties and their 
bases
103
 (Domingo, 2005: 1731). These linkages were so inherent in Bolivian politics 
that the failure to reward supporters with employment, or other benefits, was 
considered a “betrayal” by the parties and a “misuse of public office” (Domingo, 
2005: 1731). The perseverance of corruption and clientelism since democratisation, 
along with the domination of traditional parties illustrates that by 2005, Bolivians 
were not only discontented with failing economic policies but also by politics. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, political and economic discontent is a central explanatory 
variable for the left turn and it was certainly present in the case of Bolivia. Table 4.2 
below illustrates the increase in support for MAS between 2002 and 2005 and the 
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coinciding decrease in support for MNR during the same period. The table also 
displays the increase in voter turnout between the two elections. This chapter will 
demonstrate how the mobilisation of movements in support for MAS between 2002 
and 2005 can help to explain these increases in support and voter turnout. The chapter 
will now turn to a more detailed analysis of the 2005 elections before discussing the 
central indigenous movement in Bolivia. The chapter will then outline the evidence 
from field interviews which indicate that the increase movement mobilisation in 
support of MAS in 2005 can help to explain the growth in support for the party and 
voter turnout. 
Table 4.2: Performance of MAS and MNR between 2002 and 2005 
Source: Corte Nacional Electoral de Bolivia (CNE) 
4.2 The context of the 2005 election 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the 2005 election was preceded by a 
period of significant mobilisation by indigenous movements. Indeed, the increase in 
movement mobilisation can be traced back to 2000 when indigenous movements in 
Cochabamba successfully reversed plans to privatise water through a series of protest, 
which became known as “La Guerra del Agua” (or the Water War). In 2002, reforms 
implemented by Goni resulted in the widespread mobilisation of indigenous 
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 The results listed are the percentage of each chamber controlled by MAS.  
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 The results listed are the percentage of each chamber controlled by MNR.  
 2002 
(%) 
2005 
(%) 
Support for MAS  
Presidential election 
 
Legislative elections
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Chamber of Senators 
Chamber of Deputies  
 
 
22.46 
 
 
30 
21 
 
53.7 
 
 
44 
56 
Support for MNR    
Presidential election 22.5 6.5 
 
Legislative elections
105
 
  
Chamber of Senators 36 1 
Chamber of Deputies  11 7 
   
Voter Turnout    
Majority Indigenous Province  70 83 
Minority Indigenous Province  68 81 
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movements across the country (Singer, 2007: 200). Reforms included a proposed 
policy to eradicate coca (a legacy of the Banzer-Quiroga regime) which directly 
threatened the livelihood of highland coca growers represented nationally by the 
movement Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia 
(CSUTCB). In response, CSUTCB mobilised their social base in opposition to the 
policy. In particular, the Cochabamba representative of the CSUTCB, the Federación 
Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Cochabamba (FSUTCC), coordinated 
widespread roadblocks across the Chapare region paralysing traffic along the 
country’s central highway (Kohl, 2006, Pinto-Ocampo, 2008). In July 2002, Goni 
proposed the privatisation of Bolivian gas which resulted in the mobilisation of a new 
movement called the National Coordinator for the Defence and Recovery of Gas 
(NCDRG), which was an alliance of highland peasants and cocaleros movements who 
were later also joined by military leaders (Kohl, 2006: 320). By October 2003, the 
issue of gas privatisation had become particularly contentious and a broad coalition of 
social movements, including indigenous movements, took to the streets in La Paz in 
what they called La Guerra del Gas (or the Gas War) (Kohl, 2006). It was this mass 
mobilisation that led to the resignation of Goni and his successor Carlos Mesa in 2005 
(García et al., 2004: 3). In accordance with the constitution, the President of the 
Supreme Court, Eduardo Rodríguez Veltze, replaced Mesa and called presidential, 
congressional and prefecture elections for December 2005 (Kohl, 2006). 
This illustrates the level of mobilisation of movements, including indigenous 
movements in the run up to the 2005 elections. Indeed, if it were not for the 
mobilisation of movements to oust Goni, elections would not have taken place until 
2006. The Water War is particularly important for understanding the increase in 
mobilisation of indigenous movements. Firstly, indigenous people who opposed the 
right-wing administration of Hugo Banzer led the Water War 2000. In this way, the 
Water War represents the first major mobilisation in Bolivia against neoliberalism and 
it was led by indigenous movements. Secondly, the mobilisation was a success. The 
reversal of the contract by the Bolivian government to US water company Bechtel 
demonstrated that movements could achieve their goals through mass mobilisation, 
thus it acted as an inspiration for other movements. According to Mayra Gómez, 
indigenous activist and Senior Programme Officer for Parliamentarians for Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (PNND):  
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“The mass mobilisations after the 2000 Water War had succeeded in ousting 
Bechtel. But, the political system still did not appear to represent the will of 
the people, so they continued to mobilise up to the 2003 Gas War.”(Interview, 
February 3
rd
, 2012).  
Interestingly, the way in which the Water War was eventually resolved demonstrates 
the lack of trust in the effectiveness of political parties. The strikes were resolved 
through the media and the Catholic Church rather than through dialogue with political 
parties or with the government. The parties were simply not viewed as “the means to 
achieve social justice or political participation” highlighting the disconnection 
between the movements and institutionalised politics (Postero, 2006: 205). 
Furthermore, the mobilisation in opposition to Goni symbolises the discontent for 
neoliberalism in Bolivia at this time. The results of the 2005 elections (displayed in 
Table 4.3 below) illustrate the desire to break the pattern by replacing the right with 
the left, and the contestatory left in particular. For instance, regional leader of 
CSUTCB, Luís Gabriel Morales explains that the Gas War in 2003 “made people 
think, it made them think that we no longer want a President like that [referring to 
Goni], who kills its people
106
, who makes people suffer and so from this moment the 
situation changed and we decided to rise up more strongly for change” (Interview, 
May 16
th
, 2012). This mobilisation for change is evident in the clear demise of the 
traditional parties in 2005. As shown on Table 4.3 below, MNR received just over six 
per cent of the vote while MIR failed to even enter a candidate. ADN meanwhile 
relabelled itself as Poder Democrático y Social (PODEMOS) under Quiroga 
(Ballivián, 2006). Also of significance is the poor performance of the indigenous 
party, Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (MIP) led by former CSUTCB leader, Felipe 
Quispe. The radically indigenous nature of the party signified the lack of appetite of 
Bolivians for an ethnic party, and their preference for the contestatory left as 
represented by MAS. Moreover, the MIP exclusively appealed to Aymara’s therefore 
excluding the non-Aymara population resulting in a low vote share (Madrid, 2012).  
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 Luís Gabriel Morales is referring to the October 2003 Gas War when Goni sent the military to 
control the crowd who clashed with protesters resulting in the death of eighty protesters. The incident 
is known as ‘Octubre Negro’ or Black October (Garcia, 2006). 
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Table 4.3: Results of the 2005 elections in Bolivia  
Presidential candidate Party   Valid vote 
(%) 
Ideology  
Evo Morales MAS 53.7 Contestatory Left  
Jorge Quiroga Podemos 28.6 Right  
Samuel Doria Medina UN 8 Centre-Right 
Michiaki Nagatani MNR 6.5 Right 
Felipe Quispe MIP 2.2 Indigenous  
Others   0.13  
 
Total Valid Vote 
  
100 
 
Blank Votes  3.0  
Null Votes   3.4  
Source: Corte Nacional Electoral de Bolivia (CNE) 
The campaign itself was “short, but eventful”107 and was led by Morales and Quiroga 
from the outset (Ballivián, 2006: 40). Morales was the “anti-establishment” candidate 
and fervently criticised both the Goni and Mesa administration for their pursuance of 
neoliberalism and coca eradication (Ballivián, 2006). Morales claimed that these 
policies were directly responsible for poverty, corruption and the weakening of the 
state under previous governments (Ballivián, 2006). Ultimately, Morales claimed that 
the only people to benefit from neoliberalism were “the elite and foreigners” 
(Ballivián, 2006: 48). In addition Morales positioned himself and his party as 
“outsiders” who like most Bolivians, were “victims of the political system” 108 
(Ballivián, 2006:48). To illustrate this Morales referred to his expulsion from 
Congress in 2002 when he was accused of “inciting violence” in the Chapare during 
the FSUTCC roadblocks (Van Cott, 2003: 769). Morales also attacked traditional 
parties by emphasising how they had failed to bring about reform since the return to 
democracy (Ballivián, 2006). He bolstered his ‘outsider’ status by highlighting that 
his party, MAS, had never entered a coalition, nor held a majority in Congress, since 
its foundation in 1997 (Ballivián, 2006). In this way, Morales was securely positioned 
as a “champion of change”109 (Ballivián, 2006: 41).   
 
Importantly, Morales espoused contestatory left demands such as the nationalisation 
of privatised companies, including gas and mining companies which he claimed to 
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have “pillaged the land of its real owners, the indigenous people” (Madrid, 2012; La 
Nación, 2005). As one might expect, he vehemently condemned coca eradication 
polices and the US for encouraging such polices (Ballivián, 2006; Madrid, 2012).  
Indeed, his general opposition to the US only intensified after its Ambassador Manuel 
Rocha appealed to the people of Bolivia not to vote for Morales who would be a 
“major cocaine exporter” (Jim Schultz, May 10th, 2012; Madrid, 2012). In response, 
Morales elevated the coca leaf as the symbol of Bolivian resistance whilst using the 
incident to highlight the ignorance of the US on coca cultivation (Madrid, 2012). 
Morales declared his admiration for leaders like Che Guevara, Fidel Castro and Hugo 
Chávez thus definitively allying himself with the contestatory left (La Nación, 2005). 
Perhaps unlike his idols, Morales was perceived as a “leader with all the attributes of 
a rebel, but with none of their flaws” (Ballivián, 2006: 48).  
 
While MAS is accepted within the literature on the left as a leftist party, there is 
undoubtedly an ethnic component to the party that must be addressed (see Weyland 
2009; Panizza 2005; Weyland et al. 2010). Essentially, MAS is not an indigenous 
party but it draws much support from indigenous people and makes direct appeals to 
this base of support and to the movements which represent them. Madrid (2012) 
refers to this as ‘ethno-populism’. For instance, Morales made direct ethnic appeals 
by promising to fight racism, discrimination, inequality, eliminate illiteracy and 
ultimately, bring indigenous to power” (Madrid, 2012; BBC Mundo, 2005; Ballivián, 
2006). Morales chose Álvaro García Linera as his running mate. Linera was a leftist 
intellectual who was previously arrested for his participation in the radical indigenous 
movement Ejército Guerrillero Túpac Katarí (EGTK) (Ballivián, 2006). García 
claimed that his main objective in 2005 was to support the “first indigenous president 
of Bolivia and of the continent”110 (Ballivián, 2006: 41).  A central part of his 
campaign was his promise to implement a constituent assembly and reform the 
constitution to address indigenous demands (Ballivián, 2006). By selecting a running 
mate that had strong roots in a radical indigenous movement and by emphasising 
policies such as the new constitution, MAS directly appealed to indigenous people. 
The promise of constitutional reform is particularly important because, as will be 
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discussed in more detail later, it acted as the perspective compensation for indigenous 
movement support in 2005.  
 
It is important to clarify however that although MAS has strong ties in the Chapare
111
 
region, and despite its appeals to indigenous people, it is a contestatory left rather than 
an indigenous party. In 2005 MAS never claimed to be an indigenous party and also 
appealed to the electorate more generally as a leftist party. After 2000 in particular 
MAS reached out to other bases such as white people and mestizos, arguably to 
expand their base of support and improve their chances of success in upcoming 2002 
elections. In order to appeal to these voters the party countered claims that Morales 
was radical and by 2005 white people and mestizos made up half of the party 
(Madrid, 2012). So while MAS certainly has an ethno-populist component it is not an 
indigenous party but rather a contestatory left party which happens to make appeals to 
the indigenous base.  
 
In stark contrast to Morales, Jorge Quiroga was very much part of the system that 
Morales was strongly opposing. As vice president, he assumed the presidency from 
2001-2002 after president Hugo Banzer fell ill (Banzer was the founder of right-wing 
ADN). Prior to his vice-presidency Quiroga served as Banzer’s Minister for Finance 
under neoliberal reforms exemplifying his affiliation with the right and neoliberalism 
(Ballivián, 2006). In addition, Quiroga pursued the coca eradication policy 
implemented by Banzer and retired to the US at the end of his term, further 
highlighting that he was the opposite candidate to Morales in almost every way 
(Ballivián, 2006). In order to campaign for President in a climate of such discontent, 
Quiroga rejected an ADN ticket and instead formed Podemos. The party may have 
included the word ‘social’ to boost support but it was an alliance of conservative 
citizens groups from departments such as Santa Cruz, and former members of ADN 
(Ballivián, 2006). As part of his campaign, Quiroga promised to better distribute the 
profits from natural gas back into Bolivian society, but was opposed to nationalisation 
(Ballivián, 2006). Like Morales, Quiroga also promised to hold a constituent 
assembly. Unlike Morales, his focus was more on the reform of the political system 
generally than on addressing the demands of indigenous movements specifically 
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(Ballivián, 2006). Quiroga appealed to the middle class by questioning the stability of 
a potential MAS government particularly given how they had led the protests against 
Goni (Ballivián, 2006). Quiroga also accused Morales of polarising Bolivia and 
threatening to imitate a Chávez model of governance (Ballivián, 2006). In an attempt 
to further bolster support among Bolivia’s middle and upper class, Quiroga selected 
Bolivia’s most popular news presenter, María René Duchén as his running mate 
(Ballivián, 2006).  
The third candidate in the running was Samuel Doria Medina. Medina was one of 
Bolivia’s biggest businessmen and owner of the cement factory Sociedad Boliviana 
de Cemento (SOBCE) (Ballivián, 2006). Before creating his own centre-right party 
the centre-right Unidad Nacional (UN) Medina had served as Minister for Planning 
(1991-1993) under Goni. His campaign centred on the promotion of Bolivian 
business’, claiming that they were the key to growth and employment (Ballivián, 
2006). Medina positioned himself as a centre-right candidate and an alternative to 
Morales on the extreme left and Quiroga on the right (Ballivián, 2006). He selected 
Carlos Dabdoub as his running mate, who was a spokesperson for the conservative 
Santa Cruz movement for autonomy, Confederación Internacional Autonómica 
(Ballivián, 2006). The movement was set up in response to indigenous mobilisation in 
the highlands and is predominantly compromised of business associations from Santa 
Cruz seeking autonomous status in order to attain regional control over natural 
resources in the department, including gas and timber (Eaton, 2007). It can be argued 
then that Medina limited his appeal to Bolivian businessmen and conservatives in 
favour of autonomy for Santa Cruz. This limited appeal may explain his poor national 
performance in the elections in which he won just eight per cent (see Table 4.3 
below).  
 
 
 
 
 
  Qualitative Analysis: Bolivia    
157 
 
Figure 4.2: The electoral performance of candidates in minority and majority 
indigenous departments in the 2005 presidential elections 
Source: Adapted from Van Cott (2005) and Corte Nacional Electoral de Bolivia (CNE). 
Figure 4.2 above illustrates the distribution of support for the candidates by majority 
and minority indigenous departments
112
. The figure demonstrates the high level of 
support for Morales in majority indigenous departments where he received over 61 
per cent of the vote within these departments. Morales performed especially well in 
the majority indigenous departments of Cochabamba and Potosí where he received 
over 60 per cent of the departmental vote in each case (see Table 4.5 below). 
Conversely, Quiroga performed worse in majority indigenous departments. For 
instance, Podemos performed best in the departments of Beni and Tarija in the 
lowlands where Quiroga received 46 and 45 per cent of the departmental vote 
respectively (CNE Bolivia, 2005). Medina also performed poorly in majority 
indigenous departments and instead received most of his support from the department 
of Pando (23 per cent), which has the lowest indigenous population of Bolivia (see 
Table 4.5 below) (CNE Bolivia, 2005). Medina also performed well in Santa Cruz, 
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implying that his appeal to businessmen and those in favour of Santa Cruz autonomy 
was somewhat useful, however he still received just 12 per cent of the departmental 
vote.  
Indigenous people “proved crucial to the MAS’s 2005 victory” and the majority of 
those who self-identified as indigenous voted for Morales. Specifically, 71 per cent of 
those who self-identified as indigenous voted for Morales in 2005 and 63 per cent of 
those who identified as ‘mestizo who speak indigenous languages’113 also voted for 
MAS (see Table 4.4 below) (Madrid, 2012: 61). This was an increase of over 30 
percentage points from 2002 for both groups. Table 4.4 below illustrates that voter 
turnout in indigenous provinces
114
 also increased from 2002-2005 by 13 per cent. 
Therefore we can say that an increase in voter turnout coincided with an increase in 
indigenous support for MAS. Moreover, the increase in voter turnout and indigenous 
support for MAS corresponds to a general rise in support for MAS between 2002 and 
2005 of over 30 percentage points giving Morales a majority. This majority is of 
particular significance because it meant that MAS could avoid the Congressional vote 
of the sitting members from the 2002 elections. The vote would have presented a 
challenge for MAS who had 27 seats in Congress in 2002 compared to the combined 
65 seats held by opposition parties such as MNR, ADN and the right-wing party 
Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR).
115
 Interestingly, MAS also increased their presence 
in Congress in 2005 by gaining an additional 49 seats in and consequently a majority 
in Congress.
116
 As Table 4.4 below indicates, MAS increased their presence in the 
Senate by 14 per cent, and won the majority in the Lower House with an increase of 
35 per cent. It is important to note that this research does not suggest that MAS won 
the 2005 elections exclusively at the hands of indigenous votes. After all, Table 4.4 
shows that MAS also received an increase in voter turnout and support in non-
indigenous provinces and from mestizos (an increase of 23 per cent) and white people 
(an increase of 26 per cent). What this research does suggest however is that the 
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 There are 130 seats in Congress. MNR held 36 seats, ADN held five and NFR held 25.  
116
 In 2005 Bolivia had a total of 157 seats in Congress. They were divided between the Senate (27) 
seats and the Chamber (130 seats). This was changed in 2009 under the new constitution and the 
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increase in indigenous voter turnout and support may be attributed to an increase in 
indigenous movement mobilisation in support for MAS from 2002-2003. Specifically, 
this chapter will outline how indigenous movements in Bolivia formed an alliance 
entitled el Pacto de Unidad (or the Unity Pact) in 2005 to ensure the election of MAS. 
Before the pact the movements were fragmented but the pact united the bases of the 
respective movements and consolidated support for Morales in 2005. Madrid (2012: 
53) suggests that a central strategy of MAS to “woo” indigenous voters in 2005 was 
to establish “ties with a vast number of indigenous organisations across the country”. 
Ultimately, the research argues that this increase in movement support for MAS in 
2005 greatly contributed to the “significant progress” made by MAS between 2002 
and 2005 (Ballivián, 2006: 43).Furthermore this progress holds particular significance 
when we consider that MAS did not only win the election but did so by a majority, 
thus avoiding the potentially challenging Congressional vote.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Qualitative Analysis: Bolivia    
160 
 
Table 4.4: Voter turnout and distribution of the MAS Vote 2002-2005, by 
ethnicity.  
 2002 
(%) 
2005 
(%) 
Support for MAS  
Presidential election 
 
Legislative elections
117
 
Chamber of Senators 
Chamber of Deputies  
 
Voter Turnout 
 
22.46 
 
 
30 
21 
 
53.7 
 
 
44 
56 
Majority Indigenous Province  70 83 
Minority Indigenous Province  
 
68 81 
Distribution of MAS vote by 
ethnicity  
  
Self-identify indigenous 37.8 71.1 
Self-identify mestizos who speak 
indigenous languages 
27.6 63.6 
Self-identify mestizos who speak 
only Spanish 
11.5 34.2 
Self-identify white 5.8 31.6 
Total Respondents 21.6 53.3 
 
Source: Adapted from Corte Nacional Bolivia (CNE) and Madrid (2012) 
 
Finally, in order to observe the potential impact of movement mobilisation on the vote 
share of MAS, we can turn to Table 4.5 below which provides an overview Morales’ 
support by department from 2002 to 2005, along with the movement that is mobilised 
in each department. Indigenous population is also included here and it corresponds to 
majority and minority indigenous departments depicted on Figure 4.2 above. The 
movements are listed in order of their strength in each department. For instance, both 
CSUTCB and CONAMAQ are present in the department of La Paz but CSUTCB 
have more mobilisation capacity in La Paz than CONAMAQ and are listed 
accordingly. 
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Table 4.5: Geographical distribution of Morales’s vote share 2002-2005, by 
department. 
Department  Indigenous 
Population 
% 
Department  
2002 
(%) 
2005 
(%) 
Movement
118
  
Highlands      
Potosí 83.9 27.0 62.6 CSUTCB, CONAMAQ 
La Paz 77.5 22.5 54.2 CSUTCB, CONAMAQ 
Cochabamba 74.4 37.6 66.6 CSUTCB,CSCIB,Bartolinas,CONAMAQ  
Oruro 73.9 29.2 64.8 CONAMAQ, CSUTCB 
Lowlands 
Chuquisaca 
 
65.6 
 
10.1 
 
53.7 
 
CIDOB, CSUTCB, CONAMAQ 
Santa Cruz 37.5 10.2 31.6 CIDOB, CSCIB, Bartolinas 
Beni 32.7 3.2 33.2 CIDOB, CSUTCB 
Tarija 19.7 6.2 57.8 CIDOB 
Pando 16.2 20.0 16.6 CSUTCB, CIDOB
119
 
 
Total  
 
62.05 
 
20.9 
 
53.7 
 
Source: Adapted from Van Cott (2005: 51), Corte Nacional Electoral de Bolivia (CNE), and García et 
al. (2004). Note: The correlation between indigenous population and 2002 results was .64. The 
correlation between indigenous population and 2005 results was higher at 0.74. Both indicate a strong 
positive relationship between indigenous population and support for MAS.  
 
The table above indicates that support for MAS increased by almost 30 percentage 
points or more across the highland departments from 2002 – 2005. For instance, MAS 
experienced an increase of 35 percentage points in Cochabamba and Potosí resulting 
in a majority for MAS for those departments. These departments are majority 
indigenous departments which correspond to the results displayed on Figure 4.2 
above where Morales performs especially well. CSUTCB and its affiliates Las 
Bartolinas and CSCIB supported MAS in both elections, which explain the base of 
support for MAS during this time. Cochabamba for example was the stronghold of 
MAS support in both elections which can be explained by the presence of CSUTCB’s 
“most militant” affiliate, FSUTCC in the Chapare region of the department (Grisaffi, 
2013: 58). The presence of CONAMAQ in each department is interesting however 
because in 2002, CONAMAQ did not support Morales but in 2005 they entered the 
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pact with the other movements to mobilise support for MAS. The role of CONAMAQ 
in mobilising bases is particularly important when we consider the results of Oruro, 
which is the movements’ central zone of influence and mobilisation (García Linera et 
al. 2004). Support for MAS increased by 35 percentage points in Oruro between the 
two elections and this coincides with support from CONAMAQ in 2005 (the 
movement did not support MAS in 2002).  
 
The department of Tarija provides another interesting example of the potential role of 
movements. MAS experienced an increase in support of over 50 per cent in Tarija, 
which was their biggest increase in support and won the department for MAS. This is 
a particularly notable achievement given that the department is not a majority 
indigenous department but rather it has one of the smallest indigenous populations in 
Bolivia. Tarija however is also a stronghold of CIDOB who like CONAMAQ did not 
support MAS until the entered the pact in 2005, which may help to explain the 
increase in support there. CIDOB are highly mobilised in Beni, Santa Cruz and 
Chuquisaca where support for MAS increased by 30, 21 and 43 percentage points 
respectively. Unlike the exceptional case of Tarija, high levels of polarisation exist 
between indigenous people and white or mestizos populations in Santa Cruz and Beni, 
which may explain the incapacity of MAS to win a majority there. For example, this 
polarisation primarily exists between indigenous people and white people of Santa 
Cruz known as Cruceños, many of whom moved to Beni thus expanding polarisation 
to this department. Chuquisaca offers an example of a department in which the 
increase in support also gave MAS a majority where three movements are mobilised.  
 
Two movements, CIDOB and CONAMAQ, did not support MAS in 2002 but 
consolidated their support with that of CSUTCB in 2005. Finally, the only department 
in which Morales experienced a decrease in 2005 was in Pando which has the lowest 
indigenous population and where CSUTCB and CIDOB have affiliations but are not 
highly mobilised. Overall, Table 4.5 offers an insight into the role indigenous 
movements may have played in increasing support for MAS in 2005. In order to 
explore this further the chapter will provide evidence from field interviews with 
movements explaining the ways in which they mobilised support for MAS in 2005. 
Before doing so however, the chapter will provide an overview of the movements and 
their respective social bases.  
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4. 3 The movements  
Indigenous movements in Bolivia have been amongst the most active in Latin 
America (Lucero, 2007). Indeed, social movement mobilisation more generally is 
high in Bolivia. For instance, every government from 1985 to 2005 enforced a state of 
emergency as a result of high levels of social protest (Domingo, 2005: 1727). 
Mobilisation of indigenous movements can be traced to the 18
th
 Century indigenous 
rebellion led by Túpac Katarí. Katarí and his wife Bartolina Sisa held the city of La 
Paz to siege for over eight months in 1871 and the rebellion is the symbol of 
indigenous resistance in Bolivia today (Arbona and Kohl, 2004). The largest 
indigenous women’s movement in Bolivia, Confederación Nacional de Mujeres 
Campesinas Indígenas Originarias de Bolivia ‘Bartolina Sisa’ (CNMCIOB-BS), 
directly incorporates Bartolina Sisa into their name and are as a result more 
commonly known as “Las Bartolinas”. Additionally, Túpac Katarí, and his famous 
last words ‘I may die as one, but I will return and I will be millions’ are often used as 
a symbol of indigenous mobilisation by highland movements such as CSUTCB  
(Lazar & McNeish, 2006).  
Despite this profound history of mobilisation, indigenous movements in Bolivia 
remain fragmented. The fragmentation of the movements reflects an immense ethnic 
diversity in Bolivia, where 37 distinct ethnic groups exist (Van Cott, 2005). 
Fragmentation extends beyond typical highland-lowland divisions that we see 
elsewhere in the region. Instead, “political rivalry is particularly pronounced” 
between highland Aymara and Quechua movements (Van Cott, 2005: 52).
120
 This 
rivalry is often based on intense competition for resources but more fundamentally it 
is rooted in an ideological clash between Katarismo
121
 and Indianismo, which 
impedes alliances. Indianismo for instance, seeks to highlight the unfair subordination 
of indigenous people within society, and it is therefore anti-white and anti-western in 
its position (Van Cott, 2005: 53). Specifically, Indianismo “rejects the labour-union 
model of organisation as a western imposition and rejects, at least publicly, alliances 
with non-indigenous groups” (Van Cott, 2005: 53). For this reason Indianismo, in 
principle is incongruent with leftist–indigenous alliances or indeed, movement–party 
alliances. Katarismo meanwhile is more heterogeneous and less ethnically radical. It 
                                                          
120
 Quechan people represent 31 per cent of the total national population and Aymara represent 25 per 
cent (Gigler, 2009). 
121
 Named after Túpac Katari 
  Qualitative Analysis: Bolivia    
164 
 
“blends class consciousness with ethnic rights claims and calls for the reconstruction 
of the Bolivian state along ethnic criteria” (Van Cott, 2005: 53). For instance, the 
indigenous party Movimiento Katarista Nacional (MKN)
122
 followed a Katarismo 
ideology and “sought alliances with non-indigenous social movements and leftist 
populist political parties” (Van Cott, 2005: 53). This divergence exists today as 
CONAMAQ adopts an Indianismo ideology and CSUTCB a Katarismo one. Regional 
leader of CSUTCB, Luís Gabriel Morales explains that, “our movement is campesino, 
indígena and originario, because we are for everyone” (Interview, May 16th, 2012).  
Such variance is important for understanding indigenous movement mobilisation in 
Bolivia. Ideological variation and competition for resources can explain why a united 
national indigenous movement such as La Confederación de Nacionalidades 
Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE), is “unlikely to occur in Bolivia” (García Linera. et 
al., 2004: 21). Instead, movements in Bolivia are “compelled to invent network 
structures of co-ordination around specific issues and temporarily negotiate…. 
without losing the autonomy of their decisions” (García Linera, 2004: 21).123 
Importantly then, while indigenous movements in Bolivia are fragmented, they do 
form “thematic alliances” through which they temporally consolidate around an issue 
that is of common concern. (García Linera, 2004: 21).
124
 The Pacto de Unidad 
mentioned in the previous section of this chapter is an example of this. Ultimately the 
pact was the unification of movement support for Morales in which the diverse 
movements listed on Table 4.6 below came together with the common purpose of 
electing Morales. The movements formed the pact in order to elect Morales in return 
for the prospective compensation of a constituent assembly and eventual redrafting of 
the constitution to address indigenous rights. The pact was important because it 
consolidated support for Morales typically divided by the diversity of their social 
bases and ideologies, and their competitiveness with one another for resources. To 
demonstrate this diversity and to learn more about the mobilisation of the movements, 
the Chapter will now discuss each movement in turn. We begin with Bolivia’s central 
lowland movement CIDOB which is traditionally less mobilised than the highland 
movements. 
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Table 4.6: Overview of indigenous movements in Bolivia  
Movement Year 
Founded 
Movement Type Social Base 
CSUTCB 1979 
 
Highland  Highland indigenous campesinos 
especially coca growers  
CSCIB 1971 Highland  Highland people who moved to lowlands 
or the ‘colonizadores’ 
Las Bartolinas 1980 
 
Highland  Highland indigenous women  
CONAMAQ 1997 
 
Highland Highland Aymara communities  
CIDOB 1982 Lowland Lowland indigenous peoples 
 
The lowland movement: CIDOB 
While lowland movements are generally less mobilised than highland ones, recent 
plans to build a road through the lowland national park Territorio Indígena del Parque 
Nacional Isiboro-Sécure (TIPNIS) accelerated mobilisation in the region. 
Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (CIDOB) is the largest regional 
movement and is a confederation of eight smaller regional movements (see appendix 
E for a diagram of the movement’s structure). Since Morales initiated a plan in 2008 
to build a road through this national park, where many lowland indigenous people 
reside, CIDOB and its affiliated movements intensified mobilisation culminating in 
more recent marches entitled “La Marcha Por el Territorio y la Dignidad” (March for 
Territory and Dignity). CIDOB however, originally formed in 1982 to represent the 
“pueblos indígena” or “originario” of the lowlands and Amazon (Gustafson, 2003: 
273; CIDOB, Interview May 4
th
, 2013). The movement is mobilised along ethnic 
rather than class lines and initially mobilised in response to the exploration of their 
territories by ranchers, loggers and highland Indians incentivised to migrate there to 
cultivate land during the MNR government of Víctor Paz Estenssoro in the 1950s 
(Yashar, 2005).  
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From 1978, the Guaraní people held a series of community meetings for those 
affected by exploration in their territories. In 1982, with the support of NGOs such as 
Apoyo para el Campesino-Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (APCOB), these 
communities formed CIDOB (Yashar, 2005). The military regime of René Barrientos 
(1964-1982) did not seek to control CIDOB as it had the highland movements, 
illustrating the apathy of the state toward lowland indigenous people (Yashar, 
2005)
125
. As a result, CIDOB continued to organise meetings under the regime and by 
1989 it expanded its base and re-established itself as a confederation (Yashar, 2005). 
As a federation it incorporated movements such as Central de Pueblos Indígenas del 
Beni (CPIB) which mobilised in direct response to the migration of highland 
communities, known as the ‘colonizadores’, to their territories to cultivate land. This 
migration was incentivised by the state since the MNR revolution. The goal was to 
‘colonialize’ and cultivate the lowland region, and therefore increase production of 
primary commodities (Yashar, 2005; García Linera et al., 2004). In 1990 CPIB, with 
the support of CIDOB, initiated the first 650 kilometre long, Marcha por el Territorio 
y la Dignidad from the lowlands to La Paz (Yashar, 2005).  
By 1994 the structure of CIDOB encompassed various communities in the 
departments of Pando, Beni and Santa Cruz. Later, reforms under the first Goni 
administration (1993-1997) granted concessions to companies wishing to exploit 
natural resources in the lowland territories causing an increase in mobilisation 
(Yashar, 2005).
126
 In 1994 Goni introduced the Law of popular participation 1994 
(LPP) which decentralised the political system, thereby making politics more 
accessible to indigenous people living in rural regions (Gustafson, 2003). Also in 
1994, Goni introduced an Education Reform which introduced bi-lingual education to 
indigenous people for the first time (Gustafson, 2003). These reforms stimulated 
political participation of indigenous people in Bolivia, and led to further mobilisation. 
In 1996 CIDOB led a march from the lowlands to La Paz calling for an indigenous 
law (Ley Indígena), which they hoped, would guarantee the rights of indigenous 
people and their territories (Yashar, 2005). When the march reached the highlands, 
CSUTCB joined CIDOB increasing the number of marchers from 200 to 30,000 by 
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the time it reached La Paz (Yashar, 2005). The unification of movements for an 
indigenous law highlights the capacity for movements to form thematic alliances. In 
1996, Ley de Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (Ley INRA) was revised to 
include the legal recognition of indigenous territories which “opened the door” for 
further legislation on these issues (Yashar, 2005: 217). By 2000, CIDOB incorporated 
affiliate originario organisations outside the highland departments of Cochabamba 
and La Paz therefore expanding their base beyond the lowlands (Van Cott, 2005).  
Ultimately, CIDOB represent a social base that is organised along ethnic lines and has 
expanded substantially over the last number of years. While it is difficult to estimate 
the size of CIDOB’s social base, the indigenous population of the lowlands was 
estimated at 220,000 in 1994 and so we can consider this as the potential base of 
support for CIDOB (Yashar, 2005). Over 90 per cent of this population resides in the 
departments of Santa Cruz and Beni where CIDOB are highly mobilised (Yashar, 
2005: García Linera et al., 2004). The movement is also highly mobilised in parts of 
Chuquisaca and Tarija (García Linera et al., 2004). Finally, given that many of these 
bases live in isolated communities within the Amazon, the radio is a vital tool used to 
disseminate information about upcoming marches or community meetings (García 
Linera et al., 2004). Importantly, radio broadcasts are used as the “official 
communication of the assemblies”. These assemblies are community meetings in 
which leaders decide on a variety of topics, such as Marches or what party to support 
in the upcoming elections (García Linera et al., 2004: 238). 
The highland movements: CSUTCB, CSCIB, Las Bartolinas and CONAMAQ 
The CSUTCB is Bolivia’s “most important contemporary campesino organisation” 
(Van Cott, 2005: 273). Specifically, CSUTCB is the “largest indigenous organisation 
in Bolivia with affiliates in every department” (Van Cott, 2005: 59). Moreover, it is 
“without a doubt the main force of pressure mobilisation in Bolivia today” (García 
Linera, et al., 2004: 130). CSUTCB was founded in 1979 during a national congress 
by the umbrella union Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) in order to unify campesinos 
against state repression. By the end of 1979, CSUTCB had initiated a series of 
roadblocks that paralysed transportation in the country for a week and signified the 
“return of the peasantry as an independent political actor” in Bolivia (Van Cott, 2005: 
55).  
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In the late 1980s the movement was seized by the Quechua coca-growers of 
Cochabamba, many of whom migrated to the Chapare region to grow coca after 
Víctor Paz Estenssoro’s NEP created huge unemployment in the mining sector 
(Yashar, 2005). Mobilisation intensified in the mid-1980s when the government 
implemented coca eradication polices which once again threatened employment (Van 
Cott, 2005: 57). Soon, the movement incorporated cultural and ethnic demands, often 
linking the coca leaf with Bolivian identity and cultural freedom (Van Cott, 2005). In 
1994, the movement united all the coca growing federations across Bolivia and 
organised the Marcha Por la Dignidad y Soberanía Nacional (March for Dignity and 
Sovereignty) in which 10,000 people participated (Van Cott, 2005).  
As stated earlier, the movement follows a Katarista ideology, which incorporates both 
indigenous and campesino identities. Regional leader of CSUTCB, Luís Gabriel 
Morales claims to be an example of this heterogeneity as he explained that he is 
Guaraní, an ethnicity typical of the lowlands, yet he is a regional leader in CSUTCB 
which is an “instrumento de lucha” (instrument of war) from the highlands (Interview, 
May 16
th, 2012). Gabriel explains that some movements only include “indígena” in 
their documents to gain more resources from international NGOs, thus highlighting 
the tension between movements in Bolivia (Interview, May 16
th
, 2012). 
Like all Bolivian movements CSUTCB is organised as a national federation (see 
appendix E). Unlike other movements however, it has affiliations in all of Bolivia’s 
nine departments, which are linked to provincial federations in each department 
(García Linera et al., 2004). The provincial federations are connected to smaller 
unions called ‘centrals’ and ‘sub-centrals’, which are, in turn, directly linked to the 
local communities (García Linera et al., 2004). Each of these unions, from ‘sub-
centrals’ to the national confederation itself and has a leader or ‘dirigente’ (García 
Linera et al., 2004). At the local level these leaders ensure that their base complies 
with decisions made higher up in the structure and “with the decisions of 
mobilisation” (García Linera et al., 2004: 132). Together the CSUTCB operates as 
one “major mechanism of coordination” with a tight structure through which it can 
reach its respective social bases (García Linera et al., 2004: 132). The mobilisation of 
their bases is also aided by radio such as “Radio Soberanía” which is owned by the 
FSUTCC and broadcast across the Chapare region and some other areas of 
Cochabamba (Grisaffi, 2013: 58). 
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Furthermore, CSUTCB is strongly affiliated with other movements which are 
independent in their own right, and who represent distinct social bases. Firstly, the 
women’s movement CNMCIOB-BS or simply las Bartolinas considers itself the 
“sister” organisation operating at a parallel level to CSUTCB (García Linera, 2004: 
505). Las Bartolinas were founded in 1980 in order to provide a space that was 
“representative of women” within CSUTCB, which until that point was dominated by 
men (García Linera, 2004: 505). As an organisation that operates parallel to 
CSUTCB, some leaders of las Bartolinas have crossed over to CSUTCB, including 
former Executive Secretary of FNMC-BS (las Bartolinas), Leonilda Zurita who is 
currently regional leader of CSUTCB for the department of Cochabamba (García 
Linera et al., 2004: 505, Interview, Leonilda Zurita, May 9th, 2012).  
CSUTCB is also closely affiliated with Confederación Sindical de Comunidades 
Interculturales de Bolivia (CSCIB) which formed in 1972. CSCIB represent the 
highland communities that migrated to the lowlands to cultivate the land, known as 
the ‘colonizadores’ (the same colonisers that CIDOB mobilised against in the late 
1970s). These communities migrated to the lowlands because of the scarcity and 
contamination of land (due to agro-industry) in the highlands (CSCIB, 2013). In the 
1960s the government incentivised the migration through a US backed program called 
“Alliance for progress” within which a “settlement plan” encouraged migration in 
order to bolster the cultivation of products for exportation (García Linera et al., 2004: 
275). However, the quality of soil in the land was too poor for cultivation and when 
the state reneged on their promise of assistance, the communities suffered intense 
economic hardship (García Linera et al., 2004: 277). Today, the movement is 
affiliated with 36 organisations in Bolivia including COB, and is organised federally 
in the departments of La Paz, Santa Cruz, Beni, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca and Tarija. 
The final movement to be discussed is CONAMAQ, which was founded in 1997. The 
movement represents the Ayllus
127
 of Aymara people from Potosí, Chuquisaca, La 
Paz and Cochabamba (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2008). Their goal is the reconstruction of 
“original nations” through the self-determination of indigenous communities 
(Schilling-Vacaflor, 2008: 1). The main principle of the movement is that the Aymara 
people should play a role in Bolivian society by protecting the environment of the 
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communities it represents, whilst also maintaining their own cultural, economic and 
social institutions, such as customary law (García-Linera et al., 2004). The movement 
is centrally concerned however with the creation of a Constituent Assembly in order 
to reform the constitution in light of indigenous rights regarding customary law and 
territories (García-Linera et al., 2004).  
The social base of CONAMAQ is smaller and more homogenous than the other 
movements. Their social base can be found in the “more marginal and poor areas” of 
Bolivia (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2008: 1). These communities have less formal education 
and almost exclusively speak indigenous languages rather than Spanish (Schilling-
Vacaflor, 2008:1). While CONAMAQ began as a confederation with affiliates in 
Potosí (FAOI-NP) and Oruro (FASOR) it expanded its base to the Aymara people of 
Cochabamba (Ayllus de Cochabamba) and Chuquisaca. Similar to CIDOB and 
CSUTCB, the radio plays an “integral role” in mobilising the base by disseminating 
information and consolidating identity (García-Linera et al., 2004: 336). For example, 
CONAMAQ broadcast bulletins with information regarding meetings or marches on 
local radio stations such as the university radio stations (García-Linera et al., 2004: 
336).  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the movement adopts an Indianismo ideology 
through which they reject “the existing political system and especially the existence 
of political parties” (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2008: 4). Despite their reluctance to become 
involved in institutional politics, the movement entered into the Pacto de Unidad with 
the other movements to support MAS in the 2005 elections. The movement is more 
interested in “proposing solutions” through roundtable discussions with various 
organisations as well as government, a strategy preferred over marches or protest 
(García Linera et al., 2004:329). In 2000 for example, CONAMAQ organised a 
meeting in an open air theatre of La Paz with all its affiliate organisations to make 
proposals to the government regarding issues of indigenous territories, natural 
resources and the reconstitution of indigenous authorities or customary law (García 
Linera et al., 2004). More recently, in 2012, CONAMAQ held a series of meetings 
with the mining union to discuss the impact of the industry on indigenous 
communities (Interview, CONAMAQ, May 29
th
, 2012). For CONAMAQ therefore, 
roundtable discussions are more commonplace than mass demonstrations. They have 
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however, marched with other movements such as CIDOB. In 2002, for example 
CONAMAQ joined CIDOB and other non-indigenous movements such as 
Movimiento Sin Tierra (MST) in a march from the lowlands to La Paz and occupied 
the main plaza outside government buildings until the government would enter into a 
dialogue with them (García Linera et al., 2004). Additionally, CONAMAQ are key 
supporters of CIDOB in their current mobilisation around the TIPNIS issue. 
The movement however, is less likely to ally with CSUTCB with whom the 
relationship is more “distanced” (García Linera et al., 2004: 336). In terms of 
competition for resources in particular, CONAMAQ feel that CSUTCB only act on 
the interest of the cocaleros, claiming that, “everything is for the cocaleros” while 
other indigenous communities suffer (García Linera et al., 2004: 336). CONAMAQ 
also question the autonomy of the CSUTCB given the support it receives from MAS, 
thus further highlighting the tension between the two movements (García Linera et 
al., 2004: 336).  
Ultimately, the movements of Bolivia are highly mobilised, but also highly 
fragmented. As demonstrated by the discussion above, each movement represents 
different social bases from different segments of Bolivia’s indigenous population. 
Some are more tightly structured with a large national social base (CSUTCB), while 
others are loosely organised and represent a smaller more regional base 
(CONAMAQ). Some movements work together despite representing very different 
‘indigenous’ communities (CONAMAQ and CIDOB), while others are less likely to 
unite despite sharing similar ethnicity (CONAMAQ and CSUTCB are both highland 
identities). In 2005 however, all three movements and their affiliate organisations 
came together to support Morales as will now be demonstrated. The goal of this 
section of the chapter is provide an overview of the movements in Bolivia. This thesis 
argues that because indigenous movements are highly mobilised in Bolivia they can 
provide a case of support for the contestatory left. The chapter will now turn to the 
results of field interviews to uncover whether movements did indeed provide support 
to the contestatory left candidate Evo Morales in the 2005 elections.   
4.4 The results of field interviews   
As Table 4.7 below illustrates, all the aforementioned movements supported MAS in 
2005. Specifically, CSUTCB and their affiliated organisations, CSCIB and the 
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Bartolinas all supported MAS in 2002 and 2005.
128
 CONAMAQ and CIDOB 
however, only supported MAS in 2005 after the formation of the Pacto de Unidad 
through which all the movements sought to install a MAS government in order to 
achieve their common goal of a new constitution. Evidently, their goal was in 
congruence with that of Morales, who during his campaign promised to redraft the 
constitution to address indigenous rights. Consequently, the policy of drafting a new 
constitution acted as the primary prospective compensation in this movement-party 
alliance in 2005. 
Table 4.7: Indigenous movement support for Morales 2002 and 2005 
Movement Type of Movement Support in 2002 Support in 2005 
CSUTCB Highland  Yes Yes 
CSCIB Highland Yes Yes 
Las Bartolinas  Highland Yes Yes 
CONAMAQ Highland No Yes 
CIDOB Lowland No Yes 
 
This section of the chapter will provide empirical evidence that the above movements 
mobilised their social bases in favour of MAS. This case of Bolivia however, 
demonstrates that movements can provide support for a party that goes beyond the 
mobilisation of their respective bases. Firstly, CSUTCB, CSCIB and the Bartolinas all 
played an integral role in the formation of MAS. They helped to form MAS but were 
also sure to maintain their own movement identity and not entirely merge into the 
party. This is important because it allowed them to mobilise their bases as a 
movement rather than as a party, and therefore maintain their legitimacy among the 
indigenous bases. Secondly, by uniting under the Pacto de Unidad the movements 
consolidated their support for Morales, which can help to explain the increase in voter 
turnout, and indigenous support for MAS between 2002 and 2005. The movements 
mobilised their bases by using radio broadcasts and their organisational structures to 
communicate support from the national to the local level. Furthermore, the 
movements played a vital role in increasing the vote for MAS by ensuring the 
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indigenous people within their bases were registered to vote. The chapter will now 
turn to outlining these forms of support in more detail and with evidence provided by 
interview data.   
The movement creates the party: CSUTCB and MAS 
Originally, the focus of this research was centred on how indigenous movements 
mobilised support for established parties. In the case of Bolivia, however it soon 
became apparent that understanding movement-party relations in this way was 
problematic. Firstly, it implied that “political parties were above the movements and 
they were wanting to harness the energy created by the social movements from 
above”, understanding relations in this way was simply “too vertical” (Mayra Gómez, 
Interview, February 3rd, 2012). Secondly, viewing movement-party relations in 
Bolivia this way is problematic because the established parties had “lost it, they had 
been completely discredited. So they were in no place to harness anything.” (Mayra 
Gómez, Interview, February 3rd, 2012). That is, existing parties in Bolivia could not 
be trusted, and so the movements did not view them as potential allies. For instance, 
Daniel García Pamo of CIDOB explains that the traditional parties could not be 
trusted because once in power they “distributed the spaces of power, the ministries, 
only between them and so indigenous movements and the people were always 
discriminated against, by not forming part of the structure” (Interview, May 4th, 
2012). With no potential ally within established politics, the movements had to create 
their own party or ‘abrazo politico’ (political arm). Luís Gabriel Morales, regional 
leader of CSUTCB, explains that “we said, let’s put a campesino president into power 
that will be there to make laws, changes and work for us” (Interview, May 16th, 
2012). Consequently, CSUTCB created MAS and prioritised the constituent assembly 
by making it its main goal. As Gabriel Morales explains, “MAS was supported 
because it was the political arm created to achieve the new constitution” (Interview, 
May 16
th
, 2012.).  
Indeed, by examining the roots of MAS we can appreciate the part CSUTCB played 
in its formation. The party roots lie in the coca-growing Chapare region of Bolivia 
where the cocaleros first mobilised in the 1980s in opposition to the eradication of 
coca policy proposed first by President Hernán Siles Zuazo (1982-1985) and 
subsequently by Víctor Paz Estenssoro (1985-1989). As discussed earlier in this 
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chapter, the Chapare cocaleros first mobilised through the Cochabamba section of the 
CSUTCB, the Federación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de 
Cochabamba (FSUTCC) (Van Cott, 2005). While the FSUTCC initially mobilised in 
opposition to the ‘eradication of coca’ policies, they soon began to incorporate other 
demands such as indigenous rights, the sacredness of the coca and autonomy for 
indigenous regions from the state (Van Cott, 2005). In 1994, the CSUTCB leaders 
met with members of CIDOB and CSCIB to discuss forming an ‘abrazo politico’ 
through which the movements could achieve their goals (Van Cott, 2005). CIDOB 
were apprehensive about creating a political party and instead chose to pursue a 
policy of self-determination from the state (Van Cott, 2005). The CSUTCB remained 
committed to the creation of a party and formed Assembly for the Sovereignty of 
Indigenous Peoples (ASP) in 1995 (Van Cott, 2005: 69). In March of that year, 
leaders of CSUTCB declared that “in an historic congress, the campesino and 
originarios
129
 of the country have said ENOUGH! to the manipulation of the parties of 
the oligarchy and of colonialism, and we have begun the path of the construction of 
our own political instrument” (Van Cott, 2005: 70). The Bartolinas, as a movement 
parallel to CSUTCB, were also involved in the formation of MAS at this point. 
Former leader of the Bartolinas, Berta Blanco explains that along with CSUTCB and 
CSCIB, the Bartolinas “decided to create a political arm to defend our rights, and to 
tackle this we created the political instrument IPSP
130
, and so the Bartolinas is one of 
the leaders of the political instrument” (Interview, May 16th, 2012). CSCIB explain 
that they mobilised support for MAS in 2005 because they had “built MAS” and that 
they are “a social arm of this [MAS] government also” (Interview, Gustavo Aliaga, 
May 27
th
, 2012).  
Due to issues with registration the ASP could not run independently and instead 
“borrowed” the registration of the Bolivian Communist Party (PCB), which allowed 
them to run in six of the nine departments of Bolivia (Van Cott, 2008: 52). 
Interestingly, this offers an example of an indigenous-left alliance that preceded the 
2005 elections because ASP was, at that point, a predominantly indigenously 
comprised party. With most of their support coming from the cocaleros in the 
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 As discussed below, when Morales left the Assembly for the Sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples 
(ASP) in 1998, he created the Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the People (IPSP). Berta 
Blanco is referring to the role of Las Bartolinas in the creation of IPSP, which was later renamed MAS-
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Chapare, ASP won over three per cent of the national vote and elected ten Mayors 
(Van Cott, 2008). In the 1997 presidential election, ASP selected party leader Alejo 
Véliz as presidential candidate who won three per cent of the vote. The party won 
four seats in the lower chamber (Van Cott, 2008). Evo Morales won the highest 
proportion of all national deputies, but was accused of instructing followers not to 
vote for Véliz in the presidential election that resulted in the departure of Morales 
from ASP in 1998 (Van Cott, 2008). Morales created a new party with CSUTCB, 
CSCIB and Las Bartolinas called “Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the 
People” (IPSP) (Van Cott, 2008). However, again due to registration difficulties for 
new parties, IPSP adopted the legal personality of a defunct socialist party 
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) (Van Cott, 2008).The party was officially 
registered as IPSP-MAS but known as MAS.  
The adaptation of the legal personality of MAS demonstrates that the party was 
content with the perception of a leftist rather strictly indigenous party from the outset. 
In 1999 MAS won 80 Mayoral positions at the municipal
131
 level thus illustrating that 
its appeal was not restricted to the Chapare region (Van Cott, 2008: 53). The appeal of 
MAS dramatically increased just three years later when Morales almost clinched the 
2002 presidential elections. Indeed, the electoral success of MAS in 2002 was quite 
unexpected. Jim Schultz, of the Democracy Centre claims “it was a shock, nobody 
expected them to do so well in 2002” (Interview, May 10th, 2012). Mayra Gómez 
directly refers to the importance of increased voter turnout in this surprising result 
claiming that “the importance [here] was the increased voter turnout amongst rural 
indigenous peoples who were beginning to see a possibility of interaction with the 
political system” (Interview, February 3rd, 2012). Despite the unexpected success in 
2002, MAS failed to win the election because according to Mayra Gómez, “2002 
wasn’t the ripe moment”. She continues that;  
“it all happened so fast, the movement seized the situation, the long history of 
mobilisation and resistance was now claiming natural resources, using 
customary law and then the moment came right, but it hadn’t been the 
intention or belief maybe, that they [MAS] could take over political power on 
their own”. (Interview, February 3rd, 2012). 
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It is the contention of this research that 2002 was not the ‘ripe moment’ because MAS 
did not yet have the consolidated support of all the indigenous movements and their 
respective bases. Accordingly, MAS could not have taken ‘political power on their 
own’ because indigenous movement support was fragmented in 2002. For instance, 
CIDOB were first approached by CSUTCB in 1994 but declined to participate in a 
movement alliance (Van Cott, 2005). Instead, CIDOB chose to ally with small local 
parties such as Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL) with whom they had “programmatic 
affinities”, or traditional parties with whom they had “clientelistic linkages” (Van 
Cott, 2005: 72; 76). Ultimately, these alliances proved futile for CIDOB and in 1996 
they approached the leaders of CSUTCB and CONAMAQ about the possible creation 
of a pact that would pursue a new constituent assembly, but due to “disunity” the pact 
was rejected (Van Cott, 2005: 72). The idea of a pact was revived in 2002 however 
and eventually led to the Pacto de Unidad established in 2004 in anticipation of the 
election. This pact was central to the success of MAS in 2005. For instance, Luís 
Gabriel Morales of CSUTCB explains that it is possible that MAS would have lost the 
2005 election were it not for the “many affiliations” that “all instructed their bases 
how to vote” (Interview, May 16th, 2012). It was the amalgamation of the affiliations 
of all the movements in 2005, which bolstered support for MAS.   
It is important to note that, while CSUTCB was central to the creation of MAS it, like 
CSCIB and Bartolinas, have also worked to remain autonomous movements distinct 
from the party. Rather, during interviews, members of CSUTCB consistently referred 
to the movement as a central supporter of the ‘political arm’ (the party) rather than 
part of it necessarily. Senator Adolfo Mendoza of MAS explains that “CSUTCB is an 
organisation, or if you like a resource organisation for the peasant movement” 
(Interview, May 17th, 2012). While this is indeed a blurred line it is important to 
highlight that CSUTCB and the other movements remain organisations in their own 
right, albeit inextricably linked with MAS. For example, unlike the Green movements 
in Germany discussed in Chapter 2, CSUTCB did not merge into MAS, but rather 
acts as an organ external from the party with its own “autonomy and distinctiveness” 
(Rucht, 2004: 203).  
For this reason, CSUTCB should be acknowledged for the role it played in the 
formation of MAS. Crucially however, it should also be recognised that by 
maintaining its identity as an indigenous organisation, CSUTCB could mobilise its 
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base of support for the party, without losing its credibility among those bases by 
becoming an institutionalised party. It is for this reason that the movements are 
adamant to refer to themselves as an instrument or ‘abrazo politico’ for MAS rather 
than part of the political party. Identifying with the latter implies a loss of autonomy 
to a party, and an institutionalisation, which indigenous people are not as likely to 
support. Indeed, Roberts’ (1998) classification of an ‘organic model’ of movement-
party articulation is perhaps the most appropriate way to understand MAS. The author 
explains that organic models exist where parties “emerge as the political expression of 
organisation groups in civil society” (Roberts, 1998:75). In such cases, the party “may 
appear to be more of a movement than an apparatus for electoral contestation” but 
ultimately movement-party lines are “deliberately blurred” in order to attract a mass 
of unorganised voters (Roberts, 1998:75). We can also link this to our discussion of 
party-society linkages discussed in Chapter 2 by categorising the relationship between 
MAS and CSUTCB as an encapsulating, or participatory linkage in which a party 
organ is constructed to mobilise the masses (Roberts, 2002). In this case CSUTCB 
acted as a party organ but it was through the Pacto de Unidad that this organ truly 
began to consolidate support for the party by incorporating secondary associations all 
of which proceeded to mobilise their bases in support of MAS.  
A Movement alliance: ‘El Pacto de Unidad’  
The pact was officially created in 2004 by CSUTCB, CSCIB, Las Bartolinas, CIDOB 
and CONAMAQ and was itself a result of intense mobilisation of these indigenous 
movements since 2002 (Oporto, 2004). For instance, the Water War and an increase 
in lowland mobilisation from 2002 onwards led to the articulation of new demands, 
the centre of which was the creation of a constituent assembly (Oporto, 2004). The 
pact was “born” during ‘La Marcha por la Soberanía Popular, el Territorio y los 
Recursos Naturales’ in May 2002 (Interview, Froilán Puma Carmona, May 22nd, 
2012). CONAMAQ joined the march when it arrived in the highlands a month later 
and together they completed the marched on to La Paz (Garcés et al., 2011). 
Following this, the movements met in Santa Cruz in November 2003 to discuss a 
proposal for the creation of a constituent assembly which they entitled “Propuesta de 
Ley de Convocatoria a la Asamblea Constituyente del Pacto de Unidad” (Garcés et 
al., 2011: 35). The movements continued drafting plans for a constituent assembly 
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before sending it to the Congressional Joint Committee on the Constitution in 2004 
(Garcés et al., 2011: 35). 
The main goal of the pact was to ensure a constituent assembly and the construction 
of a plurinational state with a new constitution (Oporto, 2004). The movements also 
included the incorporation and further participation of social organizations within the 
political process in Bolivia (Oporto, 2004). Importantly, the pact was not designed 
specifically to elect Morales, but rather it was an agreement amongst the movements 
that they shared a common goal of reconstructing the Bolivian constitution. 
Moreover, the movements met on many occasions since 2002 to finalise a communal 
proposal. Senator Adolfo Mendoza of MAS highlights the centrality of the 
constitution in the Pacto de Unidad explaining that it was a “concrete way of 
convening a constituent assembly” (Interview, May 17th, 2012). However, in order to 
achieve their goal, the movements needed to install a president that would deliver on 
their new constitution in accordance with their vision. The movements chose Morales 
as their ally and mobilised support among their bases accordingly.  
Daniel García Pamo of CIDOB explains that the pact represented the common goal of 
writing a new constitution in which indigenous rights would be prioritised (Interview, 
May 4th, 2012). Through the pact, the movements “proposed a new alternative, a new 
vision for the country” starting with the “recognition of all thirty-six indigenous 
nations in the new constitution” (Interview, May 4th, 2012). García Pamo describes 
this as a “united war” by the movements who chose MAS as their “instrument of war” 
(Interview, May 4th, 2012). CONAMAQ leader, Juan Jose Salina, explains that, “yes, 
we were part of the Pacto de Unidad and we played an important role” (Interview, 
May 29
th, 2012). CONAMAQ’s motivation to participate in the pact was that “the 
constitution had to be changed to recognise all the indigenous nations and so in 2005 
we made the political instrument” (Interview, Froilán Puma Carmona, May 22nd, 
2012). Consequently, the “elections have fought to bring Morales to the presidency 
under the Poncho, under the Pacto de Unidad” (Interview, Froilán Puma Carmona, 
May 22
nd
, 2012).  
The election of MAS was to benefit all the movements in the pact; “we were all to 
gain power through MAS” and so “we made the pact to vote for the president” 
(Interview, Froilán Puma Carmona, May 22
nd
, 2012). For CSUTCB, the pact was 
  Qualitative Analysis: Bolivia    
179 
 
made in order to make “new laws” and to “achieve the new constitution” (Interview, 
Luís Gabriel Morales, May 16th, 2012). Therefore, CSUTCB were not only driven by 
a general desire to elect MAS, the party they helped to create, but also by a specific 
aspiration to redraft the constitution. 
Senator Adolfo Mendoza explains that through the pact, the movements could 
mobilise votes for MAS in 2005 (Interview, May 17th, 2012). Senator Mendoza adds 
that this was a collective decision by the movements. The implication of the pact is 
that in order to create a plurinational state, the movements needed to ally with a party 
that would initiate this process. With all other parties discredited, the movements, and 
CSUTCB in particular, created MAS. On the back of the unexpected success of MAS 
during the 2002 elections, the movements united to support MAS in 2005. Secretary 
General of CSCIB, Gustavo Aliaga suggests how the pact was deemed the best plan 
for electing MAS; 
“firstly, to be in government you must start with what you have, for example 
from our organisation we started, then you add more organisations but we 
agree exactly and we live together and [recognise] that we have our own 
experience, we have our own needs, and that has been really important, and 
with the rural support, indigenous and campesino organizations, elected Evo. I 
consider that, without this there would have been no government [MAS] and 
without it there can be no government” (Interview, May 27th, 2012). 
Aliaga’s words highlight the movements’ recognition that the collective effort of 
mobilising their respective bases could be a powerful tool in ensuring the election of 
Morales. Moreover, it highlights the importance of the indigenous and campesino 
organisations for the survival of MAS both in 2005 and for the upcoming 2014 
elections. Finally, Froilán Puma Carmona exemplifies the important of the indigenous 
base in bringing Morales to power when he notes that; “missing from the Pact de 
Unidad at this time, in 2005, was the middle class and the workers, the Pacto de 
Unidad was the indigenous people and the syndicate organisations
132
, these brought 
Evo Morales to power” (Interview, May 22nd, 2012). 
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The pact can also be related back to collective-based linkages discussed in Chapter 2 
in which citizens become associated with a party through affiliation with a social 
group or organisation (Roberts, 2002). Arguably, the pact signified the commitment 
of the movements to mobilise their bases in support of Morales and in doing so their 
bases became associated with MAS. The Chapter will now outline the specific ways 
in which the movements mobilised their bases in support of MAS.  
The movements mobilise their bases  
Froilán Puma Carmona of CONAMAQ claims that in Bolivia you cannot come to 
power without the support of indigenous people because “we are the base, the 
majority”, he explains that; “we have a name for it…Kollasuyo133” (Interview, May 
22
nd
, 2012). This was certainly the case for MAS who, as demonstrated earlier in this 
chapter, relied on the indigenous vote in 2005. The indigenous movements through 
the Pacto de Unidad were important in mobilising this support as evidenced by leader 
of CIDOB, Daniel García Pamo who states “all the bases [of CIDOB] supported 
Morales in 2005” and that MAS and CIDOB were “very tight” in the lead up to the 
2005 elections because “we were fighting the same cause” (Interview, May 4th, 
2012). Furthermore, García Pamo explains how both CIDOB and CONAMAQ 
worked to “strengthen the structure of MAS” by travelling “to the communities with 
the new constitution, to publically announce it, to promote it” (Interview, May 4th, 
2012). He continues that, “we informed them [the communities] of its importance [the 
constitution], and especially of the article about rights and how this would benefit 
them” (Interview, May 4th, 2012). Evidently, by promoting the new constitution, the 
movements were promoting Morales upon whom they relied to implement this policy 
once in power. García Pamo highlights the enthusiasm for the constitution in the 
communities by explaining that there was “no need to hold marches” in support of 
MAS because once CIDOB explained the constitution to these communities, “there 
was a consensus” that this constitution had to be realised (Interview, May 4th, 2012).  
CIDOB played a particularly important role in mobilising their base in favour of MAS 
given how geographically isolated these communities are, and how typically 
“excluded” they are from information about elections (Interview, May 4th, 2012). 
                                                          
133
 Although the precise meaning of Kollasuyo is varied, Puma Carmona is referring in this context 
to the power of the indigenous community of Bolivia, which as a majority  holds importance 
in Bolivian politics.  
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These bases, typically located in the Amazonian region of Bolivia, have a variety of 
distinctive languages as well as other barriers to participation. By travelling to the 
bases, CIDOB overcame the barriers of linguistic, cultural and indeed geographical 
isolation in the Amazon that MAS, or any other political party would inevitably face 
if trying to mobilise this base of support. Crucially however, CIDOB did not just 
disseminate information but they also ensured that voters in these communities were 
registered to vote, thus potentially increasing the voter turnout of indigenous people in 
the Amazonian region (Interview, May 4th, 2012).  
Indigenous activist Marco Molina describes relations between MAS and CIDOB as 
“very strong” during the 2005 elections (Interview, May 3rd, 2012). He offers some 
insight on how movements such as CIDOB mobilised their social bases in support of 
MAS by explaining the decision making process in indigenous communities. Each 
community is represented by a “Capitán Grande” (or community leader), who meets 
with the leaders from other communities in a gathering known as an “asamblea” 
(Interview, May 3rd, 2012). During the asamblea, the community leaders decide on 
various issues including who to vote for or whether to take part in protests (Interview, 
May 3rd, 2012). The leaders and their respective communities are “very co-ordinated” 
with the larger movement who influences their decisions (Interview, May 3rd, 2012). 
For example, if the movement was organising a march, the leader of the movement 
will tell each of the Capitan Grandes that “your community should support six people 
in the march”, and they will be provided (Interview, May 3rd, 2012). Crucially, a 
similar process takes place when deciding on what candidates the movement will 
support in elections. In 2005 the leader of CIDOB communicated to the Capitan 
Grandes and regional leaders that, “Evo is our candidate” (Interview, May 3rd, 2012). 
The Capitan Grandes then return to their bases and inform the community of the 
decision (Interview, May 3rd, 2012). In conjunction with this, Molina also claims that 
clientelistic linkages also exist in very secluded areas of the Amazon, where “induced 
voting” occurs in some cases (Interview, May 3rd, 2012). Nonetheless, it is clear that 
CIDOB use their federated structure to disseminate decisions made higher up in the 
movement, which proved an effective tool for mobilising support.  
CSUTCB also used the organisational structure of the movement to communicate 
decisions to the bases through community leaders. Luís Gabriel Morales of CSUTCB 
explains that the movement holds a congresses and asambleas (or assemblies) every 
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month with leaders from all nine departments. He uses the departments of Tarija, 
Pando and others as examples of Congresses held at this level; “Congreso Ordinario 
de Tarija, de Irupana, de Cobija, de Pando” (Interview, May 16th, 2012). During the 
departmental Congress, “activities are planned and issues discussed” (Interview, May 
16th, 2012). Political decisions are also made during these congresses and regional 
leaders are told what “directions” to communicate to their “base” (Interview, May 
16th, 2012). The potential for mobilisation is very high within CSUTCB who claim 
that some regional leaders have a base of “five thousand people” while “others 
represent ten thousand” (Interview, May 16th, 2012). This begs the question as to 
whether some movements, if they have larger base, are more important than others in 
the eyes of the party. According to CSUTCB, “we have more affiliations yes, but we 
don’t consider ourselves more important”, Luís Gabriel Morales continues however 
that CSUTCB are older and therefore have more “political maturity” than the other 
movements (Interview, May 16th, 2012). As mentioned above, the implication here is 
that with more political maturity and affiliations, CSUTCB may have a larger and 
more organised social base and therefore may provide more support for MAS than 
other movements. Moreover, given the role CSUTCB played in forming MAS, it 
could be argued they have provided more reliable and stable support for the party. 
This adds a further complexity to movement-party relations, which will be addressed 
in more detail in the conclusion of this chapter.  
CSUTCB also used radio broadcasts to communicate to their bases, which as 
discussed earlier in this chapter can be a useful tool for disseminating political 
decisions. For instance, whilst asking regional leader Luís Gabriel Morales how the 
movement mobilises its base, he informed me that “Soy Radialista tambien” (I am 
also a radio announcer) (Interview, May 16
th
, 2012). Here Gabriel is referring to 
Radio Soberanía, the coca growers’ radio station in the Chapare region of 
Cochabamba which is “owned, managed, staffed, and financed” by the Cochabamba 
section of CSUTCB, Federación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de 
Cochabamba (FSUTCC) (Grisaffi, 2013: 58). The radio station is the “voice of the 
cocaleros” and a source of pride for FSUTCC who painted its walls with images of an 
old man chewing the coca leaf claiming the leaf is the culture of their ancestors 
(Grisaffi, 2013: 61; Grisaffi, 2010: 432). According to one journalist from 
Cochabamba, in 2005, the radio station was used as a common mechanism to 
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mobilise bases in rural areas of Cochabamba (Interview, May 10th, 2012). The radio 
is an especially effective tool for those who work outside cultivating coca all day 
(Interview, May 10th, 2012). Ultimately, CSUTCB have played a crucial role in 
mobilising their bases for MAS, as Luís Gabriel Morales explains, “our [CSUTCB] 
role has been important, because the idea was to awaken our social base” (Interview, 
May 16th, 2012).  
CSCIB follow a similar pattern. Secretary General of CSCIB, Gustavo Aliaga 
explains that “we prepared proposals [for government] for how we might get to be in 
the next government” he continues that this proposal, referring here to the political 
proposal of MAS was “socialised within the department levels, the regional levels and 
this is how to get to power” (Interview, May 27th, 2012). Therefore, CSCIB helped 
MAS to formulate a plan for government and in order then to ensure the election of 
MAS, and in turn the implementation of this plan, they went to the bases at the 
regional and departmental levels and explained the proposal to these bases. This he 
states “is how we arrived in government” (Interview, May 27th, 2012). He continues 
that people knew Morales and considered him a leader
134
 who “had lived the same 
experiences of us” and who had worked for the interest of the people in the 
organisation (Interview, May 27
th
, 2012). Aliaga demonstrates the blurred lines 
between party (MAS) and movement (CSCIB) by explaining that they “will always 
follow this government” because Morales is “one more member” of CSCIB 
(Interview, May 27
th
, 2012). Aliaga is referring to how Morales, even now as 
president of Bolivia, remains a member of both CSCIB and CSUTCB.  
Finally, Mayra Gómez provides an interesting perspective on how movements 
mobilised votes for MAS in 2005. She explains that in 2005; 
“[t]here was a massive campaign because it was led by indigenous people, if 
anything they were talking to their communities, but they were also reaching 
out to others, particularly in urban communities and people outside the 
indigenous group. Consumer societies, the neighbourhood counsel, they were 
reaching out to everybody” (Interview, February 3rd, 2012).  
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 Along with CSUTCB, Morales was also the leader of CSCIB and continues to be President of these 
organisations today, as well as President of Bolivia.  
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This illustrates that indigenous movements did not only mobilise support amongst the 
indigenous social base, but, by reaching out to those ‘outside the indigenous group’ 
may have been responsible for mobilising support in non-indigenous communities 
such as mestizos or white people. As indicated by the results on Table 4.5 of this 
chapter, the support for MAS within these demographic groups also increased 
between 2002 and 2005. The implication here is that by mobilising support outside of 
their own communities, indigenous movements in Bolivia played a truly exceptional 
role in supporting MAS in 2005. Mayra Gómez also explains the ways in which 
indigenous movements mobilised this support. Firstly, she explains that the 
movements ensured everyone had opportunity to vote by ensuring “voting rights” 
(Interview, February 3rd, 2012). The movements did this by “lobbying for additional 
voting centres in the countryside, easing registration requirements, hitting the 
pavement on campaigns all over the country and not just cities” and through “word of 
mouth” (Interview, February 3rd, 2012). Definitively, Mayra explains that this 
occurred at every level of the community “starting with Ayllu politics, the indigenous 
structures, and then going off to everyone” (Interview, February 3rd, 2012). In other 
words, the movements secured support within their local communities and movement 
structures before mobilising support in other non-indigenous communities.  
This section of the chapter illustrates the ways in which indigenous movements 
mobilised support for MAS in 2005. Although the use of radio, canvassing and 
lobbying undoubtedly contributed to the party’s success, the research argues that the 
most effective way the movements mobilised support was by ensuring indigenous 
people could vote and by using their organisational structures to effectively 
communicate decisions to the bases. More generally, by consolidating this support 
through the Pacto de Unidad the movements increased the mobilisation of support 
from 2002. The chief motivation for this was the common goal of a constituent 
assembly and the transformation of Bolivia to a plurinational state. In 2009, MAS 
delivered on their promise when they held a referendum for the new Constitution of 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia, which was ratified with by a majority of over 60 per 
cent (Corte Nacional Electoral Bolivia, 2009). The first article of the new constitution 
recognises Bolivia as a 'plurinational' state in which community-based law and 
linguistic pluralism is legally recognised in accordance with the proposal of the 
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movements made to Congress in 2004 (Constitución de 2009 de la República del 
Bolivia, article 1). 
The impact of movement support for MAS in 2005 is best described by Mayra 
Gómez, who when asked whether MAS could have come to power without the 
support of indigenous movements, claims;  
“No, without social movements they wouldn’t have been in power, or, it 
wouldn’t have delivered a 54 per cent lead at a presidential election. It would 
have probably been local politics like before.”135 (Interview, February 3rd, 
2012).  
 
This is in congruence with the argument made earlier in this chapter that although it is 
difficult to measure the precise impact of movement support for MAS in bringing the 
party to power, the evidence presented here suggests that their role was not only 
decisive but also exceptional in terms of movement-party relations. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The chapter outlined that the movements were integral to the electoral success of the 
contestatory leftist party MAS in three ways. Firstly, despite founding the party, 
CSUTCB worked to stay distinctive as an organisation so that they could mobilise 
support for MAS among their bases. Moreover, the movement chose to refer to MAS 
as a ‘political arm’ rather than a political party. This was an effective strategy because 
indigenous people are wary of such labels. Secondly, the movements formed the 
Pacto de Unidad which consolidated their support for MAS across diverse, and 
previously fragmented, indigenous bases. Thirdly, the movements mobilised their 
bases by maximising their organisational structures to communicate decisions to 
regional and community leaders, who could then instruct their communities to vote 
for MAS. Moreover, the movements ensured that those eligible to vote were 
registered, thus boosting voter turnout and support for MAS.  
Finally, it is worth noting the nature of indigenous movement relations with MAS 
today. As discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, movement-party alliances are 
fragile and temporal in nature. This is the case in Bolivia where the strength of the 
Pacto de Unidad has gradually broken down resulting in the departure of CONAMAQ 
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 Here Mayra is referring to the performance of MAS in local elections from 1998-2002. 
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and CIDOB from the pact. The crux of this breakdown is with the failure of MAS to 
deliver on the perspective compensation i.e. the constitution in a way that satisfies 
these two movements. That is, these movements are not entirely satisfied with the 
constitution delivered by the Morales Government in 2009. For Froilán Puma 
Carmona of CONAMAQ claimed that despite the new constitution holding 
Plurinational in its title, “we are not living in a plurinational state, we are living in a 
republican system like before” (Interview, May 22nd, 2012). Specifically, he claims 
that “the Plurinational State is not working, right now it is just a name, following 
republican laws, colonisation, extraction and political manipulation” (Interview, May 
22
nd
, 2012). Ultimately, the movement no longer supports MAS because they were 
supposed to be the party to represent their demands for the elections but CONAMAQ 
now feel “deceived and betrayed” by MAS (Interview, May 22nd, 2012). In light of 
this, the movement is currently, “working on self-determination for the next 
elections.”(Interview, May 22nd, 2012.)  
CIDOB explain that the Pacto de Unidad is “broken” now that CONAMAQ and 
CIDOB have left the alliance. (Interview, May 4th, 2012). Specifically, CIDOB 
explain “now everything is quite the contrary, there is no application of the law we 
created” (Interview, May 4th, 2012). Daniel García Pamo explains that in the 
communities the people “don’t understand what is happening”; he states for CIDOB 
and its affiliates “it is difficult for us, this agreement, the promise, hope that we had in 
that moment, it failed” (Interview, May 4th, 2012). He refers especially to the on-
going issue with TIPNIS which he says is a problem “was born in 2008, 2009 when 
the President in his discourse abroad and in the international congress’s talks about 
the defence of Mother Earth (Pachamama), this is a nice discourse but in reality 
everything is on the contrary” (Interview, May 4th, 2012). Finally, Daniel García 
Pamo claims that the government is now creating “distrust” within the communities 
and for this reason “Morales will not win” the next elections (Interview, May 4th, 
2012).  
CSUTCB however remain the central base of support for MAS. In contrast to 
CIDOB, Luís Gabriel Morales claims that if there were an election next week they 
would support MAS, the leader exclaimed; “yes! We will support MAS and the 
President until the end!” (Interview, May 16th, 2012). Kathryn Ledebur of Andean 
Information network (AIN) provides some insight into the continued support of 
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CSUTCB for MAS by explaining that the cocaleros and CSUTCB is the “stronghold” 
of MAS support because they created the party. Moreover, as long as MAS continue 
to provide employment to CSUTCB and CSCIB, through their policies they will 
remain loyal to MAS (Interview, May 16
th
, 2012). This raises the questions as to 
whether some movements are more important to MAS for support, than others. For 
instance, Luís Gabriel Morales explains that CSUTCB were more “politically 
mature”, “stronger” and with more affiliations and social base than the other 
movements (Interview, May 16
th
, 2012). It could be implied that because CSUTCB 
has a stronger social base, upon which MAS relies, MAS will support CSUTCB in 
whatever social conflicts arise, thus producing rivalry and dissention between the 
movements.  
In the case of TIPNIS, CSUTCB are in favour of the construction of the highway 
through the national park because it will enhance the transportation of coca and other 
products. CIDOB and CONAMAQ on the other hand are in opposition to the highway 
because it trespasses on indigenous lands. This is an extremely contentious and a 
highly polarising debate in Bolivia today. Moreover, it is one that is almost 
exclusively between indigenous movements. MAS and CSUTCB have not backed 
down to the social pressure of the marches made by CONAMAQ and CIDOB, or 
when they do, they almost immediately renege on their promise to halt construction 
because of the social pressure of CSUTCB and CSCIB, highlighting their allegiance 
to these movements. This presents an interesting challenge for MAS in the upcoming 
2014 elections. MAS have lost the support of two central movements who represent 
very particular bases. However, the bases of the CSUTCB, CSCIB and Bartolinas 
remain firmly in MAS’ favour. The right in Bolivia is gearing up for a comeback as 
opposition campaigns emerge more vehemently than ever in Santa Cruz. In a rare 
alliance, the right in Santa Cruz have even openly supported the marches by CIDOB 
and CONAMAQ in defence of TIPNIS.  
More recently, CIDOB and CONAMAQ announced that they “will not support the 
MAS, we are not satisfied we do not want members that are subordinate to a party" 
(Arellano, 2013). Instead the movements announced their plan to borrow the name of 
a pre-existing party and run their members within this with the “priority” of winning 
uninominal seats (Arellano, 2013). This move to local seats represents an interesting 
course for the movements indicating that they are no longer interested in entering into 
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alliances with political parties for presidential elections but will instead concentrate 
on local elections. Indeed, the 2014 elections will demonstrate whether MAS can win 
the elections with the cocalero base alone. If so, the 2014 elections may provide an 
opportunity to assess whether some movements really do matter more than others. 
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Chapter 5: Peru 
“In 2006, we entered into a bet with President Humala…we believed in Humala 
because he was challenging the right...who were a danger to us all” 
- President of CONACAMI, Magdiel Carrión 
Pintado ( Interview, June 22
nd
 , 2012) 
Introduction 
The second case study selected for the qualitative analysis is Peru where the 2006 
elections signalled a left turn in a country previously dominated by neoliberal 
President Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) and his successor, centrist President 
Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006). Peru was selected because despite a large indigenous 
population which represents a total of 47 per cent of the total population, indigenous 
movement mobilisation is low. Given that indigenous movement mobilisation is the 
principal explanatory variable, low mobilisation in Peru compared to high 
mobilisation in Bolivia provides variation within the independent variable across 
cases. As with Bolivia however, there is also variation within the case of Peru because 
indigenous movements in the lowlands are more mobilised than their highland 
counterparts. This is the opposite of Bolivia where highland movements are more 
mobilised. In light of this contrast, we expect to see different results in Peru than we 
did in Bolivia. Specifically, because mobilisation is low it is anticipated that the 
movements are less effective at mobilising support for the left and therefore the 
parties do not perform as well at the national level, despite a potentially large social 
base. This is not to say that the movements failed to mobilise support the left within 
their bases, but that because mobilisation of the movements is low, it did not have the 
same impact as the movements in Bolivia. Accordingly, we expect to see lower 
support for the left. More specifically, because the 2006 elections in Peru was a 
contest between candidates of the ‘Two Lefts, we expect to see less support for the 
contestatory left in particular with whom indigenous movements are most likely to 
ally. The case of Peru therefore, provides an opportunity to address the secondary 
puzzle of the two lefts.  
The 2006 presidential elections in Peru took place during a time of immense 
discontent with persistent corruption and a lagging economy (Schmidt, 2007). 
Opinion polls in 2005 indicated that 80 per cent of Peruvians were ‘not very satisfied 
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with democracy’, indicating that political discontent was pervasive (McClintock, 
2006). Unlike Bolivia however, discontent was not met with mass mobilisation on the 
streets. Instead the desire for change was demonstrated by a record high voter turnout 
in 2006 of 90 per cent (McClintock, 2006). Therefore, while discontent was prevalent 
in both Bolivia and Peru in the run up to the elections studied, it manifested in 
different forms of political action in each case.  Interestingly, in Bolivia mass 
mobilisation was followed by the election of a contestatory leftist president and in 
Peru there was an absence of mass mobilisation and the defeat of the contestatory 
leftist candidate and success of the moderate left. Therefore Peru offers the 
opportunity to explore variation in support for the left generally as well as variation in 
support for the types of left which emerged. It is anticipated that indigenous 
movements supported the contestatory left but their low levels of mobilisation meant 
they were less effective at translating support into electoral success than their 
Bolivian counterparts.  
Two leftist candidates dominated the 2006 election in Peru. The first was former 
president Alan García (the moderate left candidate) and the second was newcomer 
Ollanta Humala (the contestatory left candidate). While Humala won the first round 
of elections (with just over 30 per cent of the vote share), he lost in the second round 
by five per cent (La Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE)). Importantly, 
Humala won much support from the majority indigenous provinces in both rounds. 
He won 63 per cent of the vote of those who self-identified as indigenous in the 2006 
Latin American Opinion Poll (LAPOP) survey in the second round of the 2006 
elections (Madrid, 2012). Accordingly, the 2006 election provides a case in which a 
contestatory leftist candidate lost the second round of the election yet received the 
majority of its vote share from indigenous people. This chapter will assess the role of 
indigenous social movements in mobilising support for Humala within their social 
bases and investigate the impact of this support. Five indigenous movements, both 
lowland and highland, are discussed. They are Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo 
de la Selva Peruana (AIDESEP), Confederación de Nacionalidades Amazónicas del 
Perú (CONAP), Confederación Campesino del Perú (CCP), Confederación Nacional 
Agraria (CNA) and Confederation National de Comunidades del Peru Afectadas por 
la Minera (CONACAMI). While the original intention of this research was to address 
the 2006 elections alone, interviews revealed that indigenous movements provided 
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stronger support for Humala when he ran again in 2011 and was elected president.  
This presented an opportunity to assess movement support for a candidate across two 
electoral cycles and in doing so observe whether the variation in Humala’s success 
can be explained by a variation in movement support across this time. Therefore, both 
the 2006 and 2011 elections are analysed in relation to movement support in this 
chapter. As with the case of Bolivia, the chapter will proceed by firstly providing a 
historical background on Peru. Secondly, the context and results of the 2006 elections 
will be discussed before turning to an overview of the movements in Peru. The results 
of field interviews are first presented in light of the 2006 elections and second in light 
of the 2011 elections, an overview of which is provided later in the chapter.  
5.1 Historical background 
The city of Cuzco in the highlands of Peru was once the centre of the Inca Empire 
(1438-1532) that stretched as far north as Ecuador and as far south as Chile 
(Skidmore and Smith, 2001). Peru was colonised by Spain in the 16
th
 Century and the 
city of Lima became the ‘City of Kings’ under Spanish rule (Skidmore and Smith, 
2001:183). Apart from the unsuccessful revolutionary revolt by the indigenous leader 
Túpac Amaru II (1780-1781) there was little resistance to Spanish rule. Indeed, it was 
the Argentinian liberator José San Martín who liberated Peru in 1821. San Martín met 
with the other great liberator of the Americas, Simón Bolívar in 1822 who was central 
in the subsequent battles with Spain in 1824. Although Spain refused to recognise the 
independence of Peru, under Bolívar the independence movement successfully freed 
Peru from colonial rule.  
In the post-independence era a number of issues emerged which remain central 
characteristics of Peruvian politics today. The first is the persistence of caudillismo 
(‘strong-man’ or dictatorial style leadership) politics centred on the military leaders 
and the second is the political instability that comes with this style of politics. For 
example, there were 15 constitutions and 35 presidents within the first forty years of 
independence and only four of these presidents were elected according to 
constitutional procedures (Scott Palmer, 2011). The first civilian president was 
Manuel Prado elected in 1872, over fifty years after San Martín liberated the country. 
Politics was for the elite only and conditions for indigenous people in particular in no 
way improved under independence. Despite representing over 70 per cent of the 
population in the 1820s, indigenous people were treated as subalterns in Peruvian 
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society and were forced to work as labourers on the haciendas (plantation) of large 
land owners, or they tried to pass themselves as mestizos to find employment in the 
cities (Skidmore and Smith, 2001). From the outset then, it was clear that the only 
way indigenous people could become part of Peruvian society was to “abandon their 
own heritage” and assimilate into the Spanish and mestizo dominant society (Scott 
Palmer, 2011: 237).  
The War of the Pacific (1879-1883) with Bolivia and Chile, bankrupt Peru and the 
traditional elite in power. To alleviate their war debts Peru offered up key 
infrastructure and resources. For example, in 1889, Britain cancelled over US$200 
million worth of debt in exchange for Peru’s railroads, the Lake Titicaca steamship 
line, subsidies, free use of major ports and a large area of Jungle land (Scott Palmer, 
2011). This initiated a trend of dependency on foreign nations, which would be an 
inherent factor of Peruvian politics throughout its history. 
Despite a brief period of civilian rule (1895-1919), political instability re-emerged in 
the period 1919-1968 during which time populist leaders from mass-based parties and 
military leaders dominated politics. It was during this time that Peru’s strongest mass-
based party, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) first emerged. 
APRA captured newly emerging social forces within the labour and student 
movements and also captured the middle-class sectors of the northern coast (Scott 
Palmer, 2011). From 1956 to 1982, APRA was a centre-conservative party that was 
willing to make alliances with former enemies to gain political power (Scott Palmer, 
2011). In 1962 for instance, APRA formed a coalition with its “archenemy” former 
military dictator General Manuel Odría (1948-1956) to govern Peru. Other political 
parties emerged during this time including Acción Popular (AP) founded by Fernando 
Belaúnde Terry who was elected president in 1963 and whose base of support could 
be found in the southern highlands of Peru (which is mostly populated by highland 
indigenous Indians) (Scott Palmer, 2011).  Importantly, unlike other Latin American 
countries, the political cleavages that emerged in the region at this time were based on 
divisions over military versus civilian rule than on liberal-conservative divides (Scott 
Palmer, 2011). 
By 1968 the Belaúnde government was usurped by the military regime of Juan 
Francisco Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975). Velasco’s government was the first to 
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implement any real reform since independence and is considered one of Peru’s “most 
ambitious military governments” (Skidmore and Smith, 2001: 208). As will be 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter, a central reform of Velasco was his 
Agrarian Reform Law, the slogan of which was “Land for those who work it” which 
directly appealed to the highland indigenous Indians who were working on the large 
haciendas (Cant, 2012). Between 1969 and 1980 over 360,000 farmer families 
received land titles as a result of Velasco’s reforms (Scott Palmer, 2011). The reforms 
also gave rise to new social actors such as agricultural co-operatives and 
neighbourhood associations. Citizenship participation however remained very much 
‘top-down’ in structure which took place through government agencies such as the 
National Social Mobilisation Support System (SINAMOS) set up by the Velasco 
regime.  
Political instability re-emerged however and another military leader, Francisco 
Morales Bermúdez, overthrew Velasco in 1975. Finally, a Constituent Assembly was 
set up in 1978 and the first constitution since the post-independence years was ratified 
in 1979. The constitution stipulated that national elections should take place every 
five years and municipal elections every three years beginning in 1980 (Scott Palmer, 
2011). The constitution limited the presidential term to five years and formally 
established a bicameral legislature in which there were 60 seats in the Senate (upper 
house) and 180 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (lower house). Crucially however, 
the constitution introduced universal suffrage and lifted the literacy requirement 
which excluded indigenous people in particular. The 1980 elections gave rise to new 
parties such as the Izquierda Unida (United Left) (IU) established in 1980 which was 
a broad alliance of leftist parties. Other existing parties re-emerged to contest the 
elections such as Partido Popular Cristiano (Popular Christian Party) (PPC).  
Former military leader Belaúnde won the election in coalition with PPC. Ensuing 
economic hardships
136
 and the escalation of violence by the region’s most “radical 
and violent guerrilla organisation”  the Shining Path137 led to the election of APRA’s 
Alan García in 1985 (Scott Palmer, 2011:266). García had led a successful 
personalistic campaign and once in power began a policy of nationalisation, starting 
with the banks (Scott Palmer, 2011). In 1990, Alberto Fujimori was elected president. 
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Foreign debt rose to over US$13 billion by 1985. 
137
 Who announced their ‘peoples war’ on the eve of the 1980 election. 
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Fujimori had successfully campaigned on a platform of anti-party politics.  In 1992 he 
initiated an autogolpe (or self-coup) in which he dissolved congress. In 1993 a new 
constitution was ratified which restricted immediate re-election of the president and 
reorganised the legislature into a unicameral congress consisting of 130 members 
(Scott Palmer, 2011). It also increased the powers of the executive (Scott Palmer, 
2011).  
Ultimately, the Fujimori era ushered in the “progressive deinstitutionalisation of 
electoral politics and a return to more personalistic approaches at the centre” (Scott 
Palmer, 2011: 253). While mass parties dominated politics between 1919 and 1968, a 
growing sense of antiparty politics emerged in the second half of the 20
th
 century. As 
a result Peruvian politics is marked by “flamboyant” leadership styles in which parties 
are “personalist vehicles” (Scott Palmer, 2011: 237). Politics is based on personal 
figures rather than political parties and as a result the multi-party system is 
fragmented and highly volatile. For instance, in 1995 fourteen groups contended for 
the presidency and in 2000 there were 12 competing parties for the presidential 
elections (Scott Palmer, 2011). Peru is also a semi-presidential system but the power 
remains in the hands of the president who nominates the prime minister. Politics has 
also been dominated by authoritarianism; since independence nondemocratic regimes 
have ruled the country “three-fourths” of the time. (Scott Palmer, 2011: 265). Even 
with the establishment of electoral democracy in 1980, Peruvian politics has been 
largely “democratic in form but authoritarian in substance” (Scott Palmer, 2011: 226).  
Throughout its history then, elections have been “intermittent and tentative” and 
focused on the will of the oligarchy (Scott Palmer, 2011: 254). Indeed, electoral 
restrictions throughout history have excluded non-elite sectors of society and 
reinforced elitism. For instance, the secret ballot was not introduced until 1930 and 
the property ownership requirement was lifted in 1931 (Scott Palmer, 2011). Women 
were granted the right to vote in 1956 but a literacy requirement was particularly 
exclusionary until it was lifted with universal suffrage in 1980. The exclusionary 
nature of Peruvian politics is also reflected in the low mobilisation of social and 
political groups, who have played “less of a role in politics” in Peru than in any other 
country in the region (Scott Palmer, 2011: 252). While 30 per cent of the workforce 
was incorporated into unions in the 1980s, this declined to less than 10 per cent by 
2000 (Scott Palmer, 2011). 
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The dominance of personal leadership over party ties is evidenced in a study 
conducted by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) in 
2005 that found that, of the politicians interviewed, most elected officials viewed 
party affiliation useless once they came to office (NDI, 2005). Politicians are unlikely 
to toe party lines and instead they operate in a state of constant conflict with one 
another, even within their parties. The NDI report on Peru’s political party system 
indicated that the caucus spokesperson for Perú Posible (Peru Possible, PP) often 
contradicts statements by his own party’s ministers and publically criticised the party 
leader, and President of Peru, Alejandro Toledo.  
Finally, there is little political oversight in this personalistic political culture. The 
principal Congressional Oversight Committee (Comisión de Fiscalización), which 
drives political debate in Peru and is highly publicised and therefore a position on  the 
committee “is the most coveted assignment in Congress”, further demonstrates the 
priority of personal exposure for politicians in Peru (NDI, 2005: 13). This dominance 
of personal figures over political parties was also a central component of the 2006 
elections, to which the chapter now turns.  
5.2 The context of the 2006 election 
A central theme for elections in Peru is ‘el mal menor’ (or ‘the lesser evil) referring to 
the poor quality of candidates presented to the electorate. This was a common theme 
in both the 2006 and 2011 elections. In 2006, the choice between Ollanta Humala of 
Unión por el Perú (UPP) and Alan García of Alianza Popular Revolucionaria 
Americana (APRA)
138
 is considered one of ‘el mal menor’ (Espinosa Pezzia, 2008). 
This theme continued in 2011 when Nobel laureate Mario Vargas Llosa claimed the 
choice of candidates was like choosing between “AIDs and terminal cancer” 
(Levitsky, 2011: 85). Later in the campaign he publically lent his support to Humala, 
a decision rooted in a vote against Humala’s opposing candidate, Keiko Fujimori, 
than for Humala (Levitsky, 2008). The recurrent theme of ‘el mal menor’ is 
substantiated by the former
139
 president of the National Congress of Peru, and 
representative of Humala’s party Gana Perú, Daniel Abugattás when he explains that; 
“Indigenous people supported him [Ollanta Humala] in both elections, not because of 
                                                          
138
 APRA is also referred to as PAP. 
139
 At the time of interview (June, 2012) Daniel Abugattás was the President of Congress. His term 
ended in July 2012.  
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some identification or because he is seen as a leader but, because he is the lesser evil” 
(Interview, June 15
th
, 2012).
 
A second characteristic of Peruvian elections is the importance of ‘personal figures’ 
over party ties. This is the legacy of the government of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), 
an era often referred to as ‘Fujimorismo’. Many of Fujimori’s reforms debilitated the 
political party system in Peru and it has yet to recover. Tanaka (2011: 77) notes that 
Peruvian parties are “weak and personalised organisations” and are only concerned 
with the pursuit of political power. Moreover, Peruvian parties “lack any roots in 
society” and are “virtually devoid of ideological contours or policy positions” 
(Tanaka, 2011: 77). According to Antolín Huáscar Flores, president of the highland 
campesino organisation Confederación Nacional Agraria (CNA), “figures, or 
candidates, are more important than political parties” (Interview, June 21, 2012). He 
uses the case of Humala in 2011 as an example in which a candidate with a weak 
party can win an election, “look at Humala, he won and he has no party” (Interview, 
June 21
st
, 2012). 
 Marleni Canales Rubio, an indigenous rights lawyer and former president of el 
Consejo Consultivo de Pueblos Indígenas, de la Comunidad Andina (CAN)
140
, also 
highlights the role of “personal figures” in Peruvian elections when she states that 
Peruvian people are “influenced by generated opinions on a ‘personal figure’ rather 
than their conviction, or their proposed policy” (Interview, June 19th, 2012). The 
president of highland organisation CNA states that “there are no parties, and 
especially no real opposition parties” (Interview, June 21st, 2012). Of particular 
concern to this research, Marleni Canales Rubio describes political parties in Peru to 
be like “western political parties” which act as a “conglomerate of individuals who 
come together for certain purposes” (Interview, June 19th, 2012). She argues that this 
is simply “incompatible with the goals of Peru’s indigenous people”, and as a result, 
their relationship with parties is particularly difficult (Interview, June 19
th
, 2012).  
These two characteristics of Peruvian electoral politics potentially present significant 
implications for this research. Firstly, if elections are centred on a lesser evil, Peru 
presents a very different motivation for support than Bolivia, which was driven by an 
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 Marleni Canales Rubio served as President of CAN in 2010 and works closely with indigenous 
movement Confederation National de Comunidades del Peru Afectadas por la Minera (CONACAMI) 
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unequivocal ideological congruence with the policies of MAS. This relates to the 
second characteristic, the personalistic nature of Peruvian parties, which may imply 
an allegiance to a candidate’s personality rather than their ideological positioning. 
This is an important consideration for this study, which posits that indigenous 
movements support leftist parties based on ideology. Despite these idiosyncrasies, this 
research finds that indigenous movements, with the exception of CONAP, supported 
Humala in both 2006 and 2011. While this support was in part motivated by ‘el mal 
menor’, movements also strongly identified several policy proposals as a reason for 
lending their support. Many of these policies in 2006 are characteristic of the 
contestatory left including the nationalisation of natural resources and the cultivation 
of coca. Although Humala moderated to the centre-left in 2011 he continued to appeal 
to indigenous votes by pursuing polices of social inclusion and indigenous land rights. 
As will be discussed later in this chapter, movement support for Humala was greatly 
motivated by these proposed reforms.  
A final factor that is important in the case of Peru is the relationship between political 
parties and indigenous communities. As discussed in chapter two of this dissertation, 
indigenous movements are crucial intermediaries between a distrustful indigenous 
social base and parties. Indeed, movements bridge the gap between this social base 
and parties by mobilising support for the party in their communities. In Peru, the 
relationship between indigenous people and political parties is particularly 
disaffected. As explained by Marleni Canales Rubio above, Peruvian parties are 
‘incompatible’ with indigenous people (Interview, June 19th, 2012).This is reflected in 
the statement by CONAP president, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez who claims that 
indigenous people in the lowlands in particular “have no trust in the political system” 
(Interview, June 11
th
, 2012). Moreover, the presence of political parties in indigenous 
communities is largely absent demonstrating the unimportance of this base to most 
parties. Javier Torres, president of civil society organisation Asociación de Servicios 
Educativos Rurales (SER), describes the behaviour of political parties in highland 
indigenous communities as the following; 
“It is like the rural communities during festivals, nothing happens all year, 
everything is closed and there are few people around, but for the week of the 
festival it is crowed with people, and then on the seventh day everything 
returns to normal. Political parties are like this. They all converge on the 
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community during elections and speak with people. They arrive in buses and 
bring you to the [voting] location. There is a mountain of unknown people 
whose only goal is to get you to the location. Then they leave.” (Interview, 
June 20
th
, 2012). 
The implication here is that there is a clear disconnect between indigenous 
communities and political parties in Peru and so we would expect that movements 
play a particularly important role as intermediary between base and party. Arguably, 
this role was especially important in the 2006 elections because there was “no major 
party or candidate that strongly identified with southern Peru” which is predominantly 
populated by poor and indigenous communities (Schmidt, 2007:815). Moreover, the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) reports that the 
representation of indigenous movements and their participation in national politics 
during the 2006 election was “not present in either the structure or platforms of 
political parties” (IDEA, 2006: 1). Indeed, the discourse regarding indigenous politics 
in Peru during the 2006 elections was weak in comparison to that of Bolivia in 2005. 
With no indigenous party, weak ties to existing parties and a relatively reticent 
indigenous discourse throughout the elections, indigenous movements in Peru had no 
option but to ally with contestatory leftist candidate Ollanta Humala who was the only 
candidate to appeal to the indigenous vote (Madrid, 2011).  
The results of the 2006 election 
Table 5.1 below lists the results of the first round of the 2006 elections along with the 
ideological positioning of the competing parties. They include; Ollanta Humala whose 
party Unión por el Peru (UPP) represents the contestatory left in this study and Alan 
García of Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) which represents the 
moderate left. Lourdes Flores Nano of the conservative electoral alliance, Unidad 
Nacional (UN) was also a central contender and so is included in this part of the 
discussion. Two further candidates are listed on Table 5.1 below including the Martha 
Chavez of the right-wing Alianza por el Futuro (AF), Valentín Paniagua of Frente de 
Centro (FC) a centrist personalist party and finally Humberto Lay leader of the 
evangelistic party, Restauración Nacional (RN). As the table indicates, the three main 
contenders for the first round were Ollanta Humala, Alan García and Lourdes Flores.   
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Table 5.1: The results of the first round of the 2006 election 
Candidate  Party  Valid Votes in 
the first round   
(%) 
Ideology  
Ollanta Humala  Unión por el Perú  30.61 Contestatory Left 
Alan García Partido Aprista Peruano 24.32 Moderate Left 
Lourdes Flores Unidad Nacional 23.81 Right 
Martha Chávez Alianza para el Futuro 7.40 Right 
Valentín Paniagua Frente de Centro 5.80 Centrist  
Humberto Lay  Restauración Nacional 4.37             Christian Conservative  
Others  3.7  
 
Total valid votes   83.9  
Blank votes   11.9  
Null votes   4.2  
Source: La Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE) 
In 2006, Ollanta Humala ran as the presidential candidate for the leftist party UPP 
(Schmidt, 2007). Although he originally announced his candidature for presidency 
with his own party Partido Nacionalista Peruano (PNP), the party incurred difficulties 
with registration and instead “struck a deal” with UPP (Schmidt, 2007: 816). As a 
former army-officer with no political experience Humala opted for an ‘anti-system’ 
strategy in which he appealed to the public’s disenchantment with the political system 
(Cameron, 2009: Meléndez, 2006). This strategy was particularly effective amongst 
the disillusioned poor and indigenous communities (Meléndez, 2006). Consequently, 
Humala represented an outsider who offered a new alternative to ‘politics-as-usual’ in 
Peru (IDEA, 2006). Javier Torres president of SER in Peru explains that “Humala’s 
discourse in 2006 marked a return of the discourse of the left in the electoral process 
of Peru for the first time since the 1990s” (Interview, June 20th, 2012). Indeed, 
Humala was the first “significant leftist candidate for more than fifteen years” 
(Interview, Javier Torres, June 20
th
, 2012). This is reflected in the policies pursued by 
Humala in his 2006 campaign including a proposal to increase state control of the 
economy and nationalise natural resources (Schmidt, 2007). Humala also strongly 
opposed the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US, which was a central issue 
during the elections (McClintock, 2006). Moreover, Humala was a “virulent 
nationalist” and pursued close ties with late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez who 
it was claimed, helped to fund Humala’s campaign (McClintock, 2006: 100; Schmidt, 
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2007).Humala also campaigned for the protection of coca cultivation by opposing 
eradication policies introduced  by previous governments (Schmidt, 2007). Populist 
and nationalist rhetoric was evident throughout his campaign. He contended that 
should the right-wing candidate Flores Nano be elected, this decision should be 
“overturned in the streets” (Schmidt, 2007: 817).  
Many of these policies appealed to indigenous voters. For instance, his vehement 
opposition to the FTA was centred on a claim that it would “ruin the competitiveness 
of local crops” which are predominantly grown by highland campesinos (IDEA 
2006:3). Humala’s opposition to the FTA also appealed to lowland communities who 
feared the agreement would lead to an increased presence of private companies in 
their territories. In addition, Humala’s position on the production of coca appealed to 
coca growing campesino communities of north central Peru.  
In conjunction with his polices, Humala occasionally used his “largely unspoken” 
ethnicity to appeal to indigenous voters (McClintock, 2006: 101). Humala was born in 
the city of Lima, was privately educated and is “neither indigenous nor white” 
(McClintock, 2006: 101).  His ‘indigenous roots’ are by default because they are 
consequence of a nationalist-ethnic ideology developed by his, father, Isaac Humala, 
in the 1960s called “etnocacerismo” (or ethno-nationalism) (Schmidt, 2007: 815). 
Etnocacerismo advances the superiority of Peru’s indigenous culture and the “copper-
coloured” indigenous majority over other ethnicities (Schmidt, 2007: 815). While 
Humala was forced to distance himself from his family during the campaign
141
, he 
occasionally referred to etnocacerismo in his campaign rhetoric (McClintock, 2006; 
Madrid, 2012). Therefore, Humala’s ethnic appeal is more because he is perceived as 
a friend of indigenous people due to his father’s ideology. None of the movements in 
this study claim to support Humala because they perceived him as an indigenous 
candidate.  
Alan García ran with his party APRA, which is Peru’s oldest, most established and 
well-organised party (McClintock, 2006; Dietz, 1998). In stark contrast to Humala’s 
strategy of ‘anti-politics’ García’s candidacy was tainted by the mistakes made in his 
                                                          
141
 Humala’s father claimed that if he were President he would grant an amnesty to incarcerated 
members of the terrorist organisation Sendero Luminoso. In a separate incident his mother claimed that 
all homosexuals should be “shot” (McClintock, 2006:101). Finally, Humala’s brother, who is much 
more radical, ran against Humala in 2006 (McClintock, 2006). 
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previous presidential term (1985-1990). During his first term, García was responsible 
for “the worst economic crisis in Peru’s history” culminating in increased poverty and 
food shortages (McClintock, 2006: 102). At the end of his term the newly installed
142
 
President Alberto Fujimori ordered a warrant for García’s arrest forcing him to flee to 
Paris, only to return in 2001 to face Fujimori in the presidential elections 
(McClintock, 2006). Despite his misgivings, support for García was strong within 
APRA’s traditional support base along the north coast of Peru (McClintock, 2006).  
In 2006, García positioned himself as an alternative to the extreme left of Humala and 
the conservative ideology of Flores Nano (McClintock, 2006). García aligned himself 
with the icon of the moderate left, former president of Brazil Luiz ‘Lula’ da Silva. 
Lula was seen as “the model for the progressive left” and García was keen to follow 
his example (Starr, 2006). His moderate left approach is also evident in his position 
on the FTA, which García did not oppose, but rather proposed the formation of a 
multi-party commission, to review the agreement (IDEA, 2006).   
García claimed that he learned valuable lessons from his first term that provided him 
with experience and an edge over the other candidates (Schmidt, 2007). He also 
appealed to younger voters (who did not remember the blunders of his previous term) 
by playing ‘reggaetón’ music throughout his campaign travels and in advertisements 
(Schmidt, 2007). His appeal to campesino and indigenous voters was much more 
subtle. His policy of “la sierra exportadora” (the “exporting highlands”) could be 
argued to target campesino voters by focusing on “dramatically increasing” the 
exportation of over 26 highland-agricultural products (McClintock, 2006: 103). 
Originally considered a long shot for the election in January 2006, García gained 
much momentum by the first round of elections and qualified for the run-off with 
Humala in June 2006. Before addressing the second round in more detail it is 
important to consider the campaign lead by the closest contender to Humala and 
García, Lourdes Flores of the conservative electoral alliance, Unidad Nacional (UN). 
Flores represented the right-wing conservative electoral vehicle, and although it is not 
the subject of this study should be discussed for two reasons. Firstly, Flores was the 
“clear frontrunner” leading with 32 per cent support from decided voters in October 
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 Fujimori was elected by the people in 19990, but staged an 'autogolpe' (self-coup) in 1992 in which 
he dissolved Congress and transferred all power to the executive branch.  
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2005 (Schmidt, 2007:816). By early January 2006
143
 however, Humala overtook 
Flores in the polls, thus demonstrating the preference for a contestatory left over a 
conservative right candidate (Schmidt, 2007). Indeed, Flores’ biggest weakness was 
her association with the rich elite and neo-liberal businessmen of Peru (Schmidt, 
2007). Additionally, Flores advocated the FTA with the US claiming it was “key to 
the development of Peru” thereby illustrating that her polices were centred on ideals 
of neo-liberalism (IDEA, 2006). While Humala presented himself as the “ordinary 
Joe”, Flores was dubbed the “candidate of the rich” and dropped to third place in the 
first round and elimination from the race (McClintock, 2006: 102).  
The electoral result of the first round highlights the distribution of votes according to 
the demographic divide of Peru. As Figure 5.1 below indicates, Humala relied heavily 
on the support of majority indigenous departments.
144
 García’s support came from 
minority indigenous departments such as Piura, Ica and La Libertad (Van Cott, 2005). 
Flores meanwhile won the department of Lima, where a third of the electorate resides 
and contains an indigenous population of ten per cent (Van Cott, 2005).
145
 In addition 
to the support from indigenous majority departments, Humala won the majority in the 
shantytowns of the city of Lima where many rural indigenous migrants reside 
(Schmidt, 2007: 817). Ultimately, much of Humala’s support came from indigenous 
people and departments such as Ayacucho and Huancavelica, where the 
“impoverished” and those of “indigenous decent” reside (McClintock, 2006: 96).146 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
143
The first round of the election took place in April  
144
Peru has twenty-five departments, five of which are majority indigenous departments, namely 
Apurímac, Cuzco, Huancavelica, Puno, and Ayacucho. Please see Appendix F for a map of Peru 
divided by departments.  
145
 Most of Lima’s indigenous population live in the poorer parts of the city of Lima and migrated there 
for work or to escape the terror of Sendero Luminoso in rural areas during the 1980s. 
146
Humala won over 62 per cent of the vote in Ayacucho and 59 per cent in Huancavelica. 
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Figure 5.1: The electoral performance of candidates in minority and majority 
indigenous departments in the first round of the 2006 election 
Source: Author’s own compilation, adopted from Van Cott (2005) and La Oficina Nacional 
de Procesos Electorales (ONPE) 
Although this pattern of support continued in the second round (displayed in Figure 
5.2 below)  it was not enough to win the election overall as Humala lost by five per 
cent. The second round was marred by a series of events that greatly damaged 
Humala’s popularity among non-indigenous voters. Firstly, the encroaching presence 
of Hugo Chávez affected Humala’s reputation. Chávez initially endorsed his 
“compadre” Humala at the beginning of the campaign but his support soon escalated 
into a political spat directly with García (McClintock, 2006: 104). For example, 
Chávez criticised the then sitting president Alejandro Toledo for his preliminary 
signing of FTA and García responded by claiming that Peruvians should be able to 
negotiate with the US as Chávez had done with oil (McClintock, 2006: 104). Chávez 
called García a “swine, a gambler and a thief” and as the conflict escalated both 
countries withdrew their ambassadors to the shock of the Peruvians (McClintock, 
2006: 104). As a “disciple of Chávez” Humala was greatly affected by this turn of 
events (McClintock, 2006: 104). Opinion polls indicated that Peruvians would not 
vote for Humala precisely because of his association with Chávez (McClintock, 
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2006). Later in the campaign Humala arrived late to a televised debate and claimed 
that García supporters blocked his route. However, CCTV footage revealed that the 
delay was a result of Humala’s unscheduled stop in a local shop (McClintock, 2006). 
Such events created a political opportunity for García who bolstered his leftist appeal 
by “matching” some of Humala’s leftist policies in the second round such as 
advocating the renegotiation of contracts with international corporations and focusing 
on social and labour issues (Schmidt, 2007: 817). García coined a new slogan for this 
policy of “responsible change” during the second round and his apparent strategy to 
incorporate some of Humala’s positions into his own campaign reflects the popularity 
of his leftist discourse in the first round (Schmidt, 2007: 817). The results of the 
second round are displayed on Table 5.2 below and indicate that Humala lost the 
election by five per cent.  
Table 5.2: The results of the second round of the 2006 election 
Candidate  Party  Valid Votes in the 
second round (%) 
Ollanta Humala  Unión por el Perú  52.6 
Alan García Partido Aprista Peruano 47.3 
Source: La Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE) 
Despite losing the election in the second round, Humala managed to maintain the 
support of indigenous people which increased by over 17 per cent in the five majority 
indigenous departments in the highlands (see Table 5.5 below which displays 
Humala’s vote 2006-2011). In the lowland departments of Pasco, Amazonas and 
Ucayalí all of which have an indigenous population of over ten per cent, support for 
Humala in the second round increased by over 15 per cent in each case as displayed in 
Table 5.2.  
Indeed, as was the case in the first round there was a clear geographical breakdown in 
the electoral results, which correspond with departments of high indigenous 
populations. More specifically, while García won the departments along the north 
coast, the indigenous departments of the highlands “overwhelmingly orientated 
toward Ollanta Humala” (Panfichi, 2006: 2)147. This is depicted on Figure 5.2 below 
in which Humala relied on the support of the indigenous departments. While this 
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support was not substantial enough for Humala to win the election, it demonstrates 
the level of support Humala received from indigenous voters.  
Figure 5.2: The electoral performance of candidates in minority and majority 
indigenous departments in the second round of the 2006 election 
Source: Author’s own compilation, adopted from Van Cott (2005) and La Oficina Nacional 
de Procesos Electorales (ONPE) 
The indigenous vote is at the heart of this project which is concerned with the role the 
movements played in mobilising support among the communities. The chapter will 
now turn to a discussion of the movements in Peru and their role in mobilising 
support for Humala in the 2006 elections. This is followed by an analysis of 
movement support in 2011. 
5.3 The movements 
While indigenous movement mobilisation is markedly lower in Peru than in Bolivia, 
it would be erroneous to assume that indigenous movements in Peru are completely 
de-mobilised. For example, the mobilisation of lowland movements within the 
Amazonian region of Peru offers “a regional enclave for indigenous organising” 
(Yashar, 2005: 250). Table 5.3 below provides an overview of these movements and 
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their social bases. Although, like Bolivia, they are all organised under a federal 
structure with affiliates across Peru, the indigenous movement as a whole remains 
nationally fragmented and internally divided (Lucero and García, 2007: 242). Unlike 
Ecuador for example, where corporatist policies instilled a sense of “solidarity and 
community ties” amongst the country’s indigenous population, Peru’s corporatist 
policies had the “opposite impact-generating greater tension, distrust and 
competition” amongst indigenous movements (Yashar, 2005: 241). One exception to 
the typically fragmented relationship of these movements is the Conference of the 
Permanent Conference of Indigenous Peoples of Peru (COPPIP), which was first held 
in Cuzco in 1997. The conference was an attempt to unite highland and lowland 
movements into one national organisation. By 2001, AIDESEP and CONACAMI 
were leading forces in a revising the organisation, which they called, the Permanent 
Coordinator of the Indigenous Peoples of Peru (also COPPIP). The COPPIP provides 
an example of highland and lowland cooperation, which although led by AIDESEP 
and CONACAMI, also incorporates the other movements (listed below) on issues 
such as constitutional reform proposals (Van Cott, 2005). However, the COPPIP is 
not institutionalised or as strong as similar organisations in Ecuador or Bolivia and it 
largely remains “a space to develop common strategies” than an organisation within 
its own right (Van Cott, 2005: 163). 
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Table 5.3: Overview of indigenous movements in Peru 
Movement Year 
Founded 
Movement 
Type 
 Social Base Federal Structure  Estimated 
number of 
social base
148
  
AIDESEP 1979 Lowland Amazonian and 
lowland regions 
222 regional 
organisations 
representing 64 
indigenous peoples   
350,000 
people
149
 
CONAP 1987 Lowland Amuesha People in the 
Amazon  
35 affiliate 
organisations across 11 
departments 
150,000 
people
150
 
CCP 1947 Highland  Campesinos working 
within the Agricultural 
sector  
  
CNA  1971 Highland  Campesinos working 
within the Agricultural 
sector 
114 agrarian leagues, 
across 17 departments 
representing 1,385 
grassroots 
organisations  
174,000 peasant 
communities
151
  
CONACAMI 1997 Highland  Indigenous 
Communities affected 
by mining across Peru  
24 Regional 
organisations across 18 
Departments 
Represents over 
1,135 
communities 
across 16 
departments
152
 
Source: Author’s own 
The lowland movements 
AIDESEP formed in 1979 and is the most prevalent and active movement in Peru 
since the 1980s (Yashar, 2005; Van Cott, 2005).  AIDESEP’s goal is to unite the 
different ethnic communities within the Amazonian region in order to address issues 
such as land appropriation and the promotion of bi-lingual education (Yashar, 2005). 
By 1998 AIDESEP represented 42 of the 59 federations within the Amazonas 
(Yashar, 2005). Notwithstanding this success, the movement remains internally 
divided since its formation. In 1987, members of the Amuesha group left AIDESEP 
and formed Confederation of Amazonia Nationalities of Peru or CONAP (Van Cott, 
2005). While both organisations are active today, CONAP “remains the relatively 
weaker, less internationally connected organisation” (Van Cott, 2005:159). 
                                                          
148
 It is important to note that these figures are purely estimates based on a variety of sources. It is very 
difficult accurately estimate the social base of any movement. Consequently, the figures above can 
only truly act as indicators of the size of a social base.  
149
 According to http://www.aidesep.org.pe/ 
150
 Estimated figure in 2002 according to Van Cott (2005: 159) 
151
 According to a report by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada in 1998 
152
 According to current president of CONACAMI Magdiel Carrión Pintado, (Interview, Magdiel 
Carrión Pintado, June 22, 2012) 
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In 1982, AIDESEP formed international alliances with other indigenous movements 
in surrounding countries (Hughes, 2010). The result of these alliances was the 
formation of the Coordinator of the Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin 
(COICA) in 1984, which represents eight Amazon basin countries and is led by 
AIDESEP (Hughes, 2010). AIDESEP were also instrumental in forming alliances 
with other movements within Peru as demonstrated by the establishment of COPPIP 
discussed above. Their role in establishing national and regional land associations is 
greatly aided by the funding they receive from international NGOs such as Oxfam 
America (Albó, 2008; Hughes, 2010). By 2000, AIDESEP united 222 regional and 
local organisations throughout the Amazon, encompassing 64 Amazonian peoples 
(Van Cott, 2005). In 2009, the movement received international attention when they 
clashed with police in the Amazon city of Bagua, resulting in the death of 34 people 
including ten civilians and 25 police officers (Hughes, 2010). The mobilisation of 
AIDESEP at this time was driven by the decision of then president Alan García to 
privatised indigenous communal lands. This marked a period of immense 
mobilisation in the Amazon and is discussed in more detail in the next section of this 
chapter.  
AIDESEP were politically active since the 1980s when they placed candidates in 
local and regional elections (Van Cott, 2005). The movement was also instrumental in 
registering thousands of undocumented indigenous people during the 1980s and 
1990s (Van Cott, 2005). Importantly, the movement played a role in politicising 
indigenous people in the amazon by holding workshops with their affiliated 
federations on the electoral processes and distributed information on political 
participation in indigenous languages (Van Cott, 2005).  
As previously mentioned CONAP separated from AIDESEP and established itself as 
an independent movement in 1987. By 2002, CONAP included 35 affiliated 
federations representing an estimated population of 150,000 indigenous people 
throughout eleven departments of Peru (Van Cott, 2005). It is organised into 5 
regional headquarters, 12 directives and a secretary of women’s affairs (Van Cott, 
2005). Current President of CONAP Oseas Barbarán Sánchez explains that CONAP 
is a defence organisation for the struggle of indigenous peoples in the Peruvian 
Amazon including the defence of collective and individual rights of indigenous 
people (Interview, June 11
th
, 2012). It represents over 67 ethnic groups in the Amazon 
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all of which have their own distinct language and culture but a common vision to 
advance indigenous rights such as the protection of their cultural identity and 
territories and the provision of bi-lingual education (Interview, 
Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11
th
, 2012). In conjunction with these rights CONAP 
are also concerned with the protection of biodiversity and an indigenous 
‘cosmovision’ (‘viewpoint’) (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11th, 2012). 
Oseas Barbarán Sánchez explains that indigenous people of the amazon are “different 
from national society” and are “now fighting for our lives, for our territories” in Peru 
(Interview, June 11
th
, 2012). 
 
Similar to AIDESEP, CONAP was also politically active from the late 1980s 
onwards. While CONAP did not place candidates from their organisation in elections, 
they facilitated independent indigenous candidates wishing to compete in local 
elections (Van Cott, 2005). According to former president of CONAP Cesar Sarasara, 
running independently from CONAP is necessary “in order to keep the national 
organisation free from involvement in electoral politics that might distract or divide 
it” (Van Cott, 2005: 159). Instead, CONAP offered their support to independent 
candidates by allowing them to “speak at CONAP and other affiliate’s meetings” and 
aiding in their registration for election (Van Cott, 2005: 159). This reflects the 
position of CONAP, which is to “not to belong to a political party” (Van Cott, 2005: 
161). This remains the position of CONAP today and is best expressed by current 
president of the movement Oseas Barbarán Sánchez who states;  
“CONAP should not have any association with any kind of political institution 
or political party, neither of the left nor the right, because CONAP is a protest 
movement and should act independently and autonomously in its decisions” 
(Interview, June 11
th
, 2012). 
Despite the desire to remain autonomous from political parties however, CONAP also 
stated that they “should look for strategic alliances with other political parties” 
(Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11
th
, 2012). This seems to contradict the 
statement above, and indicates that while the movement believes it should remain 
autonomous it also recognises that in order to achieve their long term goal of the 
legislative protection of their rights, the movement will have to seek alliances with 
parties. They are particular about the kind of party they are willing to work with 
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however. CONAP claim that alliances should only take place with “their own” 
political party which should have an “Amazonian doctrine and not a Marxist one” and 
who should be “purely indigenous” (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11th, 
2012). With no such existing party it appears CONAP would need to establish this 
party themselves. The possibility of CONAP establishing such a party however 
remains uncertain. In 2002, former president of the movement Cesar Sarasara claimed 
that “CONAP does not aspire to seek national congressional offices until it has 
developed a strong regional electoral base” (Van Cott, 2005: 161). CONAP has yet to 
establish this base because they do not claim to support any of the recent 
congressional candidates from Amazonian territories such as Eduardo Nayap Kinin, 
elected to congress in 2011. The lack of support for Nayap may relate to his running 
under Humala’s Gana Perú party in 2011 rather than independently, and he is also of 
Awajún peoples represented by AIDESEP (La República, 2012).  
Ultimately, the Amazonian movements present an exception to the otherwise weakly 
mobilised indigenous movements of Peru. Higher mobilisation in the region is 
attributed to the role of NGOs and Catholic Church in providing structural assistance 
and supporting networks amongst indigenous groups (Yashar, 2005). Moreover, 
mobilisation in the Amazonian region was also aided by the fact that the region, until 
recently had, “maintained autonomy from the state for most of Peru’s history’” 
(Yashar, 2005: 250). Finally, the region emerged almost unscathed by the atrocities of 
the civil war with Sendero Luminoso, which debilitated and destroyed indigenous 
communities in the highlands (Yashar, 2005).  
The highland movements  
Indigenous mobilisation in the highlands of Peru can be traced back to the 1920s 
when traditional “juntas comunales” or community boards were legally recognised by 
the state as a form of local authority (Van Cott, 2005: 145). The juntas helped to 
organise indigenous communities who were experiencing harsh labour conditions and 
struggling to regain their land (Van Cott, 2205). By 1923, indigenous mobilisation 
intensified and a rebellion to reclaim land emerged across the Andean departments 
resulting in the filing of thousands of lawsuits to the state for the reclamation of land 
(Van Cott, 2005). This is an important consideration in the study of mobilisation in 
the highlands of Peru because it provides evidence that mobilisation did occur but was 
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later incapacitated by the reforms implemented by the Velasco regime (1968-1975), 
and later again by the civil war with Sendero Luminoso (1980-1992). Everardo 
Orellana, leader of CCP in Junín, explains that mobilisation in Peru is not the same as 
Bolivia “because the civil war debilitated the movements from organizing” 
(Interview, June 11
th
, 2012). According to Marleni Canales Rubio, “over 70 per cent 
of the highland population were disappeared” during the internal conflict with 
Sendero Luminoso and this explains low mobilisation in the highland (Interview, June 
19, 2012).  
The exception to this is the formation of campesino organisations called rondas 
campesinos in the northern department of Cajamarca during the late 1970s. The 
rondas were indigenous community organisations that formed in response to the theft 
of livestock and were supported by local political parties (Van Cott, 2005). By the 
1980s, communities across the Sierra formed rondas in order to fight Sendero 
Luminoso who brutally targeted them (Van Cott, 2005).
153
 The relevance of the 
rondas is that while not officially a movement, these local organisations adopted an 
ethnic element and is used as an exception to typically weak mobilisation in the 
highlands (Van Cott, 2005). 
The oldest indigenous movement in Peru is the highland Campesino Confederation of 
Peru (CCP) formed in 1947 which was principally concerned with issues of labour 
and land. During the 1950s CCP was involved in massive land invasions in the 
Andean region
154
 and later began to incorporate other demands such as access to 
primary education. In the 1960s mestizo Hugo Blanco joined CCP becoming the 
central figure of the movement. Hugo Blanco mobilised campesino communities, 
especially in Cuzco were mass rallies were held and “fostered a fundamental change 
in the collective self-perception of indigenous peoples” who were “once ashamed to 
wear their ponchos and speak Quechua” (Van Cott, 2005: 146-147). The mobilisation 
of campesino communities in the highlands was driven by CCP and it is estimated 
that over 300,000 campesinos participated in over 300 land invasions during the 
1960s (Van Cott, 2005). Leftist parties such as APRA and the Peruvian Communist 
Party also played a supportive role in this mobilisation, thus illustrating the long 
history of CCP alliances with the “urban left” in Peru (Van Cott, 2005: 147). These 
                                                          
153
 The Peruvian government provided the rondas with arms to fight Sendero Luminoso  
154
 The departments of Cuzco, Pasco and Junín were especially mobilised.  
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parties were urban-based at the time and sought worker-peasant alliances with rural 
indigenous organisations such as CCP and the Cuzco Federation of Workers (FTC) in 
particular
155
. Such alliances however were difficult to sustain as ethnic demands 
clashed with class-based struggles concerning with land and labour (Van Cott, 2005). 
The lack of unity and distrust amongst campesino communities acted as a division 
within the movement (Van Cott, 2005). 
In 1968, the reforms made by the Velasco regime benefited some sectors of CCP 
more than others creating tension within the movement (Van Cott, 2005). The 
establishment of Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social (SINAMOS) 
by Velasco in 1972 for example, debilitated CCP as it provided an alternative space 
for campesino mobilisation. A central part of SINAMOS was the creation of 
Confederación Nacional Agraria (CNA), which was designed to defend indigenous 
land and convert it into cooperatives (Yashar, 2005). As a government-sponsored 
organisation with more resources, it inevitably became more popular amongst the 
communities leaving CCP incapacitated at both national and local levels (Van Cott, 
2005; Yashar, 2005). With the fall of the Velasco regime in 1972 CNA was subject to 
oppression by the Morales Bermúdez regime (1975-1980) which revoked the reforms 
of Velasco. In 1979 however CNA reconstructed itself as an autonomous organisation 
(CNA, 2013). CNA now represents a social base of 174,000 peasant families through 
its federation structure that includes; 17 agrarian federations (departmental level), 114 
agrarian leagues (provincial level), 1,385 grassroots organisations (organizaciones de 
base) (Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada, 1998). CNA 
represents small farmers and campesino communities working within the small-
medium sized agriculture sector and promotes projects concerning food security and 
sustainable agriculture (CNA, 2013).  
The CCP re-mobilised during the 1990s and currently claims to represent small 
farmers and campesino communities working within the small-medium sized 
agriculture sector (Interview, Everardo Orellana, June 14
th
, 2012). The organisation 
became involved in formal politics and alliances with political parties from the late 
1990s onwards. In 1999, they made alliances with political parties for national 
legislative elections including Alejandro Toledo’s Peru Posible (Van Cott, 2005). In 
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 The FTC is now an affiliate of CCP and a central part of the federation structure  
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2001, the CCP and affiliate organisations again entered in to a political alliance with 
Toledo in which the support and votes of CCP members was “conditioned on the 
fulfilment of pre-election promises” (Van Cott, 2005: 154). This is a clear example of 
a movement-party alliance, which this research investigates and highlights the 
willingness of CCP to enter into such alliances. Similarly, in 2001 CNA entered into a 
similar alliance with the right-wing Unidad Nacional and even provided funds for 
their campaign (Van Cott, 2005). In contrast to CCP however, members of CNA were 
appalled at this alliance and initiated protests culminating in the destruction of the 
office of CNA and the decision by the organisation to avoid political alliances 
thereafter (Van Cott, 2005).  
The final highland organisation to be outlined is CONACAMI which formed in 1999. 
CONACAMI are primarily concerned with the mining sector in Peru which greatly 
affects their communities (Van Cott, 2005). Since 1992 the number of hectares mined 
in Peru increased from four million to twenty-five million, resulting in major 
environmental and health implications for indigenous communities (Van Cott, 2005). 
Given the large number of communities affected by mining CONACAMI has a large 
base of support that spans 18 departments encompassing over 1,135 communities 
across 24 regional organisations (Interview, Magdiel Carrión Pintado, June 22
nd
, 
2012). Their social base is predominantly communities from the northern Sierra but 
also some communities from the lowlands and along parts of the coast (Interview, 
Magdiel Carrión Pintado, June 22
nd
, 2012).  
In July 2002, the organisation underwent a period of mobilisation as it led a march 
through Lima demanding government attention to indigenous rights and economic, 
social and environmental harm caused by mining (Van Cott, 2005). The national 
march was entitled “Por la vida, la tierra, el agua y el agro” and was centred on three 
issues. The first was the demand that the World Bank modify its fiscal policies 
towards mining companies. The second demand was related to respect of indigenous 
people and their territories through the implementation of a “Ley de Consulta Previa” 
(Albó, 2008). Thirdly, there was a call for a political economy that prioritised 
agriculture and to change the national legislation to incorporate rights of the 
communities and the environment (Albó, 2008).  
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Like its Amazonian counterpart AIDESEP, CONACAMI is an international 
organisation that works with affiliates in Bolivia and Ecuador. In 2001, CONACAMI 
invited indigenous leaders from Bolivian (such as CONAMAQ) and Ecuadorian 
movements (such as ECUARUNARI) to Cerro de Pasco in the Andean Region of 
Peru for a conference on the impact of mining on indigenous communities (Albó, 
2008). It is a regionally recognised organisation since its involvement in large-scale 
protests against President Toledo in 2002 (Van Cott, 2005; Lucero and García, 2007). 
Although its members are primarily indigenous Quechua speakers, CONACAMI did 
not incorporate indigenous demands until 2003 when its leaders travelled to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights to petition against the Peruvian government. 
It was during this trip that CONACAMI first articulated its demands along ethnic 
lines. It now considers itself a movement between campesino and indigenous 
ethnicities. This is explained by CONACAMI president Magdiel Carrión Pintado 
when he states that “while the organisation first formed to protect communities 
affected by mining, it has taken other trajectories too, such as climate change, food 
sovereignty, creation of a people’s constitution, criminalisation of protest, and 
defence of people’s territories (Interview, June 22nd, 2012). The chapter will now 
outline the support provided by these movements to Humala in 2006 and 2011.  
5.4 The results of field interviews   
With the exception of CONAP, indigenous movements supported Humala in both the 
2006 and 2011 elections, as indicated on Table 5.4 below. Before turning to the 
interview data, the chapter will now briefly outline some key aspects of the 2011 
election that are important for this study.  
Table 5.4: Indigenous movement support for Humala 2006 and 2011 
Movement Type of Movement Support in 2006  Support in 2011 
AIDESEP Lowland Yes Yes  
CONAP Lowland No Tacit Yes 
CCP Highland Yes  Yes  
CONACAMI Highland Yes  Yes  
CNA Highland  Yes Yes 
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Firstly, in 2011 Humala “presented a different face to voters” by moderating his 
extreme left position and distancing himself from ‘Chavista’ inspired policies 
(Sánchez-Sibony, 2012: 114). Humala publicly requested that Chávez refrain from 
meddling in Peruvian politics in 2011 (Sánchez -Sibony, 2012). Instead Humala 
publically aligned himself with Lula just as García did in 2006 (Dennison, 2011).With 
his new coalition party Gana Perú, Humala’s campaign motto was La Gran 
Transformación (or ‘the Great Transformation”) and  included proposals for cheaper 
consumer price for natural gas and redistributive social polices (Sánchez -Sibony, 
2012: 114). He also vowed to recover natural resources that were typically exploited 
by foreign companies (El Comercio, 2011). Two polices however appealed directly to 
indigenous voters.  
The first was the plan for social inclusion which involved the creation of a Ministry to 
address issues of poverty and development directly affecting indigenous communities 
(El Comercio, 2011).The second policy proposal was a constitutional amendment that 
would ensure that Peru’s constitution and domestic law were amended to be in 
compliance with article 169 of the International Labour Organisation Convention. The 
convention stipulates that indigenous people must be first consulted before the state 
can take any action that may affect their territories (Stetson, 2012). This was called 
the Ley de Consulta Previa (the law of prior consultation) And was of utmost 
importance to all indigenous movements because it would prevent private investment 
in the Amazon without prior consultation (which directly affects the lowland 
movements). It also offered protection for the expansion of extractive industries such 
as mining without prior consultation. Humala developed this policy in the aftermath 
of lowland protests in Bagua. Therefore, while Humala moderated his nationalist and 
contestatory leftist rhetoric in 2011 his policies sill appealed to the indigenous people 
who voted for him again in 2011, as Table 5.5 indicates. This relationship is best 
summed up by AIDESEP who claim that in 2011 “Humala had to moderate in order 
to convince the people in Lima that he was not radical” but “the indigenous vote for 
Humala was certainly for his government plan in both 2006 and 2011” (Interview, 
Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18
th
, 2012). 
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Table 5.5: Humala’s percentage valid vote share across both rounds in 2006 and 
2011, by department
156
  
Department Indigenous 
population 
% of 
Department 
2006  
Round 1 
(%) 
2006 
Round 2 
(%) 
2011 
Round 1 
(%) 
2011 
Round 2 
(%) 
Highlands/Sierra       
Puno 66.01 51.5 69.6 62.71 77.90 
Apurímac 64.69 57.4 73.8 51.48 68.40 
Ayacucho 60.67 62.4 83.4 58.04 72.10 
Huancavelica 56.33 59.3 76.4 55.46 72.23 
Cuzco 55.43 56.3 73 62.61 77.10 
Huánuco 26.72 43.9 63.8 44.09 63.46 
Arequipa 17.21 48.5 64.6 47.87 65.91 
Junín 13.14 40.9 62.7 38.28 54.66 
Cajamarca 1.09 28.6 52 31.58 51.16 
Coast      
Ancash 31.75 30.9 47.5 30.83 58.32 
Tacna 21.73 48.8 60.8 57.15 73.46 
Moquegua 21.29 42.6 53.4 47.81 66.75 
Lima 9.06 23.7 38 21.26 42.47 
Ica 6.1 27.9 40.8 31.00 50.09 
La Libertad 0.52 15.6 27.4 24.63 43.34 
Tumbes 0.49 23.6 46.6 27.85 45.77 
Piura 0.34 25.8 44.4 31.18 47.66 
Lowlands/Amazon      
Pasco 12.12 28.4 46.6 30.42 51.03 
Amazonas 10.6 32 57.6 40.81 58.62 
Ucayali 10.54 33.7 49.5 39.15 54.25 
Loreto 4.5 30.6 52.8 29.30 56.53 
San Martin 2.64 34.7 58.8 36.04 52.13 
Source: Author’s own compilation, adapted from Van Cott (2005: 142), Yashar (2005: 234) and La 
Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE). 
 
In conjunction with the support for his polices, Humala also received support because 
he was once again, ‘el mal menor’. His opponent, right-wing Keiko Fujimori is the 
daughter of former president Alberto Fujimori who was serving a twenty-five year 
                                                          
156
The correlation between indigenous population and first round of the 2006 results was 0.85.The 
correlation between indigenous population and second round of the 2006 results was 0.79.The 
correlation between indigenous population and first round of the 2011 results was 0.77.The correlation 
between indigenous population and second round of the 2011 results was 0.81. 
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sentence for crimes committed during his presidency ranging from corruption to 
murder and kidnapping (Tanaka, 2011). According to AIDESEP, Fujimori 
represented a “very dark part” of Peru’s political history (Interview, Edson Rosales 
Figueroa, June 18
th, 2012). For some, “the key difference” between 2006 and 2011 
elections, was that the candidates in 2011 were “very distinctive” and there was a 
strong ‘anti-Fujimori’ vote in 2011(Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa of AIDESEP, 
June 18
th, 2012). There was a deep ‘anti-Fujimori’ sentiment among the movements 
which further motivated them to support Humala. Fujimori’s polices included a 
‘tough-on-crime’ public safety policy entitled ‘mano dura’ (or ‘the strong hand’) for 
which she hired the counsel of New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani (Sánchez -Sibony, 
2012: 113). Her economic policies were a repeat of those implemented by García and 
Toledo, prioritising the business community and neoliberalism (Sánchez -Sibony, 
2012).  
Another key difference between the 2006 and 2011 elections was the mobilisation of 
indigenous movements around indigenous rights to territory in the Amazon, which 
began in 2008 and escalated into the violent clashes with police in Bagua in 2009. 
Peru is a signatory to UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007), 
and to the International Labour Organisation Convention 169 (ILO169). The latter 
stipulates the Right to Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) in which indigenous people 
must be consulted on any legislation that may directly affect them (Stetson, 2012). In 
2008 AIDESEP claimed that García’s policies violated the above convention and 
declaration because the FTA with the US and other polices affected the territories of 
indigenous people across Peru and were being pursued without prior consultation 
(Stetson, 2012). In August 2008, AIDESEP organised a meeting of over 1,900 
indigenous communities in Lima who came together to initiate a peaceful protest 
against these policies, and more generally against extractive industries in indigenous 
territories (Hughes, 2010). AIDESEP were particularly anxious to reverse Decree LD 
No. 1090 which would see over 45 million hectares of the Peruvian Amazon lose 
protected status, thus opening it up for and private investment or agricultural 
development (without prior consultation) (Hughes, 2010). 
In response to the 2008 protest, the Congress “promised to reverse the decrees 
affecting” indigenous people (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa of AIDESEP, June 
18, 2012). However, this promise was reneged upon and  resulted  protests in Bagua 
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in 2009 where AIDESEP and its affiliates conducted public demonstrations, road and 
river blocks, strikes and occupations of oil and gas installations throughout the 
Amazonian region (Stetson, 2012). The road and river blocks proved to be a 
particularly effective strategy in disrupting transport in the region. As tension 
escalated García declared a state of emergency in the five departments of the 
Amazonian region (Amazonas, Cuzco, Loreto, San Martín and Ucayali) (Stetson, 
2012). AIDESEP leader, Alberto Pizango declared that indigenous communities had a 
right to insurgency (Hughes, 2010). In June 2009, García deployed the military and 
police resulting in clashes and the death of thirty-four people (ten civilians and 
twenty-four police officers) (Hughes, 2010). 
The case of Bagua is important because it marks a turning point in indigenous 
mobilisation in the Amazon. Moreover, other indigenous movements of the highlands 
such as CONACAMI mobilised in support of AIDESEP in the lead up and aftermath 
of Bagua. Crucially, however, the case of Bagua strengthened the relationship 
between indigenous movements and Humala because he supported the movements 
and condemned García’s actions. This greatly increased movement support for 
Humala in 2011. According to AIDESEP, “Humala’s party was the only one that 
supported us and for this reason Ollanta was given support” in 2011 (Interview, 
Edson Rosales Figueroa of AIDESEP, June 18
th
, 2012). Therefore it is argued that the 
case of Bagua, and the mobilisation directly preceding it, is central in understanding 
why the movements, with the exception of CONAP, provided strong support for 
Humala in 2011. This has an important implication for the way we understand 
movements in Peru, which are typically weak and fragmented. After Bagua the 
movements across Peru united against García and neoliberalism in a new way by 
together articulating their demands for indigenous rights to their territories. Moreover, 
by supporting the movements during this time Humala could strengthen his 
relationship with them and rely on their support in 2011.  
This section of the chapter identified the central aspects of the 2011 election in order 
to provide background information essential for the understanding of relations 
between Humala and the movements across two electoral cycles.  
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Movement support for Humala in 2006 
Javier Torres, of civil society organisation SER, explains that, in 2006, Humala was 
the first “real” leftist candidate to run in Peruvian elections since 1990 and “so 
logically, all the social movements, big and small, indigenous or not, supported 
Humala” (Interview, June 22nd, 2012). In particular there was a “natural convergence” 
between Humala and indigenous social movements, which was based on Humala’s 
opposition to neoliberalism (Interview, June 22
nd
, 2012). Indeed support for Humala 
was based on the shared “grand enemy of capitalism, the transnationals and the 
mining companies” (Interview, June 22nd, 2012). Humala’s support was partly based 
on his ethnic appeals through his father’s ideology of etnocacerismo as previously 
discussed. According to one observer during the 2006 campaign Humala claimed that 
the “real Peruvian is the Indian and mestizos” such as “those of the mountains jungles 
or coasts” (referring to both lowland and highland indigenous people) (Andersen, 
2010: 22). Consequently, “the matrix of campesino and indigenous movements 
thought Humala had an ethnic discourse” in 2006 and so supported him (Interview, 
Javier Torres, June 22
nd
, 2012). 
Movement support for Humala is evident in an interview with AIDESEP in which 
Communications officer for AIDESEP, Edson Rosales Figueroa states that his 
movement supported Humala because he opposed previous governments such as 
Fujimori, Toledo and García (during his first term) who pursued development polices 
based on “purely” extractive industries which were “were affecting the Amazon” 
(Interview, June 18, 2012). AIDESEP mobilised votes for Humala “across the Jungle” 
including the “emblematic” zones of Cenepa and Huampani both in the Amazonas 
department where Humala won a majority (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 
18
th
, 2012).
157
 Edson Rosales Figueroa states that the “decentralised” structure of 
AIDESEP helped them mobilise support for Humala because they have offices 
throughout the Jungle, making it “very easy” to contact the social bases (Interview, 
June 18
th
, 2012). If bases are easy to contact, the implication is that the movement can 
mobilise these bases more efficiently and more quickly. 
                                                          
157
 These zones are part of AIDESEP’s stronghold within the Amazon region. This region also holds 
significance for Ollanta Humala as he was based there during the Cenepa War in 1995, in which Peru 
and Ecuador fought over disputed land along their border (Ostrowska, 2010) 
  Qualitative Analysis: Peru    
220 
 
Importantly, decision making within the Amazon revolves around the community 
leaders who call a meeting to decide “the best course of action” when it comes to 
political decisions such as voting (Interview, June 18
th
, 2012). While AIDESEP did 
not explicitly outline how they mobilise votes, it can be implied by Edson Figueroa’s 
reference to the structure of the organisation that decisions made at these meetings are 
disseminated throughout the organisation using this federal structure. Crucially 
however, unlike many of the Bolivian movements, AIDESEP is not a ‘top-down’ 
organisation in which the hierarchy makes decisions. In AIDESEP there is no 
hierarchy. Rather AIDESEP is a bottom-up movement in which the president, Alberto 
Pizango is “a voice” for all the organisations within AIDESEP, and that the real 
power lies with the Apu chiefs in the communities who ultimately decide what will 
happen within their bases (Interview, Javier Torres, June 22
nd
 , 2012). Javier Torres 
notes that “Pizango doesn’t have the power to change the decisions they make, he is 
only the ‘voice’ for these communities” (Interview, June 22nd, 2012). This is a 
defining difference between AIDESEP and other movements in Peru (Interview, 
Javier Torres, June 22
nd
, 2012).  
Undoubtedly then, political decision making within AIDESEP is consultative and 
ultimately in the hands of the chief of each community. It could be argued however, 
that while this bottom-up structure exists, movement leader Alberto Pizango may still 
influence decisions within the organisation because he is trusted as their 
representative and he is the person who meets with government representatives and 
politicians. Therefore it is likely that the opinion of Pizango holds much weight 
within the communities and that the chiefs are likely to agree with his propositions in 
terms of political decisions. Consequently, while this bottom-up, consultative 
structure is important, political decision-making may implicitly lay in the hands of 
Pizango and AIDESEP. Regardless of who is in charge, AIDESEP openly supported 
Humala in 2006. Their central motivation was that his polices on extractive industry 
and neoliberalism was congruent with their goals. For instance, Edson Figueroa 
explains that this support was based on “a promise” that Humala would respect 
indigenous people, their “cosmovision” and their views on sustainable development 
and environment within the Amazon (Interview, June 18
th
, 2012). 
Unlike AIDESEP, the president of CONAP, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, is keen to 
declare the movements’ independence from political parties claiming that they did not 
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support any party in the 2006 elections (Interview, June 11
th
, 2012). Specifically, 
Oseas Barbarán Sánchez explains that CONAP is a protest organization that is set up 
to defend the rights of indigenous people in the Peruvian Jungle and that to align with 
a party would result in the loss of the organization’s “essence, independence, 
transparency and autonomy”(Interview, June 11th, 2012). For CONAP to support any 
political party, “left or right” would contradict the very “constitution” of the 
movement (Interview, June 11
th, 2012). To align with a party would be a “major risk” 
for the movement which should instead act “independently in its decisions” 
(Interview, June 11
th
, 2012).While it is clear that CONAP do not mobilise votes 
among their bases for candidates, the president of the movement also emphatically 
denounces Alan García. Referring to García, he states that the 2006 election was “one 
in which a candidate who never fought for indigenous people ran” (Interview, June 
11
th, 2012). Specifically, indigenous people “were invisible” to García and perceived 
as “savages” with “no rights” (Interview, June 11th , 2012). While it is clear that 
CONAP as a movement do not mobilise votes within their community for any party, 
the criticism of García by CONAP’s president suggests that there may have been a 
natural convergence of indigenous people with Humala rooted in the common enemy 
of García and his neoliberal policies, as proposed by Javier Torres of SER. Indeed, 
this natural convergence is evident when Oseas Barbarán Sánchez states, that as 
president of the movement, “I cannot use CONAP to support Humala” because the 
movement “must maintain independence” (Interview, June 11th, 2012). Ultimately, 
the movement does not mobilise votes for any candidate but the denouncement of 
García and implied support of Humala by CONAP’s president illustrates the natural 
convergence of indigenous people of the amazon with Humala in 2006.  
The highland movements are more explicit in their support for Humala. For instance, 
President of CNA, Antolín Huáscar Flores openly declares that the movement 
supported Humala in 2006. Referring to the indigenous people of the highlands and 
the emergence of Humala in 2006 he states; “imagine these people were waiting for a 
change, they were waiting for a great transformation” (Interview, June 21st, 2012). 
Specifically Antolín explains that “we were waiting to see who could change poverty, 
especially in places in the south like Puno, Cuzco, Ayacucho and Huancavelica” and 
when CNA examined Humala’s policy proposal they felt he would bring this change 
(Interview, June 21
st
, 2012). This support is evident in the electoral success of 
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Humala in the aforementioned departments in 2006. Antolín Huáscar Flores also 
provides insight into how his movement mobilised support for Humala by firstly 
referring to the structure of the organisation, which he describes as a “pyramid” 
(Interview, June 21
st
 , 2012). The structure begins with CNA at the top which includes 
Antolín Huáscar Flores as the “leader” and moves to the agrarian federations in 15 
departments. This level is followed by the provincial and regional agrarian leagues 
and finally to smaller local and community organisations situated at the bottom of the 
pyramid (Interview, June 21
st
 , 2012). 
As leader of the movement, Antolín Huáscar Flores travels to all the regional 
organisations during “the period of campaigning” (Interview, June 21st , 2012). For 
example he states that he travelled to Cuzco and Apurimac in 2006 and visited all the 
offices and institutions of CNA where he is “trusted and has influence” (Interview, 
June 21
st
, 2012). During his travels he discusses candidates with the regional offices 
and helps them “further evaluate” what candidate they should support, for example he 
may say “look this candidate is not for us maybe this candidate is better” (Interview, 
June 21
st
 , 2012). In conjunction with this, CNA call a national assembly with the 
leaders of all their organisations to debate the candidates; “for example, some say 
support Humala and some say no, it’s a debate” (Interview, June 21st, 2012). At the 
end of the national assembly meeting “we decide, yes this guy and we say ok, now go 
and pass the message to your bases” (Interview, June 21st, 2012). Therefore, like the 
case of many of the highland movements in Bolivia, CNA mobilise support for parties 
using the structure of the organisation to ‘pass along’ their candidate choice to the 
social bases. Importantly, Antolín Huáscar Flores is eager to clarify that the 
movement is “not paid” for this support but rather it is “unconditional support” based 
on the policy proposals of candidates (Interview, June 21
st
, 2012).  
CONACAMI also lent their support to Humala in 2006. We can refer here to the 
opening  quotation of this chapter in which President of CONACAMI, Magdiel 
Carrion Pintado, states that “in 2006, we entered into a bet with President Humala” 
(Interview, June 21
st
, 2012). They supported Humala because his party offered 
something “new” (Interview, June 21st, 2012). Interestingly, CONACAMI viewed 
Union por el Peru (UPP) as a nationalist party rather than a leftist party, which he 
claims “had lost all credibility in Peru” (Interview, June 21st, 2012). CONACAMI 
“believed” in Humala in 2006 because he “was challenging all those on the right” 
  Qualitative Analysis: Peru    
223 
 
who were a “danger to us all” (Interview, June 21st, 2012).  This illustrates once again 
that a common enemy in the right can act as a motivation for indigenous movement 
support for Humala.  
Finally, regional leader of CCP, Everardo Orellana
158
, explains that their movement 
supported Humala in 2006. Interestingly however, CCP only supported Humala in the 
second round of elections because they entered their own candidate in the first round. 
It was not until their candidate lost that CCP gave Humala their support in the run-off 
(Interview, June 14
th
, 2012).  
Evidently, movement support for Humala was strong in 2006. Indeed, CONAP is the 
only movement to emphasise their independence and autonomy from political parties. 
The other movements declare their support for Humala was based on his proposals to 
alleviate poverty and respect indigenous viewpoints. This support however, is also 
based on unification against the common enemy of the right as mentioned by many of 
the movements. This is an interesting result and one that is in congruence with the 
casual mechanism proposed in this research, as discussed in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, 
Humala lost the 2006 elections in the second round by five per cent. This outcome 
calls into question the capacity of the Peruvian movements to elect presidential 
candidates to office. In order to address this issue the research compares movement 
support in 2006 with support in the 2011 elections in which Humala won. By 
comparing the elections in this way we can better assess whether any changes in 
movement support occurred across the elections, and its potential influence on 
Humala’s success in 2011.  
Movement support for Humala in 2011 
Movement support for Humala continued in 2011, again with the exception of 
CONAP who remained autonomous. Javier Torres of SER claims that in 2011 it was 
clear from the outset that whatever candidate was “anti-García” would be the winner 
because there was an “anti-García vote” in 2011 based on “everything his second term 
represented” (Interview, June 20th , 2012). Javier Torres is referring here to García’s 
neoliberal polices and his reaction to Bagua during his 2006-2011 term (Interview, 
June 20
th, 2012). He explains that Humala was critical of García and “very distinct” 
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 Everardo Orellana is regional leader of CCP in the highland department of Junín. 
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from him and that “for this reason he won” (Interview, June 20th, 2012). In addition to 
the anti-García vote, indigenous movements in 2011 were “drawn to” Humala’s 
“ethnic discourse of 2006” and his “interesting claim about national sovereignty and 
the sovereignty of communities” in the aftermath of Bagua (Interview, Javier Torres, 
June 22
nd
 , 2012). Ultimately, in 2011 Humala was critical of García and a candidate 
that prioritised indigenous people, at least “that is how he was perceived by the people 
at that time” (Interview, Javier Torres, June 22nd, 2012).  
Movement support for President Humala in 2011 is confirmed by Congresswomen for 
President Humala’s party in 2011 Gana Perú, Claudia Faustina Coari Mamani. 
Congresswomen Mamani, herself a self-identified campesina from Puno, explains that 
in 2011 Puno was a “bastion of support for President Humala” where the President 
“won one-hundred per cent” (Interview, June 28th, 2012). In particular, Humala 
received great support from “the campesino movements” who supported him on his 
policies of “social inclusion and gender participation” (Interview, June 28th, 2012). 
Congresswomen Mamani more generally explains that, campesinos and indigenous 
people are “only leftist” and that “the right-wing candidates never take into account 
the poor that live in indigenous communities as they should” (Interview, June 28th, 
2012). This is in contrast to Humala who “recognises the suffering of the indigenous 
communities” (Interview, June 28th, 2012).  
In 2011, AIDESEP supported Humala in “all of the Jungle for Humala” (Interview, 
Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18
th
, 2012). Support was mobilised by speaking with 
the communities and movements “close to the river” who know AIDESEP “very 
well” (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012). Crucially, Edson Rosales 
Figueroa explains that while AIDESEP analysed Humala’s government plan with 
these communities “a relationship with Humala was firm for some time” (Interview, 
Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18
th
, 2012). It can be argued that AIDESEP are not 
only referring to the relationship established in 2006 but also of the strengthening of 
this relationship from 2008 during the mobilisation against García. As already 
discussed, Edson Rosales Figueroa of AIDESEP claimed that because Humala was 
the only party to support the movement during the Bagua debacle, the movement 
rewarded him with their support in 2011 (Interview, June 18
th
, 2012).  
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AIDESEP not only supported Humala in the presidential elections but also in 
legislative elections by supporting candidates from his party Gana Perú (Interview, 
Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18
th, 2012). For instance, “many congresistas of 
Humala went to Cenepa and to Bagua before the events occurred” (Interview, Edson 
Rosales Figueroa, June 18
th, 2012). These members of Congress were from Humala’s 
Union por el Peru elected in 2006 and include Congresswoman Marisol Espinoza who 
subsequently became Humala’s vice-president in 2011, and Daniel Abugattás 
president of Congress for Gana Perú from 2011-2012 (Interview, Edson Rosales 
Figueroa, June 18
th
, 2012). These members of Congress came to Bagua before the 
2009 clash with police to speak with AIDESEP and its communities and “explain the 
benefits of the law, of ILO 169, the pros and cons, how they could do things and how 
we could do things” (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012). Through 
these meetings, AIDESEP and Humala’s party members “came to a good 
understanding” (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012). Humala’s 
support for AIDESEP and their leader Alberto Pizango are made clear by AIDESEP. 
For example, when García “denounced” Pizango and issued a warrant for his arrest, 
Humala “called to offer a lawyer” to AIDESEP (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, 
June 18
th, 2012). AIDESEP did not accept Humala’s offer because they claim that 
their protests “were not political in this way”, meaning they were not for political gain 
of parties nor were they to receive political gifts (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, 
June 18
th
, 2012). Nonetheless, this offer of support undoubtedly helped to strengthen 
Humala’s the relationship with AIDESEP.  
Later in 2011 “various meetings” took place between Alberto Pizango159, AIDESEP 
and “leftist parties” such as Javier Díez Canseco from Partido Socialista (PDD) to 
promote Humala for President (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18
th
, 2012). 
Through these meetings it was decided that “Ollanta would be President by the hands 
of the people” (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012). In January and 
February of 2011 there was another meeting in the Jungle during which AIDESEP 
meet with CNA, CCP and CONACAMI in order to “to strengthen their fight” for 
indigenous rights by creating a pacto de unidad or ‘pact of unity’ (Interview, Edson 
Rosales Figueroa, June 18
th
, 2012). During the meeting the movements discussed 
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 Alberto Pizango fled to Nicaragua in 2009 where he was granted political asylum. He returned to 
Peru in 2010 and was arrested at the airport. After pressure from many civil society organisations he 
was released on bail and therefore able to legally participate in meetings in 2011 with political parties.  
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Humala’s plan, which they felt “guaranteed the respect of indigenous people and their 
territories” (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th , 2012). The movements 
felt that Humala would be “a President that would respect their position” and so 
“Ollanta was put into this pact” (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18th, 2012). 
This support is substantiated by Javier Torres who states that in 2011 AIDESEP 
“made alliances with Gana Perú” (Interview June 22nd, 2012). 
Ultimately, it was “in parallel” with the mobilisation of AIDESEP in 2008 that 
“Ollanta became an ally of indigenous people” (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, 
June 18
th
, 2012). According to Hughes (2010: 90) Humala and his party were “likely 
to be one of the main beneficiaries of the mounting political crisis” brought on by the 
Bagua case, and it appears that this was indeed the case. It can be argued therefore 
that Humala’s support of AIDESEP during the Bagua conflict strengthened their 
relationship resulting in stronger movement support in the 2011 elections. Moreover, 
given that AIDESEP underwent a period of immense mobilisation from 2008 as a 
result of Bagua, their reach within their bases may have increased at this time. The 
combination of an increase in mobilisation and solidification of a relationship with 
Humala between 2006 and 2011 may explain the slight increase for Humala within 
the Amazonian departments between these elections as listed on Table 5.5 above. 
Given however that this increase is only slight across each round of the election
160
 it 
is more likely that the impact of this relationship was that it secured Humala’s support 
in the region despite his more moderate positioning in 2011. It would be expected that 
such a position would ordinarily weaken his support among the indigenous 
movements and their communities. Ultimately, that AIDESEP mobilised support for 
Humala in the isolated departments of the Amazonian region of Peru is unequivocal 
and, at the very least this is likely to have sustained his success in the region despite 
becoming a moderate left candidate.  
As with the 2006 elections, CONAP asserted their unequivocal autonomy from 
parties and reiterated that they did not support any party in the 2011 elections 
(Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11
th
, 2012). While CONAP do not dismiss 
that Humala received support by indigenous people, and the poor in particular, he 
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 For example if we compare the first round of 2006 with the first round of 2011 we can see an 
increase with the Loreto. Similarly, this increase is evident in each of the second rounds with the 
exception of San Martín. Interestingly, these departments have the lowest indigenous populations in the 
region.  
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claims that this “has not been organic” (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11, 
2012). Specifically he states that it is not like Bolivia where there was organic support 
for “Evo” (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11th, 2012). For example, “it is 
not like I said ‘let’s go support a progressive revolutionary president’” like the 
movements in Bolivia in 2005 (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11
th
, 2012). 
CONAP do however recognise that Humala has done positive things for indigenous 
people in Peru including signing the law of prior consultation in 2011 (a law he 
remarks that García opposed in 2005) (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11
th
, 
2012). Moreover, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez concedes that “thanks to Humala “the 
ministry for social inclusion was established which was a central policy proposal 
during his 2011 campaign (Interview, June 11
th
, 2012). However he complains that 
Humala is now inclined to “favour private investment sectors”, which he claims is 
another reason why Humala is different from Evo Morales (Interview, 
Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11
th
, 2012).  
 
CONAP did not support Humala in 2011 despite the appeal of his polices. CONAP 
does however recognise that in order to achieve their long-term goals they may need 
to establish “closer ties with the state” (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11th, 
2012). Their motivation for pursuing such a course of action would not be to support 
Humala but rather a necessary step towards achieving their goals (Interview, 
Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11
th
, 2012). CONAP would like to create an 
indigenous party so that they can elect their own candidates to Congress (Interview, 
Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11
th
, 2012). There are however two “barriers that limit 
[AIDESEP]” (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11th, 2012). The first is the 
difficulty in uniting highland and lowland movements, and the second is the financial 
cost of creating a party. For example, if CONAP wanted to place their own candidate 
in any election they would need the money to pay and “control the media” so that 
their candidate receives coverage in the election (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, 
June 11
th
, 2012). An alternative may be to establish a strategic plan with other sectors 
such as “labour, indigenous sector, the business sector and political parties that 
identify with indigenous people” (Interview, Oseas Barbarán Sánchez, June 11th, 
2012). Interestingly, the left will not be the beneficiaries of such an alliance. As 
expressed by Oseas Barbarán Sánchez; “leftist parties would be ones who want to 
take advantage of these votes but they are disillusioned because they do not defend 
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the rights of the Amazonian people”, and therefore CONAP would not align with 
them (Interview, June 11
th
, 2012).  
 
In contrast to CONAP, highland movement CCP supported Humala in 2011 
specifically because of his policy on social inclusion and against Fujimori. CCP 
regional leader, Everardo Orellana, explains that CCP “have done a lot of work to 
support Humala” (Interview, Everardo Orellana, June 11th, 2012). Votes were 
mobilised by “guiding” and “leading the people to see what rights they have” such as 
the right to vote (Interview, Everardo Orellana, June 11
th
, 2012). Humala was chosen 
as the candidate to support because of his policy for social inclusion and because “he 
was the only alternative to Fujimori, and so we supported Humala” (Interview, 
Everardo Orellana, June 11
th
, 2012). Specifically, he claims that the support of CCP 
for Humala was more a “vote against Fujimori” than for Humala. Regardless of their 
motivation, “Humala had the support of all the campesino movements and so he won 
the vote in the south of Peru, and in areas like Tacna and Ancash” (Interview, 
Everardo Orellana, June 11
th
 , 2012). He also uses the example of Cuzco and his own 
department of Junín which he claims “had much support for Humala” remarking that 
“we [CCP] worked very hard to support Humala” in these departments.  
Table 5.5 of this chapter indicates that support for Humala grew in some departments 
from 2006 to 2011. For example, there is an increase from the second round in 2006 
to the second round in 2011 in departments such as Tacna, Ancash and Puno. The 
second round is assessed because CCP ran a candidate of their own in the first round 
of 2006 and so did not support Humala in this round, thus making a comparison of 
these rounds problematic. However, support for Humala also declined in some cases 
such as in Cuzco where CCP claim that they “worked hard for Humala” (Interview, 
Everardo Orellana, June 11
th
, 2012). There is however an increase of support in 
Cuzco and Junín between the first round and second round. This reflects Everardo 
Orellana’s statement that their support for Humala was more “anti-Fujimori” than it 
was “for Humala” because it was in this round that the two candidates faced each 
other (Interview, Everardo Orellana, June 11
th
, 2012). Ultimately however, Humala 
won a majority in each of these departments in the second round of the 2011 
elections, which contributed to his overall vote share within the interior. Given that 
CCP claim they worked hard to support Humala in his 2011 campaign by mobilising 
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votes in these departments, it can be suggested that they in turn, contributed to his 
success.  
The final movement to be discussed in light of support for Humala in 2011 is 
CONACAMI.  President of CONACAMI, Magdiel Carrion Pintado claims that 
Humala’s policy in 2011 offered something “new” and that, “with Ollanta there could 
be change” (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22nd, 2012). He claims that his 
polices “included interesting things for the people” and so “we as an organization said 
let’s support this” (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22nd, 2012). For 
CONACAMI this was “a decision based on how [they] wanted change in the country” 
including the proposal by Humala to change the constitution so that Ley de Consulta 
Previa would be included (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22
nd
, 2012). 
CONACAMI claim that during the second round against Fujimori there was a 
“change in the structure of elections” because the “people in the country, the 
indigenous campesino people, the rondas had a force” and “you could see that Ollanta 
would be their President” (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22nd, 2012). 
CONACAMI claim that because Humala represented change “we formed a pacto de 
unidad with AIDESEP, CNA, CCP, the confederation of campesino women and 
CONACAMI” and “in this pact we spoke with Ollanta and the people who made the 
alliance and even with those of Toledo”  in order to elect Humala in 2011 (Interview, 
Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22
nd
, 2012).  
As discussed above, AIDESEP also refer to this pact made in January and February of 
2011, which united highland and lowland movements in support of Humala. The 
pacto de unidad however “did not end well and now we are all dispersed” as the 
lowland and highland movements are once again disconnected (Interview, Magdiel 
Carrion Pintado, June 22
nd
, 2012). CONACAMI are currently constructing their own 
party that “will be a political arm for the movements” like MAS in Bolivia (Interview, 
Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22
nd
, 2012). The difficulty however is that all the 
indigenous movements “have different visions” and ideas for reform and there is no 
“political table to represent ourselves or to be representative” (Interview, Magdiel 
Carrion Pintado, June 22
nd
, 2012). 
CONACAMI make an important point about the election of members of congress, 
which is deemed to be a further barrier to uniting indigenous support. Magdiel 
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Carrion Pintado claims that members of congress “do not win elections for their 
conviction” but because they have money (Interview, June 22nd, 2012). He explains 
that “there is much politicking” at this level and that the right in particular have 
“commercialised elections” by distributing “gifts” to  several communities such as 
food and other goods
161
 (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22
nd
, 2012). He 
quickly asserts however that the left also distribute “gifts” because they are not the 
“true left, they do not represent the bases” (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 
22
nd
, 2012). CONACAMI claim that in 2011 Keiko Fujimori distributed gifts in the 
countryside as part of “a millionaire campaign” to buy votes (Interview, Magdiel 
Carrion Pintado, June 22
nd
, 2012). Specifically, communities were given “a mountain 
of money” to paint their houses with slogans for Keiko Fujimori (Interview, Magdiel 
Carrion Pintado, June 22
nd
, 2012). Interestingly this attempt at a clientelistic 
relationship was unsuccessful because although the communities painted their walls 
for Fujimori, they voted for Humala; “the people that live inside are for Humala but 
their walls are of Keiko” (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22nd, 2012).  
According to Magdiel Carrion Pintado, this was a nation-wide trend; 
“This is the case in almost all of the country, you understand? You sold your 
wall, but your conscience was with Humala, you will vote for Humala” 
(Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22
nd
, 2012).  
According to CONACAMI “people were convinced that Ollanta would win by 80 per 
cent and so 50 or 60 per cent of the houses were painted for Keiko” because it would 
not make a difference to the election and at least they would have some money 
(Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22
nd
, 2012). Sometimes however, this form 
of clientelism can contradict the expectation. For instance, the department of Piura is 
“one hundred per cent anti-mining but Keiko won in the city” because there are very 
poor neighbourhoods in the city and Keiko “came with gifts and bought votes, here 
votes are traded” (Interview, Magdiel Carrion Pintado, June 22nd, 2012). Indeed, 
Humala lost the department of Piura in each round of both elections (see Table 5.5). 
This raises an important issue for this research because it suggests that in some cases 
communities that would ordinarily support Humala are subject to clientelism, which 
causes them to change their vote. This in turn, calls into question the capacity of the 
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 Specifically he refers to gifts of “fesadas, tazas and panetones” or “parties, cups and cake”. 
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movements to mobilise votes that transfer into electoral success for the left. For 
instance, the movements may have supported Humala and mobilised votes within 
their social bases for him but with the persistence of clientelism in Peru it is difficult 
to determine whether the mobilisation of support for Humala really transfers into 
votes. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The central research question asks whether the variation in support for the 
contestatory left in particular, can be explained by variation in mobilisation of 
indigenous social movements. In the case of Peru indigenous social movement 
mobilisation is low and we find that the contestatory left candidate, Ollanta Humala, 
did not win the 2006 election. Rather, he won the 2011 election as a moderate left 
candidate. The data reveal that, with the exception of CONAP in 2006, indigenous 
movements supported Humala in both his 2006 and 2011 presidential campaigns. 
Despite this support it was not enough to propel Humala to victory in 2006. 
Moreover, it was the ‘middle class’ vote that pushed Humala to victory in 2011. 
Indeed this was a strategy by Humala as evidenced in his move from the extreme to 
the moderate left, or for some the centre (Tanaka, 2011). However, indigenous 
movement support remained despite the move from the extreme to the moderate left. 
As noted earlier, evidence from the field interviews, AIDESEP suggest that Humala’s 
move to the moderate left was a necessary strategy in order to win Lima and so the 
movements continued to support him based on his policies. However, support for 
Humala among indigenous voters did drop in some cases. The work of Tanaka (2011) 
finds that if we compare Humala’s percentage vote share in 2006 and 2011 within the 
poorest provinces, we see that support for Humala decreased overall. Tanaka (2011) 
argues that the electorate shifted to the centre in 2011 and so Humala selected a 
strategy that would appeal to this new centrist electorate. This is in line with the 
argument made by Baker and Greene (2011) as discussed in Chapter 1, which 
suggests that, the Latin American electorate shifted to the centre at the turn of the 
century, and that the moderate left appealed the most to this moderate constituency. 
Humala’s appeal to the centre saw him loose much support from the poorer segments 
of society in 2011 but gain more support from the middle and upper class (Tanaka, 
2011).  
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While it is clear that the support of indigenous people did not win the election for 
Humala in 2006 or in 2011, it was nonetheless a consistent base of support in most 
cases and this value of this should not be underestimated. Indeed a number of factors 
may have skewed Humala’s results in the poorer indigenous regions such as 
clientelism as highlighted by CONACAMI. What is interesting however is that the 
indigenous vote for Humala was “one hundred per cent” for his government plan and 
the fight against a common enemy of capitalism (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, 
June 18
th
, 2012; Interview, Javier Torres, June 20
th
, 2012). This is unlike the typical 
personalistic or clientelistic relationship between indigenous people and electoral 
candidates because there was a focus on Humala’s policies and how they could 
benefit the lives of indigenous people.   
Some other important issues were revealed through the data. The first is the 
questionable capacity of Peruvian movements to mobilise support among their bases 
because of their low levels of mobilisation. For example, Javier Torres suggests that 
“indigenous movements in Peru don’t have that much capacity” to mobilise votes in 
presidential elections (Interview, June 22
nd
, 2012). Former president of Congress, 
Daniel Abugattás states that the capacity of movements to mobilise votes for a party 
is difficult. He states “the problem is that the parties are unable to bond and build 
relationships that enable them to work together with social movements” (Interview, 
Daniel Abugattás, June 15
th
, 2012). Crucially, Marleni Canales Rubio claims that the 
central problem is the inherent disregard by parties for movements once elections 
have passed. She states that “parties have not taken indigenous social movements 
seriously” rather they see them as “a manageable mob, which can help them in certain 
circumstances when they need their vote but no political party takes seriously the 
indigenous movements” (Marleni Canales Rubio, June 22nd, 2012). She believes that; 
“political parties have never paid attention to these organisations or given them any 
importance. If Bagua did not happen they still wouldn’t invite them to a meeting, or 
meet with them” (Marleni Canales Rubio, June 22nd, 2012). Indeed, this highlights the 
inherently fragile and temporal nature of political alliances in any given context.  
Javier Torres of SER also highlights the ability for alliances to fall apart when he 
explains that now Humala’s attitude towards AIDESEP has changed and that he “does 
not give leaders of the Amazonian movements, such as Pizango of AIDESEP any 
[political] space” (Interview, Javier Torres, June 22nd, 2012). Rather, Humala’s 
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attitude towards AIDESEP is one of “vote for me if you want” and “nothing more 
than this” (Interview, Javier Torres, June 22nd, 2012). Similar to AIDESEP, CCP are 
now also discontented with Humala claiming that while they supported him for his 
policy proposal in 2011 “the truth is that every day this [policy] goes unfulfilled” 
which has led  the withdrawal of support for Humala (Interview, Everardo Orellana, 
June 11
th, 2012). He explains that CCP “believed Humala was another person, with 
another mind set” but they are discontented with his performance since his election 
(Interview, Everardo Orellana, June 11
th
, 2012). It seems as though the experience 
with Humala has only managed to create further disfavour towards existing political 
parties in the eyes on the movements. Indeed, both AIDESEP and CONACAMI were 
in the process of setting up their own, indigenous-based political party at the time of 
interview. CONAP also stated during their interview that future political alliances 
should be with indigenous-based parties that have a particular emphasis on the beliefs 
of lowland, Amazonian indigenous people. It appears that despite coming together in 
a pact of unity in 2011, the movements are once again fragmented and unlikely to 
form a unified indigenous political party, through which they might best achieve their 
demands.  
Movements seem to have more of an impact at the local and provincial elections 
however. Javier Torres explains that at the local level there are “meetings of 
community chiefs, or the presidents of the communal assembly, in the case of the 
Amazonian groups, who meet and decide what candidate to vote for but this only 
impacts the local level and as far as the provincial level” (Interview, June 22nd, 2012). 
Ultimately, the movements only make an impact where the indigenous population is 
higher (Javier Torres, Interview, June 22
nd
, 2012). For example, “there was a 
candidate for Congress for Humala’s party that was ‘Awajún162’ and he won election 
with a massive vote share from Awajún people which are the base of AIDESEP” 
(Javier Torres, Interview, June 22
nd
, 2012). Here Javier Torres is referring to 
Congressman Nayap Kinin who was elected in 2011 as representative of the 
Amazonas department. In some cases therefore, “some political weight allows 
movements to help elect members of congress and Alcaldes (mayors) because of their 
political weight and dispersion of votes in some districts”.   
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 Awajún are an indigenous people that live in the north of Peru on the border with Ecuador  
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While the above provides an example in which the support from the movement helped 
to elect a member of congress, this case is more the exception than the rule. Instead, it 
appears that in most cases, “it is the urban population that decides the election” 
(Javier Torres, Interview, June 22
nd
, 2012). For example, in 2011, the Apu (chiefs) 
claim that the candidate they supported lost the vote because the “colonos”163 have 
more of a “census” in their district (Javier Torres, Interview, June 22nd, 2012). This 
result according to the Apu was “fraudulent” simply because “it was not the respect of 
the will of the majority” (Javier Torres, Interview, June 22nd, 2012). Ultimately, the 
problem is “the electoral composition of the districts”, and for this reason “they 
cannot put a president of the republic in the office” (Javier Torres, Interview, June 
22
nd
, 2012). This example highlights a central question for this study, which is that 
even with high levels of mobilisation; could indigenous social movements in Peru 
play an integral role in the election of candidates when the electoral system still 
favours the elite? I argue that until fairer proportional representation of indigenous 
districts is introduced in Peru, it will be difficult for movements to impact even local 
elections. Furthermore, with continuing fragmentation and ethnic homogeneity 
between the movements, it is unlikely they could ever have the same impact as the 
Bolivian movements who not only united through their Pacto de Unidad but also 
reached beyond their indigenous bases to mobilise support for MAS.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
163
 Colonos means the settlers. These are non-indigenous people who live in the same department as the 
Apu’s, the department of Amazonas.  
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Conclusion 
“Our role has been important, because the idea was to awaken our social base” 
- Luís Gabriel Morales, regional leader of highland movement 
CSUTCB in Bolivia (Interview, May 16th, 2012). 
 
The goal of this study was to explore the role of indigenous social movements in 
support for the left in Latin America at the turn of the century. The central argument 
is that these movements entered into a political alliance with the left through which 
they mobilised their bases in support of the party. In return the movements sought 
prospective compensation in the form of policies addressing indigenous demands, to 
be implemented upon the election of the party. The research finds empirical evidence 
to substantiate this argument. Specifically, we find that movements in both cases 
entered into a political alliance with the left driven by the prospective compensation 
offered by these parties. These findings are important for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
they help to explain support for the left in the region, and the contestatory left in 
particular because the movements mobilised their social bases in support of this left. 
Second, the findings demonstrate that social movements can play a role in electoral 
politics by mobilising their bases around election time. Third, by acting as 
intermediaries between the indigenous base and the party, the movements bridged the 
gap between a disillusioned and demobilised sector of society and institutionalised 
politics. The implication of this was that it allowed the party to draw support from a 
new social base, typically distrustful of parties
164
, which contributed to support for the 
left. The second implication is that, by acting as intermediaries, the movements 
(re)introduced
165
 a detached and marginalised sector of society into institutionalised 
politics in a way that can only work to enhance representative democracy in the 
region. The conclusion will proceed by outlining these finding in more detail before 
engaging with the implications mentioned above. Finally, some avenues for future 
research will also be outlined. The study adopted a mixed-method approach to 
                                                          
164
 For instance, we can refer to Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2, which demonstrates that indigenous people are 
more trusting of indigenous movements than political parties. Please consult Appendix G.1 and G.2 
which demonstrate this relationship in Bolivia and Peru specifically. 
165
 I include parenthesis around ‘re’ throughout to denote that in some cases indigenous people were 
reintroduced into politics by the movements but in other cases this was the first introduction to 
institutionalised politics for other indigenous communities, such as many isolated communities in the 
Amazon region.  
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investigate the role of indigenous movements in the left turn. Accordingly, a brief 
discussion of the findings of the quantitative analysis is provided here before turning 
to the findings from qualitative case studies which are at the heart of the research.  
The findings 
The quantitative analysis first explored the relationship between movement 
mobilisation (massmob) and the left using cross-sectional data from all Latin 
American countries between 1990 and 2009. The results indicated that mass 
mobilisation is positively correlated with support for the left across all models, 
including and excluding interaction terms. The implication is that the left do indeed 
rely on a mass-mobilising base (Cleary, 2006). However, because this measurement 
did not capture indigenous movement mobilisation specifically, the results from the 
original expert surveys were used to test this relationship across five countries. The 
results indicated that support for the left was highest in cases where both indigenous 
movement mobilisation and indigenous populations were high. This supported the 
argument put forward in the introduction that the left performs best where 
mobilisation is high and population was substantial enough to impact elections (see 
Figure 2 in the Introduction). The macro analysis therefore demonstrated a correlation 
between indigenous movement mobilisation, indigenous population and support for 
the left, albeit not very substantive. Although the small number of cases within this 
analysis presents some inferential challenges, this remains the key finding of the 
macro analysis because it suggests that indigenous movement mobilisation can help to 
explain support for the left in some cases.  
An individual level analysis was also conducted using survey data from 
Latinobarómetro. The aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between 
indigenous voters and the left across the region to uncover whether indigenous people 
provided a base of support for the left. While no general relationship was found, 
country level analysis demonstrated that indigenous people support the left, at least in 
the two qualitative cases explored in this study. Ultimately, the individual level 
analysis indicates that indigenous people in Bolivia and Peru are likely to support the 
left. While the quantitative analysis provided evidence of correlation between the 
central variables, causation could only be established through the qualitative case 
studies.  
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The qualitative findings are best summarised by addressing three central questions 
within each of the case studies. The first is whether indigenous movements entered 
into an alliance and provided support for the party? The second is, what was the 
impact of this support? Lastly, in light of the evidence provided, can we say that 
social movements matter? That is, can movements play a role in electoral politics? 
Indeed, this question also allows us to explore the importance of movements for 
politics and democracy more generally.  
In terms of the first question, evidence from both cases indicated that indigenous 
movements entered into a political alliance with the left and mobilised support for 
these parties. Moreover, both cases demonstrated that the movements supported the 
contestatory left in particular. In relation to the argument this provides evidence that 
indigenous movements are more likely to support the contestatory rather than the 
moderate left, and therefore the emergence of this left in some cases and not in others, 
can in part, be explained by the mobilisation of indigenous movements. For instance, 
in the case of the 2006 Peruvian elections the movements supported the contestatory 
leftist candidate Ollanta Humala rather than moderate left candidate Alan García. 
Even when Humala moderated his position in 2011 movements continued to mobilise 
support for him, believing that he was not really a moderate left candidate but rather 
he “had to moderate in order to convince the people in Lima that he was not radical” 
in order to ultimately win the election (Interview, Edson Rosales Figueroa, June 18, 
2012). In Bolivia while movements were not faced with a choice between the types of 
left, they did refer to the contestatory nature of Morales with whom they felt “united 
in war” (Interview, Daniel García Pamo, May 4th, 2012). Indeed, it can be argued that 
even if a moderate left candidate entered the race in 2005, the movements would have 
still chosen to support Morales. More specifically however it was the policies 
proposed by these contestatory leftist candidates that acted as the chief motivator for 
movement support.  
In Peru, the movements explained that their support in both the 2006 and 2011 
elections was driven by Humala’s government plan. For the movements Humala was 
seen as the candidate for change and polices such as a focus on poverty alleviation, 
the reformation of extraction polices in the Amazon and his rejection of free trade 
agreements with the US directly appealed to the movements. During his 2011 
campaign Humala put forward his plan for government entitled ‘The Great 
  Conclusion     
238 
 
Transformation’ in which he included a proposal to establish a Ministry for Social 
Inclusion and to implement a ‘Law of Prior Consultation’ (Ley de Consulta Previa) to 
protect indigenous territories from exploitation. These policies directly appealed to 
highland and lowland groups and acted as the central motivation for mobilising 
support in favour of Humala. While it is important to also note the ‘lesser of two 
evils’ component of movement support for Humala, it was the abovementioned 
polices which acted as the prospective compensation in this movement-party alliance, 
and therefore the central driver in movement support. The movement-party alliance in 
Bolivia was unequivocally based on prospective compensation. Morales’ policy to 
establish a constituent assembly was the central motivation for consolidated 
movement support across the typically fragmented indigenous movements in Bolivia. 
The movements created the Pacto de Unidad in order to mobilise enough support to 
elect Morales to office so that he could implement this very policy.  
The movements mobilised support in a variety of ways. In both cases, their 
organisational structures were utilised to effectively mobilise support for the left from 
the national to local levels. The movements also used radio broadcasts and public 
meetings to mobilise support. Crucially, they travelled to their bases to ensure 
indigenous communities were registered to vote and campaigned for additional 
polling stations in isolated areas to help facilitate voting. In the case of Bolivia, 
indigenous movements even reached beyond their own indigenous base to the cities 
where they also campaigned for Morales. Ultimately, the research provides evidence 
that the movements mobilised support for the left in both cases and that policies 
relating to indigenous issues acted as the prospective compensation for movement 
support.  
The second question leads us to explore the impact of this support on the elections in 
each case. Chapter 4 demonstrated how voter turnout and support for MAS increased 
between the 2002 and 2005 elections. This coincided with the consolidation of 
movement support for MAS through the pacto de unidad. Given the consolidation of 
this support and evidence that the movements actively worked to register votes and 
facilitate the voting process, we can argue that the support provided by the 
movements for MAS positively impacted the results for the party. In light of this we 
can say that movements matter because they can play a role in electoral politics by 
mobilising a base of support for the party.  
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The impact of movement support for the left is not so straightforward in Peru. Firstly, 
Humala lost the 2006 election despite support from the movements. Secondly, despite 
more consolidated support from the movements in 2011
166
 we do not see a 
corresponding increase in support for Humala within the majority indigenous 
departments. Instead, the results across the majority indigenous departments are quite 
mixed, increasing slightly in some cases (Tacna, Ancash and Puno) and decreasing in 
others such as Cuzco where the CCP worked hard to mobilise support for Humala. 
Ultimately, as discussed in Chapter 5, it was the increase in middle-class support 
which swung the vote for Humala in 2011. However, that indigenous movements and 
their bases did not singlehandedly win the election for Humala should not 
overshadow the important contribution of this support in sustaining overall 
indigenous support for the left in 2011. Instead, we should remember that indigenous 
people comprise approximately 47 per cent of Peru’s total population and, when 
mobilised, represents a substantial base of support for any party. Arguably, the 
unbalanced weight of the electoral system in favour of Lima impedes the true impact 
that the movements could have on elections.  
It is nonetheless important to explain why support in indigenous departments did not 
increase with further mobilisation of movements in light of the Bagua case. There are 
two explanations for this. The first is that despite an increase in mobilisation, 
movement mobilisation remains comparatively low to Bolivia. Rather, in Peru, the 
movements remained quite fragmented and isolated from one another and while their 
pact was good in theory, in reality it did not translate to increased support for Humala 
within indigenous bases. This also raises questions about the strength of the 
relationship between the movements and their bases. Where movements are less 
mobilised they are less likely to have strong social ties with their base and this may 
have impacted the ‘mass-mobilising capacity’ of the movements in Peru. Ultimately, 
a loose tie with their bases implies that the movements are unlikely to have much 
influence or legitimacy within their bases, which inhibits their ability to generate 
support.  
                                                          
166
 AIDESEP, CNA, CCP and CONACAMI all meet to form a pacto de unidad in order “to strengthen 
their fight” for indigenous rights and they felt that supporting Humala was how they could achieve this 
goal. Furthermore there was a notable increase in movement mobilisation between the elections in light 
of the conflict in Bagua.   
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The persistence of clientelistic linkages between the right and indigenous 
communities in Peru also proposes an obstacle to the mobilising capacity of 
movements. While the research finds evidence that movements voted for Humala 
despite being paid by his opponent Keiko Fujimori to paint the side of their houses 
with slogans there is also evidence that clientelistic linkages prevailed in other 
communities. For instance, Fujimori offered very poor communities in the department 
of Piura gifts of cakes, cups and blankets in return for votes. Ultimately, Fujimori won 
a majority in this department despite CONACAMI mobilising communities in favour 
of Humala, therefore illustrating the pervasiveness of clientelistic linkages there. It is 
only through further research and a focus on these relationships at a local level can we 
truly uncover the presence and impact of such linkages on the mobilising capacity of 
movements and indeed on indigenous communities.  
The implications  
There are a number of implications of this study. The first implication is that by 
mobilising support for the left the movements can help to explain support for these 
parties at the turn of the century. In this way the research contributes to the literature 
on the left by providing ‘el factor indígena’. Moreover, by providing evidence that the 
movements are more likely to support the contestatory rather than the moderate left, 
the research contributes to the literature which explores the type of lefts that have 
emerged in the region. Additionally, by illustrating the mass-mobilising capacity of 
social movements the findings support the argument that movements can act as 
important allies and sources of labour for parties.  
While the focus of this study has been Bolivia and Peru the same underlying 
mechanism (that indigenous movements provide a base of support for the left) may 
have implications for other indigenous movements and leftist parties in the region. 
Movements in Ecuador are highly mobilised and are central actors in Ecuadorian 
politics. A signature characteristic of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of 
Ecuador (CONAIE) for instance is their ‘levantamientos populares’ (‘popular 
uprisings’). Their most dramatic uprising so far was their role in the ousting of 
President Lucio Gutiérrez Borbúa in 2005 and their support for current contestatory 
left President Rafael Correa in the second round of the 2006 elections. As in Bolivia 
then, Ecuador is a case in which there is a high level of indigenous movement 
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mobilisation and large indigenous population (43 per cent) and high support for the 
contestatory left, at least during his first election. Similar to the relationship between 
CIDOB and CONAMAQ with Morales in Bolivia, CONAIE in Ecuador have 
withdrawn their support for President Correa demonstrating the fragility of these 
alliances.  
Similar to Peru, the relationship between indigenous movements and the left in 
Guatemala is somewhat fractured by the imprint of war and persistent clientelism. 
While the indigenous population is very high (66 per cent), mobilisation remains low. 
Even where movements form alliances with the left the connection between the 
movement and its base is too weak to have any impact and clientelistic linkages with 
traditional parties prevail. If the indigenous movements in Guatemala could unite in 
mobilisation they might offer an alternative to the indigenous people there. Through 
mobilisation the movements can break clientelistic linkages much as CIDOB have 
done in Bolivia by mobilising indigenous communities with policies that might 
provide long-term gains. Indeed, the 2011 elections in Guatemala indicated the 
potential for an indigenous-left alliance when the coalition of leftist parties
167
 selected 
indigenous activist and Nobel Laureate Rigoberta Menchú as their presidential 
candidate. However, the coalition received less than four per cent of the vote share 
and was eliminated in the first round. It could be argued that without high levels of 
mobilisation the indigenous movements were unable to generate support for the 
coalition.    
While the focus of this study has been on indigenous movements, the argument that 
movements can provide a base of support for the left could be extended to other 
movements of the disenfranchised, such as movements of the poor in the shantytowns 
of Latin American Cities. For instance, the movements of the poor provided a base of 
support for Chávez in Venezuela. In Argentina, the ‘piqueteros’ were central actors in 
the 2001 demonstrations which ousted President Fernando de la Rúa. Their 
mobilisation attracted the attention of opposition party Partido Justicialista (PJ) whose 
                                                          
167
 The coalition included The New Nation Alternative (Alternativa Nueva Nación) and 
The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, URNG-
MAIZ on the left and Menchú’s indigenous party Winaq. 
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leader, Néstor Kirchner would go on to win the 2003 elections (Firchow, 2007). Some 
factions of the piqueteros worked closely with the Kirchner administration, again 
illustrating the potential for movement-party alliances in the region (Firchow, 2007). 
Conducting an investigation into these alliances in Latin America, or indeed beyond 
would increase the generalisability of the argument that movements of the 
disenfranchised and demobilised can provide substantial support for new parties. This 
is especially the case where there is a broad ideological congruence such as a shared 
anti-neoliberal sentiment or call for radical reform is substantiated by specific policy 
proposals that appeal to the movements.  
This in turn, has potential policy implications for opposition and new parties in newly 
emerging democracies. Specifically, where institutionalised politics have been 
completely discredited by corruption or repression the connection with society is 
undoubtedly ruptured making it difficult for parties to generate support for elections. 
However, a movement-party alliance might offer an alternative avenue to generate 
party support. This is especially the case for emerging opposition parties in new 
democracies because they are most likely to be ideologically compatible with the 
movements. Social movements through their mass-mobilising capacity represent a 
useful political ally for new parties, particularly in emerging democracies.  
The findings also have implications for our typical understanding of the behaviour of 
social movements. As mentioned in the literature review, Kaldor (2003: 85) explains 
that new social movements operate within an “essentially non-party space”. This 
research provides evidence that this is not always the case. Rather, the evidence 
suggests that through movement-party alliances, the ‘space’ between social 
movement and parties is in reality quite distorted. By taking part in an alliance with 
the primary goal of electing a particular party to government, movements enter 
electoral politics, a space typically reserved for parties. The behaviour of the 
movements during such an alliance changes their typically contentious behaviour as 
they become more concerned with ensuring their bases are registered to vote and 
facilitating the voting process for their bases, than with holding demonstrations or 
protests. While this change in behaviour is only temporary, often only lasting for the 
duration of the alliance, it is still an interesting implication of the findings which 
contributes more generally to our understanding of social movement behaviour.  
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More generally this contributes to the social movement literature by demonstrating 
that movements are not strictly informal actors and that in some cases, in order to 
achieve their goals and progress their cause, they are willing to work with (rather than 
contend) institutional actors such as parties. Moreover, they do so by engaging in one 
of the most institutionalised forms of political behaviour, namely electoral politics. 
This is an important contribution because it implies that we must reach beyond our 
traditional assumptions of social movement behaviour in order to truly understand 
contemporary movements, particularly those emerging in newly democratising 
societies such as Latin America and more recently the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region. For some contemporary movements engaging in electoral behaviour 
and working with ‘new’ parties in particular represents a new strategy for addressing 
their grievances, albeit one that previous movements may have vehemently opposed. 
With democratisation and shifts within dominant political paradigms comes a new 
kind of political opportunity structure, one which not only explains variation in 
mobilisation but may also help to explain the variation in the behaviour of the 
movements from challengers of the institutional political system to active participants 
within it. Ultimately, these findings highlight the importance of advancing social 
movement scholarship beyond explaining variation in levels of mobilisation to 
analysing the impact of this variation on politics more generally. In doing so, we can 
learn more about the behaviour of contemporary movements as stated above whilst 
highlighting just how dynamic and influential social movements can be in politics.  
Finally, the study also highlights the democratising role social movements can play in 
politics. As mentioned above, where parties and institutionalised politics have been 
discredited movements can fulfil the representative role typically held by parties in a 
democracy. This increases the representativeness of democracies because even the 
most marginalised can feel somewhat represented in politics. Movements can also 
work to repair the party-society linkages in their respective countries by acting as an 
intermediary between parties and their bases. Collective-based linkages occur when 
citizens become associated with a party through affiliation with another organisation 
such as a union or movement. This research finds evidence that indigenous 
communities became associated with the left through the movements which helped to 
repair the relationship between parties and indigenous sectors of society in both 
Bolivia and Peru. Moreover, because the relationship between the movements and 
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parties was based on policy congruence in each case, we can say that the linkages 
between indigenous communities and the parties was also driven by this motivation, 
therefore establishing these linkages between party and society.  
This is an important implication in a region where programmatic linkages are 
historically weak and often based on clientelistic linkages instead. For example, 
CIDOB in Bolivia explained that they used the new constitution to motivate their 
bases to support MAS. What is interesting in this case is that according to CIDOB, 
simply informing their bases about the benefits of a new constitution was enough to 
convince indigenous communities to vote for MAS. The movement made the point 
that for many communities this was the first time they had been consulted about 
elections in this way, thus implying that previous linkages with parties were not based 
on informing indigenous communities of policy proposals. The key point here is that 
CIDOB established this programmatic linkage by travelling to their bases and 
informing the previously excluded communities of the policies of MAS.  
We also see evidence in Peru that programmatic linkages, established through the 
movements, prevailed over clientelistic linkages. The leader of CONACAMI 
explained that while Humala’s opponent, Keiko Fujimori, paid indigenous 
householders to paint their walls in favour of her, that they still supported Humala. 
Simply put “the people that live inside are for Humala but their walls are of Keiko” 
(Interview, June 22, 2012). Ultimately the role played by the movements in repairing 
the relationship between party and society has important implications for other cases 
in which this relationship is broken. This is particularly so given that the relationship 
was, for the most part, repaired in such a way that programmatic linkages, considered 
paramount to a responsive, accountable and representative democracy, prevailed over 
clientelistic ones (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Downs, 1957). 
It can also be argued that encapsulating, or participatory linkages were established in 
the process of movement-party alliances. For instance, these linkages occur when the 
society is incorporated directly into politics “beyond the act of voting” (Roberts, 
2002:16). In the case of this research, I argue that by mobilising their bases along 
programmatic lines movements re-politicised a previously excluded sector of society. 
While the movements were certainly important in the act of voting (by ensuring 
registration and facilitating voting in isolated communities through additional polling 
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stations) they also worked to re-politicise these communities in a way that reached 
beyond the act of voting. This is best demonstrated by the opening quote of this 
conclusion in which the regional leader of CSUTCB in Bolivia explains that the role 
of movements was to “awaken our social base” (Interview, May 16th, 2012). The 
awakening of the bases and the re-politicisation of indigenous movements more 
generally is evident in the newly emerging indigenous parties in each case. For 
example, even where movement-party alliances have fallen apart, these movements 
and their bases have not simply retreated from whence they came but have instead 
begun work to establish new indigenous parties. In Bolivia, CIDOB and CONAMAQ 
have initiated the process of setting up their own party to contest the local elections in 
2014. In Peru, AIDESEP have gained much support in their bid to establish a new 
indigenous political party.
168
 While the leaders of these parties are unlikely to enter 
the presidential palace, their very presence within electoral politics increases the 
representativeness of their democracies. 
Improving representativeness and mobilising a previously excluded sector of society 
into politics undoubtedly enhances the quality of democracy in their respective 
countries. We can consider here the work of Gaetano Mosca (1923; 1939: 52 cited in 
Dahl 1989: 240) who proposes the problem of minority rule in democracies, he states 
that; 
“The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, 
monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the 
second class, the more numerous class, is directly controlled by the first”.  
We can apply the issue of minority rule to the cases of Bolivia and Peru where 
indigenous people under both indigenous and poor identities, represent a ‘numerous’ 
sector of society yet have been ruled by the first class since colonisation. Indeed, the 
movements have reduced the minority rule problem by working to elect parties and 
politicians who better represent their demands, such as the election of Morales to the 
presidency in Bolivia or indigenous candidates like Congressman Nayap Kinin and 
Congresswoman Claudia Faustina Coari Mamani in Peru. Ultimately, while 
indigenous movements emerged from the late 1980s onwards, it can be argued that 
through movement-party alliances at the turn of the century new linkages have been 
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 Whilst visiting the offices of AIDESEP in Lima the movement was in the process of filling the 
signatures it received in support of establishing their party among their bases.  
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established which have awoken the indigenous bases, increased their 
representativeness in their democracies and incorporated indigenous demands into the 
national political debate.  
Future research  
There are three potentials avenues of further research. The first is to continue to 
observe the relationship between the actors addressed in the case studies. It would be 
particularly useful to continue to analyse the relationships in the lead up to the 2014 
election in Bolivia and 2016 elections in Peru in order to uncover how movement-
party alliances change over time. This study has already found that alliances have 
fallen apart in some cases, such as the relationship between CONAMAQ, CIDOB and 
MAS in Bolivia. Interestingly, the conservative parties of UN and Podemos have 
come out in support of these movements and their struggle over the issue of TIPNIS 
discussed in Chapter 4. While this support is soft in nature, and motivated by an 
opportunity to further condemn Morales, it nonetheless marks an unusual turn in the 
relationship between indigenous movements and the right in Bolivia. Further research 
would uncover whether the fallout of alliances with indigenous movements will 
impact support for the left in upcoming elections. In addition, further investigation of 
the relationship with other parties might help to explain increased support for the right 
in some cases. Supplementary analysis of the relationship between the actors 
discussed here would also allow us to observe the performance of the movements 
which are attempting to transition to indigenous parties. For instance, in the case of 
Peru it would be interesting to observe the behaviour of established parties and other 
indigenous movements towards these new actors. Specifically, it would be important 
to uncover whether parties will behave competitively towards them or see them as a 
potential ally within congressional and local elections. Moreover it would be 
important to observe how the emergence of indigenous parties will impact relations 
with the remaining movements. In particular, we could observe whether this will 
promote the unification of indigenous political actors in Peru or act to further divide 
them.  
The second avenue for future research is to extend the study to indigenous movement-
party relations in the three other countries with substantial indigenous populations 
(Mexico, Guatemala and Ecuador). This would provide more cases and variation 
  Conclusion     
247 
 
which would further enhance our understanding of the relationship between the 
movements and the left. The argument could also be extended to the relationship 
between leftist parties and other movements representing marginalised and 
discontented bases in the region. As mentioned earlier, such movements may also be 
compatible allies for the left and further exploration might provide more insight into 
the left turn as well as movement-party relations more generally.  
Finally, an analysis of movement party-relations at the local level would also be an 
interesting avenue for future research. Specifically, such a study could use the cases 
discussed here along with Mexico, Guatemala and Ecuador to investigate indigenous 
movement-party relations during local and municipal elections. This would add 
another layer to the analysis by assessing the impact of movement-party alliances in 
local elections. For example, in the 2011 elections AIDESEP mobilised their bases to 
elect candidates from Humala’s party to Congress including Congressman Nayap 
Kinin elected as a representative of the Amazonas (which is AIDESEP stronghold). 
At the same time however, chiefs from a smaller movement in Northern Peru actively 
mobilised support for a candidate in local elections but failed to elect him due to the 
unfair composition of electoral districts. An investigation of local level elections 
would allow us analyse the impact of movements in local elections and to consider 
other factors such as the electoral composition of districts as an impediment for 
representation for movements and their bases 
An analysis of local elections would also help to resolve some of the important issues 
raised in this study including allegations of coercion by movements and clientelism 
by opposition parties at the local level.  For example, in Bolivia Marco Molina 
claimed that in some cases movements coerced their bases into supporting MAS. 
While there is no evidence to conclusively suggest that this is the case, it would be 
imperative to investigate such claims by paying closer attention to the relationship 
between the movements and their bases at the local level. Claims of clientelism such 
as those exposed in Peru could also be resolved through a study of the relationship 
between movements, parties and bases at the local level. While movements have 
managed to break some clientelistic linkages through education and informing their 
bases of candidate’s policies other cases emerged in which clientelism prevailed. For 
instance, the leader of CONACAMI explained that in the case of the department of 
Piura, Keiko Fujimori’s gifts of cakes, cups and blankets outweighed the need to 
  Conclusion     
248 
 
address the contamination of water due to the mining industry there, as proposed by 
Humala. Further research is required in order to truly understand the implications of 
these claims on democracy and the people living in these communities. 
The findings of this study demonstrate that social movements are important political 
actors, not only because they can mobilise support for a party but also because they 
can enhance the quality of democracy by reintroducing marginalised sectors of 
society to institutionalised politics based on programmatic linkages. Where political 
trust is lost and institutionalised politics delegitimised, social movements become 
important actors in fulfilling the role typically held by political parties. Moreover, 
because social movements are perceived as outsiders of the institutionalised system 
they can play a powerful role in re-politicising the disenchanted and in turn enhancing 
representative democracy. However, the ability of movements to fulfil this role 
greatly depends on their level of mobilisation and their capacity to mobilise and 
politicise their social base. The movement must choose their ally wisely and ensure 
there is a clear ideological congruence based on programmatic linkages, which can 
legitimise the alliance to the social base. Where movements fail to adequately select 
their party ally on this basis, they run the risk of delegitimising themselves in the eyes 
of their base and, in turn, further disengaging them from politics. This study however 
highlights that even where they have fallen apart, the movement-party alliance 
between indigenous movements and the left have resulted in the (re)politicisation and 
(re)integration of indigenous people into national politics in such a way that their 
demands are better represented in their respective countries. In light of this, it seems 
appropriate to end as we began with the opening quotation of this thesis: 
The emergence of new political and alternative movements despite their scant 
participation in [traditional] political life marks the start of a new way of 
conducting politics which responds to the legitimate demands of the 
marginalized majorities. 
- Juan Del Granado, Mayor of La Paz (2001-2010). 
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Appendix A- Copy of the Expert Survey  
A.1 Copy of the Expert Survey in English  
Welcome,  
My name is Gemma Mc Nulty, from Dublin City University. I am conducting 
research regarding the levels of mobilisation amongst indigenous social movements in 
Bolivia. This survey is part of a larger research project which include five countries of 
Latin America, namely, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Mexico and Guatemala. 
The survey takes less than 15 minutes to complete. You have been selected to 
participate in this survey based on your expertise in this area. Consequently, your 
participation is invaluable to this project. Your answers to this survey will be 
completely confidential and only used at the end of the research. You can choose to 
participate in Spanish or English, or alternate between both. You will have an 
opportunity at the end of the survey to add any comments or suggestions regarding 
this survey.  
The email you received inviting you to this survey includes a brief definition of 
concepts which may be useful whilst filling out this short survey.  
Thank you for your time. 
Gemma Mc Nulty. 
There are 10 questions in this survey 
Quantity and General Activity 
1 [natquant] How many indigenous social movements would you estimate are 
active in Bolivia in the following time frames? 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
  
Less than 50 
Between 50 
and 100 
More than 
100 I don't know 
1990-1998 
    
1999-2006 
    
2007-2011 
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2 [subquant] Are indigenous social movements active in some regions more than 
others? Please mark any relent regions below.  
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
  
Not 
Active Active 
Very 
Active 
I don't 
know 
Altiplano 
    
Los Llanos Orientales 
    
Los Valles 
    
 
3 [election1] In your opinion, is the number of indigenous social movements more 
or less likely to increase around election time? 
Please choose all that apply: 
  More Likely 
  Election time makes no difference 
  Less Likely 
  I don't know 
 Other:  
4 [election2] In your opinion, is social movement activity more or less likely to 
increase around election time? 
Please choose all that apply: 
  More Likely 
  Election time makes no difference 
  Less Likely 
  I don't know 
 Other:  
Protest Activity 
5 [pronat]On average, how many indigenous social movement protests occur(ed) 
per year, during the following time frames? 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
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Less than 50 
Between 50 
and 100 Over 100 I don't know 
1990-1998 
    
1999-2006 
    
2007-2011 
    
 
6 [protype]Are indigenous social movements more likely to have regional/local 
protests or national protests? 
Please choose all that apply: 
  Regional 
  National 
  Local 
  I don't know 
 Other:  
7 [proreg]Are there any regions in which indigenous social movement protest 
activity is higher than others. Please mark any relevant regions below. 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
  
Less Active 
There is no 
difference 
between 
regions More Active I don't know 
Altiplano 
    
Los 
llanos 
Orientales 
    
Los 
Valles 
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Social awareness activities 
8 [social]Of the activities listed below, which are more commonly undertaken by 
indigenous social movements in Bolivia? * 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
  Rare Common Very Common I don't know 
Fundraising 
    
Petitioning 
    
Door-to-
Door 
Canvassing 
    
Community 
Meetings 
    
Distribution 
of leaflets 
or materials 
    
Letter-
writing to 
policy 
makers 
    
Protests 
(large 
scale) 
    
Protests 
(small 
scale) 
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Mobilisation Level 
9 [score]Outlined below are three vignettes, each representing the characteristics 
of levels of mobilisation in accordance with this research. Please select a 
mobilisation level for Bolivia in the provided time-frames in accordance to these 
vignettes.  * 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
  
Low 
mobilisation 
Medium 
Mobilisation 
High 
Mobilisation 
1990-1998 
   
1999-2006 
   
2007-2011 
   
Mobilisation scores: 
1. Low mobilisation 
 Nature: Timid demonstrations causing little to no disruption within the 
community. Locally based demonstrations or activities 
 Duration & Commitment: Demonstrations only lasting a few hours. Often the 
demonstration disperses before the issue is addressed in any way. 
 Numbers: Less than 50 people. For instance, a small crowd gathering in a 
local plaza. 
 Impact: Little to know media coverage. The issue is not addressed in the 
media and so has little impact. 
 Activities: Typical small timid handing out leaflets or materials locally, 
perhaps carrying some banners.   
2. Medium Mobilisation 
 Nature: More disruptive nature. Closure of infrastructure or roads a 
possibility. For instance the closure of the streets to make way for the 
demonstration. Usually nationally based, in places of symbolic reference 
such as presidential palace/seat of government.  
 Duration & Commitment: Protest/Activity lasts at least one day and does not 
disperse until government or policymaker recognises the issue (perhaps in 
the form of a press conference).  
 Numbers: over 100 people. Typically one large demonstration with a number 
of small movements or an umbrella movement. No simultaneous protest 
activity in other regions. 
 Impact: Media coverage makes public aware of the demonstration, thus the 
public are aware of the issue. 
 Activities: Leaflets, Banners, Slogans, Petitions, Rallies, Marches from one 
place to another such one governmental building to another.  
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3.High Mobilisation 
 Nature: Very disruptive. Infrastructure greatly disrupted with on-going 
closure of roads due to road blocks and other forms of protest. Clashes with 
the police. 
 Duration & Commitment: Protests can last days or weeks. Often they do not 
disperse until issue is resolved.  
 Numbers: 100’s of people. Simultaneous national and regional protests can 
occur.  Other movements may join the demonstration under an umbrella 
issue. 
 Impact: National Media coverage brings issue the forefront for the public.  
 Activities: Occupations, Rallies, Road Blocks, long marches across the 
country to the seat of government. Boycotts, blockades. 
Other comments 
10 [open] 
Do you have any additional comments or suggestions you would like to include in 
this section of the survey?  
Please write your answer here: 
  
Thank you for participating in this survey. 
Your contribution is essential to the project and greatly appreciated.  
 
01.01.1970 – 01:00 
 
Submit your survey. 
Thank you for completing this survey. 
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Appendix B- Field Interviews  
B.1 Detailed List of Interviewees from Bolivia  
Movements (12) 
Name Date and Place Duration Notes  
 
CSTUCB 
 
La Paz 16
th
 May 
 
30mins 
 
 
Luis Gabriel’s 
Dirigente of 
CSUTCB 
 
CONAMAQ 
 
La Paz 22
nd
 May 
 
20mins 
Froilán Puma 
Carmona Dirigente 
of CONAMAQ 
 
Ayllus de 
Cochabamba 
 
Cochabamba 24
th
 
April 
 
10mins 
 
Part of 
CONAMAQ 
 
Bartolinas Sisa 
  
La Paz 16
th
 may 
20mins Also known as 
FNCB-BS and 
CNMCIOB 
 
FSUTCC Cochabamba May 
8
th
  
11mins Part of CSTUCB  
 
CIDOB 
 
Santa Cruz 4
th
 May  
 
26mins  
 
Daniel Garcia 
Pamo 
TIPNIS Cochabamba 26
th
 
May 
23mins Pablo Rojas 
 
TIPNIS 
 
Cochabamba 23
rd
 
May 
 
5mins 
 
Rosecha Rojas 
CONAMAQ La Paz 29
th
 May  10mins Juan José Salina: 
Dirigente in the 
south of Bolivia 
(on the frontier 
with Argentina). 
 
CSIB 
 
La Paz 27
th
 May  
16minutes Secretary General : 
Gustavo Aliaga 
 
CPILAP 
 
La Paz 25
th
 May 
18minutes Part of CIDOB; 
Aldon Patino, 
secretaria de 
Educacion de 
CPILAP 
(77558835) 
 
Fejuve de el Alto 
 
La Paz 27
th
 May  
 
55 minutes 
 
 
Juan Martela; 
Dirigente of Fejuve 
el Alto during the 
ousting of Goni and 
lead up to Morales 
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election. 
 
Politicians (6) 
Name Date and Place Duration Notes  
Leonilda Zurita  Cochabamba May 
9
th
  
5mins Chief of MAS for 
Cochabamba 
Maria Viscarra Gil  Santa Cruz May 4
th
  40mins Diputada for UN 
Maria del Carmen Santa Cruz May 7
th
 25mins Diputada/Suplente 
por PBB 
Senador Mendoza  La Paz May 17
th
 30mins Senator for MAS 
who represents 
indigenous 
communities. 
Although not 
himself indigenous. 
Was in academia 
and then became 
part of MAS to 
construct the new 
constitution. 
Cocaleros/MAS Cochabamba May 
9
th
  
47minutes Two members of 
MAS, one 
“supporter” of MAS 
and Luis from 
riseup. 
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Relevant Research Organisations (7) 
Name Date and Place Duration Notes  
CEADESC Cochabamba with 
George komadina 
27minutes Works in particular 
with chiquitano 
movements from 
Santa Cruz 
CIPCA La Paz 25mins Really useful 
discussion 
CIPCA  Cochabamba 23mins Juan Carlos Reyes 
 
UNITAS 
 
La Paz May 25th 
 Carlos Revilla 
Specialises in 
Urban social 
movements around 
La Paz and el Alto 
IBIS La Paz 1 hour Jose Luis Alvarez: 
Oficial de 
Programa 
 
UNITAS  
 
La Paz  May 25
th
  
 
1 hour 
 
Jose Luis Alvarez: 
Director of 
UNITAS 
 
UNITAS  
 
La Paz  May 27
th
  
 
 
Marco: Works 
directly with 
movements and 
organisations in el 
Alto 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Appendices 
286 
 
Others (12) 
Name Date and Place Duration Notes 
Jim Schultz Cochabamba  1hour Can Quote but send 
him what I am 
quoting first.  
John Crabtree La Paz 1hour Don’t Quote 
Marco Molina Santa Cruz 43mins Works with 
indigenous 
movements in Santa 
Cruz . Can quote. 
Conference about 
performance of 
new constitution in 
the Hotel 
Presidential  
La Paz 2hours 30mins With Xavier Albo, 
Jorge Viana, 
Senadores, 
members of 
movements. NOT 
AN INTERVIEW 
but a recording to 
be used in my 
research. 
Session of Deputies Santa Cruz 1 hour Discussion 
regarding 
indigenous land in 
Santa Cruz; the 
indigenous 
community was 
present. 
Session of Senators  La Paz 27minutes Building a road in 
Tarija through 
indigenous land 
 
Protest in 
Cochabamba by 
workers and 
doctors  
 
Cochabamba 24
th
 
April  
 
13mins 
 
Here I asked people 
in the protest why 
they were 
protesting and their 
impressions of 
Morales. Also 
includes discussion 
with Lucinda 
Crespo, the director 
general of the 
hospital of 
Cochabamba.  
 
CONAMAQ – 
Platforma 
  This was a 
presentation by 
CONAMAQ 
regarding their 
political goals. This 
was a discussion 
with representatives 
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from the mining 
union regarding 
issues of 
contamination of 
indigenous lands 
due to mining.  
TIPNIS press 
conference  
La Paz May 27th 10mins Mini-press 
conference in 
support of TIPNIS 
by CIDOB and 
CONAMAQ 
TIPNIS press 
conference  
Cochabamba  Press conference by 
leader of TIPNIS in 
Cochabamba 2 days 
before they started 
their new march 
Los Medicos  Cochabamba 10mins Speech by leader of 
medicos in 
Cochabamba  
Luis from 
Riseup.com 
 
Cochabamba 
1 hour Very informal 
discussion  
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B.1 Detailed List of Interviewees from Peru 
Movements (8) 
Name Date and Place Duration Notes 
AIDESEP Lima, June 18th 25mins Edson Rosales 
Figueroa, 
communications 
and press officer for 
AIDESEP 
CONACAMI Lima, June22
nd
  1 hour President of 
CONACAMI, 
Magdiel Carrion 
Pintado. 
CONAP Lima, June 11th 36mins President of 
CONAP, Oseas 
Barbaron Sanchez  
CCP Lima, June 14
th
  36mins Everardo Orellana 
Dirigente of Junín 
for CCP 
CCP Lima, June 15th 43mins Jorge Prado Sumari, 
dirigente of CCP for 
Huancavelica and 
Vice President of 
CONVEAGRO  
Confederación 
nacional Agraria 
Peru (CNA) 
Lima, June 21st 53mins President of CNA, 
Antolín Huascar 
Flores 
El Muro Cuzco, June 1st 10minutes Member of Muro 
Cuzco 
FDTC (Federation 
of workers Cuzco) 
Cuzco, June 4th 13minutes  Secretary General 
Hector Calla Chuso 
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Politicians (4) 
Name Date and Place Duration Notes 
 
Daniel Abugattás 
 
Office of the 
President of the 
Congress, Lima. 
June 15th 
 
25mins 
 
President of the 
Congress 
 
Hugo Carrillo 
 
Congress, Lima 
June 28th 
43mins  
Congressman 
 
Claudia Faustina 
Coari Mamani 
Congress, Lima 
June 28th 
 
14mins 
 
Congresswoman 
Joel Camargo, 
Movimiento Tierra 
y Libertad. 
 
Lima, June 25th 
1 hour A Dirigente of the 
political party for 
land and liberty in 
Peru currently 
campaigning for the 
next elections. This 
is a party between a 
leftist and 
campesino/rural 
party. The interview 
includes a 
discussion on 
defining the party. 
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Organisations, Academics & Activists (9) 
Name Date and Place Duration Notes  
DESCO (Centro de 
Estudios y 
promocion del 
desarrollo) 
Lima, June 8th 1 hour Molvina Zeballos, 
President of DESCO 
SER Lima, June 20th 1 hour Javier Torres, 
President of SER 
APRODEH Lima, June 11th 10mins Human Rights 
organisation that 
specialises in 
indigenous rights. 
Interview with 
President of 
organisation 
Francisco (Pancho) 
Soberón  
Sinesio Lopez Lima, June 28th 40mins Head of the School of 
Government and 
Public Politics PUCP, 
Lima. (Pontifica 
Universidad Catolica 
del Peru) 
Erick Pozo Lima, June 12th  Academic, also at 
PUCP.  
Henry Pease Lima, June 22nd 33mins Academic and ex-
Congressman for 
Movimiento 
Democrático de 
Izquierda (MDI) 
Domilita Castillo Lima, June 27th 53mins An activist/politician/ 
movement member. 
Especially in her 
community which is 
predominantly 
campesino.  
Marleni Canales 
Rubio 
Lima, June 19th 1 hour  Lawyer and 
indigenous movement 
members. Ex- 
presidenta del 
Consejo Consultivo 
de Pueblos Indígenas 
de la Comunidad 
Erick Huaman   Lima, June 20th 1hour 30mins A specialist in 
indigenous/campesino 
rights. Has 
interviewed Hugo 
Blanco on several 
occasions and thus 
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holds a very 
particular perspective 
on campesino 
movements in Peru. 
Also travels to 
Bolivia to speak with 
movements.    
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B.3 List of questions in the semi-structured interviews  
Question Guide for Movements:  
1. Can you think of an occasion when you mobilised indigenous voters towards a 
political party? 
 Did you mobilise indigenous voters towards any particular party? 
 If so, why that party? 
 Who mobilised them? (Leaders, members?) 
 Who decided this? (movement leaders, the people, the members generally) 
 
2. When & why? 
 In terms of the time frame, what era?  
o This can be explained in years or presidential eras, Goni, Paz 
Zamora… 
 Why? 
o  Why that party and not others? What did you expect in return? 
(Prospective compensation?) 
4. How? 
 What did you actually do?  
 What mechanisms?  
o Protests, Candidate endorsement, canvassing…. 
 More institutional or non-institutional routes? 
 
5. What did you expect to receive in return for mobilising these voters? 
 What particular policies 
 (Or was if gifts?) 
 (Did you get what you were promised?) 
 
The “If not” questions 
 If not, why not? 
 
Conclusion 
So in context of all this, am I right in understanding that, 
 You did (did not) mobilise voters to vote for ……….. 
 You did this because…………….. 
 And in return……………………… 
 And the situation now is…… 
 
Question Guide for Parties:  
 
1. Did indigenous movements help mobilise support for the party? 
2. If so, how? What did they do? 
3. If not, why do you think they did not work with your party? 
4. What was you alliance based upon? Policies? Or was there another 
motivation?  
5. What impact to you think the movements had on the elections? And on 
support for you party? 
6. Are indigenous movements important in Bolivia/Peru? 
7. If so in what way? 
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8. Do Parties care about the movements? Do they believe they can be useful 
allies? 
9. How is the relationship between the movement and party now? 
 
Question Guide for Academics/Activists:   
 
1. What was the relationship between indigenous social movements and the left 
during X elections?  
2. Do you think the movements were important for the party? Did they mobilise 
support? 
3. How would they mobilise support? 
4. Do you think it made any difference? 
5. How is the relationship now? 
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B.4 Copy of ethics form presented to the interviewees before each 
interview  
 
DUBLIN CITY UNIVERSITY 
RESEARCH ETHICS  
 
April 5
th
 2012, Dublin 
 
The research aims to explore the relationship between indigenous social movements 
and political parties in Bolivia and Peru. The interviews will help investigate whether 
indigenous social movements and political parties work together during elections and 
if so how. Ultimately, the research is interested in the relationship between social 
movements and parties. The questions asked will be regarding personal experiences 
of members within social movements and political parties.  
 
Gemma Mc Nulty, PhD candidate at the School of Law and Government is the lead 
researcher. Gemma’s research is also funded by Irish Research Council for 
Humanities and Social Sciences (IRCHSS), funded by the Irish Government. The 
research is part of a doctoral dissertation which remains independent of political 
objects and is not subject to interference by any government or non-government 
bodies.  
 
Gemma Mc Nulty 
School of Law and Government 
Dublin City University,  
Dublin 9, Ireland 
+353 87 41 37 344 
gemma.mcnulty2@mail.dcu.ie 
 
Participants are required to participate in an interview, which will be recorded if the 
participant agrees.  
 
Participant – please complete the following (Circle Yes or No for each question) 
Do you understand the information provided?             
 Yes/No 
Have you had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study?    
 Yes/No 
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Have you received satisfactory answers to all your questions?   
 Yes/No 
Are you aware that your interview will be taped?    
 Yes/No 
 
This recording will be stored in Dublin City University and will be accessible only to 
me.  
Names and all other details can be changed to protect anonymity if required.  
Confidentiality of information provided is subject to legal limitations.  
Signature: 
I have read and understood the information in this form.  My questions and concerns 
have been answered by the researchers, and I have a copy of this consent form.  
Therefore, I consent to take part in this research project 
Participants Signature:         
Name in Block Capitals:         
Witness:            
 
  
Date:                 
 
If participants have concerns about this study and wish to contact an independent 
person, please contact: 
The Secretary, Dublin City University Research Ethics Committee, c/o Office of the 
Vice-President for Research, Dublin City University, Dublin 9, Ireland. Tel +353 1-
7008000 
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Appendix C. Quantitative Analysis 
C.1 Mass mobilisation and support for the left (massmob) with no interaction 
variables 
Variables  presvrl  presvrl2 lhvrl leftvoteshare 
Mass Mobilisation  1.245076** 
(.5450553) 
.2773108* 
(.1593694) 
.9604338*** 
(.3406424) 
10.48389*** 
(10.48389) 
Indigenous Population  
 
 
-.0021283 
(-.0021283) 
-.0038901 
(.003837) 
.0060704 
(.009107) 
-.0076073 
(.062897) 
Incumbent Inequality  -.0678271 
(-.0678271) 
-0.0168218 
(.0135504) 
-.0588546* 
(.0342837) 
 -.1089093 
(2883671) 
Incumbent Ideology .691822 
(.691822) 
.0963936 
(.1735839) 
.9823759** 
(.409562) 
16.1018*** 
(3.204569) 
 
GDP Growth (%) 
-.0332603 
(-.0332603) 
-.0324062 
(.0245935) 
-.0229269 
(.0473126) 
-.0648559 
(.3426428) 
Constant  11.76447 
(11.76447) 
2.534966 
(.6888838) 
10.78142 
(1.848107) 
30.1405 
(15.26847) 
R2 0.1436 0.1443 0.2070 0.2394 
N 65 65 81 169 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.  
Note: ***p>0.01, **p>0.05, *p<0.1 
 
C.2 Indigenous movement mobilisation and support for the left (movemobscore) 
with no interaction variables 
Variables  presvrl  presvrl2 lhvrl leftvoteshare 
Indigenous Movement 
Mobilisation  
.0306135 
(1.060275) 
-.1263065 
(.3665617) 
.6986483 
(.3328416) 
-.5403157 
(3.2007) 
Indigenous Population  
 
 
-.0295032 
(.0204369) 
-.0040627 
(.0078162) 
-.0167234 
(.0114619) 
.0098762 
(.0862839) 
Incumbent Inequality  .0843721 
(.0830575) 
.0164702 
(.0328967) 
.1052603 
(.041917) 
1.297553 
(.4326308) 
Incumbent Ideology -.9178969 
(1.079232) 
-.2117583 
(.4056795) 
1.400991 
(.5438487) 
13.30122 
(6.728779) 
 
GDP Growth (%) 
-.0426788 
(.2550973) 
-.085238 
(.0792754) 
.0834066 
(.0615855) 
-.0317623 
(.5694543) 
Constant  6.257643 
(5.210613) 
1.3230313 
(2.012112) 
2.684829 
(2.428803) 
-37.7332 
(23.38207) 
R2 0.1595 0.0090 0.4003 0.2129 
N 19 19 24 51 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.  
Note: ***p>0.01, **p>0.05, *p<0.1 
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C. 3 Mass mobilisation and support for the left (massmob) with interaction 
variables 
Variables  presvrl  presVRL2 lhvrl leftvoteshare 
Mass Mobilisation  1.751048** 
(.7123276) 
.4281977** 
(.1881823) 
1.17545*** 
(.4348726) 
14.23665*** 
(3.344204) 
 
Indigenous Population  
 
 
.0119095 
(.0140704) 
 
.0004017 
(.0048353) 
.0133272* 
(.0075412) 
.117202 
(.0772089) 
Mass Mobilisation & 
Indigenous Population 
(interaction) 
 
-.027697 
(.0249509) 
-.0082402 
(.0077549) 
-.0137135 
(.018045) 
-.226657* 
(.1192123) 
Incumbent Inequality  -.0792202 
(.0525734) 
-.0202808 
(.0136862) 
-.0630704* 
(.03441) 
-.1815594 
(.2848851) 
 
Incumbent Ideology .5923487 
(.6213956) 
.0718225 
(.168812) 
.9961547** 
(.4095915) 
16.07414*** 
(3.274425) 
 
 
GDP Growth (%) 
-.0193024 
(.0867816) 
-.0293191 
(.0247151) 
-.0210886 
(.047901) 
.0023174 
(.3412128) 
 
Constant  12.11383 
(2.780596) 
2.642796 
(.6919339) 
10.87771 
(1.855281) 
31.85016 
(15.07906) 
 
R2 0.1644 0.1700 0.2155 0.2553 
N 65 65 81 169 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.  
Note: ***p>0.01, **p>0.05, *p<0.1 
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C. 4 Indigenous movement mobilisation and support for the left (movemobscore) 
with interaction variables  
Variables  presvrl  presVRL2 lhvrl leftvoteshare 
Indigenous Movement 
Mobilisation  
-3.947096 
(2.310069) 
-1.5066* 
(.8300203) 
-.7384124 
(.8805137) 
-20.07877** 
(8.195758) 
 
Indigenous Population  
 
 
-.1423259* 
(.0661771) 
-.0431167* -.0584655* 
(.0284111) 
-.5431189** 
(.253218) 
Indigenous Movement 
Mobilisation & 
Indigenous Population 
(interaction) 
 
.086854** 
(.0439334) 
.0300327 
(.0172221) 
.030342 
(.0228798) 
.4280106** 
(.165444) 
 
 
Incumbent Inequality  .0472029 
(.0680893) 
.0039666 
(.0293862) 
.103473** 
(.042327) 
1.126727 
(.3932475) 
 
Incumbent Ideology -.9730501 
(1.109701) 
-.2374214 
(.4046411) 
1.389554** 
(.5331261) 
11.96429 
(6.02072) 
 
 
GDP Growth (%) 
-.0401885 
(.239374) 
-.0804415 
(.0712988) 
.0947646 
(.0604404) 
.4769356 
(.7455919) 
 
Constant  13.3973 
(5.881331) 
3.792383 
(2.13535) 
4.801297 
(2.508005) 
-5.279453 
(25.33032) 
 
R2 0.3632 0.2749 0.4837 0.3086 
N 19 19 24 51 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.  
Note: ***p>0.01, **p>0.05, *p<0.1 
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C4. Results Direct from Stata 
Mass Mobilisation model original (no interaction) (massmob) 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     11.76447   2.740765     4.29   0.000     6.280213    17.24873
   gdpgrowth    -.0332603   .0850052    -0.39   0.697    -.2033553    .1368348
  rightincum      .691822   .6410224     1.08   0.285    -.5908609    1.974505
   giniincum    -.0678271   .0516067    -1.31   0.194    -.1710919    .0354377
    indigpop    -.0021283   .0120116    -0.18   0.860    -.0261635    .0219069
     massmob     1.245076   .5450553     2.28   0.026     .1544231     2.33573
                                                                              
     presvrl        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.0553
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1436
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.2207
                                                       F(  5,    59) =    1.45
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      65
. regress presvrl massmob indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth,vce (robust) 
                                                                              
       _cons     2.534966   .6888838     3.68   0.001     1.156513    3.913419
   gdpgrowth    -.0324062   .0245935    -1.32   0.193    -.0816177    .0168053
  rightincum     .0963936   .1735839     0.56   0.581     -.250947    .4437342
   giniincum    -.0168218   .0135504    -1.24   0.219     -.043936    .0102925
    indigpop    -.0038901    .003837    -1.01   0.315    -.0115679    .0037878
     massmob     .2773108   .1593694     1.74   0.087    -.0415867    .5962082
                                                                              
    presvrl2        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .55633
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1443
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0172
                                                       F(  5,    59) =    3.02
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      65
. regress presvrl2 massmob indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth,vce (robust) 
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       _cons     10.78142   1.848107     5.83   0.000     7.099802    14.46304
   gdpgrowth    -.0229269   .0473126    -0.48   0.629    -.1171784    .0713246
  rightincum     .9823759    .409562     2.40   0.019     .1664864    1.798265
   giniincum    -.0588546   .0342837    -1.72   0.090    -.1271512    .0094421
    indigpop     .0060704    .009107     0.67   0.507    -.0120716    .0242125
     massmob     .9604338   .3406424     2.82   0.006     .2818393    1.639028
                                                                              
       lhvrl        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =   1.507
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2070
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0044
                                                       F(  5,    75) =    3.74
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      81
. regress lhvrl massmob indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth,vce (robust) 
                                                                              
       _cons      30.1405   15.26847     1.97   0.050    -.0089969    60.28999
   gdpgrowth    -.0648559   .3426428    -0.19   0.850    -.7414468    .6117351
  rightincum      16.1018   3.204569     5.02   0.000     9.773982    22.42962
   giniincum    -.1089093   .2883671    -0.38   0.706    -.6783261    .4605076
    indigpop    -.0076073    .062897    -0.12   0.904    -.1318052    .1165907
     massmob     10.48389   2.661285     3.94   0.000     5.228855    15.73893
                                                                              
leftvotesh~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  17.434
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2394
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5,   163) =   10.24
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     169
. regress leftvoteshare massmob indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth,vce (robust) 
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Indigenous Movement Mobilisation model original (no interaction) 
(movemobscore) 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     6.257643   5.210613     1.20   0.251    -4.999202    17.51449
   gdpgrowth    -.0426788   .2550973    -0.17   0.870    -.5937831    .5084255
  rightincum    -.9178969   1.079232    -0.85   0.410    -3.249437    1.413643
   giniincum     .0843721   .0830575     1.02   0.328    -.0950627    .2638068
    indigpop    -.0295032   .0204369    -1.44   0.173    -.0736544     .014648
movemobscore     .0306135   1.060275     0.03   0.977    -2.259972    2.321199
                                                                              
     presvrl        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =   1.886
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1595
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.2391
                                                       F(  5,    13) =    1.56
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      19
. regress presvrl movemobscore indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth,vce (robust)  
       _cons     1.323013   2.012112     0.66   0.522    -3.023891    5.669918
   gdpgrowth    -.0805238   .0792754    -1.02   0.328    -.2517878    .0907402
  rightincum    -.2117583   .4056795    -0.52   0.610    -1.088176     .664659
   giniincum     .0164702   .0328967     0.50   0.625    -.0545989    .0875392
    indigpop    -.0040267   .0078162    -0.52   0.615    -.0209125    .0128592
movemobscore    -.1263065   .3665617    -0.34   0.736    -.9182148    .6656019
                                                                              
    presvrl2        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .72695
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0990
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.7029
                                                       F(  5,    13) =    0.60
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      19
. regress presvrl2 movemobscore indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth,vce (robust) 
                                                                              
       _cons     2.684829   2.428803     1.11   0.284    -2.417896    7.787554
   gdpgrowth     .0834066   .0615855     1.35   0.192    -.0459796    .2127929
  rightincum     1.400991   .5438487     2.58   0.019     .2584071    2.543574
   giniincum     .1052603    .041917     2.51   0.022      .017196    .1933246
    indigpop    -.0167234   .0114619    -1.46   0.162    -.0408039    .0073572
movemobscore     .6986483   .3328416     2.10   0.050     -.000626    1.397923
                                                                              
       lhvrl        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =   1.046
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4003
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0004
                                                       F(  5,    18) =    7.97
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      24
. regress lhvrl movemobscore indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth,vce (robust)  
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       _cons     -37.7332   23.38207    -1.61   0.114    -84.82711     9.36071
   gdpgrowth    -.0317623   .5694543    -0.06   0.956    -1.178702    1.115178
  rightincum     13.30122   6.728779     1.98   0.054    -.2512399    26.85367
   giniincum     1.297553   .4326308     3.00   0.004     .4261898    2.168916
    indigpop     .0098762   .0862839     0.11   0.909    -.1639085     .183661
movemobscore    -.5403157     3.2007    -0.17   0.867    -6.986856    5.906225
                                                                              
leftvotesh~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =    14.6
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2129
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0345
                                                       F(  5,    45) =    2.66
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      51
. regress leftvoteshare movemobscore indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth,vce (robust) 
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Mobilisation model (massmob) including interaction 
                                                                                     
             _cons     2.642796   .6919339     3.82   0.000      1.25774    4.027852
         gdpgrowth    -.0293191   .0247151    -1.19   0.240    -.0787917    .0201535
        rightincum     .0718225    .168812     0.43   0.672    -.2660915    .4097365
         giniincum    -.0202808   .0136862    -1.48   0.144    -.0476768    .0071152
                    
                1     -.0082402   .0077549    -1.06   0.292    -.0237634    .0072829
massmob#c.indigpop  
                    
          indigpop     .0004017   .0048353     0.08   0.934    -.0092773    .0100806
         1.massmob     .4281977   .1881823     2.28   0.027     .0515099    .8048856
                                                                                    
          presvrl2        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                   Robust
                                                                                    
                                                       Root MSE      =  .55261
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1700
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0360
                                                       F(  6,    58) =    2.44
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      65
. reg presvrl2 i.massmob##c.indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth, vce(robust)
. 
                                                                                    
             _cons     12.11383   2.780596     4.36   0.000     6.547861     17.6798
         gdpgrowth    -.0193024   .0867816    -0.22   0.825    -.1930147    .1544099
        rightincum     .5923487   .6213956     0.95   0.344    -.6515098    1.836207
         giniincum    -.0792202   .0525734    -1.51   0.137    -.1844574     .026017
                    
                1      -.027697   .0249509    -1.11   0.272    -.0776417    .0222476
massmob#c.indigpop  
                    
          indigpop     .0119095   .0140704     0.85   0.401    -.0162554    .0400744
         1.massmob     1.751048   .7123276     2.46   0.017     .3251698    3.176927
                                                                                    
           presvrl        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                   Robust
                                                                                    
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.0476
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1644
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.2611
                                                       F(  6,    58) =    1.32
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      65
. reg presvrl i.massmob##c.indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth, vce(robust)
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             _cons     31.85016   15.07906     2.11   0.036     2.073304    61.62702
         gdpgrowth     .0023174   .3412128     0.01   0.995    -.6714809    .6761157
        rightincum     16.07414   3.274425     4.91   0.000     9.608084     22.5402
         giniincum    -.1815594   .2848851    -0.64   0.525    -.7441265    .3810077
                    
                1     -.2236657   .1192123    -1.88   0.062    -.4590761    .0117447
massmob#c.indigpop  
                    
          indigpop      .117202   .0772089     1.52   0.131    -.0352637    .2696677
         1.massmob     14.23665   3.344204     4.26   0.000     7.632801    20.84051
                                                                                    
     leftvoteshare        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                   Robust
                                                                                    
                                                       Root MSE      =  17.304
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2553
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  6,   162) =    8.98
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     169
. reg leftvoteshare i.massmob##c.indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth, vce(robust)
. 
                                                                                    
             _cons     10.87771   1.855281     5.86   0.000     7.180985    14.57444
         gdpgrowth    -.0210886    .047901    -0.44   0.661    -.1165334    .0743562
        rightincum     .9961547   .4095915     2.43   0.017     .1800259    1.812284
         giniincum    -.0630704     .03441    -1.83   0.071    -.1316339    .0054931
                    
                1     -.0137135    .018045    -0.76   0.450    -.0496689    .0222419
massmob#c.indigpop  
                    
          indigpop     .0133272   .0075412     1.77   0.081    -.0016989    .0283533
         1.massmob      1.17545   .4348726     2.70   0.009     .3089475    2.041953
                                                                                    
             lhvrl        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                   Robust
                                                                                    
                                                       Root MSE      =   1.509
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2155
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0069
                                                       F(  6,    74) =    3.25
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      81
. reg lhvrl i.massmob##c.indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth, vce(robust)
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Indigenous movement mobilisation model (expert survey) 
 
 
 
                                                                                           
                    _cons      13.3973   5.881331     2.28   0.042     .5829759    26.21162
                gdpgrowth    -.0401885    .239374    -0.17   0.869    -.5617397    .4813627
               rightincum    -.9730501   1.109701    -0.88   0.398     -3.39088     1.44478
                giniincum     .0472029   .0680893     0.69   0.501     -.101151    .1955568
                           
c.movemobscore#c.indigpop      .086854    .043934     1.98   0.071      -.00887     .182578
                           
                 indigpop    -.1423259   .0661771    -2.15   0.053    -.2865134    .0018616
             movemobscore    -3.947096   2.310069    -1.71   0.113    -8.980304    1.086111
                                                                                           
                  presvrl        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                          Robust
                                                                                           
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.7087
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3632
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.1547
                                                       F(  6,    12) =    1.94
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      19
. regress presvrl movemobscore indigpop c.movemobscore#c.indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth, vce (robust)
                                                                                           
                    _cons     3.792383    2.13535     1.78   0.101    -.8601458    8.444912
                gdpgrowth    -.0804415   .0712988    -1.13   0.281    -.2357881    .0749052
               rightincum    -.2374214   .4046411    -0.59   0.568    -1.119059    .6442159
                giniincum     .0039666   .0293862     0.13   0.895    -.0600604    .0679935
                           
c.movemobscore#c.indigpop     .0300327   .0172221     1.74   0.107     -.007491    .0675564
                           
                 indigpop    -.0431167   .0238815    -1.81   0.096    -.0951501    .0089167
             movemobscore      -1.5066   .8300203    -1.82   0.095    -3.315059    .3018589
                                                                                           
                 presvrl2        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                          Robust
                                                                                           
                                                       Root MSE      =  .67877
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2749
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.3648
                                                       F(  6,    12) =    1.21
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      19
. regress presvrl2 movemobscore indigpop c.movemobscore#c.indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth, vce (robust)
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                    _cons     4.801297   2.508005     1.91   0.073    -.4901304    10.09272
                gdpgrowth     .0947646   .0604404     1.57   0.135    -.0327535    .2222828
               rightincum     1.389554   .5331261     2.61   0.018     .2647561    2.514351
                giniincum      .103473    .042327     2.44   0.026     .0141707    .1927752
                           
c.movemobscore#c.indigpop      .030342   .0228798     1.33   0.202    -.0179301    .0786141
                           
                 indigpop    -.0584655   .0284111    -2.06   0.055    -.1184078    .0014767
             movemobscore    -.7384124   .8805137    -0.84   0.413    -2.596134    1.119309
                                                                                           
                    lhvrl        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                          Robust
                                                                                           
                                                       Root MSE      =  .99862
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4837
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0004
                                                       F(  6,    17) =    7.78
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      24
. regress lhvrl movemobscore indigpop c.movemobscore#c.indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth, vce (robust)
                                                                                           
                    _cons    -5.279453   25.33032    -0.21   0.836    -56.32935    45.77045
                gdpgrowth     .4769356   .7455919     0.64   0.526    -1.025706    1.979577
               rightincum     11.96429    6.02072     1.99   0.053     -.169677    24.09825
                giniincum     1.126727   .3932475     2.87   0.006     .3341884    1.919265
                           
c.movemobscore#c.indigpop     .4280106    .165444     2.59   0.013     .0945802     .761441
                           
                 indigpop    -.5431189   .2532138    -2.14   0.038    -1.053438   -.0328001
             movemobscore    -20.07877   8.195758    -2.45   0.018    -36.59623   -3.561305
                                                                                           
            leftvoteshare        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                          Robust
                                                                                           
                                                       Root MSE      =  13.838
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3086
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0018
                                                       F(  6,    44) =    4.27
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      51
> t)
. regress leftvoteshare movemobscore indigpop c.movemobscore#c.indigpop giniincum rightincum gdpgrowth, vce (robus
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D. Map of Bolivia with Department Borders 
 
Source: University of Texas available from 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/bolivia_admin_2006.jpg 
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E. Organisational Structure of Movements in Bolivia  
E.1 Organisational Structure of CIDOB 
 
Source: García-Linera et al., (2004) 
E.2 Organisational Structure of CSUTCB 
 
Source: García-Linera et al., (2004) 
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E.3: Organisational Structure of CONAMAQ 
Source: García-Linera et al., (2004) 
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Appendix F. Map of Peru with Department Borders 
 
 
Source: University of Texas available from 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/peru_admin_06.jpg 
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Appendix G. Trust in Political Parties versus Movements  
G.1 Bolivia 
Indigenous Trust in Parties and Sindicatos using self-reporting in Bolivia, 2006.
169
 
170
 
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) Bolivia 2006 Survey.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
169
 Chi2 for political parties reported (83.6) and Cramérs V reported (0.07). Chi2 for syndicates 
reported (59.6) and Cramérs V reported (0.06) 
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Indigenous Trust in Parties and Sindicatos using mother tongue in Bolivia, 2006.
171
 
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) Bolivia 2006 Survey.  
G.2 Peru 
Indigenous trust in parties and movements using self-reporting in Peru, 2006.
172
 
 
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) Peru 2006 Survey.  
                                                          
171
 Chi2 for political parties reported (60.8) and Cramérs V reported (0.07). Chi2 for syndicates  
reported (47.9) and Cramérs V reported (0.06) 
172
 Chi2 for political parties reported (36.3) and Cramérs V reported (0.06). Chi2 for indigenous 
movements reported (29.2) and Cramérs V reported (0.06). 
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Indigenous trust in parties and movements using mother tongue in Peru, 2006.
173
 
 
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) Peru 2006 Survey.  
 
                                                          
173
 Chi2 for political parties reported (39.7) and Cramérs V reported (0.11). Chi2 for indigenous 
movements reported (28.4) and Cramérs V reported (0.1). 
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